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Abstract 
It is generally agreed that the transition from authoritarian rule to a 
constitutional democracy often coincides with the adoption of a new, 
incomplete and often vague constitution that empowers, and more importantly 
constrains newly appointed and elected state officials and institutions. In such a 
transitional setting, it is to be expected that power will not only be exercised on 
the basis of democratic principles and practices, but that it will also be based on 
the rule of law, that serves to limit the arbitrary and abusive exercise of public 
power. Therefore, this thesis examines the role of newly empowered courts in 
emerging and transitional states and the far-reaching implications of transferring 
political conflicts into constitutional cases concerning the rule of law. It argues 
that resolving and judicialising contested constitutional questions can put the 
rule of law, the constitutional judiciary and the process of transition itself to the 
ultimate test in the period immediately following a transition to democracy.  
This thesis presents an in-depth case study analysing the recent 
constitutional and political developments in the fragile state of Iraq following 
the US-led invasion in 2003. It uses original and detailed analyses of the key 
case law of the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq; the legal doctrinal method and 
insights from comparative literature on courts, law and the political system.  
This thesis assesses the Court in the context of broader constitutional principles, 
such as the rule of law, and modern phenomena, such as the trend towards the 
judicialisation of politics, in the specific circumstances of transitional 
democratic states.   
Findings from this research are complex and multiple; they illustrate 
how establishing and upholding the rule of law in states that are newly emerged 
from authoritarian rule can be a formidable undertaking, one that is shaped by a 
legacy of authoritarianism and at best ‘rule by law’. The research concludes that, 
judicialisation affects and is affected by the rule of law. Thus, state officials and 
institutions may well bypass the constitution as well as transfer political disputes 
into constitutional cases; often using the judiciary to legitimise and 
institutionalise excessive political powers. When the government is not bound 
by the rule of law and the law is not sovereign over all, judicialisation might 
expose the court to external interference, as well as affecting the functioning of 
a new parliament which is attempting to establish its powers and legitimacy. 
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Chapter One:   Introduction 
Introduction 
It is generally agreed in constitutional literature that in recent decades, 
constitutional courts have expanded their power and influence within legal 
systems. Increasingly, constitutional judiciaries are called on to resolve a variety 
of constitutional and legal questions and controversies. Various legal and 
political systems across the globe have continued to experience this expansion 
of judicial powers. Scholarly opinion contends that by reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws and decrees, constitutional judiciaries began to engage 
in addressing and resolving issues that are central to public policy and political 
controversies.1 Scholars are divided between those who support a robust and 
activist court and others who adopt a more cautious stance towards this judicial 
role. 
In general, in developed democracies, the impact of judicialisation is 
often addressed in so far as it infringes the ‘constitutional balance’ and 
separation of power. The implications for democracy of allowing an unelected 
institution to invalidate or check the policy and actions of an elected body are 
also discussed. However, in transitional states where the demands for the rule 
of law and a constitutional judiciary tend to match those for democracy, 
questioning this impact might not be the primary concern. Instead, in a fragile 
and unstable transitional democracy, the primary concern might become the 
basic tenets of the rule of law. Often the central focus of governments and legal 
reform is on the rule of law. Therefore, one could also make the relations 
between the rule of law and judicialisation, and related implications, central to 
the existing scholarly debates. Arguably, judicialisation and the expansion of 
judicial powers could be seen as enhancing the rule of law; courts might have 
to judicialise certain issues to ensure the basic rule of law is respected. However, 
in such transitional states where corruption in state institutions is widespread, 
there is an ever growing concern that when guarantees and practices of judicial 
independence are weak or absent altogether, authority and mechanisms of 
                                                          
1 Hirschl R, ‘The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialisation of Pure Politics Worldwide’ 
(2006) 75(2) Fordham Law Review 721. 
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accountability together might serve to create political pressure or interference 
in the judiciary. Therefore, this thesis argues that judicialisation both affects and 
is affected by the rule of law. 
Most transitional democracies emerging from long-standing 
authoritarian regimes struggle to establish a rule of law system that will 
strengthen and safeguard the democratic transition and serve to prevent a return 
to similar or other kinds of authoritarian regimes. Almost all transitional states 
provide for some form of constitutional judiciary, be it a supreme or 
constitutional court. Formally, these courts have an expanded list of 
jurisdictions, are relatively accessible and independent. Therefore, they are 
expected to hold government officials and institutions legally accountable for 
infringing any newly established constitutional boundaries and rules of 
redistribution of power. In practice, the authority and influence of these courts 
often expands to cover political controversies.  
This thesis will argue that particular factors might contribute 
significantly to the greater potential for judicialisation of the constitution, during 
the periods leading up to the transitional moments, during the constitution 
writing process and in the immediate years following transition. 
Democratisation often coincides with ‘constitution making’ and a newly 
enacted or amended constitutional text, often incomplete and lacking clarity, is 
likely to create considerable conflict in interpretation of constitutional norms 
when applied in the context of transitional democracies. Despite constitutional 
adherence to the rule of law and preservation of democratic principles and 
values, together with noticeable progress regarding electoral democracy and the 
peaceful alteration of power, the rule of law often continues to present a major 
challenge in emerging democracies. Inevitably these conflicts would put to a 
crucial test the basic tenets of the rule of law, the principles of separation of 
powers and the role of constitutional judiciary. 
In the initial periods following the transition, questions with the potential 
to impact significantly on the entire constitutional order and society are 
increasingly taken to the courts, and there are high expectations that courts will 
serve to preserve and enforce the newly established democratic constitutional 
order and enhance the rule of law. Conflicts regarding interpretations of 
constitutional norms might concern both the structure and the substance of state 
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policies and laws. The courts often refrain from deciding on the substantive 
issues and content of the policies involved, instead proving more willing to rule 
on the structural aspects, by verifying how rules and institutions work. It could 
be argued that involvement in addressing or resolving substantial questions may 
prompt political interference, threatening judicial independence. Furthermore, 
it might be meaningless to impose significant substantive limitations on the 
government before a basic rule of law has been secured, the supremacy of the 
law and equality before the law has been guaranteed, and stability, predictability 
and certainty in the rules have been ensured.   
Examining judicialisation through the lens of the rule of law may raise 
substantial concerns that it might threaten or cause violations of the rule of law. 
It can be argued that in states in transition the ‘[mis]use’ of the rule of law might 
enable a government to claim it is conforming to the rule of law thus minimising 
contestation of its excessive powers. This raises real concerns over the 
independence of the judiciary and effectiveness of other mechanisms of 
horizontal accountability. The expansion of judicial involvement in 
constitutional issues merits serious attention since the judiciary might be used 
to legitimise the government exercising its powers rather than checking and 
controlling arbitrary powers.2 Such concerns have generated an ongoing debate 
questioning the independence of the constitutional courts, especially from the 
executive authority, and their capability and willingness to check governments 
exercising power.  
With growing concern over powers being consolidated in one or two 
branches of the government, conflicts involving the constitutional balance of 
powers, in particular between the executive and the legislature, are constantly 
brought before the courts. Court decisions can alter this constitutional balance, 
strengthening one branch and weakening the other. Thus, there are continuing 
demands for constitutional adjudication despite the increasing potential that 
further interferences by court in contested political issues will bring about a 
counter-reaction and potential external interference that may infringe their 
institutional autonomy. Many would argue that constitutional judiciaries, and to 
                                                          
2 Salma Yusuf, Dominique Mystris, ‘The Rule of Law Revival in Transition States’ [2012] 
Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies 12. 
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a different extent, legislatures, tend to gradually reconsider their position and 
role within an emerging democracy.3 
Given the above conceptual arguments, it is imperative to consider these 
and other related questions and concerns in the context of Iraq’s democratic 
transition. The expectation is that this case study should provide a theoretical 
framework for understanding the constitutional judiciary in Iraq, by engaging 
its experiences with those examined in the broader literature, in particular that 
on emerging democracies. In the aftermath of the 2003 regime change, the 
country began its transition from a longstanding authoritarian regime to a 
constitutional democratic system. Since its creation in 1921, the organisation of 
Iraqi governments has been ordered by written constitutions. In the last decade, 
the implementation of the new Constitution and the transition to democracy 
have been hindered by factors including the legacy of decades of legal and 
political practices under an authoritarian regime, a difficult democratic 
transition characterised by widespread post-transition violence, ethnosectarian 
conflict, corruption, and political instability. Although the 2005 Iraqi 
Constitution has been approved in a national referendum it remains a work-in-
progress. Furthermore, state institutions remain for the most part fragile and 
failing; and despite the dire need for consensus, politicians find it difficult to 
compromise and reach agreements on virtually all policies.4 This may not be 
caused by politicians’ ignorance of the values and practices of separation of 
powers and the rule of law, and of a broader sense of the constitution. Equally 
relevant is the fact that new political actors often ignore these values and 
relentlessly pursue a course of weakening newly established governmental 
institutions. However, even when they take these rules seriously, it may be 
difficult to agree on the exact meaning of the rules and to determine where the 
boundaries of power lie. 
The new Iraqi Constitution seems to have strengthened the judiciary as 
an essential component of the rule of law and empowers it to check government 
abuses and the arbitrary use of power. The newly established constitutional 
judiciary, the Federal Supreme Court (FSC), is a pre-constitutional, and 
                                                          
3 Yoav Dotan, Lawyering for the Rule of Law: Government Lawyers and the Rise of Judicial 
Power in Israel (Cambridge University Press 2013) 50. 
4 See Chapter Four (4.1.2). 
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transitional Court, which was established in the course of the transition, before 
the approval of the 2005 constitution. It has a general mandate to enforce and 
preserve the then newly created 2005 Constitution under the rubric of 
constitutional review. Furthermore, it plays a decisive role in policing the 
boundaries of powers between federal authorities and between federal 
government and sub-federal governments. The Court is new and novel to the 
context, and the other two political branches are relatively weak or unwilling to 
settle their conflicts in interpretations of the Constitution, which has often 
brought such conflicts to the Court. Increasingly, the FSC can be an 
indispensable guarantor of this new constitutional order; its position and role 
have put to the ultimate test its constitutional mandate of upholding the 
principles and values of the rule of law. 
Before discussing the structural framework and working plan for this 
thesis, it seems relevant to give a brief introduction to the constitutional and 
political developments in Iraq focusing mainly on the pre-2003 developments. 
In line with the general arguments of the thesis, this background discussion 
focuses on separation of powers and the constitutional judiciary.   
1.1 Constitutional and Political Developments in Iraq pre-2003 
1.1.1 Creation of the Modern State of Iraq  
The territory known today as the modern state of Iraq, once ruled by one 
of the oldest known legal codes, namely, the Code of Hammurabi (1790 BC), 
was part of the Ottoman Empire for almost four centuries prior to the First 
World War.5 In the aftermath of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the War, 
imperial powers divided up the Empire’s territories and created new states. In 
1914, the British army entered the territories of Iraq. In 1920, the League of 
Nations granted the British Government a Mandate over the territory of Iraq, 
and the state of Iraq was formally created from three former provinces (vilayet) 
of the Ottoman Empire: Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. The Mandate officially 
ended in 1932 when Iraq was granted official independence, becoming a 
member of the League of Nations. The state of Iraq had a Shia Muslim majority 
                                                          
5 Gareth Stansfield, Iraq: People, History, Politics (Polity Press 2007) 75. 
6 
 
together with Sunni Muslims and other ethno-sectarian communities such as 
Kurds, Christians, Yezidis, Turkmen, and Jews.6 
During the first decade of the British Mandate, the British High 
Commissioners played a crucial role in creating and building the institutional 
foundation for the state and governing system of Iraq. Since its creation, Iraq 
has had various political and constitutional systems, ruled by a series of 
constitutions, with the exception of the Basic Law of the state of Iraq in 1925 
(the 1925 Basic Law) and the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq of 2005 (the 
2005 Constitution), other constitutions were set for a provisional period until a 
permanent constitution could be written and even they were titled as ‘interim 
constitution’. It is possible to identify three different eras in the political and 
constitutional developments in Iraq.  
The first constitution of Iraq, approved in 1925, established a 
constitutional monarchy. The British administration appointed Faisal, son of the 
Sharif of Mecca, as the first King of Iraq.7 The monarchy lasted until 1958 when 
it was overthrown by a military coup (also known as the 14 July Revolution) 
which declared the Republic of Iraq.8 This was followed by four decades of the 
Republican era (1958-2003), during which the country was governed by series 
of provisional constitutions: 1958, 1963, 1964, 1968, 1970 and the draft 
constitution of 1991. In 1963, the first Republican regime was overthrown by a 
military coup led by Baath Party members; another Baathist-led coup followed 
in 1968. Each new regime introduced a provisional constitution that contained 
almost identical ideas and principles for the governance of Iraq. In 1979, 
Saddam Hussein became president of the Republic, further strengthening Baath 
rule over Iraq. 9 
                                                          
6 The mandate of Britain over Iraq was established by the Sèvres Accord between the Allied 
Powers and representatives of the Ottoman Empire in 1920. See Charles Tripp, A History of 
Iraq (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
7 During the years of the First World War, the Sharif of Mecca led the Arab Revolt in support 
of the British. After France gained a Mandate over Syria, his son Faisal was expelled from the 
country. He was then chosen by the British to become the first King of Iraq. Toby Dodge, ‘The 
British Mandate in Iraq, 1920-1932’ (2009) 2 Cengage Learning EMEA, The Middle East 
Online Series 1-5 <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/38880/ > accessed 1 June 2013. 
8 Stansfield, Iraq: People, History, Politics 75- 98. 
9 The Arab Socialist Baath Party is considered to be ‘the first Arab political party with pan-
Arabist Goals’, which were socialism, freedom from foreign control, and the unity of all Arabs 
in a single state. It was officially founded as a political party at its first congress in April 1947 
in Damascus. During the period 1948- 1951, the Baath party had branches in Lebanon, Iraq, 
Jordan and Syria. See John F Devlin, ‘The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis’ (1991) 96 (5) 
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The third era started following the breakdown of the Baath regime and 
the US-led invasion of the country in 2003. Between 2003 and 2004, Iraq was 
under the rule of the US-led Coalition Provisional Administration (CPA).10 
During this period, the first post-2003 constitutional document was approved, 
that is, the Transitional Administration Law for the State of Iraq 2004 (TAL). 
This provided for the foundation of a constitutional political system based on a 
federal parliamentary constitutional democracy. In late 2005, the (permanent) 
Constitution for the Republic of Iraq was approved in a general referendum.  
1.1.2 Iraq’s (Pre-2003) Constitutional Experience  
1.1.2.1 The Monarchy Constitution (1925-1958) 
The first Iraqi constitution, the 1925 Basic Law, established a 
constitutional monarchy and created the foundations of governmental 
institutions as well as the relations between them and the citizens. It provided 
for fundamental rights and freedoms, recognising Islam as ‘the official religion 
of the State’11 and established three branches of government. The executive 
authority consisted of the King as the head of state, and the Council of Ministers. 
The King was vested with significant powers without any responsibilities. 
Indeed, this Constitution stated that the sovereignty belongs to the nation, which 
is ‘entrusted by the people to the King’.12 He was the Commander-in-Chief of 
all armed forces, had almost absolute powers over the formation and dissolution 
of parliament, the holding of elections, and the appointment of Senators. The 
Constitution expressly stated that ‘the legislative power is vested in parliament 
and the King’, who had powers confirming laws, ordering their promulgation 
and supervising their execution. His executive powers were also crucial, since 
the King could appoint and dismiss ministers and their decisions were subject 
to his approval. The parliament consisted of the Chamber of Deputies whose 
                                                          
American Historian Review 1396-1370. See also Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics 
of Modern Iraq (updated, University of California Press 1998).  
10 The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) led by General Jay M. 
Garner, U.S. Army was initially in charge of post-2003 Iraq. In July 2003, following the 
overthrow of the Baath regime on April 9, 2003, the United States led the Coalition which 
established the CPA, headed by Ambassador L Paul Bremer III. See L Elaine Halchin, ‘The 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities’ 
(2004) CRS Report for Congress (Order Code RL32370). 
11 Basic Law of Iraq (1925), art 13.  
12 Ibid, Part II: The prerogatives of the Crown, arts 19-27. 
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members were elected by the people; and the Chamber of Senate whose 
members were appointed by the King. Elections for the Chamber of Deputies 
were held frequently, some 16 elections taking place during the monarchy era.13  
The constitution contained detailed provisions relating to the judiciary 
which consisted of civil and ordinary courts and the Supreme Court. It provided 
for the independence of the judiciary, stating that the courts were to ‘be free 
from all interference in the conduct of their affairs’.14 The 1925 Basic Law 
established a limited form of constitutional judicial review in the form of the 
Supreme Court which had powers to issue final and binding decisions on 
impeachment of ministers, members of the parliament, and judges of the Court 
of Cassations for accusations related to their duties; to interpret the Constitution 
and to review the constitutionality of laws. The Court consisted of eight 
members selected by the Chamber of Senate: four senators and four senior 
judges. The president of the Chamber of Senate chaired the Court, which was 
convoked by Royal will and with the consensus of the Council of Ministers.15 
1.1.2.3 The Republican and the Baath Constitutions (1958-2003) 
Following the 1958 military coup which overthrew the monarchy, army 
officers controlled government and civil affairs,16 introducing the first 
Republican constitution. In addition to proclaiming Iraq to be a republic, the 
1958 Constitution established the Sovereignty Council to exercise the powers 
of the president until elections could be held.17 Baathist-led coups in 1963 and 
1968 introduced three other provisional constitutions (1963, 1964 and 1968) 
which established the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The RCC 
became the ultimate decision-making body during the rise to power of the Baath 
Party from 1968 to 2003. Importantly, all of these constitutions provided for 
virtually identical patterns of governance and fundamental principles. Formally, 
these constitutions included basic rights and freedoms, recognised Islam as the 
official religion of the state and guaranteed religious freedom. 
                                                          
13 See Republic of Iraq, Council of Representatives, ‘A Summary of the Iraqi Parliaments: 
Numbers of Parliaments and Their History’ 
<http://ar.parliament.iq/LiveWebsites/Arabic/history.aspx.> accessed 12 October 2015. 
14 Basic Law of Iraq (1925), Part V: The Judicature [or Judiciary], arts 68- 89. 
15 ibid, arts 81- 83. 
16 Tripp, A History of Iraq 147. 
17 Thabit Abdullah, A Short History of Iraq (Taylor and Francis 2014) 102 
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The RCC was the most innovative and powerful governing body during 
the Republican era, having almost absolute legislative and executive powers. 
For example, the 1970 Constitution, in force until 2003, emphasised the 
significance of the RCC describing it is ‘the supreme institution in the state, 
which in July, 1968, assumed the responsibility to realise the public will of the 
people, by removing authority from the reactionary, and corrupt regime, and 
returning it to the people.’18 The RCC elected its president, who was also the 
president of the Republic, from amongst its own nine members. Most 
importantly, it had the power to issue laws and decrees, having the force of the 
law. It could also approve state budgets, international treaties and agreements.19 
The president of the RCC had extensive powers over the appointment of 
judges, governors, and all civil and military employees. He was responsible for 
supervising all public and quasi-official organisations, directing and controlling 
the work of the ministers, and presiding over meetings with the prime minister 
and cabinet.20 In 1979, Saddam Hussein, previously the Vice President of the 
RCC, who controlled the security forces, gained ultimate control over the RCC. 
He then became president of the Republic, Secretary General of the Baath Party 
regional council, president of the RCC and Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces. 
The Republican constitutions theoretically provided for a National 
Council (parliament), 21 in practice, the first election for the parliament during 
this era was not held until 1980. The Baath Party won the majority of seats in 
the parliament in all three elections held prior to 2003. Since the RCC had 
legislative powers, the then elected parliament had very limited powers which 
included considering draft laws prepared by the RCC. 22 The President had 
ultimate powers over internal and international policy making, ‘Supervising the 
good enforcement of the Constitution, the laws, decisions, judicial judgments, 
and developmental plans in all parts of the Iraqi Republic.’23  
                                                          
18 Provisional Constitution of Republic of Iraq [Iraq 1970 Constitution] (1970), art 37. 
19 ibid, art 38-45. 
20 ibid, art 57. 
21 See e.g. the 1970 Constitution devoted chapter three (arts 46-55) to the National Council 
(Parliament) which its key power was to ‘formulate its interior Regulation’; ‘consider the 
projects of Laws those proposed by’ RCC. 
22 ibid, arts 50-53. 
23 ibid, art art 57. 
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Under the Republican constitutions, the judicial authority consisted of 
different types and degrees of courts including special courts (military and 
municipal). The Court of Cassation was the highest judicial body with 
jurisdiction over the whole country. Judicial independence was mentioned in all 
constitutions to different extents. For example, the 1970 Constitution, very 
briefly in one sentence, stated that ‘judicature is independent. It is subject to no 
other authority save the Law.’ 24 As previously noted, the head of the RCC had 
power to appoint judges and to oversee the enforcement of judicial judgments.25 
None of these constitutions, save that of 1968, contained references to judicial 
review. The 1968 constitution provided that the Supreme Constitutional Court 
would be established to issue binding decisions regarding interpretation of the 
constitution, constitutionality of the laws, interpretation of the financial and 
administrative laws, and conformity of the regulations with the laws.26 In the 
same year, the Law of the Supreme Constitutional Court was issued, according 
to which the court was to be staffed by a number of judges of the Court of 
Cassation and by high-ranking state officials. Only certain members of the 
executive authority and the Court of Cassation could access the Constitutional 
Court. In reality, however, the Law of the Constitutional Court was never 
implemented and the Court never functioned.27 
1.1.2.4 The Pre-2003 Constitutional Principles in Practice  
Analysis of pre-2003 constitutional development in Iraq reveals that 
most of the universally recognised human rights were guaranteed in the 
constitutional texts and laws; the structure for some form of separation of 
powers was provided; minority rights were, to some extent, secured, and 
formally a degree of autonomy over the territory of Kurdistan was granted to 
the Kurdish population. In practice, however, these constitutional rights, 
                                                          
24Iraq Constitution (1970), art 60 (a). 
25 ibid, art 57. 
26 Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (1968), art 87. 
27 Saad abdul-Jabbar al-Aalush, ‘Nazarat fi Mozoha’ al-Raqaba al-Qazayiye aala Dastoriyat al-
Qawanin fi al-Iraq wa Mostaqbalaha fi Hemayat al-Hqoq wa al-Huriyat al-Amah’ [Perspectives 
on the Judicial Review on the Constitutionality of Laws in Iraq and its Future for Protection of 
Rights and Public Freedoms] (2005) 8 (14) Journal of the College of Law, University of al-
Nahreen 18. 
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structures and the principle of the separation of powers did not exist.28 Thus, as 
some observers would argue, these constitutions were ‘mere pieces of paper that 
ultimately had little power to bind their leaders’, since ‘[t]he government was 
free to cancel or amend the constitution while the people did not have any say 
in the process.’29 The parliaments were weak and lacked sufficient powers for 
law making and supervising the government.  
The Basic Law of 1925 established some form of separation of powers 
and judicial review as a means of preventing arbitrary exercise of powers. 
However, there were significant examples that showed the weakness of such 
arrangements. It could be argued that the powers that the King could exercise 
served to weaken the parliamentary system and contributed to the concentration 
of powers in one institution, namely, the Crown. For instance, although the 
Council of Ministers was constitutionally responsible to the Chamber of 
Deputies, it was arguably merely an advisory body to the King who could 
control ministers and their decisions.30 This severely undermined parliament’s 
supervisory powers over government.31 It could be argued that the parliament 
and the political parties were able to influence the political process, but in 
general the ruling elite did not play the dominant role in making policies and 
governing the country.32 Indeed, the King’s broad legislative and executive 
powers, which included dissolving parliament and dismissing ministers, 
effectively made him the highest authority, and questioned the very principles 
of the constitutional monarchy.33  
Iraq was the first country in the region explicitly to establish 
constitutional review. The Supreme Court did very little during its operation, 
only striking down one contested law in 1939. 34  As a result, some have argued 
                                                          
28 Sabah al Mukhtar, ‘The Rule of Law in Iraq Does it Exist?’ in Eugene Cotran and Mai Yamani 
(eds), Rule of Law in Middle East and the Islamic World: Human Rights and the Judicial 
Process (I.B.Tauris 2000). 
29 Saad Jawad, ‘The Iraqi Constitution: Structural Flaws and Political Implications’ (The London 
School of Economics and Political Science, Middle East Centre Paper Series 01, LSE Middle 
East Centre, 1 November 2013)  
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/publications/Paper-Series/SaadJawad.pdf> accessed 
1 December 2015. 
30 Adeed Darwish, Iraq: A Political History (Princeton University Press 2013)16. 
31 ibid-121. 
32 ibid, 40. 
33 Abdullah, A Short History of Iraq 102. 
34 al-Aalush, ‘Perspectives on the Judicial Review on the Constitutionality of Laws in Iraq and 
its Future for Protection of Rights and Public Freedoms’ 1-20. 
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that the main rationale for the establishment of constitutional review was to 
contribute to the enhancing of the supervision of the executive branch over the 
legislative branch.35 In particular, the court could only assemble as a result of 
Royal decree and consensus of the Council of Ministers. Thus, it was a 
temporary institution which operated only when there was a case to be 
considered. In addition, half of the members of the Supreme Court were senators 
appointed by the King.36 Under the Republican constitutions even this very 
limited or formal separation of powers that had been established during the 
monarchy era disappeared. The executive was all-powerful: from 1958 to 1968 
the President and the Council of Ministers exercised almost all legislative and 
executive powers. During Baath rule (1968-2003) the RCC was the ‘supreme 
institution of the state’, and indeed the President of the Republic who was also 
the president of the RCC had absolute power.  
It can be concluded that before 1968, that is before the rise of the Baath 
regime in Iraq, the judiciary was reasonably independent. For example, the 
Council of Judges under the presidency of the Chief Justice of the Court of 
Cassation, the highest court in Iraq, governed the judiciary and oversaw all 
judicial appointments. It is also being reported that since the regime relied 
largely on special and revolutionary courts, the civil courts were relatively intact 
and independent.37 In 1979, the Council of Judges was abolished and the 
judiciary became part of the Ministry of Justice.38 
1.1.3 The Post-2003 Constitutional Development  
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, an 
American led international coalition removed the Baath regime on 9 April 2003. 
Immediately following that, the US administration established the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), which could issue orders having the force of law 
for the administration of the country. The CPA issued some significant orders 
                                                          
35 al-Aalush, ‘Perspectives on the Judicial Review on the Constitutionality of Laws in Iraq and 
its Future for Protection of Rights and Public Freedoms’ 1-20. 
36 ibid 18. 
37Sujit Choudhry, and others, ‘Constitutional Courts after the Arab Spring: Appointment 
mechanisms and relative judicial independence’ (Centre for Constitutional Transitions at NYU 
Law International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2014) 64-76, 
<http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Constitutional-Courts-after-
the-Arab-Spring-High-Resolution.pdf  > accessed 2 December 2014.  
38 Ministry of Justice Law (101) 1977.  
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which included the dissolution of the Iraqi army,39 and disbanding the Baath 
Party.40 In July 2003 it appointed a twenty-five person Iraqi Governing Council 
(IGC) that, in turn, created a Council of Ministers and a Constitutional 
Committee to prepare a draft constitution.41  
In 2004, an interim constitution (TAL 2004) was drafted and entered 
into force. TAL (2004) set out the foundations for the governance of the country 
and a timetable for drafting a permanent constitution. In January 2005, an 
election for the Transitional National Assembly was held, and from its members 
a Constitutional Committee of 55 persons was formed, on the basis of an ethno-
sectarian quota system, to prepare a draft constitution by August 15, 2005. The 
process of drafting a permanent constitution for Iraq proved to be difficult and 
many Iraqis challenged its legitimacy. For instance, it is stated that ‘the 
Committee was effectively dissolved when an ad hoc body referred to as the 
Leadership Council—a very small group that had the active participation of the 
US Embassy—took over drafting duties and produced a final draft Constitution 
without meaningful participation from the Constitutional Committee.’42 
Nevertheless, in October 2005, the draft was approved in a general referendum.   
The Constitution was drafted in a short period which left many issues 
unresolved and included many ambiguous institutional arrangements. 
Therefore, the Constitution itself states that a committee would be formed for 
the purposes of reporting to parliament within four months ‘recommendations 
of the necessary amendments’ of the Constitution which were then to be 
discussed by the Iraqi Parliament and approved in a general referendum.43 This 
is yet to be implemented.  
Article 1 of the 2005 Constitution establishes a federal, Republican, 
representative parliamentary and constitutional democracy. It recognises the 
ethno-sectarian diversity of the country, guarantees freedom of religion while 
providing for a greater role for Islam, stating that ‘Islam is the official religion 
                                                          
39 CPA/Order 22:  Creation of A New Iraqi Army (18 August 2003). 
40CPA/Order 1: De-Ba`athification of Iraqi Society (16 May 2003); CPA/Order 5:  
Establishment of the Iraqi De-Baathification Council, Rescinded per Memo 7 Sec 3 (25 May 
2003). 
41 Feisal Amin Rasoul Al-Istrabadi, ‘Constitution without Constitutionalism: Reflections on 
Iraq’s Failed Constitution’ (2009) 87 (7) Texas Law Review 1634. 
42Choudhry, and others, ‘Constitutional Courts after the Arab Spring’ 67. 
43 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 142. 
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of the State and is a foundation source of legislation’.44 In Article 4, and for the 
first time, it establishes both Arabic and Kurdish as official languages, and 
protects other local languages. It provides for the sovereignty of the law, and 
establishes the people as the source of authority and legitimacy.45 As will be 
discussed later in Chapter Four, it establishes a bill of rights,46 separation of 
powers, and division of powers horizontally, over three federal branches of 
government, and vertically, between the federal government and sub-federal 
entities: federal regions and governorates. In Article 116, it recognises the 
Kurdistan Region, ‘along with its existing authorities, as a federal region’ and 
provides that other governorates may form similar federal regions. It establishes 
independent commissions or ombudsmen bodies to oversee government.47 The 
Constitution provides for constitutional judicial review, the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary, prohibits special courts and prohibits the immunity 
of laws from appeal or judicial review. An evaluation of these institutional 
arrangements and whether these theoretical principles have been translated into 
practice forms a significant part of this thesis.48  
It is important to notice that there is no single phrase that is used in 
Arabic literature on constitutional law or even in the constitutions of the Arabic 
countries to translate the term ‘the rule of law’. Thus, they might refer to the 
phrase: ‘dawla al-qanun (state of law), dawal al haq wa al-qanun (the state of 
right and law), or siyadat al-qanun (the law is sovereign). Often the latter phrase 
is considered the translation for the English term ‘the rule of law’.49  It is 
interesting that the same Arabic phrase could be translated differently; in the 
Egyptian constitution siyadat al-qanun is translated into ‘the rule of law’. In 
Iraqi constitutions, siyadat al-qanun is translated into ‘the sovereignty of law’.50 
It seems that none of these terms were used in almost all pre-2003 constitutions; 
                                                          
44 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 2. 
45 ibid, art 5. 
46 ibid, arts 14-46. 
47 ibid, arts 102-108 
48 See Chapters Four (4.1) and Chapter Five (5.1 and 5.2).  
49 David M Mednicoff, ‘The Rule of Law and Arab Political Liberalization: Three Models for 
Change’ [2012] Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 55; Mark David Welton, 
‘Islam, the West, and the Rule of Law’ (2007) 19(2) Pace International Law Review 165. 
50 Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt (2014) dedicates Part IV dedicated to ‘Syadat al-
Qanun’ which is here translated as the rule of law. Article 94 provides that ‘the rule of law shall 
be the basis of governing in the State. The State shall be governed by Law. The independence, 
immunity and impartiality of the judiciary are essential guarantees for the protection of rights 
and freedoms’.  
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the Arabic version of the 2005 Constitution, however, in Article 5 uses siyadat 
al-qanun, which is translated into ‘[T]he law is sovereign’ in the English text. 
Therefore, it can be said that there is no explicit use of the term ‘the rule of law’ 
in Iraqi constitutions. On the other hand, this does not mean that there has not 
been any reference to the various principles which are considered essential to 
the rule of law, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two. Almost all of 
Iraq’s various constitutions have embedded elements of the rule of law to a 
greater or lesser degree, including an independent judiciary, equity and equality, 
supremacy of the constitution and the law, separation of powers, and 
fundamental rights. 
 In respect of constitutional developments in pre-2003 Iraq, most of 
these constitutions empowered one branch of government or institution with 
extensive and decisive powers that virtually blocked any degree of separation 
of powers; the King, the RCC and indeed the president of the Republic under 
Baath rule are the most obvious examples. Other problematic features included 
the establishment of specific courts, and the influence of the executive over 
judiciary. On the other hand, constitutional judicial review has been part of the 
modern constitutional structure of Iraq. In the pre-2003 era, as discussed earlier, 
Iraq had two rather unsuccessful experiences with constitutional judicial review. 
The post-2003 experience of constitutional judiciary is the primary focus of this 
thesis.   
The above discussion gives an overview of the pre-2003 constitutional 
developments in Iraq; the rest of this chapter addresses the key research 
questions, methodology, contribution and thesis overview.  
1.2  Research Questions and Objectives 
The research questions on which this study is based are as follows: 
a) How can the rule of law and judicialisation be understood, and how 
might they affect each other?  
The aim is to analyse the conceptual difficulties regarding different 
understandings of the rule of law and its basic tenets, its relation to 
democracy and the role of the courts in a democratic system. It also aims to 
understand the expansion of judicial powers and the judicialisation of 
constitutional issues and its implications; analysing the relationship 
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amongst multiple factors and their role in the rise and increase of 
judicialisation.  
b) How might challenges and opportunities presented by transitional 
democracies test or serve these conceptual understandings of the rule of law 
and judicialisation? 
The aim is to understand the relevance of the rule of law to transitional 
democracies; as well as understanding judicialisation and its implications 
for the rule of law focusing on challenges and opportunities of expansion 
of the power of the constitutional judiciary.  
c) How might difficulties and opportunities presented by a transition from 
an authoritarian to a democratic regime in Iraq test or serve these conceptual 
understandings of the rule of law and judicialisation? To what extent has 
the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq been involved in the judicialisation of 
constitutional issues? What are the facilitating factors for and implications 
of the FSC’s decisions for legal and political developments?  
These questions are set to address the challenges and opportunities for the 
rule of law in Iraq in bringing judicialisation into the debates. Therefore, it 
assesses the position and performance of the Court in Iraq using original 
and detailed analyses of the key case law of the FSC, where judges are 
dealing with the constitutional and legal aftermath of the transition. It will 
analyse the implications of judicialisation on the ‘constitutional balance’ of 
powers and consider the potential for consolidation of powers at the 
expense of such balance. It will also explore implications for the 
independence and legitimacy of the FSC.  
d) How can the judicialisation of constitutional issues in Iraq be understood 
within the broader field of understanding and instituting the rule of law in 
general, and in transitional democracies in particular? To what extent does 
judicialisation affect the rule of law and to what extent is it affected by it?  
This question addresses the main conclusions from analysis of the case 
study used in this thesis and the Iraqi experience with constitutional 
judiciary during democratic transition. Using the legal doctrinal method and 
insights from comparative literature on courts, law and the political system, 
this thesis assesses the Iraqi Court in the context of universal constitutional 
principles, such as the rule of law, and modern phenomena, such as the 
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trend towards the judicialisation of politics, in the specific circumstances of 
transitional democratic states. These findings then will be discussed from a 
much broader perspective which challenges scholarly opinion on the rule 
of law and judicialisation. It considers the relation between the two and 
examines whether and to what extent judicialisation affects and is affected 
by the rule of law.  
1.3 Research Methodology 
This thesis analyses the interaction between the rule of law and 
judicialisation and its potential implications in transitional democracies. It takes 
into consideration that ‘constitutions neither originate nor operate in a vacuum. 
Their import cannot be meaningfully described or explained independent of the 
social, political, and economic forces’.51 Therefore, this thesis pays close 
attention to constitutional and political developments in post-2003 Iraq, in 
particular during the period 2006 to 2016, that is, the first decade of operation 
of Iraq’s FSC, which came into being as the current Constitution was approved. 
This study used the legal doctrinal method, a case study, and insights 
from the comparative literature on courts and law as well as the political system. 
The case study method, which is frequently employed in social science studies, 
serves as a valuable means for researchers to explore a particular issue or 
problem in considerable depth. It provides a detailed examination of a specific 
experience or a series of related events that can, in turn, serve to expose the 
existence of broader conceptual principles.52  
The primary sources of this thesis are the case law of the Iraqi FSC, 
constitutions, statutes, and government acts. It also uses other secondary sources 
including books, journals, newspapers, research papers and reports both official 
and unofficial. This thesis only uses cases or decisions of the FSC which involve 
the Court engaging in constitutional review, abstract constitutional 
interpretation, and other non-review jurisdictions. Thus, it excludes the non-
constitutional competence of the Court in which it functions as the court of last 
appeal. Most of the primary materials used for this research, including the FSC 
                                                          
51 Ran Hirschl, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law 
(Oxford University Press 2014) 153. 
52 Robert K Yin, Applications of Case Study Research (Sage Publications 1993) xi.  
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decisions and interpretations, are accessible in Arabic via the website of the 
Iraqi Federal Judicial Power.53 The author herself has translated most of the 
decisions, and at times reference has been made to translations and comments 
by other scholars regarding some of the FSC’s most contested decisions. It must 
be emphasised from the outset that the majority of the cases analysed here were 
brought before the Court during the period when this doctoral research was 
being conducted. The fact that these are new cases can be said to have, on the 
positive side, offered the opportunity to test further and more robustly the 
research questions. Conversely, there was a lack of academic sources 
specifically regarding constitutional jurisprudence and FSC case law, even 
though an extensive body of more general literature now exists on post-2003 
Iraq’s transition to constitutional democracy, regime change, and other related 
matters.54  
The research period was also affected by dramatic developments and 
events throughout the region and within Iraq, and the possibility remains that 
the whole constitutional order will break down and the country may dissolve 
into an endless cycle of conflict and destruction. Iraq has seen its highest levels 
of political instability, violence and disruption to both daily life and political life 
as a result of the virtual civil war and terrorist attacks that broke out while this 
research was being conducted.55 This has inevitably affected the availability of 
                                                          
53 Primary sources are mostly available on these official websites: The Iraqi Federal Judiciary: 
<http://iraqja.iq/lgna.php>; Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): 
<http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/>; Iraqi Legal Database (the ILD): 
<http://www.iraqld.iq/AboutEn.aspx>; The Iraqi Local Governance Law Library: 
<http://www.iraq-lg-law.org/en>.  
54 Peter W Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without 
End (Simon & Schuster 2007); Peter W Galbraith, Unintended Consequences: How War in Iraq 
Strengthened America's Enemies (Simon & Schuster Ome 2009); Ali A Allawi, The Occupation 
of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (Yale University Press 2008); Zaid Al-ali , The 
Struggle for Iraq's Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined 
Democracy (Yale University Press 2014); Toby Dodge, Iraq - From War to a New 
Authoritarianism (Routledge 2013); Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-building and a 
History Denied (C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd 2003) ; Peri Bearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs, 
Bernard G Weiss , The Law Applied: Contextualizing the Islamic Shari'a (I.B.Tauris 2007); 
Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Forum on Constructive 
Capitalism (1st edn. Johns Hopkins University Press 2010); Larry Diamond, Squandered 
Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq 
(Macmillan 2007). 
55 Toby C Jones, ‘Toxic War and the Politics of Uncertainty in Iraq’ (2014) 46 (4) International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 797-799; Kenneth Katzman,‘Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political 
Unravelling’ (US Congressional Research Service, 1 June 2014); Ali Khedery, ‘Iraq in Pieces’ 
(2015) 94(6) Foreign Affair 33-41; Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, ‘Violence in Iraq’ (2012) 16 (3) 
MERIA Journal 1-14; Ahmed S Hashim, ‘Iraq’s Civil War’ (2007) 106 (695) Current History 
3-10; International Displacement Monitoring Centre, ‘Iraq IDP Figures Analysis’ (15 June 
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academic sources and also impacted to a degree on the author’s motivation to 
continue with this research.   
1.4  Contribution to Knowledge 
It is generally agreed that the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
to a lesser extent other counterpart courts operating in the context of the more 
developed democracies, has been extensively studied.56 They have been a 
central focus for a growing body of comparative scholarship. Such studies have 
focused on a variety of issues. Some of these key issues include the 
independence of the courts;57 decision making and the methods of 
interpretation;58 and the potential for and implications of frequent use of the 
courts by individuals and interest groups.59 However, emerging courts operating 
in contexts of transitional and emerging democracies of post-authoritarian 
regimes have to date received less attention, possibly because it is only recently 
that interest has increased regarding the role of constitutional adjudication in 
these transitional states.60 International development agencies have put great 
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efforts into supporting rule of law reform in developing democracies which 
mainly support independent judiciaries to ensure courts are capable of enforcing 
the rule of law.61 
Of course, this body of literature which has been developed through the 
use of in-depth case studies or comparative studies will contribute to current 
understandings of such courts and their role in transitional democracies. 
Research in this field, involving transitional countries, is both appealing and 
uniquely challenging given that the constitutions themselves are new and the 
political and legal contexts to which they apply are unpredictable and in a state 
of constant change, and most importantly the rule of law continues to be under 
threat. Studies that focus on transitional democracies can make use of insights 
from scholarship dealing with courts in developed democracies but at the same 
time, they can also contribute to the general understanding of the role of the 
judiciary.  
Equally important, scholarship concerning the courts and 
democratisation focuses mostly on the relevance of courts and the rule of law in 
democratic consolidation and often regards the rule of law as one of the defining 
characteristics of a consolidated democracy.62 However, there has been less 
research concerning the period immediately following the transition to 
democracy and the relevance of the rule of law and constitutional judiciaries for 
democratization in general. This thesis argues that bringing together the rule of 
law and judicialisation is an important factor when discussing the independence, 
authority and accountability functions of courts. It is also relevant when 
analysing the institutional arrangements for checking the arbitrary exercise of 
powers and holding government officials and institutions to account for abuses 
of this kind. For the expansion of judicial powers both affects and is affected by 
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the rule of law. It is in general agreed that in transitional democracies, significant 
effort and money are frequently placed into improving the institutional aspects 
of judicial independence and other aspects of the rule of law. These reforms 
aimed at enhancing the rule of law often have international support. Analysis of 
the case study used in this thesis addresses both the challenges and opportunities 
which result from applying conceptual understandings of the rule of law and the 
role of the constitutional judiciary in practice. The experience of transitional 
democracy in Iraq might highlight common challenges encountered in the 
particular contexts of emerging transitional democracies. 
Although there is a growing body of literature on post-2003 regime 
change and political and constitutional developments in Iraq as previously 
noted, little attention has been paid to the Iraqi judiciary and even less to its 
constitutional judiciary. The experience of a functioning constitutional judiciary 
is new in Iraq and very recent in the regional context. Madhat al-Mahmood, the 
Chief Justice of the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court (FSC), has hardly referred to 
the Court in his book The Judiciary in Iraq.63 In their article, Trumbull IV and 
Martin examined the role of the FSC in election-related disputes, covering the 
case law of the Court up to the 2010 election.64 Furthermore, Reidar Visser, who 
has been observing the constitutional development in post-2003 Iraq, has 
analysed the role of the FSC in federalism-related disputes between 2005 to 
2010.65 As this thesis indicates, many of the Court’s major decisions were issued 
following the 2010 general election, which was the first election to be held after 
the 2003 regime change in the country and the first under the 2005 Constitution. 
Others have briefly mentioned the Iraqi judiciary in research literature, often as 
an example in a generalised form.66  
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With these few exceptions, the author is unaware of any specific 
comprehensive examination, written in English, which focuses on Iraq’s 
constitutional judiciary. In other words, the FSC of Iraq is an institution which 
so far not been the subject of a really thorough and detailed analyses of its case 
law from a constitutional perspective, let alone a study which locate those 
analyses in a broader perspective of theoretical debate. This is what I have set 
out to achieve in my thesis. As far as the author is aware, this research is the 
first comprehensive and updated study, at least in English, of the case law of the 
FSC and the implementations of the post-2003 constitutional democratic order 
in the country. It is distinctive in the sense that the discussed case law is broad 
in both subject matter and in the extent of cases that the FSC has dealt with over 
the last, indeed the first, decade of the Court’s operation. Therefore, analysis of 
this case study also provides insights into recent constitutional and political 
developments in post-2003 Iraq, where judges are dealing with the 
constitutional and legal aftermath of the transition from an authoritarian system 
to one of constitutional democracy. 
This thesis thus endeavours to address the gap in the literature on the 
constitutional judiciary in Iraq, introducing and integrating the experience of the 
Iraq constitutional judiciary and the FSC into the vast body of existing literature 
on courts. This thesis will also contribute to the broader debates surrounding 
judicialisation in developing democracies, and explore the difficulties of 
applying constitutional concepts in practice. It sheds light on the constant 
tensions and conflicts that occur in the processes of the exercise of power 
between the three branches of government and on the role which judiciaries 
should play in such power struggles, exposing the dangers posed by external 
political interference with the judiciary.  
1.5 Outline of The Thesis 
This chapter has provided an overview of this study and a brief 
introduction to the modern constitutional developments in Iraq. Chapters Two 
and Three develop the conceptual framework which is used as a basis for the 
analyses of the case study which follow in Chapters Four and Five. Chapter Six 
summarises the conclusions of the case study, highlights the research findings, 
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and presents a way forward for the FSC and future research directions in this 
area.  
To be more precise: Chapter Two explores the theoretical and practical 
debates seeking to provide a conceptual understanding of and a framework for 
the rule of law, democratization and the relevance of the courts to transitional 
democracies. It begins by analysing an extensive body of literature discussing 
the theory of the rule of law in more developed democracies, focusing on the 
range of understandings and definitions of the rule of law which ultimately 
emerges as a contested concept. Then, it explores the formal rule of law, which 
focuses on the manner and the form the law takes; and the more substantive 
principles and values, which might inform the rule of law, for example, the 
protection of human rights. The focus then shifts to debates concerning the 
relationship between the rule of law and democracy, including the constitutional 
judiciary and its constitutional review powers. It considers a longstanding 
debate concerning constitutional judicial review and counter-majoritarian 
difficulties and goes beyond that, arguing that courts have different roles and 
positions within a democratic order, and as institutions they are integral to 
establishing the rule of law system. 
The third section of the chapter considers the conceptual difficulties 
related to the application of the rule of law to the challenging context of 
transitional democracy. It argues that in transitional states, substantive attributes 
of the rule of law are constitutionally and principally accepted and preserved as 
equal to or more important than the formal ones. However, these often might or 
might not be the central focus or priority when they are applied. Therefore, it 
argues that legal reforms in transitional democracies should not cling to the 
ideals of the rule of law, but rather develop more practical and workable 
versions which take into consideration the changing circumstances of the 
transition. Indeed, the primary concern of the rule of law reforms then becomes 
the establishment of those institutions required for creating, interpreting, and 
enforcing laws, checking and holding to account the arbitrary and abusive 
exercise of power, and restoring the non-violent settlement of disputes. The 
chapter briefly reflects on the relevance of the constitutional judiciary, positing 
that transition from an authoritarian to a constitutional democratic system not 
only involves holding regular elections but also upholding the rule of law 
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system, both of which serve to control and constrain the arbitrary exercise and 
abuse of power. It argues that demands for the rule of law and the constitutional 
judiciary tend to improve with enhanced democracy.   
Chapter Three builds on the arguments developed in the previous 
chapter regarding the position and role of the courts in a democracy. It begins 
by considering the proliferation of judicial power and influence, also known as 
judicialisation, and analysing how this has been conceptualised. The next two 
sections examine various factors that are thought to account for the rise of 
judicialisation and to explain its persistence as a phenomenon, respectively. It 
is argued that judicialisation may occur and develop as the result of the 
interaction of various factors. The supply side argument highlights those factors 
that enhance the institutional and formal powers of the courts. These include a 
reasonably empowered, independent and accessible constitutional judiciary; as 
well as opportunities in the form of disputes and conflicts which arise in 
interpreting (unclear) constitutional norms. On the demand side, these conflicts 
can become constitutional cases that are brought before the court by different 
actors including individuals, interest groups or the government. The judiciary is 
involved in addressing or resolving such conflicts by exercising its jurisdiction. 
Therefore, relatively easy or direct access to the constitutional judiciary 
combined with the increasing influence of public interest groups appears to 
support the ability of individuals and marginalised groups to bring their cases to 
the courts.  
The fourth section explores opportunities and challenges for 
judicialisation to emerge and continue in transitional states, considering a 
number of factors which are relevant to the periods leading to the transitional 
moments, during the constitution writing process and in the immediate years 
following these crucial moments. Factors such as incomplete and often unclear 
constitutional structures and rules governing a country together with the fragility 
and weakness of the political and constitutional culture and institutions. Thus, 
the very difficulties of transition might provide for broader interaction between 
‘supply and demand’ factors. Thus, the interaction here implies that the 
government and individuals might turn to the judiciary to resolve potential 
conflicts in interpreting the provisions of the new constitution. If a newly 
established court begins to gain power and influence within this transitional 
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context, this could also affect its independence with the other branches of 
government trying to establish their powers. Comparative insights from the case 
law of some constitutional courts in countries going through a democratic 
transition reveals the common difficulties they have faced. These courts can find 
themselves at the centre of inter-institutional and jurisdictional power struggles 
involving state institutions and entities. Thus, the formal rule of law might 
become the central focus of constitutional judiciaries in transitional 
democracies, leading them to frequently refrain from deciding on substantive 
matters. This is due to the fact that involvement in substantial questions might 
provoke political interference, undermining judicial independence and bringing 
about a counter-reaction that will infringe on the judiciary’s institutional 
autonomy.  
Chapter Four applies the main argument developed in the previous 
chapters to the experience of the post-2003 Iraq and its constitutional judiciary. 
It begins by evaluating the institutional aspects of the constitutional judiciary in 
Iraq. From the supply side and demand side perspectives, important contributing 
factors may be the FSC and its assigned jurisdictions, including constitutional 
review, review of the conformity of legislation to Islamic law, and election-
related disputes. The Court has the final say in the arbitration of disputes and 
conflicts of interpretations concerning separation of powers. The FSC has the 
pivotal role of policing the boundaries of the constitutionally specified powers 
given to the institutions of the federal and the sub-federal entities. The Court is 
also relatively accessible to individuals, interest groups, politicians, and the 
government. However, despite the constitutional guarantees of the 
independence of the Court, there are significant concerns about its institutional 
independence. It is argued that the inclusion of Islamic jurists might put the 
Court in danger from external pressure from some of the strongest religious 
institutions. The context within which the FSC operates and the fragility of the 
rule of law and constitutional culture might also threaten the Court’s 
independence from political interference, especially from the executive 
authority. 
The second section focuses more closely on the structural and political 
context within which the FSC operates. In the last decade, the implementation 
of the new constitution and transition to democracy have been hindered by a 
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range of factors including the legacy of decades of legal and political practices 
under an authoritarian regime, a difficult democratic transition characterised by 
widespread post-transition violence, ethnosectarian conflict, corruption, and 
political instability. Furthermore, state institutions remain for the most part 
fragile and failing. Under a broad coalition government, agreement and 
compromises can become very difficult and there are struggles concerning the 
exact meaning of the rules, and where the boundaries of power lie. Therefore, 
these challenges and opportunities in the form of constitutional disputes are 
likely to increase the potential for the FSC to be involved in constitutional 
issues. 
Section three discusses the relevance and the use of available support 
structures for legal mobilisation concerning constitutional litigation in Iraq; and 
identifies those factors that could contribute to the emergence of a relatively 
functioning support structure in Iraq. Therefore, the possibility that the Court 
could develop an expanded concept of standing for public interest groups might 
serve to broaden access to constitutional judiciary. This standing may also play 
an essential role in initiating and supporting constitutional litigation that 
questions the exercise of powers by the government. Although civil society 
organisations are relatively new in post-transition Iraq, and face obstacles 
especially in the legal realm, examples from the case law of the FSC indicate 
that their attempts to use legal means and the judiciary have been reasonably 
effective. 
Chapter Five presents an in-depth analysis of the case law of the FSC, 
focusing on some of the most contested constitutional and political questions 
which have been subject to or affected by the Court’s decisions. Each of the four 
sections in this chapter addresses one particular set of constitutional issues, 
taking into consideration that the questions involved and decisions issued have 
or might have had significant implications for Iraqi society as a whole. First, it 
considers how different actors have frequently used the FSC, noting that to a 
large extent the Court was involved in questions and cases regarding legislative-
executive power struggles and conflicts of interpretation concerning the 
‘constitutional balance’ of powers between these two branches. The result has 
often been substantial for the entire legal and political system in the sense that 
powers might become consolidated in one or two branches of the government. 
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The erosion of such constitutional balance might also be construed as political 
interference by and in the Court, raising serious concerns regarding its ability to 
check and preserve arbitrary powers or government attempts to concentrate 
power. The FSC’s struggles over an ongoing public concern, related to 
widespread institutional corruption in the state institutions and officials, 
especially the members of the Parliament, are also addressed. The cases 
analysed in this part show that conceptual difficulties regarding the rule of law 
might explain the Court’s approach to avoiding the substance of the laws and 
government policies, and instead reviewing the formal and procedural aspects 
of law making. 
The second section examines a series of questions which are of central 
importance to the implementation of the federal structure of the state. It 
discusses the general constitutional principles and rules of allocation of powers 
to federal government and sub-federal entities. It is generally agreed that the 
Constitution establishes a federal system in which the federal government is 
relatively weak and takes a distinctive approach to distributing powers, 
allocating the sub-federal entities with significant authority. The laws enacted 
by the sub-federal government take precedence over federal statutes in matters 
of shared competence. The conflicts in interpreting the constitutional rules and 
boundaries of powers have created an ongoing crisis between the federal 
government and the Kurdistan Regional Governmenmt, the only existing 
federal region. This constitutional and political crisis involves the constitutional 
provisions on regulating Iraq’s natural resources, namely oil and gas. Despite 
the frequent calls for the FSC to decide the issue, the Court has often refrained 
from addressing the substance of the issue explicitly. 
The following section considers the role of the FSC regarding questions 
and issues central to the democratic transition and the peaceful alteration of 
power. There has been an increase in election-related cases in the periods 
leading up to or immediately following the general elections. The FSC has been 
involved in addressing and resolving questions significant to the principle of 
representation in a democracy such as the reallocation of the seats in the 
Parliament. These election cases might be viewed as one of the few areas in 
which the Court seemed determined to initiate or support reform of the legal and 
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political system. The Court is also involved in crises of government formation, 
which by implication had indeed threatened the court’s institutional autonomy. 
The final section addresses the area in which the Court has exercised the 
most self-restrained approach, declining to rule on the substance and conformity 
of current legislation with Islamic law. Such an approach seems interesting as, 
although Islamic jurists are constitutionally members of the Court, they do not 
currently sit in the FSC. Therefore, this review is carried out solely by judges.  
Chapter Six brings together the main arguments concerning the rule of 
law, judicialisation and transitional democracy. It also reflects on the main 
findings of this case study and attempts to situate them within a broader 
perspective. The thesis applies a vast and controversial body of literature related 
to the rule of law, judicialisation and courts in transitional democracies to the 
context of Iraq with its entirely new constitutional democratic order. The Court 
has addressed and resolved some of the major constitutional questions about the 
nature and function of state institutions and officials affecting the future of the 
country and society. The major findings based on the analysis of the case study 
consist of the following. First, the Court has exhibited a considerable degree of 
inconsistency in deciding apparently similar cases and in observing 
jurisdictional and admissibility rules. A good number of judgments appear to be 
inadequately or poorly reasoned, and many others have been written using 
ambiguous language. This lack of clarity and consistency in its approach raises 
the question of why the FSC has behaved in this way and raises concerns over 
the capability of such rulings to guide litigants and provide for certainty and 
predictably in applying legal norms, which is crucial for the rule of law.  
Second, in the absence of already established judicial precedents and the 
lack of a tradition of functioning constitutional adjudication, the Court has often 
seen fit to take a pragmatic approach to constitutional issues. In particular areas, 
such as election laws or reviewing the constitutionality of the pre-2005 
legislation and decrees, it seems to have taken into consideration the practical 
consequences of its decisions supporting legal and political continuity and 
stability.  
Third, the FSC’s composition, extensive jurisdictions and its frequent 
involvement in contentious constitutional questions has arguably created 
considerable political interest in and sensitivity to the court’s addressing and 
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resolution of such issues. Therefore, there has been considerable potential for 
external interference or pressure that might partially explain the Court’s 
inconsistency, its deliberate choice to favour ambiguity in its judgments or to 
take a relatively pragmatic approach to decision making. It can be argued that 
such threats to its institutional autonomy might have affected its general 
reluctance to address or resolve issues of substance related to government 
policies and to focus instead on the forms and procedures of law-making.  
The fourth finding is related to the role of the FSC in preserving the 
constitutional balance of power. Constitutionally, both the Parliament and the 
sub-federal authorities have significant powers at federal level. The Parliament 
is the principal authority in matters of policy making, law making and holding 
to account the executive authority. There has been a noticeable trend towards 
the executive branch attempting to consolidate its powers. Conflicts involving 
this balance of powers, in particular between the executive and the legislature, 
have constantly been brought before the Court. The case law of the FSC might 
suggest that it has often legitimised the government’s exercise of powers and 
supported policies changing the constitutional balance of competences. This 
interference has weakened the Parliament and further strengthened the 
government, and affected the development of the federal structure of the state. 
Given the general implications of the FSC’s decisions for the constitutional and 
political development in the country, many would question its legitimacy and 
independence in these cases. On the one hand, there are continuing demands for 
constitutional adjudication; the court’s ambition is to remain influential and 
there is an increasing danger of potential infringements of its institutional 
autonomy if it decides to interfere further in contested political areas. On the 
other hand, there has been a slight change of approach that suggests that the FSC 
has reconsidered its position and role regarding some key decisions that were 
largely criticised by politicians and scholars. 
Furthermore, the expectation is that this research will provide a 
theoretical framework for understanding the constitutional judiciary in Iraq and 
link its experience to the broader literature in this area. These findings might 
also point to some general observations that would apply to any emerging 
democracy. Thus, exploring judicialisation through the lens of the rule of law 
serves as a means of understanding issues of substantial importance to any 
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emerging democracy. It is concluded that the importance of neither the rule of 
law and independence of the judiciary should be underestimated nor 
overestimated in transitional states. In a fragile transitional democracy, the 
government’s constant use of the formal rule of law in the absence or ignorance 
of its substantive values might enable it to claim its conformity with the rule of 
law, or to be seen to do so. The increase in judicialisation of constitutional issues 
might further exacerbate the challenges to the rule of law itself. Thus, there are 
growing concerns over weak or totally absent judicial independence, authority, 
accountability and constitutional culture as well as widespread institutional 
corruption. Given these concerns, a constitutional court with an expanded 
jurisdiction and relatively open accessibility might become central to political 
interest, sensitivities and interference. It is possible, therefore, that the 
government would use the judiciary and its consistant use of formal rule of law 
reasoning to legitimise the exercise of powers and conformity of such exercises 
with the rule of law as a means to hold onto power and avoid this being 
contested. Moreover, the concluding chapter suggests that there is significant 
potential that the FSC will encounter further challenges, face various questions 
and become the focus of comparative studies on the role of courts in new 
democracies.  
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Chapter Two: Towards an Understanding of the Importance of 
the Rule of Law in Transitional Democracies 
Introduction  
This thesis engages in an in-depth inquiry of the relevance and role of 
the judicialisation of constitutional issues from a rule of law perspective 
focusing on the post-2003 Iraq. It is imperative to begin with a conceptual 
understanding of and framework for the relevance and role of the rule of law in 
transitional democracies.   
It is generally agreed that the essence of the rule of law is the supremacy 
of the law, and limiting the arbitrary exercise of power. Beyond that, 
disagreements occur concerning how the rule of law should approach these ends 
and what qualities the law must have to limit the arbitrary exercise of power.67 
There are two common approaches to defining the rule of law. The formal rule 
of law focuses on the form and manner through which the law is made and 
applied. The substantive rule of law considers the content of the law and the 
substantive values these basic formal tenets should enforce.  
The rule of law and democracy are often understood to be interrelated 
and aimed at limiting arbitrariness in government powers.  Both concepts might 
share similar principles and values but in some aspects they might be in 
contradiction, such as when it comes to constitutional judicial review. Different 
political and legal systems might observe formal and substantive understandings 
of the rule of law differently. A reasonably developed democracy observes and 
conforms to a broader and more substantive version of the rule of law. Often for 
a transitional or emerging democracy with a longstanding tradition of 
authoritarian rules, the primary concern is to establish and strengthen the basic 
formal tenets of the rule of law before considering more substantive versions. 
Therefore, as the level of recognition and conformity to the principles of the rule 
of law and democracy might differ, the difficulties associated with applying the 
rule of law might also vary. In any case, the position and the role of the 
constitutional judiciary is a central focus of debate in theory and practice.  
                                                          
67 Geranne Lautenbach, The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press 2014) 20 –21. 
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Accordingly, this chapter consists of three sections. The first section 
analyses an extensive body of literature discussing the rule of law as it is often 
understood in more developed democracies. The second section discusses a 
longstanding scholarly debate concerning the interrelation of the rule of law, 
democracy, and judicial review. The third section explores these conceptual 
understandings of the rule of law as applied to transitional states.  
2.1 The Rule of Law as a Contested Concept 
The rule of law is regarded as ‘one of the most important political ideals 
of our time’,68 and one of ‘today’s universally recognised fundamental values’.69 
However, it has no agreed definition; rather, ‘there are almost as many 
conceptions of the rule of law as there are people defending it.’70 Indeed, this is 
the initial observation on the rule of law literature because, as Brain Tamanaha 
rightly argues, the concept gives rise to ‘rampant divergence of 
understanding.’71 It has been described as ‘an essentially contested concept’,72 
or a ‘deeply contested’ concept in legal and political theory.73 Some define the 
rule of law using formal and procedural perspectives, while others add 
substantive and value-oriented content. Lon Fuller’s account of the rule of law 
is an abstract and formal theory that requires certain formal criteria to be 
fulfilled before any law can be recognized as such.74 For Albert Venn Dicey 
three fundamentals, emphasising the British constitutional system, are the 
essence of the rule of law: no punishment except for the breach of the law; all 
including state authorities are equally subject to the ordinary laws of the land; 
                                                          
68 The other ideals of modern political morality include: human rights, democracy, and the 
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Review 781.  
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and that general principles of the constitution are the result of judicial decisions 
defining the rights of individuals.75  
Indeed, as Richard Fallon rightly argues, these diverse opinions 
regarding the rule of law have commonly been associated with disagreements 
concerning the meaning of the ‘contestable normative issues’ that are 
considered and included as components of the definitions of the rule of law.76 
This is particularly observable in substantive accounts of the rule of law, which 
may include concepts, the meanings of which are subject to extensive 
disagreements, such as human rights, democracy and  justice. The rule of law is 
thus perhaps ‘in the particular state of being the preeminent legitimating 
political ideal in the world today, without agreement upon precisely what it 
means’.77  
There is much that can be said about theories and arguments concerning 
the rule of law; one way which may suffice for the present purpose is to discuss 
the meanings and basic tenets of the rule of law from formal and substantive 
perspectives.  
2.1.1 Formalist Perspectives on the Rule of Law 
Formal theories concerning the rule of law focus on the supremacy of 
the law, as well as on a set of formal criteria, with which laws must comply 
under a rule of law system. Theorists and scholars vary in their views regarding 
the criteria with which the law must comply. Fuller argues that for ‘a system of 
legal rules’ to exist, eight criteria which he called ‘principles of legality’ must 
be fulfilled. Thus, there must be rules that are: general;  publicized, or at least 
available ‘to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe’; not 
retroactive; be understandable or clear; non- contradictory; must not require the 
impossible; relatively persistent over time, and there must be ‘congruence 
between the rules as announced and their actual administration’.78 Accordingly, 
Fuller emphasises that ‘[t]otal failure in any one of these eight directions does 
                                                          
75 See Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edn, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Education 1985).  
76 Richard Fallon, ‘The Rule of Law’ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (1997) 97(1) 
Columbia Law Review 7. 
77 Brian Z Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University Press 
2004) 4 [Original emphasis].  
78 Fuller, The Morality of Law 39-41. 
34 
 
not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not 
properly called a legal system at all’.79 Other theorists and scholars often share 
this account.80 Joseph Raz, in addition to these above criteria and principles, 
underlines the importance of principles of natural justice, an independent and 
accessible judiciary, and judicial review that ‘ensure[s] conformity to the rule 
of law.’81  
It is evident, then, that the formalist perspective pays scant attention to 
the content of the law. Thus, formal theories of the rule of law are principally 
interested in ‘the way in which the law is good at its job of governing, setting 
no requirements as to the content of legislation enacted’,82 or the nature of law-
making institutions; rather the restrictions are apply to the form of the law.83 
Therefore, it is not surprising that an authoritarian regime might claim that its 
legal system conforms to the rule of law, although the law that fulfils these 
formal criteria can serve different ends, as long as the content of the law is of 
no relevance.84 In other words, the formal rule of law provides for formal justice, 
which is ‘compatible with both morally commendable and morally egregious 
ends’.85 A government might well abuse this formal definition so that the law 
becomes merely an instrument to achieve what the ruler desires it to be.86   
This is one of the essential criticisms of formal accounts of the rule of 
law. In practice, contemporary literature provides examples where a strict 
adherence and compliance with the formal rule of law was incapable of 
preventing arbitrary exercise and abuse of powers. Nazi Germany is one such 
well-known example of a state which complied with the formal rule of law 
criteria. For example, Michael Stolleis observes: ‘The German legal system was 
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rife with procedural regularity’, 87 yet the violation and abuse of power and 
human rights were rampant. Similarly, Robert Summers, pointing to the 
examples of the Nazi and Soviet regimes, views the formal concept as ‘logically 
compatible with the existence of laws that are bad or wrong or even evil in 
content’.88 In the same way, Judith Shklar argues that in a certain version, 
perhaps the formal one, the rule of law is associated with ‘governments of the 
most repressive and irrational sort.’89 It might, therefore, be argued that such 
regimes were compatible with the formal rule of law that served them to hold to 
power and avoid contestations against their power.  
Scholars mostly tend to recognise and accept these criticisms and the 
potential dangers associated with adherence to a mere formal rule of law. 
However, some argue that the formal components of the rule of law are 
‘necessary requirements for both subjecting human conduct to the governance 
of rules and for guaranteeing a (perhaps minimal) degree of stability and 
autonomy in human affairs,’ as government actions must accord with legal 
norms.90 Paul Craig maintains that the formal rule of law has an ‘independent 
function’ from other political ideals,91 or as Summers puts it, it is ‘content 
independent.’92 According to Raz, the rule of law is only one virtue of a legal 
system and should not be ‘confused with democracy, justice, equality (before 
the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the 
dignity of man.’93 It can be argued, though, that a purely formalist view on the 
rule of law might prove useful in its own right for the purposes of establishing 
the minimum requirements of any legal system. Crucially, however, this formal 
rule of law should serve to recognise some values and content-oriented 
elements. Perhaps, as it is argued in the following discussion, the additional 
elements and values emphasised by substantive theories of the rule of law can 
be seen as the most controversial aspects of any rule of law definition.  
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2.1.2 Substantive Perspectives on the Rule of Law  
Arguably, the earliest legal and political theorists who contrasted ‘the 
rule of law’ with ‘the rule of man’ understood the law not to be a mere 
realization of formal elements, but rather to represent the ‘common good’.94 The 
majority of the contemporary theories and practices of the rule of law share this 
view. This argument is also clearly illustrated by the former Chief Justice of 
South Africa, Arthur Chaskalson, who stated that: 
[T]he apartheid government, its officers and agents were accountable in 
accordance with the laws; the laws were clear; publicized, and stable, 
and were upheld by law enforcement officials and judges. What was 
missing was the substantive component of the rule of law. The process 
by which the laws were made was not fair (only whites, a minority of 
the population, had the vote). And the laws themselves were not fair. 
They institutionalized discrimination, vested broad discretionary 
powers in the executive, and failed to protect fundamental rights. 
Without a substantive content there would be no answer to the criticism, 
sometimes voiced, that the rule of law is ‘an empty vessel into which 
any law could be poured’.95 
This observation, regarding apartheid governance, might also apply to other 
contexts where the law is largely compliant with the formal rule of law. 
However, such conformity does not satisfy ‘a substantive test of moral 
correctness or, at least, acceptability’96 or ‘envisage some clear limits to the 
immorality or injustice such a legal system could bring about’.97 Determining 
what is moral correctness or acceptance or other similar propositions as basic 
for the substantive understanding of the rule of law is controversial.  
The substantive accounts of the rule of law share certain principles and 
values as essential components. Almost all accounts of a substantive rule of law 
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confirm that the content of the law should recognise and protect fundamental 
rights. For example, central to Ronald Dworkin’s understanding of the rule of 
law ideal is that, 
citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one another, and 
political rights against the state as a whole. It insists that these moral 
and political rights be recognized in positive law, so that they may be 
enforced upon the demand of individual citizens through courts [...].98  
Dworkin affirms that formal aspects of the rule of law should enforce these 
‘moral rights.’99 Indeed, many state constitutions and other statutes contain a 
Bill of Rights which may include an expanded list of rights such as the 2005 
Iraqi Constitution. Shklar criticises the disappointing performance of the rule of 
law, asserting that its meanings should recognise an ‘essential element of 
constitutional government generally and of representative democracy in 
particular.’100 Therefore, a particular form of government, fundamental rights 
or other values are often considered essential elements of a substantive rule of 
law account. 
Moreover, a more comprehensive account of the rule of law is developed 
by Lord Bingham, who defines the rule of law much more broadly. In its formal 
concept, ‘all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, 
should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking 
effect (generally) in the future and publicly administered in the courts.’101 
Bingham also underlines the substantive aspects of the rule of law. He 
incorporates certain normative principles, the most important of which are: 
clarity, limited discretion, and equality in applying laws; appropriate resolution 
of civil disputes, and fairness in adjudicative procedures. Most notably, for 
Bingham, the rule of law incorporates protection of human rights and state 
compliance with international law obligations.102 
Understanding what these substantive values entail and ought to protect 
is difficult and contested. Many conceptual approaches in defining the rule of 
law illustrate the importance of relying on and promoting formal criteria of the 
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rule of law and the necessity of also taking into consideration the content of the 
laws. The formal rule of law is almost necessary for the realisation of a 
substantive conception. Keith Ewing argues that ‘disrespect for the rule of law 
(as an instrument of formal legality) will almost certainly help to ensure that 
they [civil liberties] are fatally undermined.’103It is also argued that the emphasis 
on the substantive components of the rule of law rather than the form and the 
manner of its exercise would mean depriving the concept of its ‘independent 
function.’104 Furthermore, the meaning of those substantive values and 
principles, such as justice, for example, is itself contested, adding further 
debates to those already existing. For instance, some might argue that the law 
that fails to recognise and protect individual rights cannot be seen as the law 
that prevents arbitrariness, therefore, it does not conform to the rule of law.   
So far the discussion regarding problems in conceptualising the rule of 
law asserts that both formal and substantive theories disagree on what qualities 
the law or a political and legal system must have so as a government’s exercises 
of power conform to the rule of law. However, almost all accounts underline the 
supremacy of the law and oppose the rule of law to the arbitrary exercise of 
power. In other words, the rule of law entails the ‘legal reduction of the 
possibility of arbitrary exercise of power by those in a position to wield 
significant power’105 Of course, arbitrariness is a matter of degree and therefore 
the rule of law should not be understood to be able to prevent this fully, but to 
minimise it.106 Furthermore, as Raz has noted, although it is rather difficult to 
define an arbitrary act, an act of exercise of power can be arbitrary, 
[o]nly if it was done either with indifference as to whether it will serve 
the purposes which alone can justify use of that power or with belief 
that it will not serve them. The nature of the purposes alluded to vary 
with the nature of the power. This condition represents ‘arbitrary 
power’ as a subjective concept.107  
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On the same issue, Philip Pettit considers an act arbitrary when ‘it is chosen or 
not chosen at the agent’s pleasure. […] without reference to the interests, or the 
opinions, of those affected. The choice is not forced to track what the interests 
of those others require according to their own judgments’.108 Therefore, it can 
be said that an act or exercise of power is arbitrary when it cannot guide the 
conduct of individuals, otherwise preventing or denying their perspective, or 
does not treat them as ‘active and self-directing subjects’ but rather as objects 
of this power.109 The government is arbitrary when it ‘is not committed to 
principled action and decision-making, and does not accept that any norms 
should operate as prior constraints on its action’.110 It is argued that the rule of 
law and its various components at least minimise, and of course ideally prevent, 
such acts of arbitrariness.  
Therefore, the rule of law is an ideal aimed at correcting the danger of 
an abusive exercise of power.111 Indeed, the realization of and compliance with 
this ideal is a matter of degree. As Raz observes, ‘[C]onformity to the rule of 
law is a matter of degree. Complete conformity is impossible (some vagueness 
is inescapable), and maximal possible conformity is on the whole undesirable 
(some controlled administrative discretion is better than none).’112 In general, 
the rule of law ‘occurs insofar as a valued state of affairs exists’ wherein ‘the 
law rules’.113  The degree to which this core of the rule of law is achievable is 
both variable and relative; it is ‘not all or nothing. But one can say it exists in 
good shape or repair insofar as a certain sort of valued state of affairs, to which 
law contributes in particular ways, exists.’114 Under this state of affairs, the law 
rules against the arbitrary exercise of power.115 
So far the discussion focused on the core of the rule of law and various 
understandings of the concept. The next section sets out to address briefly the 
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relationships between democracy and the rule of law in a broader context before 
moving into the more specific context of transitional democracies.  
2.2 Relationship between the Rule of Law and Democracy 
It might be argued that any conceptual discussion addressing the 
potential interrelation between democracy and the rule of law would basically 
address the possible role of courts with a constitutional review power that could 
overrule legislation. This is essentially discussed under the rubric of counter-
majoritarian arguments. The following discussion is intended to underline 
briefly some of the relevant arguments to this thesis; it is not, however, an in-
depth inquiry of the already established and extensive body of literature in this 
regard.  
2.2.1 The Rule of Law and Democracy  
The relationship between democracy and the rule of law has generated 
an extensive body of literature. Just as with the rule of law, theorists and scholars 
are at odds both in their attempts to define democracy as a concept and in 
addressing its practical aspects. The two most common forms of democracy are 
procedural or minimalist electoral democracy and liberal democracy. Samuel 
Huntington argues that democracy is a system in which ‘most powerful 
collective decision makers’ are selected through fair, free and regular elections, 
and widespread participation in voting.116 The majority of scholars, however, 
might challenge such understandings of democracy, arguing that although 
elections are necessary and central to any democratic system, democracy 
requires much more. According to Robert Dahl, to achieve what he calls 
‘polyarchy’ further conditions are required. These include political rights such 
as freedom of expression and association, access to alternative information, free 
and fair elections, elected officials, and the right to run for office.117 In Dahl’s 
view, polyarchy is ‘a set of institutions that, taken together, distinguish modern 
representative democracy from all other political systems, whether non-
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democratic regimes or earlier democratic systems.’118 In a similar vein, Larry 
Diamond underlines the significance of these institutional requirements, most 
importantly the rule of law, the necessity for constitutional principles, a system 
of checks and balances and judicial review.119 The latter understanding can also 
be referred to as liberal democracy wherein elections are not the defining 
characteristics of democracy; liberty is as relevant as elections. Thus, as a matter 
of principle, democracy should combine both minimalist electoral and liberal 
elements. 
In other words, as is the case with the rule of law, democracy is also 
understood from a formal and minimalist or/and a substantive and liberal 
perspective. Arguably, these conceptual difficulties in defining the two concepts 
are manifested in the ongoing debates concerning the nature and extent of the 
relationship between the rule of law and democracy. In general, both share and 
value certain principles and institutions. More specifically, the differences 
between them become more noticeable when democracy and the rule of law are 
interpreted in a minimalist and formal manner. In other words, when democracy 
is defined purely in terms of elections; and the rule of law as a set of formal 
qualities, thus, the relationship is not one of coexistence or mutual dependence. 
Moreover, the essence of democracy is majority rule, yet the rule of law is based 
on ‘the protection of [the] individual’.120 Thus, both approach good governance 
in different ways. The supremacy of the power of the people by means of 
extensive political participation is central to the democratic notion of good 
governance. Under the formal rule of law, a government whose powers are 
limited by means of the law and which acts within the boundaries of the 
constitutional law is seen as a good government. 121   
Thus, representative democracy is about creating a government that 
represents the majority, and a majority that is qualified to make laws. The rule 
of law, however, aims at regulating and constraining the government, whether 
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democratic or non-democratic, keeping it within the boundaries of the law.122 
From an institutional perspective, the elected political institutions, parliament, 
and government, are arguably the most important institutions of democracy; 
whereas the judiciary and other institutions engaged in enforcement, mostly 
unelected, are crucial institutions of the rule of law.123  
Indeed, the above observation seems rather simplistic by dismissing any 
relation between democracy and the rule of law. The rule of law also matters for 
minimalist democracies, where democracy is understood as being people’s 
participation in decision-making; such participation requires a firm legal 
framework to regulate and protect fair, free and regular elections. Furthermore, 
even those who define democracy as a minimalist, procedural concept, which 
centres on elections, presume the existence of fundamental freedoms as a 
prerequisite for elections.124 Meaningful competition and participation in 
decision-making would require that the law guarantees and regulates certain 
political rights such as freedom of speech and assembly.125 These rules are often 
prescribed in the constitution and other statutes. Thus, in Cass R Sunstein’s 
words, constitutional rules can be described as ‘rules of grammar,’ setting out 
‘the rules by which political discussion will occur’,126 rules for the formation of 
branches of government and their relations. Under a rule of law system, these 
rules must comply with the principle of legality in a sense of clarity, certainty, 
predictability and respect for the supremacy of the law.127  
On the other hand, the extent of the principles and institutions shared by 
the substantive rule of law and liberal democracy is greater.128 Thus, the rule of 
law protects the core of the democratic system by protecting and 
institutionalising political and civil liberties. Moreover, it establishes 
institutions of ‘horizontal accountability’, according to which some ‘state 
institutions are authorized and willing to oversee, control, redress, and/or 
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sanction unlawful actions of other state institutions’.129 In general, it is argued 
‘that democracy goes hand in hand with the rule of law; where one of the two 
disappears; the other is in danger of being abandoned.’130  
While the basic tenets of the rule of law may not require democracy as 
a form of governance, in some sense, a democratic government requires some 
understanding of the rule of law. On the other hand, both democracy and the 
rule of law can share the common aim of preventing the arbitrary exercise of 
powers; the people create the laws that they then have to obey; the effect is to 
establish the supremacy of the people and supremacy of the law. Thus, some 
may also argue that, in a democratic system, understanding the rule of law 
should go beyond a mere legal system and courts. In Guillermo O’Donnell’s 
words, it should be a democratic rule of law that upholds fundamental rights and 
freedoms, subjecting all persons and government officials to an established 
network of responsibility and accountability which serve to constrain and 
control exercises of powers.131 It can be seen to ensure that the government does 
not exceed those formal and substantive constitutional restrictions.132 Therefore, 
the rule of law is of significant relevance whether it is understood in minimalist 
or substantive terms. The absence of a functioning rule of law will lead to the 
disregarding and manipulation of the constitution and misuse of the public 
powers. 
There is much that might be said about these and other conceptual 
understandings and difficulties concerning the relations between the rule of law 
and democracy. The two concepts might be in conflict in some ways. There is 
an ongoing debate on the position and role of courts in reviewing 
constitutionality of legal norms and acts of an elected legislature in a democratic 
system. 
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2.2.2 Judicial Review and Counter-majoritarian Debates  
It has been argued that some form of constitution is necessary to the 
existence and preservation of a democratic state. However, when such a 
constitution starts to provide rules and institutions that ‘constrain what 
democracy does’, concerns begin to be raised over the position of these 
institutions within a democratic regime.133 Judicial review may be considered 
to be one of these institutions. For the purposes of this research, judicial review 
refers to the strong form of constitutional review of legislation rather than 
merely the review of the legality of executive actions within its allocated 
powers. Judicial review of constitutionality of legislation gives judiciary, mostly 
high courts, power ‘to decline to apply a statute in a particular case […] or to 
modify the effect of a statute to make its application conform with individual 
rights.  […] or to establish as a matter of law that a given statute or legislative 
provision will not be applied’.134 Here, the rule of law, which among other 
principles establishes judicial review of legislation, may be in tension with the 
supremacy of the people and its representative democratic government.   
In general, there is an on-going debate concerning the role of judicial 
review in a democratic society and ‘whether the democratic principle of 
majority rule can be reconciled with the practice of remotely accountable judges 
invalidating legislation enacted by electorally accountable representatives.’135 
Alexander Bickel argues that ‘ the root dificulty is that judicial review is a 
counter majoritarian force in our [American] system’.136 Bickel, then defends 
judicial review and responds to charges against the US Supreme Court’s 
counter-majoritarianism, asserting that ‘judicial review is the principled process 
of enunciating and applying certain enduring values of our society.’137 Many 
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scholars have been inspired by Bickel’s explication of judicial counter-
majoritarianism and have developed different theories on the relevance of 
judicial review and responded to courts’ counter-majoritarian difficulties. For 
instance, the premise of John Hart Ely’s representation-reinforcement theory of 
judicial review is that ‘the general theory is one that bounds judicial review 
under the Constitution’s open-ended provisions by insisting that it can 
appropriately concern itself only with questions of participation, and not with 
the substantive merits of political choice under attack.’138 In other words, Ely 
maintains that courts are better prepared to deal with questions of governmental 
structure than with questions of substance.139 Furthermore, judicial review is 
said to protect minorities from tyranny of majority government.140 Robert Dahl 
argues that ‘one influential view of the Court [US Supreme Court], however, is 
that it stands in some special way as a protection of minorities against tyranny 
by majoritarian.’141These two arguments can also be found in Alec Stone 
Sweet’s words that:‘[A] precept of the new constitutionalism is that regimes are 
not democratically legitimate if they do not constrain majority rule through 
rights and review’.142 
The discussion so far illustrates that the two frequently cited 
understandings supporting judicial review would consider such review to serve 
the preservation of rights, in particular of political minorities as well as 
marginalised groups in society, from the majority government. Equally relevant, 
it would be used to limit ‘the scope of arbitrariness, and ensure that those who 
exercise public powers respect the boundaries of those powers’.143 In other 
words, judicial review might provide legal accountability for the exercise of 
power, in particular where the political process fails to secure this.144  
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However, the opponents of judicial review would argue that unelected, 
and mostly appointed, judges claim a right and a duty to stand in the way of 
what the majority’s representatives think. It challenges ‘the policy preferences 
of democratic majorities.’145 Although other elected branches are enabled to 
interpret a constitutional text under a constitutional judicial review system, 
judicial interpretations are often final and can override the legislature’s 
interpretation of the constitution. In principle, the legislature is incompetent to 
overrule or minimise the impact of these judicial decisions,146 since this would 
be difficult, often requiring constitutional amendments. Therefore, some 
scholars, including Mark Tushnet, argue that the constitution should be taken 
away from the judiciary, allowing political branches to develop its meanings.147 
In justifying such a proposition, some argue that judicial decisions reflect the 
political preferences of judges who issue them. In other words, it is claimed that 
judges are affected by their political preferences; thus, ‘politically liberal judges 
tend to reach politically liberal results and politically conservative judges tend 
to reach politically conservative ones.’148  
On the other hand, Jeremy Waldron argues that judicial review of 
legislation is inappropriate in ‘reasonably democratic societies’, wherein elected 
institutions and the judiciary are functioning reasonably; individual and 
minority rights are mostly protected by both citizens and the government; and 
there is ‘persistent, substantial, and good faith disagreement about rights’.149 
Conversely, some scholars believe that judicial review is appropriate and 
successful in such reasonably democratic contexts wherein certain conditions 
are in place, usually requiring a highly developed political system.150 Under 
such conditions, it is argued that judicial review could become a successful 
counter-majoritarian means for limiting arbitrary and overreach of powers. 
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However, such a highly developed politcial system might not be always fulfilled 
in many developed democracies, let alone in transitional or emerging 
democracies. In these latter contexts, there are real concerns about the 
independence of the judiciary and the competence of institutions of democracy 
and accountability. Therefore, one should also bring the rule of law as a central 
focus of the debates on the role and position of judicial review in transitional 
democracies. The discussion that follows will address these questions. Before 
that, though, it is important to understand the rule of law and its relevance to a 
transitional democracy.  
 2.3 The Rule of Law in Transitional Democracies 
The conceptual understanding discussed in the previous part suggests 
that both concepts of the rule of law and democracy require the existence and 
functioning of an independent judiciary. Courts can arguably play different roles 
and might serve to uphold the supremacy of the law and limit arbitrariness in 
exercises of power through the rubric of judicial review. This part develops a 
framework to assess the role and relevance of the rule of law to transitional 
democracies, analysing the challenges and opportunities for legal reforms and 
the constitutional judiciary.    
2.3.1 The Relevance of the Rule of Law to a Transitional Democracy  
Transition ideally aims at ending a non-democratic regime, and 
inducting and consolidating a democratic system.151 A review of the relevant 
literature suggests that the rule of law might become relevant to various extents 
to each of these stages.152 Though some may argue that ‘with democracy it is 
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only a matter of time before obtaining the rule of law,’153 in practice, it might 
be rather problematic as enhancing a rule of law system may become more 
challenging than establishing a functional democratic system. 
The earliest stage of democratization mostly focuses on the extent to 
which elections are active in democratising political institutions of the non-
democratic regime,154 wherein previously unelected rulers will be chosen in 
free, fair and regular elections.155 The minimalist procedural democracy, 
therefore, might become the underlying issue at this stage. It is rather immediate 
and might be less challenging than proceeding with parallel developments in 
other defined aspects of liberal democracy.156 Liberalisation, in O’Donnell’s 
view, refers to the process of introducing the replacement of rules and 
procedures of citizenship. Citizenship, in his view, is the right to equal treatment 
in the ‘making of collective choices and the obligation of those implementing 
such choices to be equally accountable and accessible to all members of the 
polity.’157 Accordingly, constraining the arbitrary exercise of powers and 
holding elected state institutions and official accountable is also relevant to a 
minimalist democracy. Although both democratization and liberalization might 
occur in the absence of each another, the two processes are often observed to be 
interrelated even if one is progressing further than the other.  
A broad understanding of democracy might also underline the relevance 
of the rule of law. Relevant studies often correlate democracy with the rule of 
law and authoritarian rule with the ‘rule of man’.158 For instance, Adam 
Przeworski argues that transition from these authoritarian regimes to democratic 
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ones is ‘the devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules.’159 
Therefore, institutionalising the rule of law can be considered crucial to 
democratization in that it aims to check and minimise the uncontrolled exercise 
of powers of the previous regime.160 Thus, in the absence of the rule of law, 
elections can create majoritarian governments, which concentrate power, 
eventually turning these new, minimalist democracies into majoritarian 
tyranny,161 or what some referred to as ‘a gambling game of shifting 
dictators.’162 Some scholars, speaking of the Latin American transitions, would 
describe many of the new democracies in the region as states of ‘(Un)rule’ of 
law wherein democratic procedures in the form of elections are often combined 
with authoritarian practices.163 
Conversely, in a consolidated democracy, or at a more advanced stage 
of democratization wherein elections take place regularly, there is consensus on 
relying on a democratic form of government, and democracy is often considered 
as ‘the only game in town’.164 The rule of law is seen to be of particular 
relevance. Some have argued that ‘[W]ithout the rule of law, democratic 
consolidation may never occur.’165 Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan argue that the 
rule of law guarantees the supremacy of the law, and it is one of the three 
‘virtually definitional prerequisites of a consolidated democracy.’166 Thus, the 
rule of law is said to increase people’s trust in the principles, institutions and 
practices of democratic systems. Upholding the rule of law, furthermore, 
implies that all actors play by the rules of the game and is claimed to constrain 
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anti-democratic attempts.167 In other words, it serves to create a legal culture 
wherein the public authorities respect and adhere to the constitutional 
limitations on their exercise of powers. In cases where powerful groups, 
individuals or even an elected majority government might threaten elections, 
and peaceful alteration of authority, they can be subordinated to the laws and 
the rule of law principles.168 The law thus provides the structure in which 
democracy operates.  
Furthermore, the rule of law seems to be central to studies that discuss 
the ‘quality of government’ in a consolidated democracy. Such studies would 
address issues concerning individual and government adherence to the rule of 
law, analysing the functioning of some institutions and their implications for 
democracy including an independent judiciary, human rights protections, or 
horizontal accountability.169 Even if some would argue that democracy, in its 
basic electoral sense, might exist in the absence of the rule of law, others would 
claim that consolidated democracies with a weak rule of law imply substantial 
deficiencies regarding the quality of their democracy.170 
There are differences when it comes to the extent to which elections have 
combined with parallel developments aimed at establishing and upholding the 
rule of law in transitional democracies. There is an ever increasing programme 
of legal reform that is said to serve to [re]establish the rule of law in transitional 
states. The following discussion will further explore that.   
 2.3.2 The Rule of Law Reforms in Transitional Democracies 
In view of the conceptual understandings of the rule of law as discussed 
above, it is imperative to explore how transitional democracies have applied the 
concept of the rule of law; as well as the increasing use of and support for rule 
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of law reforms by the international community.171 The rule of law conceptions 
which are promoted by the international community might not bring or add any 
new principle or components to the constitutional scholarship which dominates 
the national contexts. However, scholars and practitioners interested in 
promoting the rule of law in transitional and developing democracies might 
principally disagree on whether the reform should be broad as to include both 
formal and substantive aspects of the rule of law or should instead begin with 
the formal rule of law. The answer to these questions might determine how 
transitional states apply and use the rule of law.  
A comprehensive version of the rule of law might be seen in the United 
Nation Secretary General’s definition of the rule of law which states that,  
 [A] principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to 
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence 
to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, 
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.172 
 On the other hand, an international organisation with specific and limited 
objectives would focus on those aspects of the rule of law that serve its purposes. 
For instance, the International Bar Association (IBA), that supports the 
independence of the judiciary, focuses on the procedural and formal aspects of 
the rule of law.173 Its definition of the rule of law concentrates on some of the 
relevant principles including the independence and impartiality of the courts, 
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the principle of due process, a robust and independent legal profession and 
equality of all before the law.174 
Moreover, some have argued that the primary explanation for 
international efforts in initiating and supporting rule of law reforms is their 
relevance to deliver other ends. Martin Krygier refers to this argument as 
‘institutional means’ which should be associated and established to achieve 
‘valued ends.’175 Krygier underlines preventing and minimising the arbitrary 
exercise of power as the most common ‘imminent ends’ of the rule of law, which 
makes it good at delivering other related ‘external ends’ such as democracy and 
protection of human rights.176 In other words, the rule of law actually constrains 
and channels the exercise of public power ‘to a significant extent by and in 
accordance with law, so that non-arbitrary exercises of such powers are 
relatively routine, while other sorts, such as lawless, capricious, wilful exercises 
of powers routinely occur less’.177 Similarly, Charles T Call argues that the rule 
of law is believed to be ‘essential to virtually every Western liberal foreign 
policy goal, human rights, democracy, economic and political stability.’178  
For example, there is an increasing trend towards promoting democracy, 
as an external end, through preventing the arbitrary exercise or abuse of power, 
establishing a system of the rule of law. Just to take one example, the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission), an 
institution of the Council of Europe promotes the rule of law in a variety of 
ways. Its primary focus is on democratic institutions and fundamental rights; 
constitutional justice; electoral reform and political parties, as well as assisting 
constitutional and legislative process so as to ensure the democratic functioning 
of their institutions and respect for fundamental rights.179 Thus, those principles 
that ‘define the core meaning of the rule of law  as a common value of the EU’ 
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are considered ‘not purely formal and procedural requirements. They are the 
vehicle for ensuring compliance with and respect for democracy and human 
rights’. 180 Those  include: 
legality, which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic and 
pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibition of 
arbitrariness of the executive powers; independent and impartial courts; 
effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights; and 
equality before the law.181 
In any case, the ‘external ends’ reflects on substantive values and principles that 
are also essential in the substantive theories of the rule of law. It can be argued 
that both the imminent and the external ends are central to what the rule of law 
is intended to promote, that is, preventing the arbitrary exercise of public 
powers. 
Conversely, some would argue that the state of affairs of the rule of law 
in a particular context to which reforms are applied might determine the content 
of those reforms. Thus, to prioritise a particular principle or account is 
determined by evaluation of its relevance to the state. Thus, establishing the rule 
of law may require ‘baselines, conditions of existence, of survival’, or in more 
advanced contexts helping it to flourish.182 Where certain basic tenets of the rule 
of law are not in place, many would be concerned to introduce substantive 
elements,183 which may not survive in the absence of a basic formal rule of 
law.184 For example, if legality is weak, thought needs to be given to establishing 
conditions that will improve it. Accordingly, reforms might promote functional 
aspects of the rule of law rather than stick to the ‘ideals’ of the concept.185 Thus, 
in contexts where the rule of law is almost absent, reforms that introduce 
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substantive accounts may also form part of the process, but they are not 
immediately essential to it.  
In any case, transition involves redistribution and regulation of power. 
Therefore, the rule of law reformers put considerable effort to establish and 
support institutions ‘for the creation, interpretation, and enforcement of rules of 
social order.’186 In transitional democracies, legal reforms might cover and 
target a variety of state institutions. Scholars and the rule of law promoters 
would suggest that rule of law reforms should serve ‘reforming the laws, 
enhancing rule-related institutions and increasing government compliance with 
the law’.187 Often, a transition from authoritarian to a democratic system 
coincides with constitution making. It involves enacting a new constitution or 
amending the existing one to include rules and institutions that replace arbitrary 
standards and institutions of the former regime. Similarly, almost any rule of 
law reform would include judicial reform that aims to improve the 
independence, authority, accountability and accessibility of the courts.188 
In general, some commentators criticise the optimism behind the formal-
based reforms, arguing that ‘[S]tripping the law of its moral content does not 
guarantee efficiency or systemic fairness.’189 Although the pre-transitional legal 
system might to some extent conform or be said to conform to the basic formal 
rule of law, the law remains mostly an instrument serving to legitimise the 
rulers’ ignorance or exclusion of substantive elements of the rule of law, 
including human rights protection.190 As a result, reforms should concentrate on 
human rights, or other substantive aspects of the rule of law, rather than on 
merely establishing ‘formal legality.’191 
In transitional states, government might use the formal rule of law to 
hold on to power and to legitimise its authority. The lack of constitutional 
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practice and the decades of the concentration of powers often in the executive 
branch will be more likely to create obstacles for constitutional reform. 
Therefore, such obstacles might be seen to undermine the rule of law in the 
sense that the exercise of power by the government, in particular, the executive 
authority is outside the constitutional framework and the law. On the other hand, 
one would be more concerned about a greater potential for external interference 
in the judiciary. This is especially true where there is great concern over the 
independence and authority of the judiciary, as well as mechanisms that hold it 
accountable to the law and above all widespread institutional corruption. Thus, 
the government might use courts to legitimise its excesses and arbitrary 
powers.192 
The role and implications of an independent judiciary for the rule of law 
in transitional states is further discussed through analysing the special criteria 
of constitutional judiciary. Such a judiciary, carrying out robust constitutional 
review of legislations, may affect the process of democratic transition in various 
ways. The following discussion addresses the constitutional judiciary as an 
institutional means to serve the expectations of the rule of law’s ends.      
2.3.3 Constitutional Judiciary in Transitional Democracies: A View from 
an Institutional Means that Serves Ends of the Rule of Law   
As already discussed, scholars and practitioners might consider 
independent courts essential to the rule of law. The role and the institution of 
the judiciary is further emphasised in the context of transitional democracies 
as to serve the re-distribution of power and arbitration of disputes.193 Often, 
ensuring this re-distribution of power takes place requires a constitution to 
establish rules of distribution, legal institutions to implement these rules, and a 
set of checks and balances to prevent and constrain the arbitrary exercise of 
power. Neil Kritz argues that in transitional states, in particular those emerging 
from conflict, demands are high for judicial settlement of a broad range of 
disputes relating both to the previous regime and the newly established one. 
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Thus, as a crucial rule of law institution, Kritz views the judiciary as providing 
‘a peaceful and trustworthy means’ for arbitration of disputes.194 
Many, if not all, newly adopted constitutions in transitional 
democracies have established some form of constitutional judiciary with robust 
constitutional review powers.195 The drafters of these constitutions might have 
taken different factors into consideration for their choice of constitutional 
adjudicators. The spread of constitutional judicial review and ‘constitutional 
justice’ in post-Second World War Europe, for instance in Germany, Italy and 
Austria, was often viewed by their constitutional drafters as the ‘ultimate 
crowning of the Rule of Law, hence the foremost development of a truly 
democratic and civil libertarian state’.196 The relatively successful experience 
of such constitutional judiciaries has, and might still, contribute to the spread 
of judicial review and constitutional courts in other transitional democracies. 
Another factor that might have affected such choice can be the significant 
expansion of judicial powers and growth of influential courts at both the 
national and international levels.197  
Studies on the role of the courts in nascent democracies contain ample 
examples revealing the controversial impact of constitutional judiciaries from 
a rule of law perspective. These courts have been asked to decide on significant 
and controversial questions; their impact on constitutional and political 
developments is often considered remarkable. Some of them might be seen to 
have considerably contributed to the development of the rule of law.198 For 
example, many would refer to the Hungarian Constitutional Court, which often 
explicitly used the rule of law as a ground for constitutional review. The Court  
‘presumed that the change of regimes could not mean anything for the law 
other than that the entire legal order was to conform (or have its conformity 
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retained) to the new Constitution based on the rule of law’.199  The Court is said 
to uphold, in many instances, the principle of legal continuity irrespective of 
legitimacy. Thus, in many instances, it upheld the pre-transitional laws; 
although they had been enacted by the former government which had no 
legitimacy anymore.200  Similarly, studies have cited one of the remarkable 
rulings of the South African Constitutional Court in post-apartheid South 
Africa, in which it declared the initial Mandela-era constitution to be 
‘insufficiently faithful to the principles of the pacted transition from apartheid 
in effect,’ acknowledging ‘the unconstitutionality of the constitution itself.’201 
Constitutional judiciaries and judicial review may indeed ‘constrain 
political elites and create a political milieu where every politician is forced to 
realise that constitutional provisions matter’, in particular when asked to settle 
‘the core political controversies that define (and often divide) whole 
polities.’202 However, it can be seen that, at times, the judiciary may become a 
dysfunctional, ineffective or even irrelevant institution in democratic 
transition, bypassed in a context where power has become consolidated.203 
While courts operating in more stable and developed democracies might be 
accused of being agents of the most important political alliance, of the 
government, or even acting ‘above politics’,204 these indictments might 
intensify further in the transitional context. Some may even argue that in the 
majority of post-authoritarian democracies, courts ‘are not merely the agents 
of governments; they are their servants.’205  
Furthermore, it might not suffice that the judiciary is seen as relatively 
independent, in an institutional and even personal manner, from political or 
external interference. The lack of sufficient mechanisms for judicial 
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accountability and of a tradition of democracy might affect the role and 
contribution of the judiciary to the rule of law. In a post-authoritarian transition, 
Stephen Holmes would observe that: 
[a] significant danger during transition, in fact, is halfway reform. 
Halfway reform occurs when the judiciary manages to free itself from 
authoritarianism without adapting to democracy. It can refuse orders 
from the executive branch without giving any particular deference to 
the interests of society expressed in the constitution or ordinary acts of 
the elected legislature. The post-authoritarian judiciary can instead 
work exclusively to perpetuate and augment its own corporate 
advantages. The private guild interests of judges can refuse all 
compromise with the common interest of society and, remarkably 
enough, can defend this recalcitrance with the language of liberalism.206  
It can be said, therefore, that an independent judiciary which is not subject to 
the law can be as dangerous to the rule of law as a court that lacks independence. 
Similarly, the rather rapidly introduced formal guarantees of autonomy 
combined with personal independence might be said to ‘distance’ the judiciary 
from the context which its decisions affect. Such an effect could be of concern 
knowing that constitutional adjudication affects both the legal as well as the 
political system. These arguments may signify the extent to which courts can 
become a mere instrument of the government, upholding and supporting its 
exercise of powers, rather than checking and constraining the abusive exercise 
of those powers. The next chapter will provide further insights into the 
independence of the constitutional judiciary as part of the discussion of the 
phenomenon of judicialisation. 
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Conclusion  
This chapter has explained an already extensive body of literature 
discussing the complexity of defining the rule of law and its relation with 
democracy. It underlines the importance, relevance and role of the rule of law 
for the newly established constitutional order in transitional states. The question 
to ask here is not: should the rule of law precede democratic transition or should 
the democratic transition precede rule of law? One point should be clear: that 
transitions often, if not always, aim to restrain previously unconstrained 
exercises of power as much as to transform an authoritarian regime into a 
democratic one.  
In any case, the essence of the rule of law is understood to acknowledge 
the supremacy of the law that satisfies certain formal and substantive principles, 
the exact meaning and extent of which is as contested as the rule of law itself. 
The rule of law is crucially understood as the opposite of the arbitrary and 
abusive exercise of power. Importantly, strict adherence to the ideal of the rule 
of law is almost impossible; rather, approaching this ideal is a matter of degree 
which may vary significantly from one context to another. Establishing the rule 
of law in transitional democracies by sticking to the ideals of the rule of law 
might not serve its purpose in a context that may struggle to establish the basic 
formal principles of the rule of law. Therefore, a functioning understanding of 
the rule of law should also take into consideration that transition involves 
redistribution of power as well as establishing or strengthening the rules and 
institutions for a peaceful arbitration of disputes.  
On the other hand, establishing and strengthening the rule of law in such 
contexts has increasingly attracted international actors that might support 
national governments in introducing relevant legal reforms. Noticeably, 
conceptual problems concerning the rule of law have also been reflected in the 
extent and contents of the reforms. Reformers often support different formal and 
substantive accounts of the rule of law, mainly, in line with their broader 
political, economic and others ends which the rule of law is said to achieve. 
Although many such reforms cover substantial aspects of the constitutional and 
legal system, they often prioritise those principles, rules and institutions that 
reflect the challenges and opportunities in the context in which the reform is to 
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apply. Thus, they may focus on institutional means that can serve to support the 
imminent end of the rule of law, the reduction of the arbitrary exercise of power, 
which in itself may be seen as good for delivering other external ends, such as 
democracy. 
This thesis argues that courts, as an essential institution of the rule of 
law, might have a variety of jurisdictions and play different roles in a democratic 
constitutional order, and constitutional review is the most controversial of them. 
It acknowledges the counter-majoritarian debates which originated from a 
longstanding discussion concerning law and democracy without re-evaluating 
them. Instead, it looks beyond this, assessing the expansion of judicial power 
and the implications for the rule of law in transitional democracies.  
As will be further discussed in the next chapter, transitional democracies 
might face some extraordinary, albeit temporary, challenges including a weak 
rule of law system, an unstable political system, or an insufficiently functioning 
parliament. In this situation, the role and implications of judicialisation need 
further discussion. Alongside the already discussed counter-majoritarian 
arguments, there are growing concerns over the independence of courts where 
they become involved in resolving some of the most controversial constitutional 
questions that affect the whole constitutional order. In such a situation, where 
the parliament struggles to function, some might challenge and re-evaluate the 
main arguments made by opponents of judicial review, who claim that the 
legislature, as the legitimate representative of the people’s interests, should be 
authorised to develop constitutional meanings, rather than unelected judges. 
 These are some arguments that the next chapter will discuss further. It 
will examine the constitutional judiciary as one of the core institutional factors 
for judicialisation in general, focusing more specifically on questions including 
to what extent should constitutional judiciaries in transitional democracies be 
involved in issues regarding constitutional rights and structure? In which ways 
might the independence of the judiciary be undermined in contexts without any 
tradition of an independent judiciary? What are the potential outcomes of 
judicialisation from the perspective of the rule of law? 
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Chapter Three: The Judicialisation of Constitutional Issues: 
Potential Factors and Implications   
Introduction  
Chapter Two argued that the conceptual and structural analyses 
concerning the rule of law, democracy and transitional democracies have all 
recognised the importance of the judiciary. The literature confirms that there has 
been a substantial increase in court authority and the influential role that this is 
playing in countries around the world. Given their jurisdictions, position and the 
implications of their decisions for both political and legal systems, 
constitutional judiciaries can be seen to be involved in addressing and resolving 
virtually any question or dispute concerning public policy and state power.207    
There is an ongoing scholarly debate regarding those factors that may 
have contributed to or facilitated this growth in judicial powers or the 
‘judicialisation of politics.’ The implication that this may have for the rule of 
law and democracy is another issue central to these debates. The comparative 
insights presented in this chapter have been gathered from the experiences of 
constitutional courts in different contexts and suggest various explanations. This 
thesis argues that judicialisation of constitutional issues may occur and develop 
as the result of the interaction of multiple factors that can be discussed under so-
called ‘supply side’ and ‘demand side’ arguments.208 The ‘supply side’ factors 
refer to a set of factors that arguably supply courts with institutional and formal 
powers, as well as opportunities in the form of disputes and conflicts of 
interpretation of constitutional norms. The ‘demand side’ refers to the growing 
demand, from different actors including individuals, interest groups or the 
governments placed on constitutional adjudication in resolving or contributing 
to the resolution of disputes of this kind. It analyses how these actors can turn 
political conflicts into constitutional cases or use constitutional review to further 
judicialise the constitution. 
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Although it can be said that, for the most part, the relevant literature has 
focused on courts operating within reasonably stable and developed 
democracies, it seems that the newly established courts in transitional 
democracies have also grown in power and influence. One may argue that the 
relatively context-specific and often temporary challenges and opportunities in 
transitional states could bring the rule of law to the centre of the debate, 
becoming an essential factor in explaining judicialisation and its implications 
for transitional states. Therefore, it can be assumed that judicialisation both 
affects and is affected by the rule of law. 
This chapter discusses these arguments. The first section presents a 
framework for conceptualising judicialisation. The second and third sections 
respectively, examine the explanations that have been advanced to explain 
judicialisation, discussing the ‘supply side’ and ‘demand side’ factors. The 
fourth and final section focuses on the role of transitional democracies and the 
rule of law within these debates, discussing the constitutional challenges and 
opportunities faced by states undergoing the transition to democracy, as a 
potential attribute which may enable judicialisation.  
 3.1 Expansion of Judicial Powers: Institutional and Non-
Institutional Explanations 
Increasingly, the courts are becoming involved in addressing and 
resolving significant political and institutional questions. The ever-growing role 
and the authority of courts are also being analysed under the ‘judicialisation of 
politics’ arguments. Judicialisation entails ‘the reliance on courts and judicial 
means for addressing core moral predicaments, public policy questions, and 
political controversies’.209 It is argued that by and large the ‘decision-making 
rights’ seem to be shifting, either formally or informally, from elected branches 
of the government to the judiciary.210 In other words, constitutions and other 
statutes are increasingly empowering judiciaries with a range of jurisdictions. 
The judiciary itself often seems to have developed an expanded interpretation 
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of formal rules of jurisdiction and standing or admissibility. As a result of the 
judicialisation of the constitution, it is inevitable that certain ‘elements of legal 
discourse penetrate and are absorbed by political discourse’.211 Therefore, it has 
been widely observed that courts have become ‘powerful institutional actors or 
policymakers,’212 in terms of directing public policy-making,213 and being 
involved in legislative processes.214 For example, it can be seen that courts 
increasingly tend to ‘limit and regulate the exercise of parliamentary authority 
by imposing substantive limits on the power of legislative institutions. Thus, the 
judiciary could become an avenue for making substantive policy.’215 Similar 
developments can also be seen in relation to procedural ‘rules governing the 
exercise of legislative power’.216 
An initial reading of the literature attributes the expansion of judicial 
power to the values and practices spread with the global trend of 
democratization, constitutionalism, human rights, the relative decline in 
parliamentary supremacy and the ineffectiveness of majoritarian or policy-
making institutions, and government’s increasing interference in all aspects of 
social life.217 However, a deeper review suggests that scholars have developed 
different theories to account for this increasing expansion of judicial power. 
There are two predominant arguments. The first one focuses on institutional and 
legal factors and their impact on judicial power. Thus, it is argued that an 
entrenched constitution that guarantees a bill of rights and a reasonably 
independent, accessible and constitutionally empowered judiciary can increase 
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the potential for the expansion of judicial powers beyond procedural matters 
into the realm of ‘substantive political issues central to the polity’.218  
Indeed, institutional and legal factors are the most cited grounds, and 
indeed the most cited defence, for court activism from the judges’ perspective. 
The UK courts seem to frequently emphasise that the Parliament has 
empowered them with weak forms of legislative review under the Human 
Rights Act 1998. It was explicitly expressed in the Nicklinson case that 
‘Parliament has cast on the courts the function of deciding whether a statute 
infringes the Convention.’219 In other words, Lord Kerr argued that by 
exercising this jurisdiction,  
the courts do not usurp the role of Parliament, much less offend the 
separation of powers. A declaration of incompatibility is merely an 
expression of the court’s conclusion as to whether, as enacted, a 
particular item of legislation cannot be considered compatible with a 
Convention right […] it is open to Parliament to decide to do nothing.220 
In other words, the legislature expanded judicial powers by introducing the 
Human Rights Act of 1998. Although these institutional and legal explanations 
and factors are of significant relevance to judicial power in general and 
judicialisation in particular, one should be aware of overestimating and 
generalising similar arguments. The literature refers to a variety of different 
cases in which courts with similar jurisdictions and institutional structures have 
performed differently.  
One of the examples academics cite for ineffective judicial review is the 
Swedish Supreme Court.221 It is argued that the legal and constitutional factors 
(including a hierarchy of legal norms, a bill of rights, and the preview of bills of 
legislation by the Law Council, staffed with judges, before they come into 
effect) have not led to greater judicialisation in Sweden.222 It should be noticed 
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that the Swedish ‘preview-system’ contributes to that. The system consists of 
‘legislative committees in preparing legislation, open access to public 
documents and the right to publish those, the experts’ opinions of the Law 
Council and scrutiny by the Constitutional Committee of the Parliament’ which 
results in carefully drafting legislative bills minimising the potential for 
challenging their constitutionality.223 
Similarly, scholars have frequently made reference to the Japanese 
Supreme Court as an example of a self-restrained court. It is reported that in the 
course of the fifty years since the Court began functioning, it has declared only 
eight laws unconstitutional.224 Many would argue that even these were in cases 
that ‘the unconstitutionality of public policy becomes so obvious, or 
administrative discretion becomes so unreasonable and arbitrary’,225 that judges 
had no option but to overule them.  
The second set of arguments concern judges, their preference and 
willingness to engage in controversial questions of a constitutional and political 
nature. Thus, it is argued that judges decide cases according to their ideological, 
political or legal policy preferences.226 Therefore, it is claimed that ‘changing 
judicial and legal culture, not changing documents, is what leads judges to 
assume a more activist posture toward the other branches of government.’227 On 
the importance of the judges’ willingness to expand judicial powers, C Neal 
Tate, while underlining the formal and institutional factors, argues that for 
judicialisation to occur and develop, judges’ personal attitudes and policy 
preferences are critical factors. In his opinion, such developments depend on 
judges’ decisions, and he maintains that judges ‘should (1) participate in policy-
making that could be left to the wise or foolish discretion of other institutions, 
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and at least on occasion, (2) substitute policy solutions they derive for those 
derived from other institutions.’228  
Furthermore, judges’ perception of their professional role or, as James 
Gibson puts it, what they ‘think they ought to do’, 229 is of considerable 
relevance. In general, some judges might see their role or the extent of their 
influence as being restricted to applying laws without attempting to intrude into 
the political domain.230 For example, it can be seen that although judges in 
Scotland have the power to strike down unconstitutional Acts issued by the 
Scottish Parliament, they have explicitly refused to decide on issues of 
‘considerable public controversy.’231 In the Adam v The Scottish Ministers case, 
which was challenging the Protection of Wild Mammals (Scotland) Act 2002, 
prohibiting mounted foxhunting, on the grounds that it was outside legislative 
competence of Scotish parliamnet and also it was incompatible with the 
Convention rights, Lord Nimmo Smith argued that the matter in question was 
‘recognised as being more appropriate for decision by a democratically elected 
representative legislature than by a court.’232 
Other judges may see their role as being unrestricted by boundaries 
between the political and the legal realm. In this situation, judges may view their 
role as being that of the reformers striving to bring about political liberalization 
through legal channels.233 Some may even blame the ‘power hungry’ courts for 
being too assertive about deciding on moral and political issues. 234 Indeed, it is 
observed that,  
judges have been increasingly willing to regulate the conduct of 
political activity itself- whether practiced in or around legislatures, 
agencies, or the electorate- by constructing and enforcing standards of 
acceptable behavior for interest groups, political parties, and both 
elected and appointed officials.235  
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Therefore, not any court that has constitutional review powers and a mandate 
to enforce an entrenched bill of rights will inevitably exercise such powers or 
enlarge its role and influence on public policy. There is an implicit assertion 
that judges’ willingness to expand judicial powers and to affect or direct public 
policy-making is of significant relevance for explaining judicialisation. In any 
case, one could argue that the conceptual difficulties regarding the rule of law 
and democracy could also reflect the essence of the arguments mentioned 
above. Understanding and applying the substantive conceptions of the rule of 
law and democracy would potentially provide greater expansion in judicial 
powers as the grounds for constitutional review would expand, as compared to 
under formal and procedural understandings of these two concepts.  
This thesis acknowledges the judge’s role without further engaging in 
the relevant debates. Instead, it argues that judicialisation is said to emerge and 
develop as a result of the interaction of multiple factors. These factors include a 
relatively independent, accessible and constitutionally empowered 
constitutional judiciary. In addition, the fragmentation of political powers 
within and between political branches of the government may increase the 
amount of unresolved constitutional controversies and questions, and minimise 
counter-reactions by the government against the judiciary. A growing demand 
from individuals, government and interest groups to involve the judiciary in 
addressing and resolving these controversies could potentially lead to a greater 
judicialisation of the constitution. It seems important to discuss these factors in 
some detail drawing on supply and demand side explanations.236  
   3.2 The Supply Side Factors: Institutional and Structural Factors 
The following discussion is not an exclusive account of institutional and 
structural factors that may explain judicialisation, rather it will reflect only on 
those considered to be the most relevant issues. Taking into consideration the 
variety from country to country, it analyses the relevance of two factors to the 
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judicialisation: first, the extent and variety of the powers that the constitutional 
judiciary might exercise. Secondly, it explains the relevance of the 
fragmentation of political powers in the elected branches of the government.  
3.2.1 The Structure of the Constitutional Judiciary: Jurisdictional Rules  
The structure and the rules of jurisdiction regarding the constitutional 
judiciary can be considered relevant institutional factors in explaining 
judicialisation. Jurisdictional rules address the scope of authority of the courts. 
It is noted that a court with broader jurisdiction would have more opportunities 
to expand its powers.237 Constitutional review is the primary jurisdiction of the 
constitutional judiciary that has the effect of ‘subordinating state actions to 
higher principles.’238 Courts may have the power to exercise an abstract and/or 
concrete constitutional review. The court exercises an abstract review of the 
constitutionality of legislation without need for a specific concrete case or 
controversy to arise. The court may also have the power to exercise concrete 
review of the constitutionality of legislation which is coincidental to a specific 
concrete case or dispute.239 Some courts including the German and Spanish 
constitutional courts exercise both concrete and abstract constitutional review. 
The US Supreme Court exercises only concrete review.240 The French Conseil 
Constitutionnel was only able to exercise abstract review before the 
constitutional reforms in 2008. These constitutional amendments in France 
provide for the concrete constitutional review of legislative provisions that 
infringe the constitutional rights and freedoms upon referral from the ordinary 
courts.241 Constitutions may provide for an ex post review that involves an 
already enacted legislation or legal norm or an ex ante control that involves 
legislation that has been passed by the parliament but has not been 
promulgated.242 For example, the courts in Hungary and Poland exercise the ex 
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ante review wherein the President of the Republic before ratifying legislation 
can ask the court to exercise such review.243  
In any case, constitutional review provides the potential for 
judicialisation to different extents. An abstract review which is usually initiated 
by certain state officials and institutions often create a direct relation between 
policy debates amongst legislators and the judiciary.244 Thus, the parliamentary 
opposition and minorities may repeatedly use such abstract review powers as a 
means of challenging the constitutionality of a legislative bill, in the wake of 
largely failed attempts to secure their interests during parliamentary debates. It 
could be argued that actions of this kind are more likely to place courts at the 
centre of ongoing political debates.245 It would invite the judiciary ‘to intervene 
in and alter legislative processes and outcomes’, that when used regularly, could 
lead to ‘a judicialisation of policymaking processes’.246 Judges, as Sweet Stone 
notes, ‘have seized these opportunities, if only to defend their own institutional 
legitimacy, producing an increasingly dense, inherently expansionary, case 
law’.247 Furthermore, it can be said that courts that combine these above review 
powers would be more likely to contribute to a greater level of judicialisation, 
adding a political function to courts’ general social and judicial mandates.248 
According to Ackerman: 
If a court must wait for a specific complaint by an ordinary individual, 
it may take a while before a bitterly politicized dispute makes its way 
into the judges’ chambers. This delay provides the court with a valuable 
political resource to sustain itself as part of the new constitutional 
order.249  
Seemingly, an abstract constitutional review would bring the judiciary central 
to the political crisis than a concrete review. This seems important knowing that 
often a court’s rulings can only be overruled through constitutional amendments 
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or specific procedures. This may explain the growing reliance on legal 
arguments in legislative debates; it is perceived that policy makers take into 
consideration court judgments and the constitutional jurisprudence that has been 
developed towards a given policy issues while drafting legislation.250 
Furthermore, the courts may provide a binding abstract interpretation of 
the constitution independent of any review of the constitutionality of legislation 
or legal norms. Importantly, the government may use this procedure to seek an 
advisory opinion on a matter that is the subject of a legislative bill already under 
debates in parliament. It is reported that the Hungarian Constitutional Court was 
often asked to provide abstract constitutional interpretations, many would 
consider to be advisory opinions, in the process of legislative drafting. Possibly 
this procedure would invite the judiciary more closely into an ongoing 
legislative debate. This may be the reason courts often try to limit the possibility 
of becoming an advisory board to politicians especially during the process of 
drafting legislations. As a result courts often require the existence of an actual 
dispute for exercising an abstract interpretation of the constitution.251 Another 
crucial power that a constitution may provide for is the constitutional complaint 
proceedings which is a particular legal remedy enabling individuals to directly 
challenge public authorities for violating their fundamental rights.252 Some have 
argued that this procedure is directly correlated with ‘the existence of an activist 
and powerful constitutional court.’253   
Moreover, the constitutional judiciary may also have a variety of 
jurisdictions other than constitutional review. These additional powers, or as 
Tom Ginsburg refers to them, ‘ancillary powers’, vary from one constitution to 
another.254 The most common of these ancillary powers include deciding on 
conflicts of jurisdiction or competence between different governmental 
branches or between central/federal and local/sub-federal entities, election-
related disputes, impeachment of certain high-ranking state officials, and 
determining the constitutionality of political parties. In a few instances 
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constitutional drafters have attempted to even go further. For example,  the 
constitutional drafters in Azerbaijan even tried to grant the constitutional 
judiciary the power to ‘dissolve parliament when it repeatedly passes laws that 
violate the constitution’; not surprisingly this was not included in the final draft 
of the constitution.255 Another unusual power which has already been exercised 
is that of the Thai Constitutional Court concerning the approval of the 
recommendations of the National Anti-Corruption Commission in banning 
officials who are unable to provide a truthful statement of their finances.256 
It is argued that the powers discussed above may indeed bring the courts 
to the centre of political controversies and crisis. One may argue that the 
implications of courts addressing and resolving controversal constitutional 
questions would inevitably raise concerns about the independence and 
impartiality of courts operating in transitional democracies.257 That is as argued 
later, given that transitional constitutions may provide for an unclear structure 
and division of powers amongst state institutions, officials and state entities.258 
Questions and controversies of this kind can be frequent and may have crucial 
implications in the case of a newly established constitution.   
As already mentioned at the outset of this chapter, a constitution may 
formally expand the powers and mandate of the constitutional judiciary. On the 
other hand, courts regardless of the extent of their formal jurisdiction might 
expand their own powers, for instance through interpreting rules relating to 
jurisdictions and standing. This could be seen as enabling courts to address or 
resolve questions and controversies which many would argue lie beyond a 
court’s jurisdiction. Although there is no direct relation between formally 
entrusted powers and judicialisation, it can be argued that the more powers a 
court has, the greater the potential for it to become the centre of political 
controversies. 
Given the nature of constitutional judiciaries, their jurisdiction, and the 
questions they deal with, they will always be involved in some decisions that 
are affected by or touch upon the realm of politics. Indeed, some would argue 
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that what differentiates the constitutional judiciary from the ordinary courts is 
that it is not ‘detached from the gravitation field of contention for gaining, 
exercising and preserving political power.’259 In other words, almost any 
decision which it takes may carry implications for the whole legal and political 
system. It also establishes judicial precedents that are crucial in deciding future 
constitutional questions of a similar kind.260 Thus, legally an annulment decision 
is understood to overturn an unconstitutional law and at the same time, this can 
be viewed politically as a retrospective defeat of the majority in parliament that 
passed this law.261 Moreover, it can be argued that such a decision would also 
affect the rule of law where it is intended to reinforce the supremacy of the law 
or hold the government to account for excessive or arbitrary exercise of public 
power. 
A court operates within a political context and applies its decisions to 
that context. Therefore, it is also affected by that context and this may also 
explain the differences in the actual powers that the courts exercise. Many 
would argue that the potential for judicialisation to occur and develop is greater 
where there are fragmented political powers. Thus, arguably such conditions 
might result in the greater independence of the court where fragmentation of 
political powers could serve to diminish the potential external interference with 
or influencing of the judiciary. Therefore, it is important to address the impact 
of the political context within which the judiciary operates focusing on the 
fragmentation arguments.   
3.2.2   Fragmentation of Political Powers and Judicialisation  
It has already been argued that the constitutional judiciaries have 
implications for the legal and political system. Therefore, it is assumed that they 
take into consideration the legal and political constraints. The judiciary not only 
affects the other branches of the government, but is also dependent on them in 
                                                          
259Böckenförde, E.-W. (1999). Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. Strukturfragen, Organisation, 
Legitimation [Constitutional Review. Structural Issues, Organization, Legitimacy], Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 44(1): 10-11, (as quoted in Michael Hein, ‘Constitutional Conflicts 
between Politics and Law in Transition Societies: A Systems-Theoretical Approach’ (2011) 3(1) 
Studies of Transition States and Societies 17). 
260 Aharon Barak, ‘Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in A 
Democracy’ (2002) 116 (1) Harvard Law Review 63. 
261 Hein, ‘Constitutional Conflicts between Politics and Law in Transition Societies’. 
73 
 
many ways: for example, this might be related to their role and involvement in 
judges’ appointment, promotion, discipline and the enforcement of judicial 
decisions. Given these interrelations between the judiciary and the political 
branches, scholars may argue that fragmentation in political powers is one of 
the factors that may explain the potential for judicialisation. Fragmentation here 
means that different political parties control different branches of the 
government, something that can increase difficulties in coordination and 
decision making.262 As the complexity in coordination between government 
branches increases the potential for unresolved controversies, political 
deadlocks may also rise, affecting competence in policy making and serving as 
checks and balances.263 In such situations, it is also possible that political actors 
and interest groups or individuals rely on constitutional litigation for seeking 
policy goals that they could not have achieved by political means.264  
In other words, under a majority government, where one political party 
controls both elected branches, courts which constitutionally authorised to 
overrule legislation, might find less room to actually exercise such power. For 
example, some might argue that the self-restrained approach and the ineffective 
constitutional review power of the Japanese Supreme Court might be related to 
the consecutive majority governments that were controlled by the Japanese 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for over three decades (1955-1993).265 It is 
argued that ‘judges who decided politically sensitive cases according to non-
LDP political preferences incurred a substantial risk that the Secretariat 
[government body] would assign them to a series of low-status positions.’266 
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Thus, the majority government could easily, if it chose, undertake counter 
reactions to the Court’s involvement in controversial questions. 
However, fragmentation arguments do not appear to explain the 
independence of the judiciary in the United Kingdom where, often, a single 
political party controls both the legislative and the executive branches of 
government. Indeed, this example is of relevance and an interesting one. There, 
the judiciary has limited or weak constitutional legislative review powers under 
the Human Rights Act 1998. The potential for expansion of judicial powers and 
the introduction of strong constitutional legislative review under exceptional 
circumstances has been recently discussed by the courts. In the Jackson case, 
Lord Steyn famously expressed the view that, 
The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of 
Parliament, pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of 
place in the modern United Kingdom. […]. The judges created this 
principle. If that is so, it is not unthinkable that circumstances could 
arise where the courts may have to qualify a principle established on a 
different hypothesis of constitutionalism. In exceptional circumstances 
involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of 
the courts, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords or a new 
Supreme Court may have to consider whether this is a constitutional 
fundamental which even a sovereign parliament is acting at the behest 
of a complaisnt House of Commons cannot abolish.267 
Therefore, judges have expressed concerns about the danger of strong majority 
government and how the court may need to become more active in such 
circumstances. Similarly, in the Axa case, Lord Hope expressed the view that, 
It is not entirely unthinkable that a government which has that power 
may seek to use it to abolish judicial review or to diminish the role of 
the courts in protecting the interests of the individual. […] The rule of 
law requires that the judges must retain the power to insist that 
legislation of that extreme kind is not law which the courts will 
recognise. 268 
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The fragmentation thesis argues that courts under a strong majority 
government are more cautious about expanding their powers mainly because 
of the potentiality of responses from the government that might undermine 
their independence. However, here an independent judiciary highlights the 
threat that a strong majority government may pose by violating the rule of law 
principles and, therefore, affecting courts supporting or evaluating the 
possibility of expansion of constitutional legislative power and judicialisation  
The United Kingdom example is different from transitional 
democracies in many ways, not least because principles of the rule of law, 
democracy and independence of the judiciary are far more firmly entrenched. 
One could argue that in transitional democracies, fragmentation arguments 
may explain the rise of the politicians’ desire to establish independent courts. 
It can be seen that,  
In the uncertainty of democratization, politicians who fear electoral loss 
create a strong and independent judiciary to protect themselves from 
the tyranny of election-winners in the future. Weak political parties or 
several deadlocked ones are likely to produce powerful, independent, 
and accessible judicial institutions.269 
Thus, the fragmentation of political power and the potential increase in 
judicialisation of the constitution in transitional democracy may be related. It 
can be argued that a transition to democracy would often increase fragmentation 
of political powers. This is an important argument given that in many 
transitional democracies the political parties, once elected, will be in power 
without any real restraints on their powers ‘until they are outvoted, overthrown, 
impeached, exiled or murdered.’270 Therefore, when powers are fragmented, 
undertaking actions that may overrule the controversial judicial decisions would 
need a broad coalition and coordination between government branches. When 
parliament is deadlocked or a government divided such coordination often 
proves to be impossible.  
Furthermore, fragmentation of political powers may also increase the 
use of constitutional litigation. Although an increase in the courts’ involvement 
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in addressing and resolving constitutional controversies is an indication of the 
greater level of judicialisation, it is not a sign of the court's independence. As 
some literature illustrates, judicialisation under a fragmented political system 
can severely undermine court independence in transitional democracies. Thus, 
at times of constitutional crisis those in power may use constitutional judiciaries 
to serve to rule in their interests. If they succeed in influencing judicial 
decisions, then the court may be seen to be supporting the government and 
legitimizing its exercise of powers, whereas protecting the rule of law might 
come to its margins.271  
Therefore, this thesis argues that fragmentation of powers in government 
branches does not necessarily result in a more independent judiciary; indeed, it 
can threaten the courts’ independence. There may be an interrelation between 
fragmentation, the increase in constitutional litigation and judicialisation of 
constitutional issues. The case study of this thesis will further test these 
arguments in some detail in Chapter Four. Before that, it is essential to address 
the rules of standing and bringing constitutional litigation before the 
constitutional judiciary and the implications for the rise in judicial powers.  
3.3 The Demand Side Factors: Accessing the Judiciary and Legal 
Mobilisation 
Constitutions and other statutes define who can initiate constitutional 
cases and bring constitutional controversies and disputes before the 
constitutional judiciary. The judiciary itself is also essential in defining the 
extent of accessibility of the court. It is imperative to understand the relevance 
of the rules of standing to the increase in judicialisation. The following 
discussion focuses firstly on the accessibility of the constitutional judiciary and 
secondly, the support structure for legal mobilisation around constitutional 
litigation.  
                                                          
271 Trochev, ‘Courts as Losers: The Impact of Constitutional Crises on Judicial Power in Russia 
and Ukraine’ 34. 
77 
 
3.3.1 Accessing the Constitutional Judiciary  
Constitutions adopt different positions on who can access and initiate 
litigation before the constitutional judiciary. The ‘rules of justiciability’ and 
‘standing’ address procedural matters such as the type of cases or controversies 
the courts may hear and the eligibility of the petitioner to bring a case to the 
court. These rules determine the extent of the cases that the court decides and 
arguably the court’s powers.272 Indeed, as Yves Mény argues, constitutional 
courts respond to litigation that is brought before them; to issue rulings, they are 
‘obliged to wait for a favourable opportunity to arise.’273 Some courts may be 
more accessible and therefore hear more cases and controversies than others, 
which could increase the potential for judicialising constitutional issues. Taking 
into consideration the differences from one country to another, individuals, 
governments, politicians, lower courts and even the constitutional judiciary 
itself or public interest groups may have the right to initiate constitutional 
litigation.  
Individuals may access the court using constitutional complaint 
proceedings and concrete judicial review. The exhaustion of all other ordinary 
legal remedies may or may not be a precondition for instigating a constitutional 
complaint, depending on the constitution. For example, in Germany, any person 
who believes their constitutionally protected rights have been infringed by 
public authorities can make a constitutional complaint to the Federal 
Constitutional Court, once all other ordinary legal remedies have been 
exhausted.274 Conversely, in Israel, unless otherwise required by specific law, 
principally ‘controversies in which public agencies are involved as respondent, 
make their way directly to the Supreme Court’.275 The Court has often 
developed ‘liberal rules of standing’ which have allowed judicial review in 
cases brought by those who had not suffered an injury in fact.276 It has been 
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asserted that a direct access to the constitutional judiciary can clearly be 
correlated with the expansion of judicial power and active courts.277    
Furthermore, courts are limited in exercising constitutional judicial 
review and other jurisdictions by cases that are brought before them by a state 
institution, an authorised individual or court itself. Within the framework of 
concrete review of legislation lower courts are authorised and obliged to submit 
a petition for judicial review to the constitutional judiciary, if a doubt has arisen 
about the constitutionality of legal norms to be applied in a concrete case 
pending at this court. Furthermore, any litigant who can assert an injury can 
initiate constitutional review. Conversely, within the framework of its abstract 
review, the constitutional judiciary reviews constitutionality of legislation 
challenged mostly by actors other than courts. These may include a state body, 
a number of politicians, or the governments of federal entities.278 For example, 
in Austria, an abstract review can be initiated by one-third of the members of 
the National Council or the Federal Council, as well as one-third of the members 
of a provincial Parliament.279 
Other less common procedures may be used for bringing constitutional 
cases. The constitutional judiciary itself may initiate constitutional litigation 
acting as ‘sua sponte- on its own motion’. The Hungarian Constitutional Court 
is usually seen as the leading example here. Some may also argue that 
constitutional judges who decide or act without being seen to be bound by the 
limit of the petition that is submitted to the court are probably exercising the 
‘self-initiated procedure’.280 Moreover, some courts can be accessed directly by 
the public interest groups as third parties to the litigation. This will be analysed 
in detail in the discussion that follows in next part. 
Therefore, given this possibility that a court might expand its powers, it 
can be argued that the accessibility of the constitutional judiciary also depends 
to a significant degree on the court’s interpretation of these formally and 
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constitutionally guaranteed rules of justiciability and standing.281 The 
Constitutional Court of Kosovo expanded its powers by interpreting the rules of 
standing and admissibility of constitutional cases broadly. The Court has 
recently established the notion of a ‘continuing situation’ according to which ‘a 
set of circumstances […] repeats anew every day, thereby preventing a legal 
time limit from beginning to run until the situation ceases’.282 The Court has 
used this to expand its jurisdiction. It is argued that, in some cases, reverting to 
this notion has had significant outcomes on the constitutional order and the 
stability of the political system.  
In a case that involved the country’s President, in September 2010, the 
Kosovan Court held that the President ‘could not simultaneously serve as 
President and the chairman of his political party’.283 The decision came when 
the Court was asked to decide whether the president’s position as the Chairman 
of his political party violated the constitution, which explicitly bans the 
President from exercising any political function.284 Remarkably, the case was 
brought outside the allotted time limit for referring to the Court, and it was 
assumed that the Court could dismiss the case on the grounds of inadmissibility. 
The Court however considered the matter as a continuing situation that is not 
affected by the statute of limitations.285 Regardless of the outcomes, this 
example indicates the importance of the court’s role in determining the extent 
of accessibility.  
Therefore, it can be argued that a more expanded and liberal 
interpretation of rules of standing and accessibility, and the existence of fewer 
barriers to adjudication would increase the potential for judicialising more 
questions and controversies. It may also increase the diversity of actors who 
bring these constitutional cases. In other words, as the US Supreme Court 
Justice Powell argues, ‘[r]elaxation of standing requirements is directly related 
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to the expansion of judicial power’.286 Thus, the expanded standing may 
improve the accountability function of the judiciary in serving to strengthen the 
checks against those in power and constitutional violations.287 Given the binding 
nature, finality and wider implications of constitutional decisions, one may 
argue that constitutional litigation can often be used strategically and regularly 
as a means of challenging a government’s exercise of powers.288 From that 
perspective, an accessible court is essential for the rule of  law. On the other 
hand, an expanded standing may be seen to contradict democracy as it 
potentially gives rise to greater judicialisation and that in itself may increase 
judicial interference in areas which should be reserved for majoritarian 
policies.289 The next part will discuss these arguments in further depth.  
The discussion so far has addressed the relevance that direct access to 
the constitutional judiciary may have for potentially increasing judicialisation. 
The court may also be accessed indirectly, namely, by public interest groups 
demanding judicial protection for their policy interests by assisting others who 
are unable to exercise this right despite being entitled to standing. The next 
section considers support structure arguments, addressing the role that indirect 
access plays, focusing on litigating for public interest and the implications of 
this for judicialisation and the rule of law.  
3.3.2   The Support Structures for Constitutional Litigation   
This part develops the argument that an expanded standing increases 
access to the constitutional judiciary and then increases the judicialisation of 
constitutional issues. Courts are largely dependent on others to bring questions 
and controversies forward.290 Although individual access to the constitutional 
judiciary is relatively well-established and courts are reasonably accessible, in 
practice, the capability of individuals who have suffered an injury to litigate or 
sustain their litigation once it has been initiated is limited. Their intellectual, 
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financial and legal abilities to surmount cost barriers or restrictive procedural 
requirements limit their access.291 Marc Galanter differentiates between what he 
called the ‘have-nots’ and the ‘haves’ (in relation to their power, wealth and 
status).292 The latter are in a more advantageous position regarding litigation 
and seeking judicial protection for their interests.  
Therefore, the accessibility of the courts becomes meaningful if these 
individuals can have real access and bring their cases forward. Charles Epp, 
referring to the emergence of the ‘rights revolutions’ in several common law 
democracies, underlines the necessity of support structures for legal 
mobilisation. Epp argues that:  
Cases do not arrive in supreme courts as if by magic. […] the process 
of legal mobilization - the process by which individuals make claims 
about their legal rights and pursue lawsuits to defend or develop those 
rights- is not in any simple way a direct response to opportunities 
provided by Constitutional promises or judicial decisions, or to 
expectations arising from popular culture.
 
Legal mobilization also 
depends on resources and resources for rights litigation depend on a 
support structure of rights-advocacy: lawyers, rights advocacy 
organizations, and sources of financing.293 
As previously argued in this chapter, institutions and rules are essential but the 
extent to which they can be used and applied to a context is complex. Although 
rights protection is the central focus of Epp’s thesis, one can argue that support 
structures for legal mobilisation involving constitutional judiciary can also be 
of significant relevance to cases concerning the accountability of those in power 
and the rule of law.  
Therefore, public interest groups or civil society organisations are 
increasingly involved in litigation defending their own policy interests either 
directly or indirectly by supporting others’ cases. They can support those 
individuals who may be considered to be in a disadvantaged position regarding 
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having adequate resources, skills, and information to support their cases.294 
Richard Cortner maintains that the public interest groups may choose litigations, 
because they are temporarily, or even permanently, disadvantaged in 
terms of their abilities to attain successfully their goals in the electoral 
process, within the elected political institutions or in the bureaucracy. 
If they are to succeed at all in the pursuit of their goals they are almost 
compelled to resort to litigation.295 
In other words, litigating for ‘public interest’ can be used strategically, and 
especially when these groups seem to lack the support of the elected branches 
for their policy interests, the judiciary is seen as being the next most reliable 
institution. As Cortner has argued, their use of the judiciary serves to develop 
constitutional jurisprudence, whether it takes the form of the ‘aggressive 
litigant’ who seeks a new constitutional interpretation from the court or the 
‘defensive litigant’ who does not.296 Furthermore, one can argue that there are 
two groups of ‘disadvantaged’ litigants. First are individuals who, because of 
their weak position regarding resources or expertise, seek or attract support from 
a network of support structures such as public interest groups or organizations. 
Second are public interest groups which may themselves be in a disadvantaged 
position regarding their inability or difficulties to gain or protect their interests 
using political means or in the political arena. The cooperation between these 
two actors may indeed contribute to the growing demands for judicial powers 
or judicialisation. 
Supporting individuals with their cases may include providing financial 
and intellectual support through third party intervention or amicus curiae 
briefs.297 Amicus briefs, originally introduced as a means of supplying courts 
with information not delivered by the parties who are involved, have become ‘a 
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partisan advocacy of specific positions’.298 Third-party intervention implies that 
non-parties to a case with an interest in its outcome seek leave from the court to 
intervene in the litigation.299 In any case, the third party or the amice may 
highlight issues not being raised by other  parties. For instance, in constitutional 
cases it may bring to the court’s attention the wider economic, social and policy 
implications of a decision.300 Thus, in some instances, the complexity and 
sensitivity of constitutional contestations may discourage or even prevent a 
person who is the injured party from bringing forward their cases, being unable 
to present or otherwise insufficiently presenting them.301 
Furthermore, public interest groups have been crucial to the support 
structures, in particular, the third party intervention and amicus curiae briefs. 
Constitutions and indeed courts are varied in providing for public interest 
standing. Some constitutions provide for ‘third-party public interest standing’ 
whereby the public interest groups are authorised to access directly the 
constitutional judiciary on behalf of individuals. The most recent constitution in 
Kenya authorises ‘a person acting in the public interest’ (not necessarily the 
injured or concerned party) to institute litigation claiming that a constitutionally 
protected right ‘has been denied, violated or infringed, or is threatened.’302 A 
similar application is possible in Croatia wherein ‘any person’ can access the 
constitutional judiciary in other words; ‘[E]very individual or legal person has 
the right to propose the institution of proceedings to review the constitutionality 
of the law […].’303 The doctrine or practice of third-party public interest, 
whether authorized explicitly in the constitution or developed by judges, is that 
A third party or bystander litigant […] assert[s] constitutional rights on 
behalf of other individuals or groups. Dissimilar to a class action 
litigant, the third-party public interest litigant does not suffer the injury 
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of the alleged violation but is permitted to litigate the constitutional 
violation, whether as the sole petitioner or in addition to other direct or 
indirect plaintiffs.304 
Furthermore, it is observed that courts might expand rules of standing for public 
interest, deciding which of the cases involving public interest can be initiated 
without the need for an injury in fact or personal harm. The Israeli Supreme 
Court has developed the view that ‘when the claim alleges a major violation of 
the rule of law (in its broad sense), every person in Israel has legal standing to 
sue.’305 Similarly, the Indian Supreme Court has played a leading role in 
developing procedural rules for public interest litigation. It  reduced the standing 
barrier for litigants arguing that ‘it would not reject a claim in the community 
interest based solely on lack of locus standi’. The Court emphasised the need to 
liberalise standing in order  ‘to meet the challenges of the times’, and ‘to 
embrace all interests’ that protect ‘public resources and the direction and 
correction of public power so as to promote justice’.306 It can be argued that an 
expansion of judicial power driven by increasingly active litigation in the public 
interest and made possible by an expanded standing may enable the judiciary to 
check and limit the government power in controversial policy areas. Thus, many 
would argue that under the rubric of  public interest litigation the Indian 
Supreme Court ‘has altered accountability norms and administrative structures 
through the creation of investigative bodies and oversight commissions that 
have supplanted the role of ministries.’ 307   
On the one hand, some may argue that since public interest litigation can 
enhance and expand individuals’ access to the constitutional judiciary and serve 
to protect their interests and rights through legal means, it can serve to hold 
governmental exercise of powers within constitutional limits.308 This procedure 
may allow ‘the judiciary to hear abstract cases [brought by a third-party] to 
examine the constitutionality of legislations.’309 It is reported that actio 
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popularis was central to Hungary’s Constitutional Court decision to uphold the 
limitations on the executive’s powers before this procedure was abandoned in 
its 2011 law reform.310 
Therefore, the procedure serves to promote the ends of the rule of law 
and the legal arbitration of controversial matters brought into court cases 
concerning government infringement of rights or other abusive exercises of 
power.311 It is also argued that allowing access to interest groups, in particular, 
those with similar interests to politicians, may serve to improve their attempts 
at monitoring government through judicial means.312 Aharon Barak argued that 
‘[T]he rules of standing are closely related to the principle of the rule of law. 
Closing the doors of the court to a petitioner with no injury in fact who warns 
of a public body’s unlawful action means giving that government agency a free 
hand to act without fear of judicial review.’313 Thus, one could also see this 
procedure as being central to the rule of law reforms in transitional democracies 
that target judicial institutions. 
On the other hand, the interrelation between expanded standing, broad 
public interest litigation and the judicialisation of state policy and governance 
has also raised serious concerns challenging the role of the court. The 
experience of the Indian Supreme Court suggests that the Court’s decisions 
concerning public interest litigation may be seen as ‘too arbitrary, or too 
pragmatic, and not guided by predictable standards from both outside and even 
from within the Court.’314 This remark may also apply to other courts that have 
significantly expanded their powers by substantially loosening rules of standing 
for public interest groups. As a result, the judiciary may become ‘less 
constrained by legal doctrine and precedent, and more constrained by 
policy/political factors, in adjudicating governance disputes than ordinary 
claims.’315 These are serious concerns since a court with such an expanded 
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accessibility might be more likely to trespass into political fields and exceed its 
jurisdictional limitations. In other words, some may argue that: 
[L]imiting standing to injury-in-fact claims prevents the judiciary from 
exercising too much power, the fear being that if the judiciary agrees to 
hear abstract cases about what a law may do, the judiciary is essentially 
taking on a role more suited for a publicly elected body.316  
Of course, there is no denial that this may be the plausible scenario. Even if 
public interest litigation must be important to the constitutional adjudication, 
there should be some limitations. For example, one could argue that litigating 
for public interest through a third party can only bring abstract review cases that 
challenge the constitutionality of legislation.317  
3.4 Transitional Democracy: A Challenge and Opportunity for 
Judicialisation 
It may be argued that judicialisation can also occur in authoritarian 
regimes, therefore, it is not solely related to democracy.318 Tamir Moustafa 
argues that the economic factors, specifically foreign investment, explain the 
rise of a relatively independent and influential Supreme Constitutional Court in 
Egypt. There, constitutional judicial review was introduced mainly to provide 
legal protection for property rights and to restrict government power in this 
regard.319 Whilst acknowledging the above argument, however, this thesis 
considers transition to democracy to be one of the relevant factors explaining 
the rise of influential constitutional judiciaries and the potential for greater 
judicialisation of constitutional issues in transitional states. Thus, many would 
argue that democratization and the expansion of judicial powers are correlated. 
An authoritarian regime, as Tate notes, would not invite or permit ‘even 
nominally independent judges to increase their participation in the making of 
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major public policies’ nor would it tolerate ‘decision-making processes that 
place adherence to legalistic procedural rules and rights above the rapid 
achievement of desired substantive outcomes.’320 
The following discussion concerns the plausibility of expanding the 
judicialisation of constitutional issues under a newly established democratic 
constitutional order and the implications for the rule of law. It goes beyond the 
problems of the legitimacy of constitutional judiciaries, arguing that the courts 
are increasingly involved in significant controversies and questions of both a 
constitutional and political nature which could have various implications for the 
legal and political system as a whole. Two points may be considered relevant 
here: the newly adopted constitutional text as it is written and functions, as well 
as the context to which it applies.   
 
 3. 4.1 Constitutional and Institutional Opportunity Structures for 
Judicialisation in Transitional Democracies 
States in their path toward transition to constitutional democracy often 
appeal to new principles, rules and institutions to redistribute powers subject the 
exercise of power to the supremacy of the law and the supremacy of the people 
through their representatives. Thus, the newly established constitution creates a 
‘constitutional balance’ of powers and means for arbitration of potential 
conflicts in interpreting this balance or any controversy concerning power 
struggles. Given the nature of political transition and the context to which it 
applies, the enforcement of the constitution always proves challenging and can 
result in major controversies, disputes and ongoing crises that test the 
conceptual and structural aspects of the rule of law and democratic transition. 
3.4.1.1 Constitutions in Transitions: Normative and Transformative  
The constitutions of post-authoritarian transitional states are often 
defined as putting an end to an authoritarian rule and setting the foundation for 
a new democratic order.321 The transition to democracy involves restructuring 
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the constitution, rules and institutions; holding elections, and balancing the 
relation between the pre-transitional legal system and the post-transition 
democratic constitutional order.322 It is inevitable that the conceptual and 
structural difficulties regarding the rule of law become relevant. There is a 
constant tension between legal and political continuity and change. Thus, 
constant conflicts exist concerning upholding legal continuity and the 
legitimacy of the former regime; between retroactive or prospective aspects of 
legal norms. The constitution aims to address and regulate these and similar 
issues. Thus, the constitutional text should be reasonably clear, consistent and 
non-contradictory and capable of guiding state officials, institutions and also 
individuals exercising their powers. It should guarantee formal and substantive 
principles of democracy. It is almost inevitable that there will be frequent and 
immediate conflicts in interpreting the constitution and disputes about 
competences in transitional states. As a result, the constitution becomes vital 
insofar as the resolution of these controversies and disputes is concerned. It can 
be seen as being essential with regard to holding public authorities (present and 
past; elected or appointed) accountable for their exercise of power, the 
supremacy of the law and the newly established democratic principles.323  
There are many reasons that the constitutional text may contribute to the 
occurrence of potential controversies and conflicts involving state power or may 
become largely irrelevant to their resolution. During the transition to 
democracy, the constitution making process and consequently the final 
constitutional texts are often affected by the growing lack of trust among parties 
aiming to establish a stable constitutional democracy. The constitutional text 
then ‘can often be characterized as aspirational documents’ containing a great 
deal of ‘ambition but little specificity’. 324 It is observed that ‘the participants in 
the constitutional bargain are unlikely to have longstanding relations of trust 
among themselves, nor much experience with what may be the difficult issues 
of implementation in the new constitutional order’.325 
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Therefore, it seems almost impossible to establish constitutional 
principles and rules regarding contested matters, that would be accepted by all 
parties involved in constitution writing.326 Thus, they may opt to adopt an 
ambiguous formula that could allow agreements to occur over time as legal and 
political institutions interact.327The result may often be ‘thoroughly 
transformative documents by necessity’.328 Even when the constitution is 
defined as permanent, to distinguish it from the provisional constitution that is 
usually written to regulate the immediate period of transition, it still can be 
regarded of as transitional and transformative.  
The constitution has a ‘constructive relation’ to the changing and 
unstable political order. It contains provisional political arrangements that 
govern constitutional and political order for a specific period. Its unamendable 
provisions, especially regarding individual rights and the basic foundation of 
the state,329 are intended to protect the core of the new constitutional order.330 
Furthermore, the distribution of powers and constraints of state powers are often 
affected by the political and constitutional legacy of the pre-transitional regime. 
For instance, it is said that the German Basic Law responded to the Weimar 
Republic by establishing a symbolic presidency.331 On the other hand, the 
constitutional text is often detailed and thick; for example, containing ‘large 
amounts of material –socio-economic provisions, group rights, etc.’332 It may 
also provide for considerable ambiguity in defining the institutional structure of 
the state power, and defer various matters of significant importance to 
implementing legislations.333 Thus, much about the new power sharing or 
redistribution of powers is left undefined, and is often subjected to a series of 
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constitutional reviews or amendments that are intended to be conducted 
immediately.334 
Given this explanation of the transitional constitutions, seemingly the 
line or differences between ordinary and constitutional politics can be 
distinguished by only  the narrowest of margins, and the ‘standard dichotomy’ 
between the two seems unclear.335 Whilst the constitution can be seen 
principally as superior to the ordinary politics, in the transitional state often the 
latter transcends the former.336 Having said that, the constitutional issues and 
questions are increasingly expanding into policy areas, and ‘it becomes ‘thicker’ 
in each domain (more dense, technical, and differentiated)’.337These 
constitutional issues will at some point be subjected to the scrutiny of the 
constitutional judiciary, giving the court a thicker ‘grounds for judicialised 
debate’.338Furthermore, this expanded list of constitutional issues when 
combined with ambiguity, lack of openness, clarity and stability may become 
an insufficient guide for the exercise of power and for enacting implementing 
legislation, or the ‘making of particular laws’.339 Thus, one would challenge the 
conformity of the constitution itself to the basic tenets of the rule of law, along 
with its ability to guide politicians, and ultimately judges, and to serve to 
strengthen the state of the rule of law and democracy. The implementation of 
such a constitutional text would certainly be affected by the context to which it 
is applied wherein there are growing concerns regarding a weak constitutional 
rule of law culture. 
3.4.1.2 A Weak Constitutional and Rule of Law Culture 
The discussion of the relevance of the rule of law for transitional 
democracies in the previous chapter refers to many examples from emerging 
democracies that evidence the existence of a large gap between the 
constitutional balance of powers in theory and in practice.340 In the immediacy 
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of the transition, the exercise of power by the newly elected or appointed state 
officials and institutions seems to have put the constitutional balance of powers 
to its ultimate test. As a result, this may lead to growing concerns about these 
powers being concentrated in one body at the expense of the other. These 
comparative insights from emerging democracies also illustrate the weak rule 
of law tradition and the danger that the transitional states may become states of 
‘unrule’ of law,341 or at best ‘ruled by law’. 
Although, it is to be expected that state institutions would experience 
different degrees of incompetence and challenges to their legitimacy, it is 
noticeable that parliaments are the institutions whose performance tends to be 
poor, causing them to be considered ineffective representative bodies.  In some 
cases, they can be seen as ‘irrelevant actors in the public-policy process, or even 
obstructionist’.342 Conversely, in both presidential and parliamentary systems, 
the executive branch may become more powerful and influential.343 Any 
number of factors may contribute to that: for example, the dominance of the 
political elite’s narrow interests, the weakness of political parties, institutional 
deadlock or the authoritarian practices of the government.344 In this case, this 
excess of power would certainly eliminate the constitutional balance of power 
and undermine the newly established democratic order and the rule of law.345  
Whilst in relatively developed and stable democracies, other political 
and peaceful means exist that can serve to overcome the ineffectiveness of 
elected branches of the government including check and balances, 
accountability mechanisms and holding new elections. In a fragile and emerging 
democracy, even though these means are formally secured, in practice 
exercising them seems challenging. As Teitel puts it: ‘the relative competence 
and capacities of judiciaries and legislatures in ordinary times […] simply do 
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not hold in unstable periods.’346 In other words, the ‘implicit assumptions about 
democracy and democratic accountability […] ought not be automatically 
applied to illiberal regimes, nor to regimes beginning to move away from such 
rule.’347 Thus, in a weak constitutional culture, wherein constitutional rules are 
often ignored or violated and there is a lack of a ‘sustained institutional 
experience and practice of constitutional democracy’,348 political arrangements 
and compromises may often prove inappropriate as conflicts are ongoing.349  
Often, in the early stages of democratization political actors increasingly 
try to test constitutional boundaries of powers in an attempt to expand their 
powers.350 Conflicts of competence, therefore, are more likely to occur, the 
resolution of which may define or redefine balance of powers. However,  it 
seems highly unlikely that even basic contestations over the exercise of power 
can be resolved through democratic means, in parliament.351 Although the 
judiciary may not be ‘any better attuned to constitutional values than politicians; 
judicial interpretations of the constitution that create constitutional practices and 
discourses may nevertheless serve to develop constitutional culture.352 
Furthermore, Barak maintains that in ‘young and fragile democracies’ there is a 
crucial ‘need to establish preliminary understandings of the basis of 
democracy’, whereas in ‘an old and established democracy like the United 
States the main principles of the constitutional framework have already been 
established, and judicial corrective –which assume the existence of democracy- 
is limited in its role.’353  
In transitional states, the law can be in a state of flux as the political 
system too is unstable; consequently many of the controversial issues and power 
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struggles that often require speedy solutions may lack relevant laws that would 
serve to resolve them.354 The contested parties may make significant use of 
‘case-by-case’ resolution of constitutional disputes in an attempt to defend their 
particular interpretations of constitutional rules, filling gaps left by the 
politicians’ failure  to enact the necessary implementing legislation to ensure 
the functioning of the new constitutional order. The assumption that judiciary 
and legislature are reasonably functioning in ordinary times may not be 
applicable due to the circumstances of transitional states here.355 Therefore, 
some may argue that the case-bay case resolution of the constitutional 
controversies could provide substantial solution at a time when the other 
branches of the government are unable to compromise or function.356  
Thus, it may be argued that the constitution often establishes ‘a weak 
and incompletely realized commitment to democratic processes’.357 Thus, the 
judiciary may support a ‘quick transition to basic democratic governance before 
they [drafters and parties to the constitutional negotiations] are capable of full 
agreement’.358 Therefore, it can be said that the newly established constitutional 
judiciaries are expected to ‘act as stabilizing anchors to protect freedom in a 
turbulent age’,359 and also ‘provide a convenient outlet that enables citizens to 
bring into the public arena issues ignored or neglected by the political 
system’.360 Courts can be equally aware of their role in such contexts and 
sometimes explicitly comment on this. For example, Justice Albie Sachs of the 
South African Constitutional Court said, ‘[W]e are aware that we are 
simultaneously both heirs to a timeless international tradition, and promoters of 
a new constitutional jurisprudence, this in a country that both longs for 
transformation and desperately needs predictability’361  
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The discussion so far suggests that judges may constantly argue that they 
are promoting the rule of law and fostering the transition to a democratic system 
whilst they are becoming increasingly involved in addressing and resolving 
contested constitutional controversies. Thus, it can be argued that under a weak 
rule of law system in transitional states, constitutional questions and 
controversies would often be transferred into constitutional cases brought before 
the constitutional judiciary. The inevitable expansion of judicial powers and 
influential role of the courts may or may not mean an improvement in the rule 
of law. Therefore, it is imperative to discuss the potential implications of 
expansion of the judicial powers for the rule of law. The next part briefly 
analyses judicialisation through the lens of the rule of law in transitional 
democracies and develops the conceptual arguments that form the basis for the 
analysis of the case study used in this thesis that will follow in chapters four and 
five.   
3.4.2 The Potential Implications of Judicialisation on the Rule of Law   
Some studies have suggested that the legitimacy problems of 
constitutional judicial review are almost irrelevant to the constitution making 
processes that often coincide with the transition from an authoritarian regime to 
a democratic order. Indeed, commenting on the process of post-communist 
constitution making, Sadurski notes that ‘the debate about the wisdom (or 
otherwise) of setting up a system which importantly limited the supremacy of 
parliaments was almost non-existent, and constitutional courts enjoyed their 
legitimacy largely by default.’362 Others were of the opinion that,  
The most difficult problem facing the countries of Eastern Europe today 
is the creation of a government that can pursue effective reforms while 
retaining public confidence and remaining democratically 
accountable. The core institution of the fledgling democracies, 
therefore, is the parliament. […] To over legitimate the court […] is to 
diminish the assembly in the public’s eyes and to help discredit the 
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entire concept (which has barely been learned) of representation 
through periodic elections. 363  
Of course, there are serious concerns about ‘overemphasising’ the role of the 
constitutional judiciary and the implication of a rapid and substantial 
judicialisation of constitutional issues. It is said that transitional states or the, 
arguable, ‘exceptionalism’ of their circumstances should not be seen ‘as a means 
of side-stepping the objections that we might raise elsewhere to the institutional 
anomalies of strong judicial review.’364 Thus, judicialisation may create 
conflicts between strengthening the rule of law and enhancing democracy. 
On the other hand, as argued in the previous chapter, almost all legal 
systems have introduced some form of a constitutional judicial review of 
legislation.365 Some scholars even correlate the success or the relevance of 
judicial review to a reasonably functioning democracy and judiciary. Despite 
serious concerns about the functioning of the institutions of democracy and 
judiciary in transitional democracies, almost all new constitutions have set up 
constitutional courts with some crucial powers.366 One of the reasons for this 
may be that somewhat exceptional circumstances and differences between those 
countries that have newly emerged from authoritarianism and the established 
democracies may make it possible to introduce rules, institutions, and practices 
which are usually criticised in developed democracies, including judicial 
review. However, such exceptions should be used to hold government officials 
accountable to the law and the constitution.367 In other words, under the rubric 
of constitutional review, these courts are intended to serve to protect the new 
constitutional order, smoothing the transition from formal to the substantive rule 
of law and from an authoritarian to a more liberal system.368In doing so, it may 
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define and redefine the constitutional balance of powers and constraints on state 
power.  
Moreover, judicialisation in new democracies has potential implications 
that may define or redefine the constitutional balance of powers and the rule of 
law.369 It is assumed that constitutional judicial review would be most effective 
and ‘intense in those political systems in which the Rechtsstaat had been 
established before the advent of democracy […]’.370Constitutions in transitional 
democracies are by and large transformative, their legal and the political 
systems are also usually unstable and changing. Often, constitutional 
adjudication and decisions may reflect this transformative nature. Thus, the 
strength of judicialisation may not be the same as the rule of law. One can argue 
that judicialisation both affects and is affected by the rule of law. The expansion 
of judicial powers and the emergence of influential courts under a fragile rule 
of law system may result in yet another challenge for democratization and the 
rule of law itself.371 Thus, it is argued that  
[E]arly signs of political independence at the top level of judicial 
hierarchies may prove to be conjectural rather than a true reflection of 
any systemic change within the judicial branch more generally. And 
they may prompt a defensive reaction by incumbent power holders in 
the executive branch, unwilling to make long-term concessions to 
judicial scrutiny and independence. Thus, the balance of power between 
branches is continually shifting and being tested. 372 
In other words, challenges to judicial independence are more frequently found 
in transitional and developing democracies, although, in principle, the courts are 
protected through institutional guarantees of independence and it is difficult to 
overturn their decisions. However, as Gretchen Helmke asserts, in practice such 
institutional guarantees are absent or largely undeveloped in most developing 
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democracies.373 The author makes several observations in this regard, noting 
that judges in developing countries are threatened not only by their decision 
being overturned, but also physical intimidation and violence. Moreover, 
although the legislature is formally granted powers designed to provide 
institutional protection, and to promote an independent and accountable 
judiciary, the ‘de facto’ powerful executive that concentrates power, mostly 
dominates the implementation of such mechanisms.374 Furthermore, given the 
significance of the constitutional judiciary and the implications of their 
decisions, the powerful state actors may turn to the judiciary to serve to 
legitimise their excess of power. 375 
Given the struggles of the judiciary to establish its independence and 
legitimacy in such contexts, it is argued that a court ‘may have to build its own 
constituency before it can even attempt to assert its power.’376 Some studies 
have suggested that constitutional judiciaries should aim to create a balance 
between the growing demands for the resolution of constitutional disputes and 
their own legitimacy and independence. For example, some may argue that the 
court should consider its approach depending on the type of questions which it 
is being asked to resolve. It may decide to settle constitutional issues, which 
enjoy significant political consensus and substantial agreement. In this situation, 
the court’s decision provides further guarantees or reinforces those matters that 
are already clear and accepted.377  
Equally important, in transitional democracies where the formal rule of 
law is still at risk the government does not obey its own laws, judicial rulings 
and the proclamation of rights seem to place an ineffective obligation on the 
government.378Thus, studies have suggested that in the early stages of 
transitions, courts may avoid addressing and resolving the substance of sensitive 
constitutional questions in order to protect judicial independence from external 
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and political counter reactions.379 These include constitutional issues which are 
central and crucial to the constitutional democracy, yet deeply contested among 
political actors. Some of them are extensively contested among political actors 
and require specific legislation passed by a supermajority in the parliament 
which would be highly unlikely to be achieved. On the other hand, principally 
judicial decisions of constitutional courts ‘supplant the choices made through 
the political process’ which often difficult to be changed.380  
For example, the above assumption may explain, partially, the Russian 
constitutional judiciary’s shift from resolving the disputes concerning 
competence and separation of powers to ruling on conflicts concerning 
protection of rights. One could argue that human rights cases were safer for the 
Court to rule on than intruding on decisions relating to cases involving the 
separation of powers which put the court at the centre of the conflicts between 
political branches.381 The first Russian post-communist Constitutional Court is 
considered to be a well-known example of a court that endangered its legitimacy 
and existence by deeply interfering in constitutional conflicts involving political 
actors. 
 In the case of the Russian Communist Party in 1992, the Court was 
central to a constitutional conflict between the parliament and the President. 
When the President, Boris Yeltsin, ‘in a series of decrees after the 1991 coup 
attempt, disbanded the Communist Party and seized its property and assets, the 
Communists challenged the decrees as exceeding presidential power’.382  The 
Court’s decision, to uphold President’s decree banning ‘the organs of the 
national Communist Party of Soviet Union’ but not the local organs of the Party, 
did not settle the dispute, and was not accepted by the parties to the conflict. 
The Court then became further embroiled in the crisis by negotiating a 
compromise between the parliament and the President. In another move in 1993 
the Court ruled unconstitutional a presidential decree that had granted Yeltsin 
emergency powers.383 What happened in the few months following was 
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remarkable, as the President himself ‘dissolved the parliament and suspended 
the Court’s operation’.384 Many would argue that the Court’s involvement in 
these controversial questions and their central role in this crisis provoked 
government responses that ultimately affected the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Indeed, when the Court reconvened in 1995, it no longer had the power to 
determine the constitutionality of political parties, a jurisdiction that it had 
previously held.385  
In any case, judges may tend to protect the power and legitimacy of their 
courts by deliberately avoiding becoming embroiled in politically sensitive 
issues, settling disputes or ruling against powerful politicians. Instead, they 
focus on the procedural aspects of the case.386 Declining jurisdiction or focusing 
on the procedural matters implies that the courts mainly scrutinise how the 
legislature and executive have made their decision not what they decided. 
Another prevailing approach in constitutional adjudication is that the courts 
often focus on the legal continuity. In general, the rule of law requires that the 
law is ‘continuous and prospective.’  However, it can be said that the law in 
transitional contexts seems to be ‘simultaneously continuous and discontinuous, 
retrospective and prospective.’387The conflicts concerning legality and 
legitimacy of the law are often raised when the question or the legal norm before 
the court involves a pre-transition law. Thus, the courts often uphold the formal 
aspects of the rule of law rather than the substance of the law itself until the time 
that the law is replaced or amended by the parliament.388   
The courts may also adopt several strategies which are intended to 
preserve and expand the democratic and constitutional government’s authority, 
while at the same time protecting and expanding the courts’ power.389 The 
constitutional judges may use a number of methods available to any court or 
develop its own approach to avoid deciding on the substance of an issue. The 
most obvious method includes interpreting jurisdictional and justiciability rules 
in their narrower sense. For example, a literalist interpretation of rules may 
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provide greater certainty about the law, and the objectives that the legislature 
aims to achieve. Since the judges’ long-term objective should be to develop 
gradually a culture in which judicial decisions are respected and defended, this 
clarity contributes to the legitimacy of the decisions.390  
Although some may claim that since the constitutions in transitional 
democracies are principally transformative in nature, constitutional adjudication 
may also be seen as transformative and ‘self-regarding’. Thus, it can be seen 
that the courts might change previous principles and precedents in response to 
changing legal and political systems especially when dealing with ‘high-profile 
cases.’391 Consistency or application of stare decisis may further assist a judge 
in an unstable and untested political context.392 Overturning precedent might 
become very costly on the court,   
Obviously, every judge follows precedent to some degree, […]. But it 
is equally obvious that judges can and do place many values far above 
precedent. Judges in a stable democracy can place stare decisis further 
down the list because they know that shifts in judicial policy explicitly 
on grounds of policy will not threaten their legitimacy. A judge in a 
fragile democracy, though, must be far more circumspect. She realizes 
that every precedent overturned brings her closer to political 
irrelevance. This is slightly different in stable democracies in which 
changes in court’s policy ‘will not threaten their legitimacy’.393 
Therefore, it can be seen that ambiguous and open ended judgments, 
overturning precedents or inconsistency in deciding similar cases alike may also 
undermine court legitimacy and the rule of law. Thus, one could question the 
extent to which the court itself upholds the rule of law. These arguments are 
further developed in the following chapters that focus on the experience of the 
newly established constitutional judiciary in Iraq’s post-2003 democratic 
transition, compering this to the theoretical insights developed in this chapter. 
 
                                                          
390 Zasloff, ‘The Tyranny of Madison’ 854. 
391Teitel, ‘Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation’ 2033. 
392 Zasloff, ‘The Tyranny of Madison’ 850-854. 
393 ibid 852 [original emphasis]. 
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Conclusion  
It is in general agreed that the rise of judicialisation is increasingly 
correlated with the interplay of multiple factors. Thus, a relatively independent, 
accessible constitutional judiciary under the rubric of judicial review and other 
jurisdictions that often put the judges at the centre of highly contested 
constitutional questions can expand judicial power. This thesis argues that the 
fragmentation of political powers, the lack of constitutional culture and indeed 
of a rule of law culture in the years immediately following democratic transition 
may increase the number of controversies and disputes regarding the new 
constitutional order.  In the case of the often unstable and changing political and 
legal circumstances of transitional states, judicialisation may have two 
implications. On the one hand, an expansion in judicial powers may serve the 
basic tenets of the rule of law, namely to minimise the arbitrary and excessive 
use of power, by upholding the supremacy of the law and arbitration of disputes. 
That might be largely true regarding judicialisation that has implications 
concerning the formal elements of the rule of law. Thus, the court checks that 
the government understands and conforms to ideas of legal certainty, clarity, 
stability, predictability in implementing general constitutional norms, and 
guiding the state officials and institutions in exercising their powers and 
enacting the implementing laws.  
On the other hand, judicialisation may undermine the rule of law, if the 
courts become increasingly involved in addressing and resolving controversial 
questions that are central to the government policy. Courts may undermine their 
legitimacy and conformity to the rule of law by exceeding the constitutional 
limitations and boundaries of the distribution of powers. Furthermore, as a result 
of the growing concerns about the judiciary’s independence from political 
interference and external influence, the government may use courts and the 
formal rule of law as a means of legitimising arbitrary and overreaching powers.  
Given the ongoing demands placed on constitutional adjudication, the 
court’s increasing vulnerability to potential political interference, and its desire 
to further influence constitutional and political developments in transitional 
democracies, it appears that the judiciary tend to respond gradually to the 
broader implications of their decisions and involvements. Hence, the courts may 
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interpret rules concerning jurisdiction and standing or use precedents to limit 
their involvement in contested constitutional issues and avoid ruling on the 
substance of controversial constitutional cases.     
These above arguments will be expanded in Chapter Five of this thesis 
by conducting a detailed analysis of the case law of the Iraq Federal Supreme 
Court. However, before presenting this analysis, it is important to explain the 
institutional and structural aspects of the Iraqi constitutional judiciary and the 
political context within which it operates. Therefore, this will be considered in 
the next chapter in order to identify those factors that facilitate judicialisation 
and to highlight the potential implications that this has for the rule of law in a 
transitional democracy.   
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Chapter Four: Understanding the Iraqi Federal Supreme 
Court: Applying the Judicialisation Factors 
Introduction 
Chapter Three maintained that, in general, judicialisation of 
constitutional issues occurs and develops as a result of the interaction of 
multiple factors. It argued that the structural and political context of transitional 
and emerging democracies provided institutional opportunities in the form of 
constitutional contestations and disputes. It also implied that the newly 
established or empowered constitutional judiciaries are intended to be 
reasonably independent and accessible. The analyses then illustrated that there 
can be a growing demand on the judiciary to address and resolve a broad range 
of constitutional questions that might even include the basics of the newly 
established constitutional order. The focus then shifted to the implications of the 
judicialisation of constitutional issues for the rule of law and democratic 
transition. It highlighted the possibility that government might use the judiciary 
and the formal rule of law as a means of legitimising its own exercise of 
excessive powers.  
In view of the above arguments and the detailed analyses of the Iraq 
Federal Supreme Court (FSC) case law in Chapter Five, it is important to 
understand how the FSC interacts with institutional, political and socio-
structural factors. It should be noted that Iraq was one of the first countries in 
the region with a constitution that had explicitly established constitutional 
judicial review (1925-1958). In the aftermath of the overthrow of the monarchy, 
judicial review became entirely absent from the political and constitutional 
tradition of Iraq for decades, save for the 1964 constitution where it remained 
only on paper. The FSC was established in the course of Iraq’s transition from 
a longstanding authoritarian regime to a constitutional democracy under TAL 
(2004). It is anticipated that the newly established constitutional judiciary will 
be drawn deeper into the political and constitutional process.  
This chapter argues that the 2005 Constitution and the context within 
which the FSC acts and with which it interacts have contributed to the rise of 
the judicialisation of constitutional issues and consequently the potential 
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politicisation of the judiciary, which directly affect the rule of law. Therefore, 
this chapter is divided into three sections. Section one provides significant 
insights into the constitutional and political context within which the FSC 
operates. Section two concerns the institution and powers of the constitutional 
judiciary in post-2003 Iraq. Section three analyses the potential for an emerging 
network of support structures for legal mobilisation of constitutional litigation.   
4.1   Post-2003 Constitutional and Political Developments in Iraq 
Chapter Three suggested that the composition of and performance of the 
two political branches, the executive and the legislature, are of significant 
relevance to judicial power. It also underlined that the institutional 
fragmentation of governmental branches may serve to provide the judiciary with 
constitutional questions and disputes that might expand its judicial powers. The 
key ideas which were discussed there were the extent to which the parliament 
can be marginalised and the executive authority may attempt to consolidate 
power and weaken the legislature or subvert its competence. Furthermore, in 
countries that adopt some form of federal system with a devolution of powers, 
conflicts of competences involving different levels of government tend to also 
be common controversies dealt with by the constitutional judiciary. These 
arguments are the basis for the discussion of the case study examined in this 
thesis. 
4.1.1 Horizontal and Vertical Distribution of Powers under the 2005 
Constitution  
It is vital from the outset to understand the foundations of the 
constitutional system in post-2003 Iraq, focusing on the 2005 Constitution.394 
Article (1) of the 2005 Constitution states that, ‘The Republic of Iraq is a single 
federal, independent and fully sovereign state in which the system of 
government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic, and 
this Constitution is a guarantor of the unity of Iraq.’ The Constitution distributes 
powers horizontally among three branches of the federal government: the 
                                                          
394 The 2005 Constitution of the Republic of Iraq includes a preamble, fundamental principles, 
a bill of rights and liberties, the structure of the federal government, powers of the federal and 
sub-federal governments, amendment procedure, and transitional provisions. 
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legislature, the executive, and the judiciary; and vertically between federal and 
sub-federal governments (regions and governorates).  The federal system in Iraq 
‘is made up of a decentralized capital, regions, and governorates, as well as local 
administrations.’395 Article 117 of the Constitution explicitly recognizes ‘the 
region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region’, and 
affirms the right of other governorates to form their regions. Thus, the 
Constitution distributes powers, vertically, between federal and sub-federal 
governments (regions and governorates).  
4.1.1.1 Legislative and Executive Authorities: Formulation and Powers 
On the federal level, the Constitution expressly addresses the 
relationship between the three branches of government, based on the principle 
of separation of powers.396 The federal legislature consists of the Council of 
Representatives (Parliament), which represents the entire Iraqi people and the 
‘Federation Council’ (FC) which is intended to represent the sub-federal 
entities.397 The Constitution regulates, in some considerable detail, the 
composition and competences of the Parliament.398 Its members are ‘elected 
through a direct secret general ballot,’399 for the duration of four years.400 An 
absolute majority of its members is required to achieve the quorum with which 
the Parliament opens its sessions, after which a simple majority is needed for a 
decision to be made unless otherwise stipulated.401 With regards to the FC, the 
Constitution states that a law passed by a two-third majority of the Parliament 
shall regulate the formation, membership conditions, competences and all other 
matters.402 Despite the importance of the FC for the federal structure of the new 
Iraq, like many other crucial implementing legislation it has not been enacted 
due to the controversies and disagreements among political parties.   
                                                          
395 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 116. 
396 ibid, art 47. 
397  ibid, art 48. 
398  ibid, art 49- 64. 
399 ibid, art 49 (1): ‘The Council of Representatives shall consist of a number of members, at a 
ratio of one seat per 100,000 Iraqi persons representing the entire Iraqi people. […]. The 
representation of all components of the people shall be upheld in it.’  
400 ibid, art 76 (1). 
401 ibid, art 59 (1), (2). 
402 ibid, art 65. 
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Iraq’s Parliament has crucial powers; its legislative powers include 
proposing and enacting federal laws.403 The Parliament’s second and most 
crucial authority is to oversee ‘the performance of the executive authority,’ 
using ‘formal questioning’404 directing inquiries to government ministers and 
the Prime Minister (PM), granting and withdrawing confidence from a minister 
or the whole cabinet according to the given situation. It also has the power to 
question the President of the Republic and heads of independent commissions 
such as the High Commission for Human Rights and the Independent Electoral 
Commission.405 Iraqi Parliament also decides on number of key issues and 
policies ranging from ratifying international treaties to providing consent for a 
declaration of war or state of emergency. Furthermore, parliamentary approval 
is necessary for the appointment of several high-ranking government officials 
and of members of the judiciary including the President and members of the 
Federal Court of Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor, the President of 
Judicial Oversight Commission, and the Iraqi Army Chief of Staff. Thus, 
constitutionally the Parliament has significant powers; and in the absence of the 
FC, it is the only legislative body and institution that is entrusted to exercise 
crucial mechanisms of checks and balances against the executive authority.  
The executive branch consists of the President of the Republic (the 
Presidency Council) and the Council of Ministers.406 The Presidency Council 
was established during the transitional period, and it was constitutionally 
extended for the first legislation term (until 2010).407 This was elected by a two-
thirds majority of the Parliament and was composed of three members, each 
representing the major Iraqi communities: Shia, Sunni, and Kurds. Any of the 
members could veto legislation, meaning that unanimous approval by the 
Presidency Council was needed for any law to be enacted. Moreover, the 
Presidency Council had the final word in appointing members of the FSC.408 
                                                          
403  Constitution of Iraq (2005), arts 61, 62.  
404 The formal questioning with the view to vote of confidence is used in this thesis to refer to 
the formal procedure with serious consequences that must be followed before the vote of 
confidence in minister/s or Prime Minister.  
405 ibid, art 102. 
406 ibid, arts 66.  
407 ibid, art 138. 
408 This method has result at each major community of the Iraqi society to have representative 
in the FSC. TAL (2004), arts 36(1), 37, 39(1,2), 44(4). 
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Arguably, this constitutional extension of the Presidency Council transformed 
it into a powerful institution, even though it was intended to be temporary and 
an exception to the rule that provided for a single and largely symbolic 
presidency.409  
The President, who since 2010 replaces the Presidency Council, is 
elected by a two-thirds majority of the Parliament, and the term of office 
coincides with the end of the term of the Parliament with the possibility of re-
election for the second term only.410 The Constitution stipulates that the 
President shall exercise a range of powers, some of which are crucially 
important including presenting draft laws to the Parliament.411 However, most 
powers are not considered to be of significance compared to the powers of the 
other institutions. These powers mostly relate to the ratification of acts of 
Parliament or the Prime Minister. It means that the act is considered approved 
if not rejected by the President during a specific time frame and, if rejected, still 
a special majority of the Parliament can override that rejection.412  
The Prime Minister, who is nominated by the President from the largest 
parliamentary bloc, heads the Council of Ministers, after gaining the confidence 
of an absolute majority of Parliament to form the government.413 The office of 
the Prime Minister is said to be the most powerful and competent institution in 
the Council of Ministers, being constitutionally empowered with indispensable 
powers and responsibilities: 
[T]he Prime Minister is the direct executive authority responsible for 
the general policy of the State and the commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces. He directs the Council of Ministers, presides over its meetings, 
and has the right to dismiss Ministers, with the consent of the Council 
of Representatives [Parliament].414  
                                                          
409  Constitution of Iraq (2005), arts 63, 66. 
410 ibid, art 72. 
411 ibid, art 60 (1). 
412 ibid, arts 73 (2): ‘[T]o ratify international treaties and agreements after the approval by the 
Council of Representatives. Such international treaties and agreements are considered ratified 
fifteen days after the date of receipt by the President. [ …] To ratify and issue the laws enacted 
by the Council of Representatives. Such laws are considered ratified after fifteen days from the 
date of receipt by the President.’  
413 ibid, arts 76. 
414  ibid, art 78.  
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The Council of Ministers, along with the President and the Parliament, has a 
significant role in legislating, since it can present draft laws. Furthermore, it has 
a range of other powers including planning and executing ‘the general policy 
and general plans of the state’, overseeing the work of government ministers, 
preparing the draft of the national budget, and other powers regarding 
international relations from negotiating to signing international treaties.415  
Furthermore, one innovative feature of the Constitution is that it 
establishes a series of ‘independent commissions’. Most of these are 
constitutionally subject to supervision or monitoring by Parliament, or 
otherwise connected to the legislature including the High Commission for 
Human Rights, the Independent Electoral Commission and the Commission on 
Public Integrity. Conversely, the Constitution explicitly attaches the Board of 
Supreme Audit, the Communication and Media Commission and the 
Endowment Commissions to the Council of Ministers.416 These institutions are 
designed to oversee government and act independently from it.  
4.1.1.2 The Foundation of the Iraqi Federation  
The 2005 Constitution distributes powers, vertically, among three levels 
of governmental entities: the federal government, the federal regions (as of now 
Kurditsan is the only region), and numerous governorates not incorporated into 
a region. Section four of the Constitution, which defines ‘Powers of the Federal 
Government’, begins with Article 109 which makes the federal authority 
responsible for preserving ‘the unity, integrity, independence, and sovereignty 
of Iraq and its federal democratic system’. Article 110 then enumerates those 
powers exclusive to the  federal government in Baghdad: foreign affairs, 
national security, fiscal policy, customs and commercial policy across sub-
federal boundaries, citizenship and broadcasting policies; general and 
investment budgeting; international water resources and distribution of internal 
water resources; and general population survey.The following articles addresses 
separately powers over oil and gas: it begins with Article 111, which states that 
‘oil and gas owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.’ 
Article 112, in rather unclear text details the powers of federal and sub-federal 
                                                          
415 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 80. 
416 ibid, arts 102-108. 
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governments over oil and gas in terms of management and strategic policy 
making, which many would maintain to have left the federal government with 
extremely limited authority, this will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five.417  
The Constitution, then, provides some key principles regarding Iraqi 
federalism. Thus, Article 114, details shared competences between the federal 
and sub-federal governments, such as customs; energy; environmental, health, 
and education policies; development and general planning; and internal water 
resources.  Article 115 provides that ‘[A]ll powers not stipulated in the exclusive 
powers of the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and 
governorates that are not organized in a region.’ In addition to that, the most 
innovative feature of this Article provides that in any conflict of competence 
involving matters that is considered of shared competence, ‘priority shall be 
given to the law of the regions and governorates not organized in a region’. 
Article 121 provides another important principle regarding the contradiction 
between regional and federal laws: ‘in matters outside the exclusive authorities 
of the federal government, the regional power shall have the right to amend the 
application of the national legislation within that region’. 
The above is a brief account of the key aspects of federalism under 2005 
Constitution. It seems important to further examine how the constitutionally 
allocated public powers are exercised; and whether the 2005 Constitution and 
the context within which the FSC acts and with which it interacts have 
contributed to the rise of judicialisation of constitutional issues. 
4.1.2 Iraq’s Emerging Democracy: A State of Consociational and 
Transitional Justice  
It is generally agreed in the literature on constitution making in 
transitional states that a constitution is viewed ‘as foundational and forward 
looking’ and is said to look ‘back to undoing problems of the past as well as 
laying foundations for future.’418 The 2005 Constitution is about more than 
providing the foundation for organising the government; it also underpins the 
                                                          
417 Chapter Five (5.2.3). 
418 John Morison, ‘Ways of Seeing? Consociationalism and Constitutional Law Theory’ in 
Rupert Taylor(ed), Consociational Theory McGarry, O’Leary, and the Northern Ireland 
Conflict (Routledge 2009) 283-284. 
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potential mechanisms addressing and dealing with the past and future problems 
that a divided society may have to face. Before further discussing power sharing 
in post-2003 Iraq, it is relevant to briefly point to another increasingly important 
aspect of many transitional democracies, namely, that post-conflict societies 
may adopt some policies and measures of transitional justice to deal with the 
human rights’ violations and unjust practices of previous regimes.419 Among 
other measures of this type, the 2005 Constitution underlines the need for the 
de-Baathification of post-2003 Iraqi society and politics in order to ‘liberate’ 
these from the ‘ideas’ and structure of the former ruling Baath party. 
The very first order issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
banned the top four ranks of Baath Party members ‘from future employment in 
the public sector.’420 It is interesting to note that the membership of the Baath 
Party was previously a requirement for getting employment in the public sector 
and for obtaining promotion.421 The Constitution also bans ‘the Saddamist 
Baath in Iraq and its symbols, under any name whatsoever’, and bans it from 
being ‘part of political pluralism in Iraq’.422 The Constitution also excludes 
those who are ‘covered by De-Baathification statutes’ from running in 
elections.423 In 2008, the Iraqi government reformed this process by establishing 
                                                          
419 I have by no means reviewed in detail the literature or explored specific legislative 
developments on transitional justice. There are diverse measures through which post-
transitional states in particular sought to restore transitional justice. For example, one 
classification is according to the area of the law such as constitutional justice, criminal justice, 
administrative justice, etc. See e.g. Roman David, Lustration and Transitional Justice: 
Personnel Systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (University of Pennsylvania 
Press 2011) 22. Mark S Ellis, ‘Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the 
Former Communist Block’ (1996) 59 (4) Law and Contemporary Problems; Cynthia M Home, 
‘International Legal Rulings on Lustration Policies in Central and Eastern Europe: Rule of Law 
in Historical Context’ (2009) 34(3) Law & Social Inquiry 713-744; Katarína Šipulová, Vít 
Hloušek, ‘Different Paths of Transitional Justice in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland’ 
(2013) 9 (1) World Political Science Review 31- 69 
420 CPA/Order 5:  Establishment of the Iraqi De-Baathification Council, rescinded per Memo 7 
Sec 3 (25 May 2003); CPA/ Order 1: ‘eliminating the party’s structures and removing its 
leadership from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi society’. See also Miranda 
Sissons, Abdulrazzaq al-Saiedi, ‘A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq’ 
(International Centre for Transitional Justice, Report 3 April 2013) 
<https://www.ictj.org/publication/bitter-legacy-lessons-de-baathification-iraq>  accessed 10 
May 2015; Aysegul Keskin, ‘De-Ba'athification: An Analysis of Existing Lustration 
Framework’ (Conference Papers - International Studies Association 2009). 
421 Nussaiba Younis, Set Up to Fail: Consociational Political Structures in Post-War Iraq, 2003-
2010’ (2011) 4(1) Contemporary Arab Affairs 9. 
422 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 7. 
423 ibid, art 135. 
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the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC), the body in charge of 
implementing de-Baathification legislation. This legal reform also ensures that 
the AJC’s decisions can be appealed before the FCC.424   
It has been argued that de-Baathification undermines the legitimacy and 
stability of the political process. Thus, one of the primary criticisms of 
implementing de-Baathification policies in the period immediately following 
the transition was that it seems to be related to the removal of a significant 
segment of the population, mostly secular Sunnis, from the public sector.425 
Importantly, from a Sunni perspective, the implementing of the de-
Baathification policies has resulted in a collective punishment of them. This has 
been one major criticism from Sunni politicians and the broader public view 
that is said to have discouraged them from participating in the early stages of 
the post-2003 political process. 426   
4.1.2.1 Power-Sharing in Post-2003 Iraq  
 It has been generally agreed that Iraq has always been a divided nation, 
an unfortunate perception that has intensified since the transition in 2003. 
Therefore, it was a primary concern during the constitution-writing process that 
the new constitution would adopt some forms and institutions of power-sharing. 
Brendan O’Leary, who played an important role during the 2005 constitution 
writing, defines power-sharing as ‘Any set of arrangements that prevent one 
agent, or organised collective agency, from being the “winner” who holds all 
critical power, whether temporarily or permanently.’427 Thus, post-Saddam Iraq 
was intended to be based on Arend Lijph Lijphart’s main principles of a 
constitution that is based on power-sharing. These include a grand coalition, 
proportional representation, mutual veto, and autonomy.428 During constitution 
drafting, there was an implicit consensus that the post-2003 political system 
                                                          
424 The Law of the National High Commission for Accountability and Justice (10) 2008, art 15, 
prior to this amendment the Commission was only answerable before the parliament.   
425 A Dawisha, ‘Iraq: Setbacks, Advances, Prospects’ (2004) 15(1) Journal of Democracy 5-20. 
426 ibid. 
427 Brendan O’Leary, ‘Power Sharing: An Advocators Conclusion’ in Joanne McEvoy, Brendan 
O'Leary (eds) National and Ethnic Conflict in the 21st Century: Power Sharing in Deeply 
Divided Places (University of Pennsylvania Press 2013)388. 
428 Arend Lijph Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies a Comparative Explanation (Yale 
University Press 1977) 25. 
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necessitates the recognition and acceptance of some form of consociational 
democracy, with which Iraq:  
[W]ould have a largely ceremonial President, a more powerful Prime 
Minister, and that both of these offices would be chosen by an elected 
Parliament. The assumption among Iraqi political leaders was that these 
posts −together with the Speakership of the National Assembly 
[Parliament] − would be divided among the major communities, to 
ensure representation for each at the most senior levels of the Iraqi 
government.429  
The consociational system is said to have been initially introduced by the CPA 
in 2003 which appointed members of the Interim Governing Council, the 
provisional government that was established and supervised by the CPA (July 
2003-June 2004), on the basis that they represented all the ethnosectarian 
groups in the country. This ‘relied on the notion that both the mutual fear 
among sectors of the Iraqi population as well as a deep historical sense of 
mistrust necessitated the active prevention of any one political, sectarian group 
from ruling alone’.430 In addition to certain constitutionally recognised aspects 
of power sharing, over time other informal arrangements have developed 
which in their totality affected the composition and performance of the state 
institutions.431 For example, the three-member Presidency Council was 
established under TAL (2004) and then the 2005 Constitution extended its 
work until 2010, that is, the first legislation term under the 2005 Constitution. 
Although Parliament through the special majority of legislators (two–thirds or 
three-fifths under TAL (2004) and the 2005 Constitution respectively) could 
overrule the veto issued by the Presidency Council, this in practical terms 
proved rather problematic. The Bylaw of the Parliament (2006) in Article 8 
                                                          
429 N Feldman, R Martinez, ‘Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An Experiment 
in Islamic Democracy’ (2006) 75(2) Fordham Law Review 911. 
430 Khader Abbas Radwan, ‘The Political Regime in Iraq: Between Reform and Legitimacy’ 
(Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 16 January 2012) 7 
<http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/db281bc3-5eaf-419e-a59f-3d7a612231df> accessed 
22 July 2014. 
431 See e.g., Paul Dixon, ‘Is Consociational Theory the Answer to Global Conflict? From the 
Netherlands to Northern Ireland and Iraq’ (2011) 9(3) Political Studies Review 309–322; Reidar 
Visser, ‘The Emasculation of Government Ministries in Consociational Democracies’ (2012) 6 
(2) International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 231. 
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established a three-member collective speakership of the Parliament (the 
Presidency Commission). Although this arrangement was later declared 
unconstitutional by the FSC in 2010.432 Interestingly, the Presidency 
Commission is still being followed as the Parliament has yet to amend the 
Bylaw corresponding to the Court’s decision. In practice, the allocation of the 
position of deputies for the President of the Republic, the Speaker of the 
Parliament and the Prime Minister to the representatives of each major group 
(Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurd) has become a constitutional tradition.  
4.1.2.2 Proportional Representation and Coalition Government  
Under the Baath regime, political parties were far fewer in number.433 
Conversely, post-2003 Iraq has seen a substantial increase in the number of 
political parties and organisations.434 While a stable party system and competing 
parties with clear identical ideologies and political platforms operating within 
institutional rules and structures are said to be crucial for democratic 
transition,435 these are almost absent in post-2003 Iraq.436 Most political parties 
appeal to specific sects or ethnic communities, and very few of them might be 
able to have a broader appeal.437 Shia and Sunni Islamic parties, together with 
secular nationalist Kurdish parties, have dominated the political process. The 
                                                          
432  IRQFSC 87/2010 [2/12 /2010]. 
433 Asmaa Jameel, ‘Project on the Development of Political Parties in Arab Countries: The Case 
of Iraq Political Parties in Iraq’, within the research project: Political Parties Development in 
the Arab World (Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies, Beirut 2007) <www.appstudies.org> 
accessed 22 October 2014. 
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outcomes of the general elections so far held in the country have largely 
reflected this division of political parties and voters along the main sectarian 
and ethnic lines of Iraqi society. 438 
There have been three national and local elections which were based on 
proportional representation. The adoption of proportional representation was 
largely based on the assumption that ‘some form of proportional representation 
is needed in the face of deep‐rooted ethnic divisions, in order to give minorities 
adequate representation.’439 Many scholars and observers have pointed to the 
ethnosectarian division of the political parties and voters which seems to have 
been exacerbated by and attributed to the adoption of proportional 
representation. The first election under the 2005 Constitution for the Parliament 
was based on the closed-list proportional representation and a single national 
electoral district. Accordingly, the parties with absolute control over the 
electoral list were elected, rather than individual candidates, resulting in a 
fragmented parliament consisting of many small political parties.440 Since 2009, 
elections have been held using the open-list system that is said to have served 
to weaken slightly the political parties and voters’ focus on ethnosectarian 
appeals. Many have referred to the advance of the cross-sectarian and secular 
Iraqiya list in the 2010 parliamentary election as a promising example in this 
regard.441 
It is claimed that a proportional electoral system guarantees the 
representation of minority groups, and increases ‘the quantity of political 
parties, which itself can facilitate pluralism since they are more likely appeal to 
and strengthen the identity group’, which results in a coalition or national unity 
governments.442 Such an outcome is evident insofar as the representation of 
minorities and coalition governments is concerned. However, many observers 
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have noticed that this has further deepened the already divided ethnosectarian 
political parties and voters, facilitating the fragmentation and instability of the 
political system.443 Clearly, elections in which no political party can gain the 
majority needed for forming a government have resulted in inclusive national 
unity governments after months of political deadlock. Therefore, as Nussaibah 
Younis noted, the primary implication of the proportional representation of the 
political system in post-2003 Iraq is that:  
Firstly, there is always likely to be a delay between the declaration of 
election results and the formation of a government– opening the door 
to violent instability after each election. Secondly, because smaller 
parties are incentivized to wait until after the election before entering 
into coalitions, political alliances are made secretly and on the basis of 
political expedience without voters having any say on subsequent 
alliances. This period of power brokering takes place between the 
political elites and prevents the development of an inclusive and 
accountable national politics based on policy rather than on elite 
bartering.444 
Furthermore, during this period of negotiations, or indeed ‘political conflicts’, 
often more informal power-sharing arrangements will be introduced that may 
alter the constitutional balance of powers or establish new institutions outside 
the constitution itself. The impact suggests that those in power tend to rule by 
law than by the rule of law, bypassing the Constitution itself. For example, in 
2010, following the first general elections under the 2005 Constitution, the long 
ongoing political and constitutional crisis left Iraq in a ‘power vacuum’ that was 
seen to threaten the already fragile political and security environment of the 
country. The competing political parties gathered in Erbil, the capital city of the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq, to reach an agreement regarding forming the new 
government. The 2010 Erbil Agreement is said to have resulted in the formation 
of an inclusive coalition government representing almost all the major 
competing political parties in the 2010 elections. It also provided for several 
‘extra-constitutional provisions that go in the direction of enhanced 
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consociationalism’.445 Many would argue that these arrangements were 
designed to restrict the exercise of the executive’s power, in particular that of 
the then Prime Minister al-Maliki.446  
There is a substantial gap between how the constitution works in theory 
and in practice. Although some might claim that power sharing arrangements 
served to stabilise the transition to democracy, such arrangements have certainly 
proven to be problematic for the rule of law in Iraq and the stability of the state. 
It can also be argued that having representatives of all the major groups in a 
government in which often none of them are prepared to work together increases 
the already existing tension between them. Moreover, as the number of parties 
in the coalition increases ‘their individual legislative weights decrease, making 
it more difficult to form a decisive coalition’.447 For example, in the first 
legislative term, there were nine parties in the government; for any legislation 
to be enacted a legislative coalition of all these parties was necessary.448 More 
importantly, this has also been said to diminish the potential for an active 
political opposition within the parliament or for effective checking and 
oversight of the government.  
This experience of Parliament in post-2003 Iraq illustrates that it has 
mostly struggled to legislate and oversee government performance. It has been 
almost impossible to agree to enact a great deal of constitutionally vital 
implementing legislation including laws intended to regulate the FSC, the FC, 
the oil and gas sector, and also political parties, something which has legal, 
political and economic implications for the balance of power and the entire 
country. This has occurred in part because it seems so difficult given the 
extremely unstable, ethnosectarian divisions amongst the political parties in 
Iraq; what makes this worse is that the legislature has chosen to ignore this 
legislation although this could potentially exacerbate the situation. The political 
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parties competing in Parliament have shown more concern for their short-term 
interests than the longer-term interests of the country. Furthermore, both 
Parliament and Council of Ministers have experienced a great degree of internal 
dysfunction that has further weakened their performance.449 Legislators and 
ministers have frequently boycotted parliamentary and ministerial sessions.450 
For example, during the first three months in 2013, the Parliament held 13 
sessions and received 25 draft laws; during the same period scheduled sessions 
were postponed 11 times due to the lack of quorum.451 This has been more 
frequent in the case of important policies and legislation that is extremely 
contested, such as the oil and gas legislation and the law of the FSC.452 Thus, it 
is noted that in the case of the Iraqi Parliament:  
The most important body in the new oversight framework as it holds 
the key to reform in all areas of governance is perhaps the most 
ineffective of all. Its inner workings are hopelessly sectarian, and its 
Bylaws are so cumbersome and deficient that it has been incapable of 
enacting long-overdue legislation designed to repair the damage caused 
to state institutions since 2003. Moreover, as a result of the delicate 
political balances struck following […] elections, which saw the rise of 
broad coalition governments deprived of a real parliamentary 
opposition, the Council [Parliament] has been unable to exercise 
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effective oversight on government, for fear it might upset the political 
alliances that undergird it. 453 
Furthermore, the frequent recourse to the informal power-sharing arrangements 
so as to resolve, temporarily, political crises have created a tradition wherein it 
seems common that major policy debates have been conducted outside the 
Parliament. The role of the Parliament could be seen as the role of approving 
such policies instead of discussing them.454 
Interestingly, the impact has been somewhat different on the office of 
the Prime Minister which has significant powers. This has had serious 
implications, the most obvious being the abuse of this Office; the extraordinary 
competition for that position has often delayed efforts to establish a coalition 
government. It has been observed that during the last three national elections 
that resulted in coalition governments, all those parties participating were 
extremely focused on the position of the Prime Minister, leaving the transfer of 
powers ineffective and endangering the political stability and even the security 
of the country.455 The first elected prime minister under the 2005 Constitution, 
al-Maliki (2006-2014), has been accused of abusing his office and committing 
serious constitutional violations which severely compromised democracy.456 It 
has been argued that he built:  
a personal power base in the security establishment and bolstered the 
electoral prospects of his Dawah Party, thereby demonstrating the 
immense power that the office of Prime Minister affords. Maliki took 
direct control over security forces and military operations, placing 
personal allies in the security apparatus. He has taken security decisions 
without consulting the cabinet for authorization, including unilaterally 
forming personal intelligence and military units outside the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior. Maliki also 
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created tribal-support councils in provinces across Iraq that are seen as 
Dawah Party tools for controlling and influencing local populations.457 
The Prime Minister held the Office of Commander-in-Chief and acted as Interior 
minister. He also directly commanded newly established security organisations 
including the National Counter-Terrorism Forces and the Baghdad Brigade for 
the security of the capital.458 He was in charge of choosing Generals and 
directing governorate command centres, which were established in unstable 
areas across southern and central Iraq,459 certainly without any consultation with 
the cabinet or the Parliament which is constitutionally empowered to approve 
such appointments.  
Thus, with such expanded powers, the Prime Minister emerged as the 
most powerful political actor, securing a third term in office which led to serious 
criticism within the coalition parties. Maliki himself claimed, however, that 
‘there were too many constitutional limitations to his power’.460 Reportedly, 
since his first term in office (2006-2014), he ‘sought to place the office of the 
Prime Minister at the centre of state power, diminishing the ability of the cabinet 
and Parliament to influence the formulation and application of policy’.461 In 
addition, many observers have accused him of creating a sense of 
marginalization among Sunnis and Kurds, as main partners in the government. 
Some have referred to a series of arrests targeting prominent Sunni leaders 
including the Vice President, Hashmi, and the Finance Minister, Issawi.462 Many 
have indicated that the Prime Minister was also relying on FSC decisions to 
serve to legitimise his powers.463 Some maintained that such concentration of 
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power was a reaction to the necessity for greater security, a claim which was 
dismissed by others who believe that,  
security from the government is a primary concern, along with fears 
that the elected government is exhibiting increasingly authoritarian 
tendencies. The fear of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ is high at a time 
when these communities are still plagued by memories of their 
respective experiences of persecution, living in the spectre of civil war 
and conditioned by a decade of power-sharing politics.464  
Formally and constitutionally, most of the institutions and separation of powers 
on the federal level is based on majoritarian rule. It has been noted that under 
Article 76, it is possible to form a majority cabinet or government consisting of 
only Arabs or even Shia Arabs.465 However, proportional representation would 
make it difficult for a single party to form a majority government or to make 
decisions and policies on a majority basis. It was asserted that strong majority 
government in Iraq is problematic because the ‘current political leadership is 
overwhelmingly based on communal or ethnic groups, that would exclude 
minorities.’466 Similarly, the federal system whereby significant autonomy and 
powers were assigned to regions was said to act as a check on any majority 
government in Baghdad.467 
4.1.2.3 Asymmetrical Federalism and Decentralization   
Federalism is another arrangement that has been considered as being 
integral to power-sharing. Many scholars, Kurdish negotiators and the US itself 
openly advocated a federal system in post-2003 Iraq, others, including Sunnis, 
refused and considered any such attempt. One of the reasons for establishing 
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such a federal system was believed to be the extreme mistrust among the parties 
that negotiated and drafted the Constitution in 2005. The Sunnis boycotted the 
2005 election for the Interim National Assembly that was primarily in charge of 
writing the 2005 Constitution. Therefore, this is said to have left the Kurds and 
the Shia’ parties dominating the process; in fact, in the final months leading up 
to the referendum, there were some Sunni representatives included in the 
constitutional committee.468 On the other hand, many have supported the need 
for specific recognition of Kurdistan, which has had a long historical struggle 
for autonomy, having been suppressed by consecutive strong central 
governments; Kurdistan has enjoyed a de facto semi-independence since 
1991.469 Thus, such significant differences between the Kurdistan Region and 
rest of the country can be said to require different relations with the federal 
government or ‘constitutional asymmetries’ in Iraq with regard to Kurdistan.470 
The compromise was that the Constitution established a federal system wherein 
sub-federal governments have guaranteed substantial authority over local policy 
and resources, and share significant powers with the federal government. In fact, 
in practice, the existing federal structure only covers the Kurdistan Region; the 
Constitution, and the implementing laws allow the governorates outside 
Kurdistan to form parallel federal regions.471 
In general, many have argued that the federal structure is likely to create 
‘an exceedingly weak central government and extraordinarily powerful 
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regions.’472 It is also noted that the federal government lacks ‘sufficient power 
to keep Iraq together and functioning’.473 One of the main reasons for defining 
the 2005 Constitution in this way is the constitutional provisions regarding oil 
and gas which assign significant powers to the region; not surprisingly, any call 
for constitutional amendment focuses on relevant oil and gas provisions.474 In 
practice, many have called for constitutional amendment in favour of less 
decentralization.475In other words, federalism remains controversial and 
arguably the majority of the political parties have been unsupportive of 
implementing federalism and in fact ‘worked assiduously -if fruitlessly- to 
amend decentralization articles in the Constitution and to clarify the document’s 
textual ambiguities in favour of greater central government control.’476 The 
failure to agree on a kind of federation that would feature post-2003 Iraq is said 
to be a main impediment to an effective government, and has contributed to 
constant delays and deadlocks in decision making in general and enactment of 
key implementing legislations.477  
This may also be true to a large extent regarding the federal regions 
which have more powers than governorates. The former, and not the latter, have 
the power to ‘adopt a constitution of its own that defines the structure of powers 
of the region, its authorities, and the mechanisms for exercising such authorities, 
provided that it does not contradict this Constitution.’478 Regional authorities 
can amend the application of any federal laws that contradict or differ from the 
laws of the region, on matters not exclusive to the federal government.479 On 
the other hand, a governorate council is not subject ‘to the control or supervision 
of any ministry or any institution not linked to a ministry.’480 Constitutionally, 
it has ‘broad administrative and financial authorities to enable them to manage 
their affairs in accordance with the principle of decentralized administration, 
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and this shall be regulated by law’. In addition to explicitly emphasising ‘the 
independent finances’ of the governorate council,481 the Constitution treats 
governorates the same as the regions in guaranteeing the allocation of an 
‘equitable share of the national revenues sufficient to discharge their 
responsibilities and duties.’482 Both federal and governorate authorities can 
exercise each other’s powers ‘with the consent of both governments’, such a 
process to be ‘regulated by law.’483 Thus, in principle, the federal government 
cannot exercise powers over matters that are constitutionally considered within 
the competence of the governorates without its consent. Moreover, governors 
and members of the governorate council are elected; they are representatives of 
the governorate’s people, and are therefore responsible for them and not the 
federal authorities.  
With regards to the federal structure, the Constitution is substantially 
ambiguous on many aspects of this, and much more was left to implementing 
legislation; this still remains to be developed. The Law of Governorates Not 
Incorporated into a Region (Governorates Law) is an essential implementing 
legislation enacted in 2008 to devolve powers to governorates and to provide a 
legal framework for establishing federal regions equivalent to the Kurdistan 
region.484 The extent of the devolution of powers and decentralization in the 
Governorate Law and its conformity to the constitutional mandate for a federal 
system is contentious. Some have criticized this Law for expanding federal 
powers. The Governorates Law is said to have explicitly adopted a narrow 
understanding of the constitutional mandate on the federal structure of Iraq and 
established a new institutional and structural framework for the relations 
between the federal government and the governorates.485 It subjects governorate 
councils to supervision by the federal Parliament.486 The Law makes governors 
directly responsible before the federal authorities, meaning they can be removed 
from office by an absolute majority of the Parliament at the request of the Prime 
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Minister.487 Others maintain that this Law clearly contradicts Article 115, which 
granted governorates the residual competences,488 and Article 122 of the 
Constitution that limits governorate powers by the principle of administrative 
decentralisation.489 In practice, governorates are mostly weak and incapable of 
exercising their powers partially for reasons related to the increasing 
dependence on the federal authorities for all budget and  their administrative 
and delivery of public services is also under the authority and direction of the 
federal government ministers. Some have argued that the constitutional and 
legal rules as well as budgeting have been considered the ‘weapons’ that often 
used by the federal and local authorities ‘in the competition for influence, 
authority, and power.’ 490   
4.1.2.4 The FSC and the Power-sharing Arrangements 
The above discussion suggests that the informal power-sharing 
arrangements could alter the constitutional balance of powers, bypassing the 
Constitution and undermining the rule of law. Furthermore, the subsequent new 
balance of powers can be said to have resulted in a more marginalised and 
weaker legislature that struggles to fulfil its constitutional role; amongst other 
things, this could mean that its function of checking the excesses of government 
has been largely neglected. This is compounded by the ambiguous nature of the 
Constitution, largely a deliberate policy originally used to speed up the process 
of constitution writing. Taken as a whole, this means that many questions 
remain unresolved, contributing to the rise of constitutional disputes.491  
It might be expected that under such conditions the judiciary would be 
drawn deeper into constitutional contestations and political crises. For example, 
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those in power might turn to the judiciary to legitimise and institutionalise their 
exercise of power and their excesses. Similarly, other political actors, whose 
participation in the government and policy-making might be endangered and 
marginalised as a result of this, may turn to the judiciary in the hope of taking 
legal action against the government’s arbitrary exercise of power or of gaining 
their policy interests. When the parliament is marginalised, even individuals and 
emerging public interest groups may frequently turn to the judiciary to protect 
their interests or to challenge the government’s abuse of power. As will be 
evident throughout the analysis of FSC case law in Chapter Five, various actors 
have used the Court to some extent for reasons of this kind. Moreover, 
considering the extent of the policies and constitutional legislation that the 
country relies on in continuing its transition to democracy, it is expected that the 
judiciary will frequently be asked to resolve a range of disputes and policy 
conflicts.  
Another crucially relevant issue concerns the impact that power-sharing 
arrangements may have on the constitutional judiciary. It is debatable whether 
appointments to the courts should be based on power-sharing, whether a court 
should rule according to a qualified majority rule or consensus and whether 
judges should uphold, modify or strike down power-sharing deals specifically 
based on ethnosectarian divisions that might conflict with the constitutional 
structure and rights.492 The Constitutional Court of Bosnia is one such example. 
Six of its nine justices are appointed as representatives of major groups in the 
country: the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), the Croats and the Serbs. The three 
remaining members come from outside the country and are selected by the 
President of the European Court of Human Rights. These non-citizen members 
are believed to serve ‘to prevent ethnic deadlock in adjudication.’493  
In response to the role of the courts regarding power-sharing, some 
scholars point to their general mandate, arguing that emerging democracies 
usually establish strong constitutional courts and constitutional judicial review 
since these are seen as ‘an indication that they are expected to play a more direct 
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role in superintending the institutions of democracy and, particularly, in 
defining the limits of democratic decision-making.’494 Others hold that courts 
‘should avoid allowing themselves to become forums for ‘lawfare’ by national, 
ethnic or religious protagonists who may seek to reverse what they previously 
conceded at the negotiating table.’495 This might suggest that courts should 
uphold power-sharing arrangements, but it does not address how courts should 
respond to new, informal, power-sharing arrangements that contradict 
constitutional principles and fundamental rights. On a few occasions the FSC 
has tackled and, in fact, has overruled some informal power-sharing 
arrangements as evidenced in its case law, discussed in the next chapter. 
Overall, the 2005 Constitution was written to put an end to authoritarian 
rule and set the foundation for the constitutional democratic system, and it is 
affected by the political and constitutional legacy resulting from decades of an 
authoritarian regime. Many of the Constitution’s arrangements were said to 
prevent the consolidation of powers in one state institution, whilst still allowing 
for a majoritarian, possibly sectarian or ethnic, government. It is widely argued 
that post-2003 Iraq is in a paradoxical situation. The country has seen substantial 
improvements regarding electoral democracy, the general referendum, the three 
national and local elections for governorates councils and two prime ministers 
have been voted out of office. The Sunnis boycotted the first election in 2005 
which resulted in their underrepresentation, but they have participated 
substantially in the subsequent elections.496 However, it is also widely noticed 
that ‘consolidation of democracy is still distant’,497 and parallel improvements 
regarding the rule of law are largely absent.498  
Furthermore, the development of the post-2005 constitutional and 
political system over the course of the last decade has encountered a series of 
formidable challenges. The most obvious of these include pervasive and almost 
continuous violence, terrorist attacks, the Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence and the 
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Kurd-Arab ethnic conflict,499 the instability of state institutions,500 and 
widespread corruption.501 On the other hand, many would argue that in practice 
the KRG’s relations with Baghdad might be seen as having a somewhat 
confederal nature. The Kurds have had ongoing power-struggles with the federal 
government in Baghdad, leading to numerous political and constitutional 
crises.502 This challenging internal environment, not to mention the impact of 
the international and regional problems, have contributed negatively to the 
performance of Iraq’s state institutions. All this has contributed to the fact that 
the Constitution has yet to be fully implemented; key institutions are still not 
established; numerous gaps and contradictions are yet to be filled and resolved. 
Given the above discussion, the degree of FSC’s independence is open 
to debate as will be discussed in the next section.  
4.2 The Iraq Federal Supreme Court: Composition, Powers, and 
Independence 
The first post-2003 constitution, TAL (2004), established the FSC with 
powers of constitutional legislative review.503 The TAL was an interim 
constitution and was replaced by the 2005 Constitution, which establishes the 
new FSC. The implementing legislation, the Federal Supreme Court Law 
30/2005, was enacted under TAL (2004), before the 2005 Constitution came 
into force. The composition and the powers of the FSC as established in the 
TAL were far less controversial than they proved to be during the drafting 
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process of the 2005 Constitution. Religious groups insisted on a constitutional 
council that reviewed legislation before it was enacted to ensure its conformity 
with sharia law. This view was strongly opposed by both secular and Kurdish 
political parties.504 They eventually reached a compromise, reflected in Article 
92, that specifies that the new FSC will consist of a number of Islamic jurists 
and legal experts together with judges. However, all other aspects regarding the 
composition and the ‘work’ of the Court were deferred to future implementing 
legislation which requires a two-thirds majority of the Parliament.505 
Insofar as it concerns the new FSC, the Parliament has continually failed 
to pass the implementing legislation. The draft law relating to the new FSC was 
first introduced into the Parliament in 2008, and since then the draft has 
frequently come before the Parliament (a total of 14 times as of May 2015). The 
debates that brought the draft closest to the voting stage were held in 2011, 2013 
and, most recently, in May 2015. In August 2014, the legislature established a 
‘provisional law committee’ within the Parliament with a specific mandate to 
pass the new FSC Law.506 The legislature’s failure to enact is seen to be severely 
impeding the Court’s legitimacy and independence and is leading to increasing 
political attacks on the Court. Until the Parliament passes the implementing 
legislation, the current FSC with its pre-constitutional composition exercises 
powers specified in the TAL, the 2005 Constitution or any federal legislation. 
Thus, Article 130 of the Constitution seems to uphold legal continuity rather 
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than legitimacy thereby ensuring that all pre-transitional and any other existing 
laws ‘remain in force unless annulled or amended in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution.’  
The following explains, in some detail, the constitutional and legal 
framework within which FSC is regulated, both before and after the ratification 
of the 2005 Constitution.  
4.2.1 Pre-constitutional FSC versus Prospective FSC: Composition and 
Jurisdiction 
The current or pre-constitutional Court (the FSC) consists of nine 
judges, all appointed through the executive-judiciary process. Thus, the 
Presidency Council that reflected the dominant (ethno sectarian) political 
powers during the early stage of the transition approved appointments without 
any input from the legislature. In consultation with the regional judicial 
councils, the Higher Judicial Council (HJC) presented three nominees for every 
FSC vacancy to the Presidency Council for approval.507 The pre-constitutional 
FSC, which is the de facto constitutional judiciary, or a ‘caretaker institution’ 
has been exercising the powers provided for the new court in the 2005 
Constitution. Under the 2005 Constitution,  
The Federal Supreme Court shall be made up of a number of judges, 
experts in Islamic jurisprudence, and legal scholars, whose number, the 
method of their selection, and the work of the Court shall be determined 
by a law enacted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council 
of Representatives [Parliament].508 
In practice, changes regarding the integration of non-judge members have not 
affected the current composition of the pre-constitutional FSC and will not come 
into effect until the Parliament enacts the new law of the FSC.  
The 2015 draft law of the new FSC (which is still under debate in 
Parliament) stipulates a comprehensive appointment process which involves 
wide-ranging actors. Accordingly, the new Court is to consist of fifteen 
members in addition to the Chief Justice and one deputy: seven judges are to be 
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nominated by the FSC in consultation with the Higher Judicial Council and the 
regional judicial councils. The draft considers the non-judge members to be an 
advisory board; two legal experts are to be nominated by the Ministry of Higher 
Education, and four (this was initially two) Islamic jurists (two Shi’a and two 
Sunni) will be nominated by the two Islamic endowment authorities. For each 
vacancy on the FSC, there must be three nominees of whom two will be selected 
by the Council of Minister and Parliament will then approve the candidate who 
has been elected by a majority. The draft law also stipulated that the FSC’s 
members would serve a twelve-year term with the possibility of the tenure of 
the Chief Justice being extended for two more years.509 The draft guarantees 
that consideration should be given to the constitutional balance among the 
various groups within Iraqi society in the composition of the Court.510 In other 
words, the draft regards appointments to the FSC as forming part of the power-
sharing arrangements without specifying how or the number of representatives 
of each group within the Court. 
The 2005 Constitution not only provides for a different composition for 
the new FSC, but also empowered it with greater jurisdictional powers in three 
areas. First, it is to exercise constitutional review of legislation and regulations. 
This power of constitutional review does not apply to ex ante abstract review of 
legislative bills or the procedural decisions issued by the Parliament. This has 
been reemphasised by the FSC decisions on several occasions; there was 
ambiguity concerning whether the Court has the jurisdiction to review 
legislation before being promulgated. The FSC denied jurisdiction to exercise 
ex ante abstract review of legislative bills; it reviews only decisions issued by 
the Parliament regarding the eligibility of MPs which had already been 
implemented.511 With regards to the second of these powers, the Constitution 
expands the FSC’s mandate to decide on several other crucial constitutional 
issues. The Court can provide a binding abstract interpretation of the 
constitution independent of any review of the constitutionality of legislation. It 
should be noted that the FSC is not authorised by its statutes to exercise this 
jurisdiction.  
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Third, the Constitution has followed the contemporary trend regarding 
constitutional judiciaries’ ancillary powers.512 The FSC has the jurisdiction to 
resolve disputes or conflicts of competence arising from the application of 
federal laws, and disputes arising among sub-federal governments. 
Furthermore, it has the power to impeach the President, the Prime Minister and 
Ministers. It approves the final results of the national parliamentary elections 
and decides on any appeals regarding decisions made by the Parliament 
concerning the eligibility of its members.513 The Court can exercise any other 
powers specified in other legislation. Most recently, the Law of Political Parties 
empowered the Court to review judicial rulings concerning the dissolution of 
the political parties.514 The FSC is also the highest court of ordinary jurisdiction, 
having appellate powers over the decisions of the administrative courts.  
The legal position of the FSC is exceptional, and it operates in legal 
uncertainty. Its composition is based on legal norms that were suspended by the 
2005 Constitution and in fact it infringes Article 92. The constant failure of the 
Parliament to enact the implementing legislation necessary to regulate fully the 
FSC’s composition and remit has undermined the Court’s independence, 
authority and legitimacy, since an institution that is authorised to uphold the rule 
of law and the Constitution is itself not subject to clear, stable rules or general 
principles of legality. Some have maintained that the Court ‘represents one of 
the most meaningful Rule of Law institutions in Iraq, and it is not operating 
consistently with its constitutional mandate.’515 
The difficult position of the FSC is evident in the extensive debates and 
disagreements regarding its controversial decisions, including politicians and 
the government’s reactions to these, and the constant failure to pass the FSC’s 
draft Law.516 These controversies have concerned the number, appointment, 
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tenure and the powers of the members of the Court. The issue of incorporating 
Islamic jurists and vetoing decisions concerning the conformity of the 
legislation and government acts to Islamic law has provoked the most heated 
controversy. Those who reject veto powers for Islamic jurists argue that this 
would significantly alter the Court’s function, promoting an Islamic state 
wherein religious rules take precedence over the existing, mostly secular, legal 
system. It also increases the possibility of external interference in the FSC’s 
judicial functions.517 Others have voiced highly contentious views regarding 
whether the FSC and its Chief Justice should be separate from the HJC, and also 
whether decisions should be unanimous or by a majority on disputes between 
the federal government and sub-federal governments.518 
With regard to judicialisation, the Court has been involved in many 
contentious constitutional and political questions that have major implications 
for the rule of law and democratic transition. Thus, there have been growing 
concerns about the independence of the Court. The following discussion 
analyses some of the most important aspects of the constitutional judiciary in 
Iraq, analysing their relevance to the potential rise of judicialisation. 
4.2.2 The Independence of the FSC 
Formally, a number of constitutional provisions explicitly protect 
judicial independence. Article 19 of the 2005 constitution stresses that ‘[T]he 
judiciary is independent, and no power is above the judiciary except the law.’ 
This independence is reemphasized elsewhere:‘[T]he judicial power is 
independent. The courts, in their various types and levels, shall assume this 
power and issue decisions in accordance with the law’.519 Subsequently, Article 
88 explicitly refers to the independence of judges, stating that ‘[J]udges are 
independent, and there is no authority over them except that of the law. No 
power shall have the right to interfere in the judiciary and the affairs of justice’. 
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The independence of the judiciary is also obvious from those articles that refer 
to the principle of the separation of powers. Article 47, provides that ‘[T]he 
federal powers shall consist of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, 
and they shall exercise their competencies and tasks on the basis of the principle 
of separation of powers’. Furthermore, the legislators in their oath before 
assuming their duties make a commitment to protect this independence stating, 
‘and I shall endeavor to protect […] the independence of the judiciary’.520   
In addition to that, judges are protected from removal ‘except in cases 
specified by law’.521 Another important means of preventing political influence 
on the judiciary involves prohibiting judges and general prosecutors from 
‘combining a judicial position with legislative and executive position and any 
other employment.’522 Most importantly, judges are prohibited from joining any 
political party or organisation or taking part in any other political activity.523 
Remarkably, the Constitution more generally prohibits any legal rules that 
specify immunity of certain administrative and governmental actions or 
prevents decisions from being challenged before the judiciary.524 This is 
considered a significant improvement given that such practice was common in 
pre-2003 constitutions which excluded substantive governmental acts (the acts 
of sovereignty) from any judicial scrutiny.525 Finally, the independence of the 
FSC is protected by constitutional provisions that directly regulate the FSC, 
which provides that ‘the Federal Supreme Court is an independent judicial body, 
financially and administratively.’526  
These constitutional provisions illustrate that on a formal level the 
independence of the FSC is substantially protected to a degree that is necessary 
but not sufficient. Thus, the formal protection does not necessarily prevent the 
potential informal politicisation of the courts ‘both by the government and by 
any other political actors (most probably, the opposition).’527 It is equally 
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important to note that some may also challenge its ‘exceptionally high degree 
of independence’ that ‘could even encourage a certain degree of politicisation 
at the informal level.’528 Therefore, the nature of the independence of the FSC 
seems more complicated than the legal framework outlined above would 
suggest, especially when considering the relation between the FSC and the HJC, 
the de-Baathification policies, and the membership of Islamic jurists on the 
FSC.  
4.2.2.1 The Relation Between the FSC and the HJC: An Ongoing Power-
Struggle Between Legislature and the FSC  
The formal constitutional and legal principles specifying the 
independence of constitutional judges by means of sufficient financial and 
organisational resources ‘are designed to guarantee that they will be free from 
extraneous pressures and independent of all authority save that of the law.’529 
The relationship of the judicial system to the executive authority in modern Iraq 
has experienced constant shifts. Under the Monarchy constitution (the Basic 
Law 1925) the judiciary was separated from the other two branches, and the 
Council of Judges, under the presidency of the Chief Justice of the Court of 
Cassation, the highest court in Iraq, governed the judiciary and oversaw all 
judicial appointments. In 1979, the Council of Judges became part of the 
Ministry of Justice, which supervised and controlled all courts.530 In 2003, the 
CPA re-established the Council of Judges and separated it from the Ministry of 
Justice, which became responsible for supervising all judges and courts except 
the Federal Court of Cassation (FCC). The FCC is meant to be supervised by 
‘the court's Chairman, due to the particularity of this court being the Supreme 
Court in Iraq.’531 Under TAL (2004) , it was renamed ‘The Higher Juridical 
Council’ (HJC) and consists of the presidents of the highest courts and is headed 
by the Chief Justice of the FSC, who is in charge of the administration and 
supervision of the federal judiciary in Iraq.532 Under Article 90 of the 2005 
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Constitution, the legislature specifies the rules that regulate the HJC’s 
composition and its jurisdiction. 
In December 2012, the legislature passed the Federal Judiciary Law 
112/2012, separating the FSC from the HJC. As a result, the President of the 
FCC became the President of the HJC, instead of the Chief Justice of the FSC, 
Madhat al-Mahmoud. This also established the HJC as ‘the highest 
administrative body’ or  supreme authority over judicial affairs.533 However, in 
September 2013, the FSC overruled the 112/2012 Law and reinstated Chief 
Justice Mahmoud as the head of the HJC.534 Interestingly, the grounds cited by 
the Court for the unconstitutionality of this contested Law were mainly based 
on the fact that the Law had separated the presidency of the HJC and of the FSC, 
and it defined the HJC as ‘ the highest administrative body that administers the 
affairs of the judicial bodies even though the Constitution affirmed its role as a 
fundamental part of the judicial authority.’535 As a result of this controversial 
FSC decision,536 and the failure to enact the new Law, the previous legal norms 
that regulated the HJC remained in effect, meaning that the Chief Justice of the 
FSC remains the president of the HJC.537 The only change that was indirectly 
associated with the 112/2012 Law was the fact that the FSC’s Chief Justice is 
no longer the President of the FCC.   
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It is important to note that the Constitution remains silent on the relation 
of the FSC to the HJC; both are listed alongside other institutions as components 
of federal judicial power.538 On the statute level, the FSC is ‘the highest judicial 
body, and constitutionally its relation with the HJC is unclear.539 It is not clear 
whether the Court is subject to the supervision of the HJC, which theoretically 
implies that the FSC judges are supervised by members of the HJC, including 
those judges who are of a lower rank than the FSC judges. It seems that the 
legislature has adopted this view in the latest draft laws of the FSC and the 
Federal Judiciary. In any case, in practical terms there is no legal hierarchy or 
supervisory relation when it comes to the HJC and the FSC since these are both 
still chaired by one person, Mahmoud. Any dramatic changes seem unlikely to 
occur in the near future, especially given a recent FSC decision that gave the 
judicial authority a dominant role in drafting and eventually deciding on any 
legislation that regulates the judicial system.540 
Like many other crucially important pieces of legislation, this has 
become part of the power-struggles in post-2003 Iraq.541 Furthermore, this 
uncertainty and the significant influence and even control wielded by the Chief 
Justice over the judiciary together with the exceptional formal independence of 
the FSC may encourage the Court to become involved in political crises. This 
might also put the accountability of the Court in question, especially given that 
it has been involved in and decided many controversial constitutional questions 
central to ongoing political crises. For example, the formation of the 
government, the extent of the competences of the Parliament and the 
government and other similar matters on constitutional significance as will be 
discussed in Chapter Five. Thus, the FSC can be said to have become of 
outstanding interest to political actors in their struggles to influence the newly 
established post-2003 constitutional order.  
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4.2.2.2 The Impact of the De-Baathification Policy on the Independence of the 
Court 
There is an ongoing debate about the challenges that transitional justice 
may pose to the rule of law and the problem of retroactivity and prosecuting 
individuals for offenses under the previous regime. Many are concerned that it 
‘risks being perceived as political justice, threatening the normative purposes of 
prosecution.’542 This thesis does not intend to engage in this debate. Instead it 
focuses on the implications of this for the independence of the judiciary. Among 
other measures that were established by the CPA to deal with former Baath 
Party members, a Judicial Review Committee was formed to review the 
eligibility for continued office of those judges who worked under the Baath 
regime.543 In 2008, the judiciary especially the FCC was given a decisive role 
in enforcing de-Baathification, and accordingly it now decides on the AJC’s 
decisions on de-Baathification.544  
Given the general weakness of Iraq’s institutions and the widespread 
corruption, this raises serious concerns about the implications of the 
constitutional provisions regarding de-Baathification policies and the 
implementing legislation. It could be said to have threatened sitting judges and 
their institutions; in particular, as a court-curbing measure against activist 
judges who may rule against powerful officials or politicians. It could also result 
in potential interference in decision-making and the outcomes of highly 
politically charged disputes. Therefore, the transparency of the implementation 
of the de-Baathification Law has been controversial for the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary. This has raised the issue of politicization and the 
possibility of triggering political interference both in the judiciary and by it.  
In an extremely controversial case that occurred just before the 2010 
General Elections, the AJC disqualified five hundred electoral candidates who 
were running in the parliamentary election, mostly from the Sunni community, 
on grounds of de-Baathification. The decisions were challenged before the FCC. 
The Court argued that it could not review all the evidence in such a short period 
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before the election, and therefore allowed candidates to run for election, 
deferring the matter until after the election. The decision was deeply contested 
and divided the nation politically. Widespread protests showed the anger among 
people, mostly within the Shi’a community and political parties. The then Prime 
Minister Maliki, ‘threatened to ignore the Court because it had made, what he 
viewed, an unconstitutional ruling’.545 Remarkably, the FCC then changed its 
decision and stated that it could review the evidence, and eventually approved 
all but twenty-six of the five hundred candidates. The events preceding this 
significant shift of opinion are rather more contentious. It was reported that the 
FCC’s decision followed an informal meeting between the main parliamentary 
leaders (possibly including Prime Minister himself) and the Chief Justice of the 
FSC, who was ex officio president of the FCC. Some observers have argued that 
this meeting was decisive for the outcome of this case.546  
Another highly contentious case involves the removal, albeit temporary, 
of the Chief Justice of the FSC, from his position.547 In February 2013, the 
nominally independent AJC removed Mahmoud from office on de-
Baathification grounds. This occurred following investigations into the links of 
several judges with the Baath party, including Mahmoud. It was reported that 
the decision was in response to a request from an independent member of the 
Parliament who challenged the Chief Justice’s eligibility for public office.548 As 
a result of his association with and position during the previous regime, the AJC 
charged him under the section of the de-Baathification Law relating to 
‘supporters of the regime.’549 It was argued that he had a major role 
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(1) in the appointment of members of the judiciary to high positions 
who turned out to be strong supporters of the regime, (2) that the chief 
justice had been promoted with some rapidity through the ranks of the 
judiciary (including being appointed to the Court of Cassation in an 
unusual process that involved the intervention of Saddam) and (3) that 
the chief justice was given various awards and honours during that 
period.550 
Given his association with and role during the Baath regime, these are serious 
allegations and questions which could undermine not only the Chief Justice’s 
personal career but also the legitimacy of the constitutional judiciary within 
which he plays such a significant role. Ironically, the application of the de-
Baathification rules is taken extremely seriously when it comes to the particular 
legal requirements for the heads of judicial bodies.551  
Interestingly, the decision to remove the Chief Justice was later 
invalidated by the highest appellate court (FCC), and he was reinstated.552 Some 
observers claim that the AJC relied on evidence which was regarded as 
insufficient by the FCC.553 Others, including Visser, argue that the move by the 
AJC was not controversial, especially given that the Chief Justice was a senior 
judge under the Baath Regime.554 Some even argued that the Chief Justice’s 
retained his position despite de-Baathification due to his support for the Prime 
Minister’s attempts to consolidate both his own power and that of his party.555   
In general, Mahmoud’s case has provoked great controversy and 
remains unclear. Some commentators are convinced that the crucial motivation 
behind the whole process was political, and the AJC’s involvement, in this case, 
was linked to ongoing power struggles between the Prime Minister and his 
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opponents.556 Thus, in reaction to the decision of the AJC to remove the Chief 
Justice, the AJC’s members immediately dismissed the head of the Commission. 
The Prime Minister’s legal advisor, announcing the dismissal, argued that the 
Parliament had never approved his appointment as the head of AJC. The FCC, 
which had previously overruled the decision concerning the removal of 
Mahmoud, ruled that the Prime Minister is authorised to appoint a new head of 
the AJC. The Parliament, however, rejected the dismissal of the head of the 
AJC.557  
In this case the de-Baathification was part of a much broader conflict 
and power-struggle, mainly, between opponents and supporters of the Prime 
Minister. This raises serious concerns about the independence of the judiciary, 
other rule of law principles, and transparency in the implementation of the De-
Baathification Law. In other words, due to this piece of legislation, the judiciary 
could become central to power struggles among politicians, which threatens 
‘sitting judges, undermining judicial independence in future cases.’558 
Importantly, it is not just the De-Baathification Law that has the potential to 
trigger external interference in the judiciary. There are also concerns that the 
presence of Islamic jurists in the composition of the FSC might lead to an 
influential and intrusive role for religious leaders and political actors in Court 
matters.  
4.2.2.3 The Presence of Non-Judge Members in the Composition of the Court   
In general, the institutionalization of Islamic law is not a new 
development. To a greater or lesser extent, it has been recognised and 
incorporated in most if not all constitutions of the Muslim majority countries. 
The most obvious and inevitable issues relate to the conflicts that involve 
Islamic law, and therefore deciding how they should be interpreted and resolved 
and which institution should be responsible.559 Iraq is one of the countries where 
                                                          
556 Wicken, Sullivan, ‘De-Ba’athification Body Ousts Iraq's Chief Justice as Protests Continue’. 
557 ibid. 
558 Pimentel, Anderson, ‘Judicial Independence in Post-Conflict Iraq’ 45. 
559 Contemporary constitutions of Islamic countries vary in the extent to which they recognise 
Islamic law and the role of jurists. Intisar Rabb has distinguished between three types of 
constitutions that could be developing in this regard. First is the ‘dominant 
constitutionalisation’, under which Islamic law is the supreme law of the state and Islamic jurists 
are directly empowered to specify and interpret the substance of Islamic law, e.g. Iran. In 
141 
 
Islam seems to have shifted from playing a largely symbolic role to this 
becoming an increasingly dominant one. In the pre-2003 Iraqi constitutions, 
Islam had a limited role, being recognized as the religion of the state.  
The role of Islam has become more substantial in the post-2003 
constitutional documents. In particular, the 2005 Constitution contains several 
provisions which illustrate the role which Islamic law could potentially play 
within the legal system. The Constitution focuses on this role, starting with 
Article 2, which establishes Islam as the official religion of the state, and states 
the necessity of future legislation conforming with the established provisions of 
Islam, and the potential impact on family law.560 Most significantly, in a new 
departure, the drafters of the Constitution included Islamic jurists in the 
composition of the FSC, alongside judges and legal experts. This has proved to 
be one of the most contested aspects of the new constitution. Certainly, both the 
legislature and the judiciary have a significant role in determining the influence 
of Islamic law in the new legal system.  
The 2005 Constitution incorporates Islamic law without shifting all the 
interpretative power to Islamic jurists.561 Scholars have extensively debated the 
broader issues of the constitutionalisation of religion and particularly of Islam 
in various contexts. Many have discussed the so-called ‘repugnancy clauses’562 
in Iraq’s post-2003 constitutional developments.563 Some have considered that 
these provisions pervade the constitutional text. Others argue that they have 
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little if any substantive impact, viewing them as ‘an assertion of identity, 
primarily of the Islamic variety rather than a phrase of legal substance’.564  
In practice, this issue is more challenging. Essentially, the controversy 
rests on whether interpreting and deciding the consistency of legislation with 
Islamic law should be the exclusive domain of the Islamic jurist members of the 
FSC or should involve the entire Court. Furthermore, determining the substance 
of Islamic law is more complicated due to the historical development, internal 
diversity, and binding nature of its commands.565 Thus, it is more problematic 
to understand and establish ‘on whom they (Islamic jurists) must rely for 
determination on questions of what Islamic principles require, the courts may 
well be open to outside influences, seriously compromising their 
independence.’566 For example, assuming that the interpretation of Article 2 
itself is of substantial impact, it has been argued that ‘if Article 2 is interpreted 
to require judicial fealty to fatwas, then anyone authorized to issue a fatwa 
would have direct power to dictate outcomes in judicial cases.’567 This is crucial 
given the diversity of Islamic law and its contested interpretations depending on 
different sects and schools of Islamic jurisprudence.  
Scholars, commentators, policy makers and judges themselves have 
different perspectives on the potential role of non-judge members of the Court, 
namely Islamic jurists, and the extent to which they should participate in 
decision-making processes within the Court. Some have regarded their role to 
be consultative or advisory, whereas others called for a more inclusive role.568 
Firstly, the advisory role seems to have some basis in a broader perspective on 
Islamic governance and democracy.569 It is suggested that ‘jurists can or should 
play a consultative role in defining the nature and content of Islamic law for a 
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democratic Islamic constitutional regime.’570 Applying such arguments to the 
FSC, jurists should have an advisory role. Those who advocate this view also 
refer to the Sharia Courts Law (1923), a piece of legislation no longer in force. 
According to this law, in cases concerning Islamic jurisprudence, a sharia court 
would seek clarification and statement from Islamic jurists on sharia rules that 
apply to a particular issue; although their statement is then included as part of 
the decision, they were not considered binding for the court.571  
The initial draft law of the FSC, which proposed an advisory role for the 
non-judge members of the Court, also supports this view.572 However, one 
should consider the extent of the differences which exist between sharia courts 
and the FSC. Sharia courts were empowered to deal with specific, individual 
claims that involve Sharia law, namely family law; whereas the constitutional 
judiciary, the FSC, is entrusted with significant powers, deciding on broad 
constitutional issues of substantial impact on the whole constitutional and 
political system.  
Second, it is suggested that the non-judge members enjoy the full 
membership of the FSC. From a comparative perspective, the membership of 
the constitutional judiciary is not limited to judges; this is because its task is 
more than of a purely judicial and legal nature. Thus, such courts take into 
consideration political, social, economic and international factors, and therefore 
can determine, or at least significantly contribute to policy-making.573 Thus, the 
drafters of the 2005 Constitution who supported the existence of Islamic jurists 
within the composition of the court were aware of this role. Arguably, Article 2 
of the Constitution necessitates the existence of Islamic jurists in the Court, to 
review legislation which may contradict Islamic law.  
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A third view, however, might be that the role of the non-judge members 
of the FSC should vary according to the case. In other words, the nature of the 
court’s jurisdiction should determine the relevance and the extent of 
participation of non-judge members. This classification of cases is problematic 
and seems impractical, as it is unclear whether the entire court should decide 
and determine the nature of these classifications or only certain members. On 
the other hand, supporters of this view may wish to differentiate between 
altering the jurisdiction of the FSC and resolving disputes. Thus, the 
adjudicatory role of the FSC including resolving disputes is exclusive to 
members of the Court who are judges, so participation in adjudication by non-
judges would contradict this fundamental constitutional principle. Other 
jurisdictions including the constitutional review of legislation and constitutional 
interpretation can be exercised by Islamic jurists and legal experts alongside 
judges.574 The debate here hinges on the independence of the judiciary, which 
is left solely to the implementing legislation regarding the new FSC, and 
whether to grant adjudication powers to non-judges. 
 It should be noted that the Constitution establishes the presence of 
Islamic jurists in the FSC which in itself is not in contradiction with the rule of 
law. However, it can be seen to pose a challenge to the rule of law, especially 
since the absence of the implementing legislation has left many aspects of the 
constitutional judiciary uncertain. In other words, the general constitutional 
rules regarding the FSC are seen to run counter to the rule of law in terms of 
clarity, stability, predictability and guiding the enactment of a particular law.575 
Equally important, many are concerned that allowing Islamic jurists to decide 
on or veto decisions concerning the constitutional review of legislation would 
facilitate external interference from non-state actors, namely powerful religious 
institutions. This argument was evident in the constitutional debates during the 
constitution writing process in the immediate of post-2003. For example, 
religious parties, namely those supported by Shi’a Muslims, favoured ‘a state 
whose institutions and actors would be constrained by non-state forces, the 
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Najaf jurists, when state officers sought to extend themselves beyond proper 
Islamic boundaries.’576The Najaf-based Shi’ite clerical institution, the 
Marjaiyya, is popular and highly respected, and has played a crucial role in 
political and constitutional developments in post-2003 Iraq.577 Therefore, courts 
including the FSC are seen to have a mandate  
to ensure that the legal machinery of enforcing the law should not 
deprive it of its ability to guide through distorted enforcement and that 
it shall be capable of supervising conformity to the rule of law and 
provide effective remedies in cases of deviation from it.578  
Furthermore, ensuring that the Court is independent should ‘prevent the political 
interests of the legislative and executive branches from being directly 
transferred to the court, which would endanger the court’s adjudication as 
adjudication.’579 This might also provoke ongoing constitutional crises and 
potentially result in ‘the dominance of politics over law’.580  
The FSC has been introduced into a troubling political and legal context 
with the view that its broad constitutional review and other powers should 
ensure the basics tenets of the rule of law. Some may argue that the flawed 
experience of the rule of law coupled with a difficult and violent political 
context has raised serious concerns over the legitimacy of the FSC and there is 
a growing sense that the executive branch is influencing the FSC. Many have 
expressed similar concerns about potential religious influence and all of these 
together could severely undermine the rule of law and the independence of the 
Court, resulting in ‘extra-constitutional’ norms dominating the legal system.  
The discussion so far has emphasised the importance of the FSC’s role 
and the challenges which it faces. Of equal importance is the degree of 
accessibility of the Court and of compliance with its decisions.    
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4.2.3 Standing before the FSC and Compliance with its Decisions 
Previously, it was observed that the rule of law underpins the importance 
of the judiciary, thus ‘given the central position of the courts in ensuring the rule 
of law [principles] it is obvious that their accessibility is of paramount 
important.’581 Cases or controversies normally reach the FSC in different ways 
depending on the jurisdiction which it exercises. The ordinary courts play a 
central role in instigating and bringing cases that raise questions of 
constitutionality before the FSC. In general, an ordinary court itself or any party 
to the litigation which believes that the legal rule which is due to be applied to 
a case is unconstitutional, has the right to challenge the constitutionality of that 
particular rule. The ordinary court must respond to the request and defer 
questions of constitutionality to the FSC, thereby obliging the appellant to file 
a lawsuit. The decision to refuse a request can be appealed before the FSC 
itself.582 In either instance, the ordinary court suspends proceedings until the 
FSC decides on the issue of constitutionality.583  
Accessing the FSC through concrete review has two implications. On 
the one hand, it provides assurances about the seriousness of the claim to prevent 
those that are intended solely to delay the resolution of a particular case. On the 
other hand, it might also limit the powers of the constitutional judiciary in 
controlling the constitutionality of legislation. It could be argued, in fact, that 
the ordinary court exercises the FSC’s review power in deciding that there is no 
contradiction between the legal norm and the Constitution. An immediate 
referral of a question of constitutionality by the ordinary court may result in the 
FSC exercising its broader constitutional review powers. However, an appellant 
may intend to delay the resolution of a particular case, knowing that this case 
will stay on hold until the FSC makes its decision. Indeed, the possibility of 
appealing the decision of the ordinary courts, or refusing to grant a request, gives 
the FSC discretionary powers regarding the extent of its accessibility and 
judicial review. Finally, the content and legal issues addressed in the 
constitutional case, that are directly referred from the ordinary court, depend on 
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the exact constitutional matter or question as specified in the referral decision. 
Thus, the FSC has emphasized that the referral decision must explicitly define 
the contested legal provision that raises the question of constitutionality, and the 
constitutional provision which it is claimed to contradict, otherwise it will be 
dismissed.584 
Furthermore, the Constitution guarantees direct access to the FSC 
without requiring any concrete case. Under the 2005 Constitution, the FSC has 
jurisdiction to settle matters that arise from the application of legislation and 
other acts of the federal authorities for the exercise of which the law of the FSC 
‘shall guarantee the right of direct appeal to the court to the Council of Ministers, 
those concerned individuals, and others.’585 However, by substituting ‘formal 
institutions’ [as stated in TAL (2004)] with ‘the Council of Ministers,' the 
Constitution might be understood to have limited the extent of direct access to 
only one institution. In subsequent wording, the use of the word ‘others’ 
guarantees wider access to other formal or informal institutions. Hence, a formal 
institution can challenge the constitutionality of legislation provided that there 
has been an actual ongoing dispute with another formal or informal 
institution.586 The application must also contain the contested statutory 
provisions, which are claimed to be unconstitutional, and the constitutional 
provision/s claimed to have been violated. Furthermore, it needs to include a 
written approval letter from the concerned minister or the head of the body that 
is not related to any ministry.587 
On the other hand, the 2005 Constitution explicitly stipulates that the 
FSC has jurisdiction to provide abstract constitutional interpretation. Given that 
the current Law of the FSC, enacted before the ratification of the Constitution, 
does not have such jurisdiction, the Court itself has developed standing rules for 
initiating abstract constitutional interpretation. It has limited standing to ‘the 
President of the Republic, the Parliament, the Council of Ministers and 
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ministers, and has explicitly excluded civil society organisations, political 
coalitions, and parties from initiating such petitions.588 The FSC does not 
explicitly require that there should be an actual dispute that involves interpreting 
a contested constitutional provision. In practice, the Court has been noticeably 
inconsistent in this regard. On occasion, it has dismissed applications for 
abstract constitutional interpretation on the grounds that there is a dispute 
between two parties involving the contested constitutional provision and has 
therefore obliged them to initiate a lawsuit.589 There are also examples involving 
ongoing disputes between two parties for which the Court provided an 
interpretation without requiring a lawsuit.  
In addition to that, the Constitution guarantees that any concerned 
individual, natural or legal person, can file a constitutional complaint, provided 
that he/she suffered an actual injury due to the challenged law, that this harm 
can be undone by overruling the law, and that the injured individual has not 
partially benefited from the contested law. Thus, harm that is potential, abstract 
or unknown is not accepted. Another important procedural requirement is that 
the application is signed by a lawyer or a legal representative from the concerned 
institution.590 The Court seemed to have detailed the ‘injury-in-fact’ condition 
for individual constitutional complaints and narrowed the possibility of 
litigation for the public interest, as detailed in the final part of this chapter.   
Equally crucial, an accessible, independent and functioning court has no 
means or power of its own that serves to enforce its decisions; they are only 
meaningful when enforced. Decisions of the constitutional judiciaries are often 
defined as binding on all authorities and final; they cannot be appealed or 
overruled save through constitutional amendments. This has led some to argue 
that binding decisions of the constitutional judiciary, especially in emerging 
democracies, might trigger ‘more constitutional harm than constitutional 
benefit, particularly when governmental non-compliance provokes a 
constitutional or political crisis that the fragile, and emergent constitutional 
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order is not yet strong enough to weather.’591 Others could maintain that in a 
post-conflict state, similar to that of Iraq, a ‘partial deviation from strict 
adherence to democratic norms [and the rule of law] might be justified based on 
certain conditions that often prevail in transitional societies.’592 Principally, it is 
critical for the rule of law that political branches adhere to court judgments once 
the decision has been made to seek its rulings.  
The FSC’s judges work largely by consensus in most cases and dissents 
are not issued; rulings and interpretations are final and binding on all, including 
the government, and cannot be overridden. The Court explicitly expresses this 
in the final part of its judgments.593 The implications of this, however, are not 
always immediate. On the one hand, there is a constitutional exception to the 
general rule of the binding and final force of the Court’s decision. The 
Constitution empowers Parliament to discharge the President of the Republic 
by an absolute majority in the case of being convicted by the FSC for ‘perjury 
of the constitutional oath, violating the Constitution or high treason.594 On the 
other hand, the implementation of FSC decisions, and the impact of the 
annulment of unconstitutional legislation require parliamentary action. In 
principle, when the court declares a contested law unconstitutional, it directs the 
legislature to replace its unconstitutional provisions with others that comply 
with the Constitution. Thus, the legislature decides when and how to introduce 
the required amendments. For example, the FSC states that; ‘[…] therefore, it 
requires from the legislature, according to its competence, to annul this 
paragraph, and replace it with a new paragraph which [is] in conformity with 
[…] the constitution’.595 This might suggest that the binding force and effect of 
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FSC decisions is subject to interference on the part of the legislature, which 
often happens over time.596  
Furthermore, enforcing FSC’s decisions might also become problematic 
due to the ambiguity of the judgment itself. Some might consider it essential for 
a self-restrained court to avoid deciding on the substance of certain contested 
issues by structuring its conclusions in such a way that the outcomes do not 
favour ‘one political actor over another.’ Importantly, judges might still issue 
clear judgments by articulating the conclusion in a manner that does not favour 
a particular party expressly or implicitly.597 Constitutional interpretation is 
needed when the text of the Constitution is unclear; but an unclear binding 
interpretation will make the implementation of the Constitution even more 
challenging. The FSC is often asked formally to explain its ambiguous 
decisions. In principle, the FSC denies it has jurisdiction to explain its previous 
rulings, no matter how ambiguous they are. In a somewhat controversial 
decision, when asked to explain a previous ambiguous ruling, the FSC denied 
that it had jurisdiction over this matter, arguing that it was within the jurisdiction 
of the State Shura Council (Shura Council), if asked, to explain judicial 
judgments.598 The Shura Council was originally part of the Ministry of 
Justice.599 Under the Iraqi legal system, when a judgment is considered unclear, 
the party to the dispute may ask the court or the Shura Council to explain the 
judgment.600 It is important to note that the Law of the Shura Council does not 
establish such jurisdiction. It provides, when asked, legal advice to 
governmental institutions, and also to explain legal judgments [although not 
court rulings] at the request of the interested ministry or bodies not connected 
to the ministry.601 
 This conclusion was problematic and if exercised would undermine the 
binding effect and final force of the FSC decisions on all authorities. Explaining 
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any unclear judgments by the FSC also risks raising a further challenge, namely, 
that the Shura Council’s explanation may contradict the FSC’s ruling, or may 
expand or narrow the scope of its applicability. To date, there have been no 
reported cases of the Shura Council providing explanations for ambiguous 
judgments issued by the FSC. Under Article 101 of the Constitution, it is 
‘specialized in functions of the administrative judiciary, issuing opinions, 
drafting, and representing the State and various public commissions before the 
courts except those exempted by law.’ Thus, it has an important role in 
providing legal advice to ministers on draft legislation.602 Therefore, due to the 
controversy of this issues and the continuing demand to clarify its ambiguous 
decisions, the draft law of the FSC adds a new jurisdictional power, whereby 
applicants can formally pursue an interpretation of any unclear and ambiguous 
rulings issued by the FSC.603      
Insofar as judicialisation concerns the fragility and ineffectiveness of the 
government branches, the power-struggles and the nature of the 2005 
Constitution itself suggest there would be an increase in constitutional questions 
and disputes and in the Court’s involvement in contested cases. The current 
rules of standing also cover the range of actors that can bring cases to the Court. 
However, a number of factors, regarding finance, skills, and information as well 
as the complexity of the constitutional issue, may limit individuals’ ability to 
initiate and sustain constitutional litigation. Importantly, though, the broader 
implications of constitutional questions, beyond interested persons, might also 
encourage others to litigate in the public interest or to provide a support structure 
in this regard. This highlights the importance of discussing the prospects of a 
support structure network of this type emerging in post-2003 Iraq and the extent 
of the role it might play in addition to the potential implications that this might 
have for judicialisation and the rule of law.  
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4.3 An Emerging Support Structure: Potential for Public Interest 
Litigation before the FSC 
In light of the general discussion in Chapter Three, this section examines 
whether the existing legal and institutional frameworks in Iraq can serve to 
develop a legal support structure. Its main focus is on public interest litigation 
and the role of governmental and non-governmental institutions towards 
establishing and developing support structures for constitutional litigation in 
post-2003 Iraq.  
4.3.1 The Legal and Institutional Framework for Developing Public 
Interest Litigation  
 
The core idea behind public interest litigation is that ‘civil lawsuits are 
being used in a new way to benefit the condition of groups within society or 
society as a whole’.604 In essence, it ‘aggregate[s] the claims of individuals or 
resolve[s] contested questions in ways that affect broad numbers of 
individuals.’605 Thus, it is argued that public interest litigation may play a 
twofold role. First, the ‘law-based advocacy intended to secure court rulings to 
clarify, expand, or enforce the rights for persons beyond the individuals named 
in the case at hand’.606 It relates to cases that involve the interpretative power of 
the court regarding constitutional provisions or legislation with wide-ranging 
implications.607 Second, it ‘can help new constitutional principles to take root, 
as well as increase public awareness of human rights and embolden those with 
legal claims to come forward’,608 serving to improve the rule of law.609  
                                                          
604 Lesley K McAllister, ‘Revisiting a ‘’Promising Institution’’: Public Law Litigation in the 
Civil Law World’ (2008) 24(3) Georgia State University Law Review 696.  
605Helen Hershkoff, Hershkoff H, ‘Public Interest Litigation: Selected Issues and Examples’ 
(Word Bank, working papers, 1 June 2004) <http://inprol.org/resource/9921/public-interest-
litigation-selected-issues-and-examples > accessed 9 November 2014 
606 James Goldston, ‘Public Interest Litigation in Central and Eastern Europe, Roots, Prospects, 
and Challenges’ (2006) 28(2) Human Rights Quarterly 492-527. 
607 Peter A Appel, ‘Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm’ 
(2000)78(1) Washington University Law Quarterly 215-311.  
608 H Hershkoff, A McCutcheon, ‘Public Interest Litigation: An International Perspective’ in 
Mary E MacClymont and Stephen Golub (eds), Many Roads to Justice: The Law Related Work 
of Ford Foundation Grantees around the World (Ford Foundation 2000) 285. 
609 Goldston, ‘Public Interest Litigation in Central and Eastern Europe’ 492. 
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Post-2003 Iraq’s constitutional development could be said to have 
increased the prospects of a relatively active support structure. The Constitution 
guarantees an expanded bill of rights that consists of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights and freedoms, and recognises those created and 
protected by Iraq’s international obligations.610 On the other hand, there are 
numerous examples of rules, specifically those that were issued by the Baath 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and a large number of CPA/Orders 
that have been judged by many to have infringed the Constitution and the basis 
of the rule of law. It should be noticed that under Article 130 of the Constitution, 
pre-transitional laws remain in force until they are annulled or amended to 
conform to the Constitution. One case will suffice for the purposes of the 
argument here. The Constitution explicitly prohibits unlawful detention,611 
emphasising that, ‘[N]o person may be kept in custody or investigated except 
according to a judicial decision.’612 In practice, for a long period these 
provisions were infringed by pre-2003 legal rules that entitled the Interior 
Minister,613 directorate generals,614 or the governor of Bagdad,615 to detain 
offenders, bypassing the judiciary.  
Amending, annulling or enacting new legislation to replace the 
supposedly unconstitutional laws is the principal role of the legislature and it 
has been seen to be struggling to do so. Litigation that challenges the 
constitutionality of such legal rules is another crucial means available when 
other possible methods are absent or weak. However, this method is also limited 
as the FSC only has the power to annul legal norms when there is a successful 
application that directly challenges the constitutionality of the contested laws. 
Importantly, the Constitution entitles any concerned person, institution or court 
of ordinary jurisdiction to challenge the constitutionality of such legislation.616 
                                                          
610 Constitution of Iraq (2005), arts 8, 14-47.  
611 ibid, art 19 (12) (a).  
612 ibid, art 37 (1) (b). 
613 See e.g., Revolutionary Council, Legislative Decree (27) 1992/2/4, the decree was repealed 
by Law 2012/66. 
614 Public Customs Law, art 237 (2), (1).  
615 Revolutionary Council, Legislative Decree (55) 1992/3/28. 
616 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 93(3): ‘Settling matters that arise from the application of the 
federal laws, decisions, regulations, instructions, and procedures issued by the federal authority. 
The law shall guarantee the right of direct appeal to the Court to the Council of Ministers, those 
concerned individuals, and others.’   
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In practice, their competence to initiate and maintain the litigation process is 
limited due to necessary resources and expertise. It could be said that any 
annulment of these unconstitutional rules would protect broader public interests. 
Therefore, litigating for public interest might become of relevance and interest 
to a larger group of individuals, governmental and non-governmental 
institutions.  
There are governmental institutions which can play a substantial role in 
defending and litigating for the public interest. An important and relatively 
innovative institution in post-2003 Iraq is the ‘Independent High Commission 
for Human Rights’,617 and the Ministry of Human Rights. These two institutions 
are principally in charge of addressing human rights violations, promoting and 
protecting human rights against state power. Despite several instances whereby 
the Ministry of Human Rights could have denounced rights violations by 
challenging the government’s abuses of powers in court, it has played a far less 
effective role in this regard. For example, there was a dispute between the 
Directorate General of Customs and the Ministry of Human Rights concerning 
the Directorate’s decision to detain a number of offenders, bypassing the 
judiciary. The legal issue was the constitutionality of the Public Customs Law 
which authorised such decisions.618 Clearly, the contested law contradicts the 
constitutional provision which prohibits any detention and investigation ‘except 
according to a judicial decision.’619 In the absence of any action taken by the 
Ministry challenging the constitutionality of this legislation, the issue remained 
as it was, until an investigation court challenged the constitutionality of the 
Customs Law during hearings that involved the cases of these detainees. 
Although the FSC later annulled the contested law,620 if the Ministry had 
originally challenged the Law, it could have defended and protected the 
fundamental rights of detainees, in this case, and therefore the broader public 
interest.  
                                                          
617 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 102. 
618 Public Customs Law (23) 1955.  
619 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 37 (19) (b). 
620 IRQFSC 2/2011 [22/2/2011]. The Investigation Court of al-Ratba requested the FSC to annul 
this procedure because the contested provision was inconsistent with the Iraqi Constitution. 
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Another important governmental institution is the Public Prosecution 
Department, which is part of the federal judiciary.621 It can play an essential role 
in defending public interests and the rights of certain vulnerable groups in civil 
lawsuits,622 and more substantially in criminal lawsuits.623 Under the Public 
Prosecution Law, one of the appealing ‘purpose clauses’ is that the public 
prosecutor should protect state security and institutions, the interests of the 
people, public wealth, the federal democratic structure and principles in post-
2003 Iraq.624 These somewhat general principal objectives may serve to develop 
an active role for Prosecutor General in defending public interests.  
In one of the few cases in which the Prosecutor General was seen to have 
exercised his powers defending ‘the order of the state’, he submitted a letter to 
Parliament calling for President Jalal Talabani to be replaced due to his 
prolonged absence as a result of health problems. Many argued that this matter 
might also have been brought before the Court. This is perhaps a constitutional 
issue but the relevant constitutional and legal rules are unclear and involve 
interpretation of Article 72 of the Constitution. This stipulates that ‘[I]n case the 
position of the President of the Republic becomes vacant for any reason, a new 
President shall be elected to complete the remaining period of the President’s 
term.’625 This move was open to debate, but implies that the General Prosecutor 
may have an important role to play in a broader context. For example, there are 
calls for an active role for the General Prosecutor, in exercising his power to 
protect public wealth by initiating lawsuits against corrupt officials and 
politicians and bringing them to justice.  
Other than these governmental institutions, the legal-oriented civil 
society organisations [CSOs] may play a crucial role in addressing and 
monitoring government violations of human rights and its broader abuses of 
power. 
                                                          
621 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 89: ‘The federal judicial power is comprised of the Higher 
Juridical Council […] the Public Prosecution Department, the Judiciary Oversight Commission, 
and other federal courts that are regulated in accordance with the law’.  
622 Public Prosecution Law (10) 2006- Amendment to Law (15) 1979, arts 13, 14. 
623 ibid, arts 2, 3. 
624 See ibid (Justifying Reasons). 
625 Although the President had been treated in hospital in Germany since 20 December 2012, 
after suffering a stroke, he never resumed his presidential duties nor was replaced. The letter is 
available on the website of the Iraqi Higher Judicial Council <http://www.iraqja.iq/mgles.php> 
accessed 13 May 2013. 
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4.3.2 Civil Society Organizations: The Potential for Developing Support 
Structures 
The 2005 Constitution recognises and actually protects both the 
existence and work of civil society organisations and other interest groups.626 
These are regulated through a series of institutional arrangements including the 
state Ministry CSOs, the CSOs Committee in Parliament, and a General 
Directorate of CSOs in the Prime Minister’s office, which is in charge of 
supervising CSOs affairs.627 Principally, these organisations and groups are 
supposed to address and document human rights violations or power abuses 
conducted by state authorities. One might also see these relations with the 
government as being controversial since they could affect the effectiveness of 
their role in challenging government abuses of powers.  
CSOs or public interest groups might see litigating in the public interest 
or supporting others’ cases as being more effective than engaging in prolonged 
social campaigns.628 Given serious concerns over the functioning of the Iraqi 
legislature and its capability to pass or amend legislation, it might be suggested 
that these organisations can systematically challenge repressive and 
unconstitutional rules in the FSC. For example, a key condition for valid 
individual constitutional complains is that the lawsuit, or petition, must be filed 
by a lawyer.629 In several instances, the FSC has dismissed cases because the 
application was not signed and filed by such a lawyer.630 The least that support 
structure can contribute here is providing lawyers that assist individuals in 
exercising their right to initiate constitutional complains. 
                                                          
626 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art: [T]he State shall seek to strengthen the role of civil society 
institutions and to support, develop and preserve their independence in a way that is consistent 
with peaceful means to achieve their legitimate goals, and this shall be regulated by law.’  
627 Post-2003, the NGOs’ work has been regulated by CPA/Order 45: Non-Governmental 
Organizations [Amended per Order 61] (23 February 2004) which provides principles and 
standards which govern these organisations. In April 2010 a new law was passed by the 
parliament to replace the previous order and to regulate the creation and the operation of the 
NGOs in Iraq.  
628 Surya Deva, ‘Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review’, [Reprinted] (2009) 1 
Civil Justice Quarterly Issue 24 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan047384.pdf> accessed 7 
May 2014. 
629 Bylaws of the FSC, art 1(1).  
630 IRQFSC 12/2009 [2/1/ 2009]. 
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Although there is barely any clear legal provision providing for the 
explicit right or role of civil society organisations to initiate public interest 
litigation, the general constitutional legal principles, and judicial precedents 
suggest such a role. One might consider the constitutional provisions concerning 
the FSC’s jurisdiction that guarantee the right of direct appeal to the Court for 
the Council of Ministers, those concerned individuals, and others.631 The word 
‘others’ here suggests a wider access for other institutions, including civil 
society organisations. The FSC could interpret the ‘others’ either to allow or to 
limit standing for these organisations that are litigating in the public interest. To 
this point, the record of public interest litigation in the FSC is far from 
impressive, but there is evidence that this can be enhanced and broadened. Most 
importantly, the few examples of public interest litigation that have been 
brought before the Court are considered landmark cases in the FSC’s 
jurisprudence, the detail of which will be discussed in the next chapter.632 It 
might, however, be of relevance to outline briefly the two leading cases. 
The very first example related to the post-2010 election crisis and Open 
Session of the Parliament (55/2010) ruling.633 The Court declared a decision 
issued by the acting speaker of the Parliament to consider the first session of the 
Parliament open as unconstitutional.634 The ruling is important as a civil society 
organisation challenged the unconstitutionality of this decision of Parliament 
and the delay in forming the new government on the ground that it harmed the 
public interests of the people. Civil society organisations widely welcomed the 
decision and considered it to be an example of subjecting officials to the rule of 
law. The second example which was indirectly supported by civil society 
organisations is one of those key decisions of the FSC.  In the MPs’ Allowance 
(79/2013) case the Court held as unconstitutional the controversial Law 
concerning MPs’ Pensions.635 The decision came as protests had spread all over 
the country demanding basic services fuelled by anger over the corruption of 
                                                          
631 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 93 (3). 
632  See Chapter Five (5.3.1). 
633 The parliament elected in March 2010 convened once in June, and the speaker left the session 
open indefinitely but unattended, meanwhile politicians were negotiating to form the 
government. This led to extensive debates and criticisms concerning the procedure, the open 
session, taken by the Parliament. See Chapter Five (5.3.3).  
634 IRQFSC 55/2010 [24/10/2010].  
635 IRQFSC 79/2013 [23/10/2013]; See Chapter Five (5.3.3). 
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state officials. One of the protestors’ most recurrent demands was to cut the high 
salaries of MPs. Civil society organisations played a crucial role in supporting 
these demands, and the National Union of Lawyers went further, challenging 
the constitutionality of this particular piece of legislation on the ground that this 
was in the public interest of the Iraqi people.636  
Moreover, civil society organisations can be of further significance in 
providing a support structure for constitutional litigation, particularly in respect 
to those who have limited access to justice. One of the means by which such 
support can be provided is by third party intervention. Indeed, the Iraqi legal 
system recognises third party intervention: ‘[A]ny person of interest may 
request to be engaged in the suit as a third party, whether to join one of the suit’s 
litigants or to independently apply for a judgement in his favour.’ 637 Thus, third 
party intervention is possible on the request of an outsider; upon the request of 
a party to the litigation; or on the action of the court itself.638 An intervenor 
becomes a party to the litigation after he is granted leave to intervene with 
respect to the remedy and can participate actively and fully in the litigation.639 
In one of the very few instances, the Iraqi Union of Journalists entered 
as a third party in litigation, which had itself been initiated by a group of 
journalists concerned about the impact of a newly enacted law upon their work. 
In this instance the Court upheld the law.640 This case is important in that it was 
initiated by a group that sought to defend the public interest and, most 
importantly, a CSO entered the case as a third-party intervener. Allowing 
intervention by non-parties in ongoing litigation, which was originally 
established to prevent contradictory rulings regarding similar cases with the 
same interests, might also serve as a means of developing an essential basis for 
public interest litigation.  
In principle, while the Court is receptive to third-party intervention, the 
law limits this intervention, requiring applicants to demonstrate that they have 
constitutional standing to sue; it is required that the engagement of third party 
                                                          
636 Although the specific issue was the financial privileges of the MPs and high ranking officials, 
it is observed that it was part of the much broader issue of corruption in which the parliament 
has been involved.  
637 Civil Actions Law, art 69. 
638 ibid. 
639 ibid, art 70. 
640 IRQFSC 34/49/2012 [12/6/2012].  
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is based on ‘a viable interest in the suit’.641 The FSC itself could have an 
essential role here through loosening the requirements of standing for public 
interest litigation and adopting more flexible rules of standing. Thus, the 
expanded standing that could be developed by the Court would be effective 
given that the FSC’s interpretations and decisions are binding and not subject to 
review or annulment, except a constitutional amendment which is another 
complex matter.642  
Overall, the post-2003 legal and institutional framework suggests that 
emerging CSOs and other interest groups tend to rely on the judiciary as a means 
of upholding the new constitutional order. An expanded standing for third-party 
public interest litigation could bring more cases to the Court challenging the 
government’s exercise of powers and expanding the accessibility of the Court 
to disadvantaged individuals and groups. This procedure could also serve to 
promote the ends of the rule of law and the legal arbitration of controversies, 
bringing into Court cases concerning government infringement of rights or 
abusive exercise of power.643 
 This could however further affect the already weak parliament as 
interest groups might bring matters that should be dealt with in parliament into 
the Court. It seems that, in the case of Iraq, such groups often turn to the Court, 
believing that seeking litigation would serve their interests better than the 
politicians who often spend months struggling to compromise. Both of the cases 
mentioned above were reported to have been brought before the FSC only after 
politicians had spent months of unsuccessful debates focusing on particular 
narrow interests rather than the broader interests of the public. This endangered 
the already unstable political process and security, increasing potential 
constitutional infringements, either in form of power-sharing arrangement or the 
concentration of powers in one body. Thus, the implications were significant for 
the rule of law and transitional democracy, not to mention for Iraqi citizens. 
These are just a few illustrative examples, begging the question: is the judiciary 
                                                          
641 Civil Actions Law, art 71. 
642 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 126. 
643 Domingo, ‘Judicialisation of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary?’ 117-118; Barker, 
‘Third Parties in Litigation’ 43. 
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able and willing to accept broader involvement in such cases? Over time, the 
development of the jurisprudence of the FSC will provide the answer.  
Conclusion  
This chapter applied the variables which are argued to account for the 
expansion of judicial powers and judicialisation to the case of the FSC and the 
context within which it operates. Ongoing political and legal uncertainty and 
ethnosectarian divisions within Iraqi society and the political parties have put to 
the ultimate test the rule of law, democracy and the role of the FSC. 
Constitutionally, the FSC is designed to become an empowered, independent 
and relatively accessible constitutional judiciary. The current pre-constitutional 
FSC has been operating in the challenging political and legal context of the post-
2003 transition to democracy which continues to be fragmented, divided and 
unstable. A difficult challenge for the constitutional judiciary is the legitimacy 
and the legal uncertainty of the current FSC whereby successive legislatures 
have failed to enact the implementing legislation that would establish the new 
form of the FSC. One of the most contentious issues concerns the presence of 
the non-judge members of the FSC, namely Islamic jurists; once incorporated 
into the Court, their role and relations to the religious institutions could have 
substantial implications for the country’s emerging democracy.  
Another potential factor that could determine the extent and implication 
of judicialisation of the Iraqi Constitution can be the emerging support structure 
especially the civil society organisations and public interest groups. These 
actors have grown in quantity and quality as the post-2003 transition can be said 
to have some success regarding the electoral democracy that opens up the 
country to new practices and expanded the political rights and activities. The 
possibility of an expanded standing for litigating for public interests can be said 
to enhance the accessibility of the constitutional judiciary and increases 
constitutional cases brought before the FSC. Thus, it could serve to challenge 
government excesses and arbitrary powers, and support broader legal and 
political demands for upholding the newly established constitutional order and 
the rule of law. Although there are some examples illustrating how 
governmental and non-governmental institutions have pursued litigation to a 
great effect, it remains unclear if the currently available procedural mechanisms, 
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including public interest litigation and third-party intervention, will be sufficient 
to provide the necessary support structures for constitutional litigation. 
 Thus, many of the factors mentioned above would certainly facilitate 
the expansion of judicial powers. One reading of the factors discussed and their 
impact on FSC suggests that the constitutional judiciary has already been 
involved in some constitutional cases that have served to define and redefine the 
constitutional balance of powers. The other possible reading might place greater 
emphasis on the serious challenges the FSC faces from external political 
pressure that might threaten the independence of the constitutional judiciary. 
Thus, this view may be concerned that certain political actors or the government 
itself might rely on the FSC to legitimise their exercise of powers, transferring 
deeply contested political disputes that have decisive implications for the entire 
political and legal system to constitutional cases that require judicial resolution. 
Analysing the case law in next chapter will provide greater insights on whether 
the FSC has been self-restrained, activist or inconsistent, and whether it has 
taken on the substantive issues or avoided addressing and resolving the 
substance of greatly contested constitutional questions as well as the wider 
implications for the political process and stability in the entire country. From a 
broader comparative perspective, judges, including those of the FSC, in 
emerging unstable contexts seem to be relatively aware of the potential 
challenges they face, especially those concerning the independence of the 
judiciary. Is it likely that they will develop a variety of mechanisms to defend 
the independence of their court while at the same time expanding their powers 
to provide a legal basis for the resolution of constitutional conflicts? 
These and other possible suggestions form the central focus of the next 
chapter that analyses the FSC’s case law that has developed over the course of 
the decade it has been in operation. The chapter will test the theoretical 
assumptions developed in the previous chapters and consider how the FSC has 
been influenced by the various factors discussed in this chapter. It will develop 
these arguments further, discussing the transition to democracy with regard to 
[re]establishing the key structures of political significance to rule of law through 
the analyses of the case law of the FSC. It provides significant insights into the 
court’s contribution to and its impact on the rule of law in Iraq’s democratic 
transition. 
162 
 
Chapter Five: The Federal Supreme Court’s Judicialisation of 
Constitutional Issues 
Introduction  
Previously in chapter two, we saw how it was recognised that the 
essence of the rule of law is the supremacy of the law, limiting and preventing 
arbitrary exercises and abuses of powers. The experiences of constitutional 
judiciaries in transitional democracies largely suggest that courts are extremely 
vulnerable to interference from politicians and other powerful actors, and to the 
government’s court-curbing actions and non-compliance with their decisions. 
On the other hand, courts seem also willing to expand their powers into political 
conflicts which are often transfered into constitutional cases. Therefore, it is 
anticipated that courts’ approach to constitutional questions will vary depending 
on the nature of the controversy, the parties to the dispute and the broader 
implications of a given case for the political and legal system.  
Based on the aforementioned argument, this chapter evaluates the case 
law of the constitutional judiciary in Iraq’s post-2003 transitional democracy, 
focusing on the perspective of establishing the rule of law. The 2005 Iraq 
Constitution establishes pluralism; federalism; a parliamentary and democratic 
system of governance; it protects human rights; and supremacy of the law and 
of the Constitution. It also recognises the people as the source of authority and 
legitimacy. Each of these fundamental constitutional principles has been 
challenged to differing degrees and has played a central role in constitutional 
conflicts and litigation. Furthermore, with each new piece of legislation that is 
passed or with each set of elections, the Court is confronted by new 
constitutional questions that often have crucial implications for the entire legal 
and political system.  
The following discusses FSC’S case law on selected issues which are 
anticipated to occur in the immediate of transition to a democratic constitutional 
order with significant impacts on the development of the constitutional 
jurisprudence in post-2003 Iraq. For the most part, cases are presented in a 
chronological order, making it easier to follow the activities of the Court over 
nearly a decade of functioning. This period can be considered exceptional, not 
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only for the sheer quantity of cases which were received and decided by the 
Court but also for the novelty of the cases and decisions, since the first elections 
under the 2005 Constitution truly tested and challenged the rule of law.  
It should be noted that the FSC rulings are short (the average judgment 
is some three pages long), and often insufficiently detailed in their reasoning. 
Moreover, the FSC’s jurisdiction is limited to the content of the petition for 
constitutional judicial review and explicitly expressed legal questions; it cannot 
decide on issues which are not addressed in the petition. Since the FSC is not 
authorised by its statute to issue abstract constitutional interpretation, it has 
developed certain requirements for a valid petition for abstract constitutional 
interpretation. The Court makes a distinction between abstract constitutional 
interpretation, which only certain state officials and institutions can ask for; and 
resolving legal disputes that involve constitutional interpretation for which a 
lawsuit must be filed to the Court. One of the pre-conditions for bringing and 
considering lawsuit is the existence of an on-going dispute which clearly 
identified the contested constitutional and legal provisions.644 
 Interestingly, the Court has followed an inconsistent approach as to 
whether to dismiss a request for abstract constitutional interpretation when it 
involves an on-going dispute between two parties which would oblige the 
petitioner to file a lawsuit; or instead to issue an interpretation of the 
Constitution. The Court, as will be discussed further in this chapter, often uses 
this distinction as the main grounds for not answering constitutional questions. 
A further point to bear in mind is that understanding the internal decision-
making of the FSC remains problematic since information on this matter is 
neither accessible nor reliable. At the time of writing, it was not possible to 
conduct interviews especially with FSC’s judges and, so far, there has been no 
tradition of judges including dissents in the judgment; most judgments are 
issued by unanimity;  only very few in total have been issued with a majority 
decision.  
In this chapter, the discussion of cases is organized into four sections, 
with each focusing on the Court’s approach to a specific subject matter. The 
first section explores the role of the FSC in legislative-executive conflicts whilst 
                                                          
644 Bylaws of the FSC, art 5. 
164 
 
the second evaluates questions of federalism. The focus in the third section is 
on cases involving elections and government formation and the fourth concerns 
questions of conformity of legislation with Islamic law. 
 5.1 The FSC’s Rulings on Legislative-Executive Power Struggles 
The analysis in Chapter Four provided in-depth discussion of the powers 
of the legislature and the executive branches and the relations between them at 
federal level.645 This thesis has argued that constitutional courts often receive 
and decide on a substantial number of disputes of competence between 
governmental branches. These questions concerning the structure and powers 
of state institutions may actually test the FSC’s accountability function in 
relation to the separation of powers and in holding officials and institutions to 
account for bypassing the constitutional boundaries of power and infringing the 
constitutional balance of power. The resolution of such conflicts and 
contestations can have a significant impact on the development of the 
constitutional order and in democratic transition. The following discussion 
focuses firstly on those key constitutional cases, in which the FSC’s rulings have 
defined or redefined the constitutional balance of power regarding the executive 
and the legislative branches. The discussion then shifts to one specific 
controversy in which the Court and litigants were involved in a legal battle 
regarding the constitutionality of the pension entitlements of parliamentarians 
and of the state’s high-ranking officials.  
5.1.1 FSC Rulings on Conflicts of Competences and Inter-Branch Relations  
One of the critical aspects of the Constitution, which the Court has been 
regularly called on to decide, is the respective constitutional powers of the 
legislative and executive branches and, therefore, the relations between them. 
The following discussion addresses some of the key rulings in three different 
types of these constitutional cases respectively: the independent commissions, 
the law making and the accountability powers of the parliament. 
                                                          
645 See Chapter Four (4.1). 
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5.1.1.1 The Independent Commissions  
One of the most controversial of the FSC’s rulings involving the 
respective competences of the legislative and executive branches relates to the 
Independent Commissions. The Constitution establishes a number of 
Independent Commissions or bodies, but failed to define the exact nature of 
their relationship with the state institutions. Thus, some are subjected to 
parliamentary monitoring, such as the Independent High Electoral Commission 
(Electoral Commission).646 Others are responsible before the Parliament, such 
as the Central Bank of Iraq, or are attached to the Parliament, such as the Board 
of Supreme Audit and the Communications and Media Commission.647 Only 
two independent commissions are clearly attached to the Council of Ministers: 
the Endowment Commission,648 and the Martyrs’ Foundation.649 More 
significantly, Article 108 of the Constitution provides that ‘[O]ther independent 
commissions may be established by law, according to need and necessity’.  
Although there had not been any reported contestation concerning the 
independence of these commissions, the Office of the Prime Minister requested 
the FSC’s view regarding the constitutional provisions on the independent 
commissions and their relations with other governmental branches. The 
applicant argued that the relationship which these commissions had with either 
Parliament or the government, as stipulated in the Constitution, contradicted the 
principle of separation of powers. It was also argued that the nature of these 
relations, whether monitoring, responsibility, or attachment, has been 
interpreted [in practice] in such a way that any relation with the executive branch 
is effectively denied. The petitioner concluded, therefore, that such an 
interpretation would be inconsistent with the nature of the executive function of 
these commissions, claiming that the reference to independence should not 
mean they are entirely independent of the three branches; rather this should refer 
only to their financial and administrative independence and having no links with 
any ministry. 650   
                                                          
646 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 102. 
647 ibid, art 103(1), (2).  
648 ibid, art 103 (3). 
649 ibid, art 104. 
650  IRQFSC 88/ 2010 [18/1/2010].  
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In the Independent Commissions (88/2010) case, the FSC scrutinized the 
relevant constitutional provisions and decided to submit or ‘attach’ these 
commissions, in particular the Electoral Commission which was the subject of 
the claim in this case, to the executive branch, arguing that independent 
commissions are part of state’s structure, perform tasks of an executive ‘nature’ 
and are not linked to any ministry. Furthermore, those commissions that are not 
currently explicitly linked to Parliament or the Council of Minister should be 
attached to the latter.651 Closer reading of the Court’s reasoning indicates that, 
first, the decision emphasizes the executive nature of the work of the Electoral 
Commission, arguing that [in constitutional terms] subordinating the 
Commission to Parliament contradicts the fundamental principle of separation 
of powers enshrined in the 2005 Constitution. Second, it argues that some of the 
commissions that have executive functions are constitutionally subjected to the 
supervision of the Parliament and linked with it. However, this contradicts the 
constitutional powers of the legislative and executive branches as stipulated in 
Articles 61 and 62. In other words, the Constitution does not establish these 
powers for Parliament to exercise. Third, the Court argued that the attachment 
of several of these commissions to Parliament does not prevent the Council of 
Ministers, as stipulated in Article 80(1), from supervising the ‘work of the 
ministers and departments not associated with a ministry’. Thus, the FSC’s 
interpretation in this case viewed independent commissions as ‘department not 
associated with a ministry’, whereby they are to be supervised by the Council 
of Ministers. 
This conclusion and the ruling that Independent Commissions (which 
are meant to oversee state institutions and in particular the government itself) 
should be attached to the Council of Ministers has been contested and criticized 
on a number of grounds. First, it has been argued that by reestablishing the link 
between these commissions and the governmental branches, the Court has 
explicitly contradicted the text of the Constitution. Some may even argue that 
the FSC has found an ‘error’ in the 2005 Constitution, ruling ‘in favour of the 
government against a constitutional provision itself.’652 Thus, the decision 
                                                          
651 IRQFSC 88/ 2010 [18/1/2010]. 
652 Reidar Visser, ‘The First Step of the New Maliki Government: Attaching the Independent 
Electoral Commission to the Executive’ (Iraq Gulf Analyses, 21 January 2011). 
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established some level of government supervisory control over these bodies in 
keeping with its principal executive function in Article 80(1) of the Constitution, 
even for those commissions which are constitutionally connected to the 
Parliament.653Secondly, and more interestingly, the interpretation was requested 
in the absence of any legal dispute, an admissibility requirement, that has been 
strictly applied by the Court in other similar cases. In this case, the Prime 
Minister was not in conflict with any other party. More importantly, in its 
reasoning the Court states that the legislature attaches to the Parliament the High 
Commission of Human Rights,654 and the Public Integrity Commission,655 
although the Constitution does not mention either of these. Such a conclusion 
implies the unconstitutionality of the legislation that established this attachment, 
and the necessity for its annulment. In this instance, the Court found that the 
contested statute was unconstitutional but did not rule it to be unconstitutional 
as the application had not explicitly asked about that matter.  
Thirdly and most significantly, the FSC ignored or contradicted its 
previous interpretation regarding the independence of commissions of this 
type.656Thus, in an earlier decision, the Court interpreted the term 
‘independence’ regarding independent commissions. It found that: 
Employees of the commission and each according to their competences 
are independent in exercising their duties as stated in the law of the 
Commission [the Public Integrity Commission] subject to nothing but 
the law and no one can interfere or affect the functioning of the 
Commission […] however the Commission is subject to the supervision 
of the parliament in exercising its acts.657 
In other words, in the most recent case, the FSC overruled its previous decision 
on the same legal issue to reach a conclusion that further supported the 
                                                          
653 Jonathan Cohen, ‘Decision 88: Balance of power under the Iraqi constitution’ (Jurist 18 
March 2011) <http://www.jurist.org/forum/2011/03/decision-88-checks-and-balances-in-
iraq.php> accessed 12 January 2014. 
654 High Commission of Human Rights Law (53) 2008.  
655 Federal Public Service Council Law (4) 2009.  
656 The applicant requested from the Court to interpret the meaning of the word ‘independent’ 
stated in Article 102 of the Constitution that ‘[T]he High Commission for Human Rights, the 
Independent Electoral Commission, and the Commission on Public Integrity are considered 
independent commissions subject to monitoring by the Council of Representatives, and their 
functions shall be regulated by law.’ 
657 First Independent Commission (228/2006) case, IRQFSC 228/2006 [9/10/2006]. 
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executive’s attempts at and policies for centralisation of powers. Interestingly, 
when confronted by severe criticism, Maliki, the incumbent Prime Minister, 
responded that this was ‘an attempt to cast the government in a bad light and 
undermine its efforts to be strong’.658 Reportedly, he even took further action, 
which included issuing an arrest warrant on corruption charges for the head of 
the Electoral Commission who had publicly complained about and severely 
criticised the fact that the ruling might result in the Electoral Commission 
becoming answerable to the Prime Minister.659  
Similarly, the Court’s decision to subject bodies such as the Central 
Bank and Electoral Commission to the government’s general policy can be seen 
as a cause for concern especially given that the Court has issued other rulings 
that are said to have shifted the constitutional balance of power in favour of the 
executive branch and, by implication, the prime minister. This might have been 
one of the reasons why in the period immediately following that ruling the 
Parliament pushed for the enactment of the FSC legislation and in the month 
that followed, the FSC draft law had its second reading of the darft. 
5.1.1.2 Parliament’s Right to Initiate Legislation 
The right to initiate legislation is the first stage of the law-making 
process, determining the subject and the contents of the law. It is common that 
both the government and parliament have the right to legislative initiative. 
Constitutions may limit legislative proposals by either excluding certain laws or 
requiring the fulfillment of certain conditions. For example, the French 
constitution gives this right to both the prime minister (‘legislative project’), and 
members of parliament (‘legislative proposals’).In practical terms, the 
government usually exercises this power. Legislative proposals(or 
amendments) initiated by the parliament are inadmissible ‘if their adoption 
                                                          
658 Ahmed Rasheed, ‘Critics Alarmed as Iraq’s Maliki Centralizes Power’ (Reuters 23 January 
2011)  
<www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/23/us-iraq-politics-cabinet-idUSTRE70M1MV20110123> 
accessed 10 July 2015 
659 Romano, ‘Iraq’s Descent into Civil War’ 555.  
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would have as a consequence either a diminution of public resources or the 
creation or increase of an item of public expenditure’.660  
Under the Iraqi Constitution, the legislative initiative right is not 
exclusive to the Parliament, but is shared with the executive, and indeed in 
practice this body is more likely to exercise this right. Article 60 stipulates that 
‘Draft laws shall be presented by the President of the Republic and the Council 
of Ministers’,  and that ‘Proposed laws shall be presented by ten members of the 
Council of Representatives (Parliament) or by one of its specialized 
committees.’ Furthermore, Bylaws of the Parliament require that the Fiscal 
Committee within the Parliament should submit to the government for approval 
any bill or amendments relating to the law of the general budget or other 
legislation that would create or increase financial obligations on the 
government.661 
In a controversial move the Prime Minister filed two lawsuits against the 
Speaker of the Parliament and the Presidency Council, challenging the 
constitutionality of a Law that separated certain departments of a government 
ministry.662 This contested law was proposed by the Parliament and the 
petitioner argued it was not approved by the government. The legal issue was 
that Parliament’s constitutional power to legislate is based on draft laws 
presented by the government which is in charge of planning and executing ‘the 
general policy and general plans of the state’.663 Therefore, the abolition of a 
ministry or dismantling of its structure as planned in this proposed Law was an 
encroachment on the executive role of the federal government. Furthermore, the 
petitioner argued that there is a constitutional distinction between draft and 
proposal laws.  
In its landmark ruling on the Draft and Proposal Law (43/2010), the 
FSC distinguished between draft laws and proposal laws, maintaining that the 
executive has the legislative initiative right to create draft laws and not the 
Parliament. The Court struck down the contested law, arguing that firstly, the 
                                                          
660Constitution of the Republic of France (1958), arts 39, 40. <http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/constitution/constitution-of-4-october-
1958.25742.html > accessed 12 January 2016. 
661 Bylaws of the Iraqi Council of Representatives (15) 2006 [Bylaws of the Parliament], art 
130. 
662 Disengagement of Departments of Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works Law (20) 
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proposal was presented by the Parliament and lacks government approval. 
Secondly, the FSC referred to the principle of the separation of powers, arguing, 
several times, that the executive authority presents draft laws and that any laws 
that have been passed without being presented by the executive branch would 
infringe Article 60(1) of the Constitution. Thirdly, the Court argued that the 
government is constitutionally responsible for fulfilling various commitments 
created by legislation, including financial, political, international and social 
obligations.664 Therefore, the executive has the exclusive power to submit draft 
laws, and any law proposal presented by the Parliament is considered to be ‘an 
idea’ but not a draft law, which needs to be developed as a draft law and 
approved by the government before being passed through Parliament.665  
The conclusion reached in Draft and Proposal Law (43/2010) ruling is 
of crucial importance and has far-reaching implications which severely limited 
the legislative role of the Parliament, the state’s only legislative body. The 
FSC’s interpretation limits the legislative powers of the Parliament to proposal 
laws which must be submitted to the executive, transferred into draft laws and 
then approved by the same body, before the draft can be presented to Parliament 
for enactment. The executive can reject a proposal law and therefore block the 
legislative powers of the Parliament. Since then, this ruling has been used as the 
grounds for challenging the constitutionality of any law that was originally a 
legislative proposal and failed to fulfill the requirements that were created by 
the Court.  
One of the examples whilst illustrates the implications of the above 
Draft and Proposal Law interpretation involves a deeply contested piece of 
legislation. In January 2013, Parlaimnet passed the Term Limit Law for Iraq’s 
Three Presidencies.666 The contested law limits the number of terms in office 
for the Speaker of the Parliament, the President of the Republic and the Prime 
Minister. It was passed following concerns that the incumbent Prime Minister, 
Maliki, would seek a third term in office, which is constitutionally possible. 
Constitutionally the President of the state is limited to two terms in office;667 
                                                          
664 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 80. 
665 IRQFSC 43-44/2010 [12/7/2010]. 
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however, the constitution says nothing specifically regarding the two other 
presidencies [Speaker of Parlaiment and Prime Minister] that the contested law 
sought to limit to two terms in office. The Prime Minister’s office challenged 
the constitutionality of the contested law. The applicant argued that this 
limitation contradicts a fundamental constitutional principle, typical of any 
parliamentary system, namely, that ‘the people’ are the source of power and its 
legitimacy. Since the Parliament is empowered to elect its Speaker,668 and the 
Prime Minister,669 it was implied that ‘the people’ decided not to limit their term 
of office; otherwise, if they had chosen to do so, they would have specified 
constitutional limitations similar to those for the President’s term. The petitioner 
further argued that the contested law take effect retroactively as the limitation 
applies to the three incumbent presidencies, and that the rationales described in 
the law are of political rather than public interest. Another argument that was 
presented, the most crucial one, was that the Parliament has no power to add 
constitutional provisions or regulate matters that need constitutional 
amendments, such as asserting that the Prime Minister shall resign if half of his 
cabinet ministers resign.670  
As many had predicted, in the Term Limit Law (64/2013) case, the Court 
held that the contested Law was unconstitutional due to the procedural means 
by which the law was enacted. Thus, it had been proposed by the Parliament, 
bypassing the executive branch; it had not been submitted to the executive to be 
drafted and approved as required by Court’s previous Proposal and Draft Law 
(43/2010) ruling.671 Interestingly, the subject of the contested law was actually 
extremely controversial and, although the ruling was largely predictable, it 
                                                          
668 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 55: ‘The Council of Representatives [parliament] shall elect 
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illustrated the implications that the latter interpretation of the draft and proposal 
laws would have. It was crucial to see that, despite all the arguments and 
counter-arguments regarding the substance of the law, the Court’s annulment of 
the time limit for the terms in office of the three presidencies disregarded the 
substance of the law in this instance. Many upheld that this time limit was 
needed given the increasing concerns about the consolidation of power in the 
office of Prime Minister and the potential personalization of powers. 672 In other 
words, it can be said that in unstable and  transitional state such as Iraq,  laws of 
this kind may protect the transition itself althogh in its essence it can be seen to 
contradict the core of the representative democracy and ‘the right to vote, elect, 
and run for office’ as guaranteed in Article 20 of the Constitution. 
The distinction between proposal and draft laws has been significantly 
criticized. It can be said that in a series of subsequent cases, the Court has taken 
these criticisms into consideration, and seems to be trying to limit the 
implications of depriving Parliament of its legislative initiative right. In one case 
involving a contested proposal law that had been passed without seeking 
government approval, the Court clarified its Draft and Proposal Law (43/2010) 
interpretation, whilst still declaring the relevant law unconstitutional on this 
ground. It insisted that this interpretation does not deprive the legislature of its 
main and most crucial power in law making. Thus, in order for a proposal law 
to fulfill constitutional requirements with respect to legislating, it needed to be 
developed into a draft law in coordination with the government that is 
responsible for planning and implementing the general policy of the state. The 
FSC further explained that:  
If the executive authority, without any constitutional and legal ground 
or reason related to the general policy of the state, refrained from 
transferring a proposal (presented by the Parliament) to a draft law, then 
the parliament can exercise its accountability powers in Article 61(2) 
including withdrawal of confidence from the Prime Minister after 
[formally] questioning him for his violation of the constitution.673  
                                                          
672 ‘The members of the parliament have different opinions regarding the Term Limit Law’, 
<http://www.al-vefagh.com/News/85277.html> accessed 11 December 2015. 
673 IRQFSC 19/2013 [6/5/2013]. The contested law was the Law of Salary and Allowance of 
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The Court thus addressed and clarified a procedural matter to overcome the 
government’s arbitrary refusal of legislative proposals, on which both the 
Constitution and the previous ruling were silent. However, this is easier said 
than done; holding the government to account and formally questioning it every 
time it refuses to approve a proposal law is not practical, mostly because the 
FSC has also limited Parliament’s accountability powers, namely formal 
questioning of ministers, in a series of rulings which will be discussed shortly.  
It took a long time before the Court issued its second landmark ruling on 
the legislative initiative right of Parliament. When the FSC was asked to 
determine the constitutionality of a law that regulates the replacement of MPs,674 
the Court is said to have had clearly considered the occasion as offering an 
opportunity to shift its approach from an absolute ban on Parliament’s direct 
legislative initiative right to one which set clear limitations to this. Thus, in the 
most recent development, in the Second Proposal and Draft Law (21/2015) 
case, the Court was more explicit and decisive in the limitation on Parliament’s 
legislative role. Two separate petitions (which were decided jointly) were filed 
with the Court, challenging the constitutionality of the MPs Replacement Law 
2006 on the grounds that the law failed to fulfil the necessary constitutional 
requirement established by the FSC’s Proposal and Draft Law (43/2010) 
decision.  
The contested law was a proposal law initiated and passed entirely by 
the Parliament, without having been approved or transferred into draft law by 
the government. The FSC ruled that,  
According to this principle (separation of powers) each authority 
exercises its competences and functions completely and as established 
by the Constitution, the legislative authority exercises its constitutional 
competences and powers, and the very first of which is to enact federal 
laws that the public interest necessitates and within the constitutional 
framework. And laws enacted directly by the Parliament must not 
contradict this principle, and these laws are laws that establish financial 
obligations on the government not listed in its manifesto or budget 
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without its consultation and its approval; laws which contradict the 
government’s ministerial manifesto upon which the Parliament gave its 
confidence; and laws involving the judicial power without the 
judiciary’s consultation as this contradicts the independence of the 
judiciary. Other than these the Parliament can exercise its original and 
direct legislative powers to enact federal laws to achieve public interest 
and within the constitutional framework.675 
The Court found that the contested law was not included in any of these three 
categories; it did not create financial obligations on the government, contradict 
the government’s ministerial manifesto, or regulate the judicial powers. 
Therefore, the FSC said that the contested law which was directly enacted by 
the Parliament without the involvement of the government did not contradict 
the principle of separation of powers.676 Since then, the Second Draft and 
Proposal Law (21/2015) interpretation of the legislative power of the Parliament 
has been considered an important step that revises the FSC’s jurisprudence and 
preserves Parliament’s role in legislating. The Speaker of the Parliament, 
together with MPs and political leaders, explicitly noted that the Court has 
retained and strengthened the legislative role of Parliament, and overruled its 
previous decision in the Draft and Proposal Law (43/2010) case.677  
It is important to note that the Draft and Proposal Law (43/2010) ruling 
almost paralysed Parliament and blocked its legislative powers, rendering it 
incapable of legislating without the executive’s authority. It could be argued that 
this violated the principal task of the parliament and the fundamental 
constitutional principle of separation of powers. In principle, the executive 
authority may have certain powers, input and impact on legislating and law 
making. The problem lay with the Iraqi Constitution and the FSC’s 
interpretation in particular since this made the government’s right to legislative 
initiative the rule, whilst the legislative initiative right of the Parliament became 
the exception, and was subject to government approval.  
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One can make several important observations on these two landmark 
decisions of the FSC regarding the legislative initiative right. First, the 2015 
decision was issued on the basis of a case for which there was no legal dispute 
or any petition for an abstract interpretation of the relevant constitutional 
provisions, an admissibility requirement that the FSC’s judges rarely disregard. 
Second, the Court granted the judicial authority a role in the legislative process 
as it obliges Parliament to consult it regarding any laws that may affect, or are 
related to, this branch. For example, this will somehow give the judiciary control 
over the implementing legislation of the new FSC which is still the subject of 
continuing debates in Parliament.678 Third, the Court changed or explicitly 
explained the precedent established by the 2010 ruling. In the 2010 case, the 
Court established the general principle that Parliament can only initiate 
proposals, and since a proposal is an idea and not a draft, then it needed to be 
transferred into a draft law by either the Council of Ministers or the President 
of the Republic in order to be consistent with the government’s policy 
manifesto, which was itself approved by the Parliament.679 Thus the 2015 
interpretation implies that the Court no longer considers a ‘proposal’ to be an 
idea that only the government is constitutionally authorised to transfer to draft 
law, on which basis any law passed exclusively by the Parliament would be 
unconstitutional.   
There may be different understandings of the actual impact of this latest 
ruling of the FSC: the Second Draft and Proposal Law (21/2015). Some may 
argue that it has reformed the Court’s position on the direct and original 
legislative powers of the Parliament by means of proposal laws from an absolute 
ban into three rather broad exceptions. Accordingly, the Parliament has a limited 
role in initiating legislation, the extent of which is determined by the Court itself 
and how judges interpret the concepts of financial obligation, government 
manifesto, and judicial power. Others may believe that the Court’s ruling does 
not actually create something new in this regard. Formally Parliament can now 
legislate and is said to have the power to directly enact a law, without the 
approval of the executive, unless it falls within one of the three aforementioned 
                                                          
678 See e.g. Article 95 of the Constitution of Afghanistan explicitly provides that the Supreme 
Court through government proposes for drafting laws regulating the judiciary.    
679 IRQFSC 21, 29 /2015 [14/4/2015]. 
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categories. But the Parliament’s draft law is still to go through government, to 
be tested against the financial obligation it puts on the government, as well as 
the public interest and objectives behind it. From this point of view, the Court 
seems unaware or has not taken into consideration that Bylaws of Parliament 
obligate the financial committee within Parliament to seek government approval 
on all proposal laws containing a financial aspect.680 
Interesting is that the Court has stated that limiting the ‘legislative 
initiative rights of parliament’ is also typical practice in parliamentary systems 
globally. From a comparative perspective this is true to some extent; parliament 
may frequently be excluded or restrained from the process of law making 
regarding legislation that creates or increases financial items in the 
government’s expenditure or general budget. Some of the exceptions introduced 
by the FSC’s 2015 decision are matters reserved for government alone, outside 
the remit of Parliament. This should prevent Parliament from blocking 
government policies. For example, in Poland, the government has an exclusive 
right to legislative initiative on budgetary and other financially important 
laws.681  
Although it is rather rarer for the judicial power to be explicitly 
authorized to participate in the law-making process, this does happen. The 
Russian constitution explicitly entitles the highest courts [the Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation 
and the Supreme Court of Arbitration of the Russian Federation] to the right of 
legislative initiative within their jurisdiction.682 Similarly, the Constitution of 
Afghanistan provides that the Supreme Court through the government can 
propose legislation regarding judiciary.683 Furthermore, autonomous entities or 
federal regions within a federal state can also be entitled to initiate legislation 
on a federal level, as in Spain.684   
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In practice, it can be said that the three exceptions that the FSC 
introduced are so broad that if interpreted as such, then, effectively, they do not 
represent much of a change. It will be interesting to see how the Court reacts to 
future challenges to laws on these grounds. It remains to be seen if this shift 
would have made a difference to the laws already annulled on the basis of the 
2010 ruling, or whether the outcome would have followed the same lines as this 
new case, and would have still have been found unconstitutional by the Court. 
It seems possible that at least some of the laws annulled on the basis of the 2010 
ruling would have been constitutional as long as the Court found that they were 
not included in the three aforementioned exceptions specified.  
For example, the Term Limit Law was not related to the judicial 
authority, nor did it create any financial obligation on the government or 
contradict the government manifesto, unless the Court should decide to interpret 
the exceptions broadly enough to suggest this is the case. Interestingly, one of 
the petitioner’s arguments in the Term Limit Law case was that the contested 
law was of no significance to the public interest. This is important given that 
one of the general requirements for Parliament’s original direct legislative 
initiative right by means of proposal law, including those that are not considered 
within the three exceptional categories, is that the legislation that enacted by the 
Parliament must be in the public interest. Whilst it is generally agreed that the 
‘self-reforming’ approach that the Court adopted regarding the legislative power 
of the Parliament might become a rather formal one, in practice it is still subject 
to the FSC’s discretionary power in interpreting the three exceptions and, most 
importantly, the public interest with which the proposal law would be 
associated.  
5.1.1.3 Parliamentary Oversight of the Government’s Performance 
Overseeing, checking and holding the government to account is the 
second and most important power of the parliament under a democratic 
constitution. The 2005 Constitution provides for Parliament to monitor 
government and hold it accountable, ensuring that the exercise of public power 
conforms to the rule of law and the constitution. In the Iraqi Parliament, 
overseeing government is addressed in the form of questions (both oral and 
written), discussion and inqury, the investigation committee and interrogation. 
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These procedures enable a dialogue within the Parliament and each seems to 
carry different implications. Except for the (simple) question which any 
individual MP can direct to the PM and ministers, other institutional instruments 
require that at least twenty-five MPs ‘raise a general matter for discussion’ 
inquiring about a policy or the performance of the executive or ‘to call them to 
account on the issues within their authority’.685 The formal questioning that calls 
ministers and the PM to account on government policies and performance is 
stronger in its effect than any other form of questioning. This is because any 
steps to withdraw confidence from the government or from a minister must 
follow parliamentary interrogation proceedings. If the outcomes do not satisfy 
Parliament, MPs can submit a motion of withdrawn confidence. If this is 
approved by the majority of parliamentary members then the government must 
be replaced (without elections).686 
Exercising these institutional means of overseeing government, 
especially parliamentary questioning or interrogation, is experiencing 
difficulties in establishing itself in Iraq, and on several occasions the FSC has 
become involved. One of the major obstacles to effective parliamentary control 
of government is the fact that all of the post-2003 governments have so far been 
based on a coalition of different political parties reflecting the ethno-sectarian 
nature of these parties, meaning there has been an absence of real opposition. 
Furthermore, political decisions are often the result of difficult compromises 
between various coalition parties and it is generally not in the interest of the 
majority to question these compromises.  
MPs have been persistently calling on ministers and the PM, directing 
inquiries and questions to them regarding a range of different isssues from 
delivering basic public services to matters concerning state security and other 
high profile issues. In response, ministers and especially the PM have largely 
avoided responding and resisted facing the MPs in Parliament. For instance, PM 
Maliki constantly refused to respond to questions posed by MPs in Parliament, 
arguing that questions concerning high profile matters, including national 
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security, should not to be discussed in an open parliamentray session.687 
Increasingly, ministers who were about to be questioned by MPs challenged the 
constitutionality of the procedure and at times even the substance of the 
questions and of the matters due to be asked about. The relevant FSC rulings 
have important implications regarding Parliament’s ability to monitor 
government performance effectively.  
The first case involved the Minister of Higher Education, who was due 
to be questioned by Parliament, but instead of responding to the questions he 
requested an interpretation of the constitutional provisions regarding formal 
questioning from the FSC. In addition, the petitioner sought an interpretation of 
the constitutional provision that gives the FSC jurisdiction to settle ‘accusations 
directed against the President, the Prime Minister and the Ministers’.688 It can 
be argued that the petitioner added this latter provision to emphasise the 
seriousness of the outcome of the Parliament’s formal questioning session. In 
the First Formal Questioning of Minister (35/2012) case, the Court created a set 
of conditions whereby  a questioning request must fulfill otherwise it would be 
considered unconstitutional. Most importantly, the Court concluded that the 
‘questioning request’ must include defined facts concerning the breach of the 
Constitution and law that have caused irreparable damage. In other words, the 
FSC judges argued that parliamentary interrogation as stipulated in the 
Constitution and detailed by Bylaws of the Parliament was almost the equivalent 
of the criminal ‘charge sheet’ under the Criminal Procedural Law.689 Therefore, 
the interrogation of ministers by parliament is the most serious (‘highest and 
most dangerous’) means of parliamentary supervision over the government. 
Thus, the Court said that it might result in a vote of no confidence in the 
Minister in question or the whole ministerial cabinet collectively if the charges 
were evidenced. For that reason, a formal request for questioning must include 
the breach/es of the constitution and the damage it has/they have caused. 
Additionally, the Court held that deciding on the accusation directed against the 
President, Prime Minister, and other Ministers (impeachment) falls within the 
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jurisdiction of the FSC and should be regulated by law. For reasons related to 
the absence of both the implementing legislation on the new FSC and that 
regulating the impeachment procedure, the current FSC cannot impeach these 
officials and any accusations must be dealt with according to existing laws.690 
Since then, challenges to the constitutionality of the questioning of 
ministers have continued to be brought before the FSC. In fact, subsequent 
challenges frequently referred to the FSC’s initial ruling, which explained the 
requirements for a constitutional and legal parliamentary questioning. The 
Parliament has addressed an important point in all these cases: the formal 
questioning of ministers is a procedural matter which falls within Parliament’s 
jurisdiction and not that of the Court. It is one of the critical means of holding 
the government to account. Thus, accountability of government in itself is 
fundamental to the parliamentary system, and one of the guarantees of 
upholding principles of legality and democracy.691  
In the first case following the main ruling, the same minister challenged 
the constitutionality of the parliamentary request to question him, arguing that 
it did not fulfill the necessary constitutional conditions including those 
established by the FSC’s jurisprudence. The Court reemphasized the need for 
fulfillment of these conditions, arguing that the specific breach of the 
Constitution and law needed to be outlined in the questioning request as well as 
the damage that had been caused by such actions. The decision was based on 
the judges’ evaluation of the kind of questions and accusations provided in the 
questioning request handed to the Minister by Parliament.692  
Faced with substantial criticism, in its subsequent rulings the Court took 
a more self-restrained approach which is seen to have limited its role in this 
regard. Thus, in the Parliamentary Formal Questioning of the Minister for 
Youth and Sport (95/2012) case, the Minister for Youth and Sport, who was due 
to be questioned by the Parliament, challenged the constitutionality of the 
questioning request, reflecting on the Court’s main ruling in this regard. Several 
facts had been presented in the questioning request and the same arguments 
were underlined by the Parliament defending its powers to question cabinet 
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ministers. Importantly, the FSC was seen to distinguish between procedural and 
substantive aspects of the questioning request, and found that the request 
fulfilled the formal conditions. Regarding the substance of the questions and 
accusations made against the minister, it held that it is within the power of the 
Parliament to determine and decide on the constitutional and legal conditions of 
a questioning request. This is to happen, said the Court, during a session in 
which questions are directed to the minister and responded to by him. As a 
result, the ministerial responsibility regarding these matters should be 
determined by the MPs, who should decide whether the subject was to be 
considered a formal questioning or [a simple] question and inquiry.693 
Therefore, the presence in Parliament of the minister who is to be questioned is 
a constitutional obligation, and he must stand before the MPs during the 
questioning session.694  
The aforementioned cases illustrate the potential and extent to which a 
parliamentary power, here the formal questioning of ministers, which is 
essential for holding government accountable to the rule of law, could be 
judicialised. In the first ruling (35/2012), the Court clearly surrendered its right 
to exercise its jurisdiction regarding impeachment, limiting its powers and 
denying any possibility that it would impeach any of the government ministers 
or the President. This is despite the fact that it exercised other jurisdictions 
introduced by the 2005 Constitution for the new Court, including the abstract 
interpretation of the Constitution and approval of the results of the general 
elections. It could be argued that exercising this jurisdiction requires 
implementing legislation to elaborate this before the Court can exercise its 
jurisdiction and that until then the existing laws govern that issue. Importantly, 
the relevant existing laws do not establish judicial impeachment of the 
government official and the available means to oversee the government is 
exclusive to Parliament. 
                                                          
693 Constitution of Iraq (2005) provides for both methods; questioning and a simple ‘question’ 
and ‘inquiry’ session. art 61 (7/1): ‘A member of the Council of Representatives may direct 
questions to the Prime Minister and the Ministers on any subject within their specialty and each 
of them shall answer the members’ questions.’ Whereas the same article in the same paragraph 
under section C, states that: ‘a member of the Council of Representatives, with the agreement 
of twenty-five members, may direct an inquiry [questioning] to the Prime Minister or the 
Ministers to call them to account on the issues within their authority.’ 
694 IRQFSC 95/2012 [27/1/2013]. 
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On the other hand, the Court’s interpretation of the requirements for the 
formal questioning of government has limited parliament’s accountability 
function and provoked ministers who were due to be questioned by the 
Parliament, to turn to the Court to try and block Parliament’s oversight function 
in holding them accountable for abuses of power. It seems interesting to note 
that in the initial case, the Court interpreted the relevant constitutional principles 
and provisions and determined the requirements that the request for questioning 
must fulfill, and then in the subsequent cases it examined the fulfillment of these 
requirements. It is generally agreed that formal questioning is the most extreme 
and most ‘dangerous’ form of parliamentary oversight of the government and, 
by implication, it may result in Parliament moving towards withdrawing 
confidence from the government.  However, interpreting the questioning request 
as being equivalent to the ‘charge sheet’ in a criminal investigation can be seen 
as poor reasoning or a failure to comprehend the Bylaws of Parliament that 
elaborate these procedures. Thus, even Bylaws do not require the questioning 
request to contain the constitutional violation and the consequent harm 
attributed to the act of the minister in question.695   
In subsequent cases the FSC has seen to have slightly modified its 
previous approach. It did not examine the facts provided in the lawsuit brought 
by the Minister of Youth and Sport as part of the parliamentary interrogation. 
Rather it considered whether the request fulfilled the formal conditions, namely, 
whether it was signed by at least twenty-five MPs. Most importantly, the judges 
argued that it was within Parliament’s jurisdiction to decide on the substance of 
the matters and questions to be directed to the minister. In a similar case, the 
FSC pressed the issue further, arguing that Parliament has the authority to 
determine whether the request fulfills these conditions and not the FSC. The 
petitioner listed a series of accusations regarding certain illegal act allegedly 
committed by the minister in question, and the Court implicitly agreed that these 
conditions are in place. Thus, it stated that the Minister is constitutionally 
obliged to attend Parliament to answer questions.696 
Parliamentary interrogation is not the only means of oversight by which 
the legislature can hold government to account, nor is it the only one subject to 
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183 
 
the FSC’s ruling. In the Investigative Committees of Parliament (96/2012) case, 
the Ministry of Health challenged Parliament’s power to establish an 
investigation committee. The contestation was based on the fact that the 
legislature had formed an investigative committee regarding alleged violations 
and abuses committed by the Inspector General of the Health Ministry. The 
petitioner made several arguments. First, that Parliament’s constitutional power 
to check and oversee government actions is limited to a questioning and inquiry. 
It then argued that Parliament does not have any investigative powers to 
scrutinize members of the executive branch of the government, with the 
exception of the Prime Minister and Ministers. Second, an investigation is 
conducted by either an administrative or judicial body, and the legislature’s 
investigative power contradicts the principle of the separation of powers in 
Article 47. Third, the parliamentary investigative committees took place within 
parliament and have no jurisdiction over the executive power.697 The FSC 
upheld Parliament’s right to establish investigation committees, arguing that 
this was essential for parliament to exercise its powers and role in overseeing 
government. It could obtain any necessary evidence and documentation, which 
could be used to prove an executive official’s violation of the law and the 
committee is required to submit the case with all relevant evidence and 
documentation to the competent bodies including the Public Prosecution Office 
or the Public Integrity Commission for further actions. Therefore, the Court held 
that Parliament had the power to take these steps as part of its constitutional 
competences.698  
The essence of the controversy in this case is perhaps the petitioner’s 
ignorance of the constitutional and statute rules that regulate parliamentary 
control of government. Thus, the Constitution does not explicitly provide for 
the investigation committees in Parliament. However, the Bylaws of Parliament 
do explicitly provide for such a jurisdiction, stating that Parliament’s powers of 
oversight include ‘any other officials in the executive branch.’699 Thus, the FSC 
emphasized that there are procedures and methods, not detailed in the 
Constitution, which the parliament may follow when exercising its 
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accountability function. In other words, the FSC insisted on Parliament’s power 
to hold the executive accountable by means of checks and balances, whether 
these were established by the Constitution or legislation.  
5.1.2 Between Deciding and Avoiding Substance of the Law: Cases 
Involving Salaries of High-Ranking Officials  
One of the critical challenges for the Iraqi people and its government is 
the extent of corruption within the state institutions and in particular amongst 
high-ranking government officials. Various factors have contributed to the 
dramatic increase in corruption in the country, and one of parliament’s most 
crucial tasks is to pass the necessary legislation to tackle or at least minimize its 
impact. However, it has done little and is often considered to be part of the 
problem; it grants high salaries and financial privileges to high-ranking 
government officials including MPs, ministers and the three Iraqi presidency 
offices. This has placed an enormous burden on the country’s general budget, 
as well as creating a gulf between the financial privileges they enjoy and the 
living standards of the rest of the civil servants and the ordinary people. Public 
and civil society organizations have continuously called for widespread protests 
to demand changes and tackle the problem.700 
                                                          
700 See e.g., The Telegraph headline: ‘Iraqi MPs' Lavish Salaries Causing Public Outrage’. It 
states that Iraq’s lawmakers are being paid over £180,000 a year-for working for only 20 
minutes since they were elected in March, and without passing a single law. It reported that 
‘Iraqi MPs get a base salary of £6,500 a month, on which they pay just 6 per cent tax. In addition, 
they receive £7,800 a month for housing and security arrangements. There is also a one-off 
£37,500 stipend to cover expenses during their four-year term. Regardless of whether parliament 
is in session or not, MPs are entitled to stay free at Baghdad's Rasheed Hotel and collect a £375 
per diem when travelling inside or out of Iraq. Once out of office, they get 80 per cent of their 
salary for life’ 27. ‘Iraqi MPs Lavish Salaries Causing Public Outrage’ The Telegraph (London, 
2 November 2010) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/8104439/Iraqi-MPs-lavish-
salaries-causing-public-outrage.html> accessed 27 July 2015; Barbara Surk , Iraqi MPs Get 
Handsome Pay for Little Work’ The Washington Post (Washington, 2 November 2010)  
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/nov/2/iraqi-mps-get-handsome-pay-for-little-
work/?page=all>; Ali Abel Sadah, ‘Iraqi Activists Seek to End Pensions for Parliament’ (al-
Monitor, 13 August 2913) <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/iraq-
parliament-pension-controversy.html#>; Iraq to Slash Politicians’ Salaries amid Protests (al- 
Arabiya News 16 February 2011) 
<http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/16/137896.html>; 31; ‘Iraq's PM Says He'll Cut His 
Salary by Half’ (al-Arabiya, 5 February 2011) 
<http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/05/136332.html > accessed 2 December 2015. 
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In 2011, the Parliament enacted two pieces of legislation regulating the 
pensions of MPs (MPs’ Allowance Law 2011),701 and Ministers (Ministers’ 
Allowance Law 2011).702The First MPs’ Pension (9/2012) case was an 
interesting one. A group of retired MPs challenged the constitutionality of the 
provisions of the MPs’ Allowance Law 2011. Their primary claim was that the 
contested law violated their right to 80% of their salaries under a previous law 
that regulated retirement pension.703 Petitioners argued that this infringed the 
fundamental constitutional principle that prohibits the retroactive effect of 
laws.704In addition, they cited other constitutional provisions including the 
exemption of low income from taxes,705 and the state’s obligation to guarantee 
a ‘suitable income’.706  
The FSC found the contested provision was constitutional, arguing that, 
firstly, there was no provision in MPs’ Allowance Law 2011 stipulating a 
retroactive effect. Secondly, there was no link between petitioners’ arguments 
and the aforementioned constitutional provisions since the tax exemption 
applied only to low incomes and the petitioners were not considered to be in the 
low-income bracket. Thirdly, it lay within the powers of the federal authorities 
to determine the suitability of income.707 The Court manifested a similar 
approach in the Pension of Ministers (16/2012) case, in which a minister 
challenged the constitutionality of a similar provision of the Ministers’ 
Allowance Law 2011, on similar grounds.708 Interestingly, the primary legal 
issue in both cases was that by the time these two new pieces of legislation had 
been enacted, the petitioners’ retirement pensions had become acquired rights, 
which cannot be reduced, but can be increased. Most importantly, in both these 
rulings the Court upheld contested laws and ruled on the substance of the issue. 
The Court did not address the issue of the pensions in itself, but the issue of 
                                                          
701 Law of Salary and Monthly Allowance for Members of the Council of Representatives (28) 
2011 (MPs’ Allowance Law 2011). 
702 Salary and Monthly Allowance for Ministers (27) 2011 (Ministers’ Allowance Law 2011). 
703 Unified Retirement Law (27) 2006 [Repealed] (Retirement Law 2006).        
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reducing and increasing these was the subject of the petition rather than the 
constitutionality of the retirement pension itself.  
Since then the allowance and financial privileges of high ranking state 
officials, MPs in particular, has been central to a number of constitutional cases. 
There has been a major shift in the approach of the Court towards constitutional 
litigators. Significantly, the FSC annulled the two contested laws in other cases, 
on entirely different grounds. The first case of this kind and Second MPs’ 
Pension (31/2013) case, was initiated by the Iraqi Union of Lawyers challenging 
the constitutionality of the high salaries of the MPs and ministers. The Court’s 
previous ruling in the Proposal and Draft Law (43/2010) was central to the 
claim: the petitioner argued that the contested law was a proposal presented and 
passed by the legislature without being transferred to a draft law and approved 
by the Council of Ministers. Significantly, the Court found the contested law 
was unconstitutional, not on the substantial grounds that it reduced or increased 
pensions, but on procedural grounds. It was a proposal law presented and passed 
by the legislature that failed to fulfill the necessary constitutional 
requirements.709  
In fact, the Court did not address the most crucial issue that the 
petitioners emphasized in their applications, namely, the constitutionality of the 
MPs’ pension itself. Therefore, the constitutional litigation focusing on the 
unconstitutionality of the substance of the contested law continued to be brought 
before the Court. In two subsequent cases, petitioners sought to assert the 
unconstitutionality of the legal provisions which had initially introduced such 
pensions for MPs (Articles 3,4 of Law of Parliament 2007).710 The petitioners 
did bring to the attention of the judges the essential constitutional issues on the 
substance of the contested laws. First, it was argued that the law contradicts the 
Constitution since this expressly provides for legislation regulating MPs’ rights 
and privileges, and remains silent on the issue of retirement pensions.711 Second, 
the MPs’ retirement pension was introduced by Law of Parliament 2007, which 
treats MPs and ministers alike in terms of rights and privileges including 
retirement pension, whereas, constitutionally, MPs are not entitled to equal 
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treatment in this regard.712 Third, the Retirement Law 2006, which regulates 
requirements for the entitlement of state employees for retirement pensions, 
required a minimum of twenty-five years in service and not less than fifty years 
of age for retirement referral;713 however, the majority of the MPs failed to 
fulfill this condition. Despite these challenges to the substance of the contested 
law, the Court again found it unconstitutional on the same procedural ground as 
in the main case: the lack of the approval of the government of proposal laws.714  
Indeed, many had anticipated that such pensions would be introduced 
again. The Parliament could have met the procedural requirements upon which 
they were annulled, that is, by obtaining government approval of the relevant 
proposal law, or the executive authority could initiate a draft law reintroducing 
these pensions. In the most recent development, in 2014, the Parliament passed 
Retirement law 2014, which also excluded ministers and MPs from the general 
rules.715 This exception appears to be reintroducing similarly high pension 
salaries to those that were previously declared unconstitutional by the Court 
based on the procedural requirements of law making. Since the enactment of 
Retirement Law 2014, there have been a considerable number of cases 
challenging the constitutionality of the specific provisions of the law that 
introduced these exceptions, arguing that the contested provisions implicitly 
reintroduce high retirement pensions for high ranking officials including MPs. 
Not surprisingly, the Court ruled the law unconstitutional again on the same 
procedural grounds, as it ruled in the Third MPs’ Pension (38/2014) case.716  
There are several observations on these cases. Firstly, a number of 
retired MPs initially challenged the constitutionality of the contested legislation 
for entirely the opposite reasons to the latter cases, claiming that the contested 
law had decreased their retirement pensions. Later developments included the 
ongoing widespread public anger and protests, led mainly by the civil society 
                                                          
712 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 63 (1): ‘[A] law shall regulate the rights and privileges of the 
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713 See Retirement Law 2006, art 1 (5). 
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organizations and most importantly the Iraqi Union of Lawyers, which 
eventually challenged the high salaries of MPs. Secondly, the law in question 
was challenged in two different ways. In the initial cases, the arguments were 
based on the FSC’s jurisprudence in the Draft and Proposal Law (43/2010) 
case: the formal procedure by means of which these laws were enacted was 
argued to be unconstitutional. The contested laws were therefore annulled by 
the FSC on procedural grounds. The second series of cases were brought before 
the Court claiming the unconstitutionality of the substance of the law and the 
pension itself. Interestingly, the FSC’s decisions that ruled unconstitutional such 
contested laws were on the same procedural grounds, with no indication as to 
the substance of the issue.  
Despite the fact that the Court continues to annul such laws, the 
developments in the cases of the MPs’ retirement pensions suggest that, unless 
the substance of the issue is addressed, the battle over this particular issue will 
continue. The MPs’ pension cases also illustrate the general approach of the 
FSC concerning the conflict between the procedural and substantive aspects of 
the rule of law. For different reasons, many would argue that the legislature has 
infringed the principle of equality before the law and some other constitutional 
principles in granting some state officials such a distinctive financial privilege 
in comparison to other state employees. In all these relevant cases, judges based 
their decisions on procedure and how the law is enacted and not on what the law 
contains.Thus, the FSC tried to uphold the formal rule of law.    
In concluding this section, it can be argued that for decades in Iraq, 
constitutions were written and applied to serve to empower governors, and even 
when they guaranteed some form of separation of powers, there were significant 
violations and acts that altered the constitutional balance of power favouring the 
executive authorities. The outcome was a state that was, at its best, ruled by law. 
Arguably, executive dominance left the Parliament ineffective and weak and 
incapable of performing, especially in overseeing the government’s 
performance. Thus, key to the constitutional democracy in post-2003 Iraq 
emerging from a longstanding tradition of strong executives and overcoming 
the dangers of an unchecked and unaccountable government, was to provide and 
safeguard the separation of powers, the supremacy of the Constitution and, most 
crucially, a state in which both the governed and those who govern are ruled by 
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the rule of law. The Constitution was generally criticised for adopting an 
ambiguous and incomplete balance between empowering and restraining 
government institutions, especially the legislative and the executive branches. 
Given the position and jurisdiction of the FSC as the final interpreter and 
arbitrator of constitutional controversies and disputes, it is not surprising that 
the Court has been central to power-struggles between the legislature and the 
executive.  
The case law of the FSC evidences two points that most of the literature 
on courts in emerging democracies might also support. First, constitutional 
questions regarding the structure and powers of the newly established state 
institutions and officials have become increasingly judicialised including even 
some basic questions. Thus, it can be said that the Court was facing a growing 
demand to address and resolve contested constitutional questions that often 
resulted in the Court being seen to interfere in political issues and intrude into 
the domain of the political branches, infringing the separation of powers. By 
implication such an act increased potential political pressure on and even 
interference in the constitutional judiciary and at times provoked severe 
government reaction. Second, constitutional adjudication serves to define and 
‘redefine’ the constitutional balance of powers; often the implications have been 
to serve to legitimise the exercise of powers rather than checking these and 
holding to account arbitrary decisions of individual government officials or 
institutions. In general, it is agreed that the FSC has played a substantial role in 
restructuring the constitutional balance of power, and its interpretations almost 
certainly affected the performance of the Parliament’s powers of law making 
and overseeing government. Furthermore, its insistence on how the law is made 
and ignorance or avoidance of what the law actually contains has served to 
legitimise government exercise of powers and raised serious questions about the 
capability and willingness of the FSC to uphold substantive attributes of the rule 
of law, as was evident in the cases concerning the retirement pension of high-
ranking government officials. 
Many would argue that the FSC could have reached conclusions that 
upheld the legislative and accountability powers of the Parliament. Given that 
the Court did not hesitate to establish new relations and rules by broadly 
interpreting the Constitution, as it did in the case of the Independent 
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Commissions, then the Court could have also interpreted the principle of 
separation of powers as providing support for upholding Parliament’s original 
direct right to legislative initiative in Draft and Proposal Law (43/2010) ruling. 
Such an outcome would have prevented challenges to the laws that were then 
annulled on the basis of that interpretation. It is also noticeable that the FSC is 
becoming more aware of the implications of its decisions and can be seen to 
have gradually minimised these. Cases that involved formal questioning or 
interrogation of ministers provide an example of how, after the Court defined 
the requirements for a valid parliamentary interrogation procedure, then in the 
subsequent cases implicitly asking judges to check whether Parliament had 
observed such requirement, the conclusions it reached often suggested a shift of 
approach favouring parliamentary control of government. A similar pattern was 
also seen in the most recent Proposal and Draft Law (21/2015) case. It is still 
unclear how this shift of approach will affect legislative-executive relations and 
the broader balance of powers. It would be interesting to know whether any of 
the already annulled legislation would still be tenable under the terms of the 
Proposal and Draft Law (21/2015) ruling. 
The separation of powers horizontally might be said to have the effect 
of limiting arbitrary exercises of powers by preventing consolidation of power 
in one government body or official. Similarly, the federal structure and division 
of powers between different levels of governments or other power-sharing 
arrangements in post-2003 Iraq was also believed to serve to prevent the 
concentration of power in one state institution, a person or even a single 
ethnosectarian group. The following discussion analyses the role of the FSC and 
its approach to cases and conflicts of competence between federal and sub-
federal governments.    
 5.2 The Role of the FSC in Developing Federal Structure of the 
State 
Federalism, decentralization and devolution of powers between the 
federal government and the sub-federal governments (regions and governorates) 
are said to be the most innovative and contested constitutional principles in post-
invasion Iraq. As was argued in our previous chapter, the constitutional and 
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legal rules that govern these entities and their powers are mostly characterised 
by generalities and ambiguities.717 Various actors, including the CPA officials, 
constitutional drafters, ethnic and political groups, that were involved in the 
post-2003 constitution making were generally agreed on some form of 
federalisation, but deeply divided on almost all related aspects.718 It is almost 
inevitable that such a division of power will create constitutional disputes and 
contestations, which at some point the judiciary will be called upon to resolve; 
this is, after all, one the primary reasons for having a constitutional judiciary. A 
considerable number of jurisdictional disputes and power conflicts have been 
brought before the FSC. The following discussion analyses some of the key 
rulings.  
The FSC was involved in addressing and resolving three kinds of 
constitutional questions. First, questions concerning the nature and extent of 
federalism and decentralization regarding Governorates. Second, questions 
focusing on ‘shared competence’ between federal and sub-federal governments. 
Third, and most controversially, the ongoing power-struggles over resource 
allocation, in particular the distribution of oil and gas powers. 
5.2.1 Boundaries of Powers between Federal Government and 
Governorates  
Chapter Four discussed the constitutional and legal framework for the 
federal system of Iraq. It was maintained that constitutionally, sub-federal 
governments enjoy significant autonomy in local decision making and also 
substantially participate in decision making at the federal level. In addition, their 
legislation takes precedence over federal laws in any conflict involving the 
application of shared powers. However, Iraq’s federalism and decentralization 
is said to be ‘partial and incomplete’, and it is generally agreed that with any 
such system ‘intergovernmental authorities and responsibilities are constantly 
subject to revision and renegotiation.’719 It is observed that the passage of 
legislation that regulates the powers of the governorates (Governorates Law 
2008) has created some controversial constitutional questions and disputes 
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involving the legislative powers of the Governorate Councils and their 
relationship with the federal authorities in Baghdad.  
5.2.1.1 Governorates’ Right in Legislating on Matters of Local Interest 
The first issue, which was the subject of a series of litigation, was the 
extent to which governorate councils are empowered to legislate in matters of 
local interest. Constitutional and legal provisions and even the case law of the 
FSC was unclear in this regard. In its earlier rulings on this matter, the FSC had 
some rather contradictory views. Prior to the enactment of the Governorates 
Law 2008, Parliament requested for a constitutional interpretation of the 
relations between: on the one hand, Article 115, which provides for two key 
principles: sub-federal governments have exclusive powers over residual 
competences, and laws enacted by the sub-federal governments take precedence 
over federal laws in any conflict concerning a matter of shared competence. On 
the other hand, Article 122, which underlines governorate administrative and 
financial independence and powers. The Court was asked to clarify whether 
governorate councils have legislative powers regarding matters of local 
importance. In First Governorates’ Legislative Power (9/2007) case the Court 
ruled that: 
Through scrutiny of the provisions of Article 115 and the other Articles 
of the constitution of Iraq of 2005, it is apparent that the provincial 
[governorate] council does not enjoy legislative capacities in reliance 
on Article 122, paragraph 3, of the constitution, through which the 
province [governorate] may manage its affairs in accordance with the 
principles of administrative decentralization and in conformity with the 
provisions of the law enacted pursuant thereto.720 
It is important to notice that this interpretation was issued before the enactment 
of the Governorates Law, according to which governorate councils can enact 
legislation regarding local policies. Most important, Article 61 of the 
Constitution granted the federal legislature the right to enact federal laws, but 
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not local legislation. Therefore, legislating on matters of local interest is not 
included in the exclusive competence of the federal government, but lies within 
the powers of governorate councils.  
In the Second Governorates’ Legislative Power (16/2008) case, the 
Governorate Council of Najaf requested from the FSC to clarify the Council’s 
legislative powers concerning taxation. The FSC issued what appeared to be an 
opposing interpretation: it emphasized the supremacy of the governorate’s 
legislation, in this case relating taxation, as guaranteed by Article 115 of the 
Constitution, except for matters of exclusive federal competence.721 The Court 
reached this conclusion citing provisions from the Governorates Law, which 
provides that the governorate council is ‘the highest legislative and supervision 
authority’ within the governorate. 
It [council] has the right to enact legislation on local matters within its 
governorates’ borders to enable it to manage its own affairs according 
to the principle of administrative decentralization, so long as it does not 
conflict with the constitution or national law. The governorate council 
and local councils are subject to the supervision of the council of 
representatives.722 
Accordingly, the Governorates Law recognized governorate councils’ right to 
enact laws, orders and rules to regulate administration affairs according to the 
principle of administrative decentralization, emphasizing that these laws must 
not contradict the federal Constitution and laws. 
The two interpretations of the legislative powers of the governorate 
councils appear contradictory: the first ruling denies that the governorate has 
any legislative powers whilst the second confirm such a power (in taxation). 
Consequently, Basra’s Governorate Council sought a ruling that could clarify 
and determine which of the two previous interpretations should be adopted; it 
also sought interpretations for certain phrases that are used in these two rulings. 
In the Third Governorates’ Legislative Power (21/2010) ruling, the FSC denied 
that there was any contradiction between these two interpretations. It insisted, 
without further explanation, that the principle of administrative decentralization 
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as adopted in the Constitution and detailed in Governorates Law is the basis for 
governorate powers. Moreover, in response to the second part of the application, 
the Court refused to explain its previous rulings arguing that it has no 
jurisdiction to explain its decisions.723 Thus, none of these rulings resolve the 
issue of the legislative power of the governorates and leaves the matter open to 
debate and different interpretations that could be the subject of further 
litigation.724  
5.2.1.2 The Administrative and Fiscal Independence of the Governorates  
In regard to the governorates’ administrative and fiscal independence 
from the federal government in exercising their constitutional powers. Article 
47 of Governorates Law subjected them to ‘oversight and audit by the Board of 
Supreme Audit, and branches of the independent commissions formed under the 
Constitution’. This issue was central to the Administrative Decentralization 
(7/2012) case. The Babylon Governorate Council petitioned for an 
interpretation of the constitutional provision which states that ‘The Governorate 
Council shall not be subject to the control or supervision of any ministry or any 
institution not linked to a ministry. The Governorate Council shall have 
independent finances.’725 It also sought judicial interpretation of the relationship 
between the legal terms: ‘control’ and ‘supervision’ in the Constitution and 
‘oversight’ in the Governorates Law.726 
The FSC found, as a general principle, that the constitutional powers and 
administrative independence of governorates is not subject to the control and 
supervision of any ministry or any institution not linked to a ministry. However, 
the Court held that according to the Governorates Law 2008, this independence 
is limited by the administrative decentralization principle and the governorates’ 
coordination with the Council of Ministries.727 Most important, it held that the 
                                                          
723 IRQFSC 21/2010 [18/5/2010]. In several instances the court has been asked to explain its 
rulings due to their ambiguity but the court denies it has this jurisdiction. When asked to explain 
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the jurisdiction of the State Shura Council to explain court rulings. See IRQFSC 57 /2010 
[16/8/2010].  
724 Hamoudi, Negotiating in Civil Conflict 170. 
725 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 122. 
726 IRQFSC 7/2012 [26/2/2012]. 
 727 Governorates Law 2008, art 45 (1): ‘a high commission shall be formed for coordination 
between the provinces headed by the president of the Council of Ministers and the membership 
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governorates’ fiscal independence should not contradict the federal 
government’s powers in planning and executing the general policy of the 
state.728 With respect to the relations between these legal terms, the Court denied 
jurisdiction, arguing that interpreting ordinary laws, such as the Governorates 
Law, lay outside the FSC’s jurisdiction.729  
The decision is considered crucial in terms of determining the extent and 
the limitations on the independence of the governorates. Thus, it explicitly 
explains the Court’s interpretive approach, emphasizing the necessity of 
comprehensive interpretation of all relevant constitutional provisions to 
establish the rationale and philosophy behind their enactment.730 It can be said 
that the Court could have determined the extent of administrative 
decentralization as stated in the Constitution and detailed by the federal 
legislation, yet it avoided doing this on jurisprudential grounds. This is despite 
the fact that the Court has in many of other instances based its rulings on the 
interpretation of ordinary laws.  
Another issue which has been a heated controversy concerns the extent 
of the federal authorities’ powers regarding the dismissal of governors who are 
elected by the governorate council, which itself is elected in local elections. The 
governor can be removed either by the council’s members following a 
questioning session, or by Parliament upon the request of the PM. In any case, 
a dismissed governor can appeal against the decision of dismissal to the 
judiciary. In 2009, the Salah al-Din governorate council dismissed its governor, 
who then challenged the dismissal decision before the FSC. In the Removal of 
the Governor of Salah al-Din (58/2009) case, the Court upheld the decision of 
the Governorate Council and confirmed the removal was lawful.731 However, 
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728 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 80 (1): ‘[T]o plan and execute the general policy and general 
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729 IRQFSC 7/2012 [26/2/2012]. 
730 Ibid. 
731 IRQFSC 58/2009 [13/10/2009]. This ruling could not be found on the official website of the 
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the removal proved controversial. The dismissed governor refused to comply 
with the FSC decision and demanded that, unless a presidency decree was issued 
that confirmed his removal, he would stay in his position. At first, Maliki, the 
Prime Minister, criticised the removal and then ordered that the dismissed 
governor must leave his position. In another development, it was also reported 
that Maliki interfered further to prevent the Governorate Council from electing 
a new governor without his involvement, and even there were reports that he 
then placed the office of the dismissed governor under military occupation for 
several days.732 
Since the first case in 2009, the FSC has not been called upon to decide 
on dismissal decisions, and in fact the legislature amended the Governorates 
Law in 2013 which repealed such jurisdiction for the FSC and instead provided 
that the governor can appeal the dismissal decision to the Administrative Court. 
It is interesting that some may argue that the amendment indicates how removal 
can become a highly contested political issue in regard to the extent of the 
federal authorities’ oversight over the ‘elected’ governor and the involvement 
of the FSC.   
On the other hand, in a number of cases the FSC was called on either by 
the Administrative Court or the removed governor to decide on cases 
challenging the constitutionality of the governorates law provision that entitled 
federal authorities to dismiss the governor on the grounds that such a power 
contradicts the Constitution and does not lie within the exclusive competences 
of the federal government. In the aftermath of July 2014, vast territories in 
northern Iraq fell into the control of ISIS, including the city of Mosul, the centre 
of the Ninawa governorate. In May 2015, the Parliament dismissed the governor 
of Ninawa from his position, who appealed the decision to the Administrative 
Court, which itself referred the case to the FSC on the ground that it is a dispute 
between federal government and local government. However, the FSC 
dismissed the case referring to the above mentioned amendment to the 
Governorates Law in 2013. In another case the dismissed governor of Ninawa 
again challenged his removal, this time challenging the constitutionality of 
Article 7(2/B) of the Governorates Law which provides that Parliament, upon 
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the request of the PM, can dismiss the governor. In the Dismissal of Governor 
of Ninawa (106/2015) case, the Court argued that, 
the 2005 Iraqi Constitution neither provide for Parliament to dismiss 
the governor, […] nor prevent it from that, since Parliament is entitled 
to oversight the executive branch (Article 61) and the governor is part 
of the executive branch and as the Parliament pursuant to Article 61, 
can dismiss ministers, a fortiori it is authorised to dismiss governor who 
is the highest executive chief in his governorate […] furthermore, 
Parliament can dissolve governorate councils then it can also dismiss 
governors.733  
Accordingly, the FSC ruled the contested law constitutional on the above 
grounds; it can be argued to have legitimize the expansion of the federal 
authority’s power as reflected in the Governorates Law. 
There are other examples that many would say clearly indicate the extent 
of the interference by federal authorities or their attempts to supervise 
governorate councils. The Salah al-Din Governorate Council challenged the 
constitutionality of a decision issued by the Parliament establishing a 
parliamentary committee to investigate the Governorate’s budget. In Fiscal 
Independence of Governorates (90/2013) case, the FSC upheld Parliament’s 
decision on two grounds. First, the Court argued that, constitutionally, the 
legislature has oversight power, and thus the parliamentary committee is a 
means of exercising this power and establishing facts which are used by other 
governmental institutions such as the Public Prosecution and the Public Integrity 
Commission.734 Second, it argued that the Governorates Law 2008 subjected the 
governorate councils to the supervision of Parliament.735  
On the other hand, some may also maintain that the Court has supported 
the continuity of the legal system, upholding pre-2003 legislation that clearly 
contradicts constitutional principles and the rules regarding federal structures. 
For example, according to the pre-2003 Iraq law, the National Company for 
Water Transportation exclusively controls all maritime services in Iraqi ports. 
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This Law was partially suspended by a CPA Order.736 The Ministry of 
Transportation issued regulations in accordance with that part of this Law, 
which was not suspended, restricting private companies to offer maritime 
services in Iraqi ports. The petitioner (a private company offering these services) 
challenged the constitutionality of the act of the Ministry. The Court dismissed 
the case arguing that part of the contested regulation had never been published 
in the Iraqi Gazette, and lies outside its jurisdiction.737 This raised a crucial 
issue, as it is argued that the FSC,  
could have resolved the question by indicating that the central 
government had no power over regulation of the ports (excluding, of 
course, matters relating to customs, immigration, and importation of 
goods, none of which was presumably being contested by the private 
company seeking to offer maritime services). 738 
While the aforementioned jurisdiction is not listed in the federal government’s 
exclusive powers, the FSC’s decision could be understood as empowering the 
federal authorities to exercise such powers that are not exclusively listed in 
Article 110. Thus, this practice and the FSC jurisprudence suggest that the 
federal government’s exclusive competence is not, as many might argue, a 
limitation on the federal government’s powers; it seems that ‘exclusive’ in this 
context does not mean that federal authorities cannot exercise other powers that 
are not listed there.739 It is interesting to consider why the Court remains silent 
or ineffective in this regard. Is it because the Court is a weak institution and its 
decisions in supporting and developing federal structures would not be respected 
and its legitimacy would therefore be endangered? This might be the case to 
some extent: clearly, examples where the FSC has ruled unconstitutional the 
federal authorities’ policies regarding governorates are few in number. In a very 
unusual example, the Court upheld Article 115 of the Constitution, arguing that 
there is no specific jurisdiction listed for the federal government to appoint or 
dismiss security officials within a governorate, in other words, this is a residual 
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power and belongs to sub-federal governments.740 This decision was issued prior 
to the enactment of the Governorate Law.  
5.2.2 Shared Competences   
The Constitution provides for shared competences which are to be 
exercised based on the principle of co-operation between sub-federal 
governments and the federal government. The nature and extent of this co-
operation remain unclear and therefore has been central to considerable 
constitutional litigation. The following discussion focuses on three important 
areas of shared powers: international representation, public health, and public 
education.  
The extent to which shared competences depend on the federal 
government’s action was the focal point in the Governorates’ International 
Representation (36/2011) case. The Constitution provides for the establishment 
of offices for sub-federal governments in Iraq’s embassies and international 
diplomatic missions.741 Although this has been implemented to some extent, 
with the KRG having representative offices in Iraqi embassies, no similar 
practice exists in the case of the governorates. The refusal of the federal 
government and more specifically that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
implement this constitutional provision, establishing offices for governorate 
representatives, was challenged by Diyala Governorate Council. It requested 
that the FSC oblige the relevant federal authorities to implement the 
Constitution, but the Court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds.742 
However, the above decision did not prevent the petitioner from 
submitting another request, asking the FSC to determine the extent of the federal 
government’s obligation to implement the contested constitutional provision, by 
establishing representative offices of this kind. It was also asked to decide which 
governmental institution is responsible for implementing this constitutional 
provision and what the legal consequences should be for non-implementation. 
As the Court noted, essentially it was being asked to clarify the government’s 
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obligation in respect to the implementation of Article 121. The FSC argued that 
the federal government is responsible, and in doing so it must take into 
consideration the need for establishing such offices and the logistical and 
physical requirements which this would entail. Most importantly, it should 
consider international treaties and agreements regarding diplomatic 
representation and relations in accordance with the principle of reciprocity in 
international relations. Provided that these conditions were fulfilled, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in co-ordination with other relevant governmental 
bodies should implement this provision.743 In practice, it is a difficult and costly 
undertaking for the federal government to establish representative offices for 
(fifteen) governorates. Therefore, the decision was taken on pragmatic grounds, 
bearing in mind the various factors in deciding the case and deferring this issue 
to the federal authorities.  
This was not the first case regarding shared competences. In the 
Specialist Doctors (20/2010) case, the Governorate Council of Nineveh 
challenged the constitutionality of the decision of the federal Health Ministry 
regarding practical problems related to the employment and distribution of 
specialist doctors in the governorate. In principle, local authorities have a role 
in deciding these matters; however, the Ministry considered specialist doctors 
to be a ‘federal asset’ and decided to relocate several of them, without consulting 
the Governorate Council. Therefore, the Court was asked to decide whether 
governorate councils have jurisdiction in this matter, with reference to Articles 
114 (shared competences) and 115 (residual powers). The Court dismissed the 
case arguing that it did not specifically request an interpretation of the relevant 
clauses.744 In another case, in 2009, the Court had dismissed a request from the 
governor of Diyala challenging the legality of a decision by the governorate 
council to eliminate a director working in the government oil sector from his 
position on the same grounds.745 Thus, the Court’s rulings implicitly allow the 
federal authorities to continue exercising their powers on these matters. 
Similarly, both federal and sub-federal governments share power in 
matters of ‘public educational and instructional policy’.746 As with all similar 
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competences, the nature and extent of co-operation between these governments 
remains unclear; thus, the exercise of such power can be expected to create 
jurisdictional conflict, as occurred between the KRG and the federal 
government. The Federal Ministry of Higher Education denied the legality of 
decisions issued by the KRG concerning legalization of qualifications obtained 
from overseas universities, claiming that such decisions are valid only within 
the region and for its residents. A joint committee, which was set up to find a 
solution for this disputed matter, repeated the same statement.  
Applicants seeking employment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
submitted the KRG’s certification of their qualifications to the Ministry as part 
of their applications. Uncertainty regarding the validity of this documentation 
led the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to request an interpretation of the term 
‘sharing’ in Article 114 of the Constitution which provides that ‘[T]he following 
competences shall be shared between the federal authorities and regional 
authorities’. Furthermore, it petitioned for a ruling determining the legality of 
KRG’s decisions, specifically those relating to shared competences which had 
been issued without any coordination or (as in this case) following unsuccessful 
attempts to reach agreement with the federal authorities. The petitioner insisted 
on the constitutionally of all KRG’s legal actions taken since 1992 unless these 
are amended or annulled by its authorities.747 In the KRG’s Higher Education 
Ministry (29/2013) case, the Court dismissed the claim on the grounds that the 
issue was a legal dispute and required the parties to the dispute to initiate a 
lawsuit which then would be decided by the FSC. It also concluded that the 
matter could not be resolved through an abstract interpretation of the 
constitutional phrase ‘shared competence.748 The Court has been somewhat 
inconsistent in using this admissibility rule to decide cases. The following 
discussion provides further evidence of the FSC’s use of this admissibility rule 
as a means of avoiding tackling significant constitutional questions.  
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 5.2.3 Federalism and Hydrocarbons under Iraq Constitution: Power 
Struggles over Oil and Gas Sector 
The problem of revenue sharing places an additional challenge on the 
federal system as the oil sector plays a key role in Iraq’s economy. This matter 
is of such importance that the Constitution addresses this explicitly in separate 
provisions which are interpreted differently by federal and sub-federal 
governments respectively. This resulted in an ongoing legal conflict between 
the federal government and the KRG’s authorities, the implications of which 
often extend beyond Iraq’s border.749  
5.2.3.1 Principal Constitutional Provisions on Distribution of Powers over Oil 
and Gas 
There is consensus regarding ownership of oil and gas as stated in Article 
111 which states that ‘Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the 
regions and governorates’. Therefore, it is accepted that regional government 
and governorates contribute to the national budget from their hydrocarbons. The 
principal disagreement, however, relates to Articles 112 and 115 [the residual 
competences]. Article 112 stipulates that,  
First: The federal government, with the producing governorates and 
regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas 
extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in 
a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of 
the country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for the 
damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the former 
regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that 
ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, and this 
shall be regulated by a law. 
Second: The federal government, with the producing regional and 
governorate governments, shall together formulate the necessary 
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strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that 
achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced 
techniques of the market principles and encouraging investment.750 
Several observations can be made here. First, the federal government has certain 
powers but not exclusive power over oil and gas activities. This article only 
refers explicitly to the management powers of a specific nature over those fields 
actually in production as of the 2006 date of the Constitution’s approval. 
Second, it is largely unclear which powers the sub-federal governments have. 
The Constitution explicitly requires consultation and collaboration with, and 
input from the relevant sub-federal governments, as the words with and together 
specify. However, the nature and means of cooperation necessary for exercising 
this power are deeply contested.  
Crucially, therefore, the Constitution distinguishes, whether by intention 
or coincidence, between two kinds of oil fields: it explicitly refers to current 
fields and therefore implicitly addresses the undeveloped or even non-
discovered fields. This differentiation is said to be important. Thus, some may 
argue that power over the current fields is not listed within either the federal 
government’s exclusive competences or its shared competences. Therefore, 
based on Article 115, residual powers, governorates and regional governments 
may be able to even claim a right parallel to that of the federal government to 
undertake activities involving the ‘management’ of oil and gas ‘extracted’ from 
‘present fields’. 751 
In general, involved parties have seized on differences in interpretations 
and therefore in the oil policies of federal and sub-federal governments 
respectively. The Kurdistan Regional parliament has passed a law that regulates 
energy resources within the region.752 The KRG-Oil and Gas Law 2007 is 
enacted based on the KRG’s interpretations of the related constitutional 
principles. Thus, its key principles underline power-sharing with the federal 
government regarding oil and gas. Accordingly, the KRG ‘shall, together with 
the federal government, jointly manage Petroleum Operations related to 
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producing fields’.753 It ‘shall oversee and regulate all Petroleum Operations 
pursuant to Article 115 of the federal Constitution and in a manner consistent 
with Article 112’.754 This is where the residual powers, such as those of the 
KRG, prevail. Furthermore, the KRG shall ‘cooperate with the federal 
government in formulating policies to develop the petroleum resources of the 
region’.755 This implies all fields, present and future. On the other hand, the 
federal Parliament has failed to pass implementing legislation that would 
eliminate these constitutional ambiguities. Therefore, the federal authorities rely 
on pre-2003 legislation, namely, the Law of Oil Ministry 1976, which gives the 
central government exclusive power over oil and gas.756 
It can be seen that the two governments are agreed that constitutionally 
some level of collaboration is needed in this regard; however, there are critical 
disagreements concerning the substance of this cooperation and its meaning. An 
initial reading of KRG petroleum legislation indicates that the Law generally 
accords this region a leading role which is subject to principles of shared 
competence meaning that the KRG law takes precedence in any conflict. In 
practice, the KRG has developed oil fields [mostly undiscovered fields] within 
the region, relying on this regional legislation, until or unless the federal 
Parliament enacts the federal hydrocarbon law.757 Similarly, the KRG claims 
the legality and validity of its activities and oil contracts, which have been 
undertaken even prior to 2003, based on the Constitution itself, which states: 
Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain 
in force, and decisions issued by the government of the region of 
Kurdistan, including […] contracts, shall be considered valid unless 
they are amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of the region of 
Kurdistan […], provided that they do not contradict with the 
Constitution.758 
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From the federal government’s perspective, since the ownership of the oil and 
gas is for all Iraqi peoples, then the federal government as the representative of 
all Iraqi people plays a leading role in the development of the hydrocarbon 
sector. Thus, federal authorities have the management rights to all fields, 
including those which were undeveloped, and future discoveries. Most 
importantly, any development or contracts made by the KRG regarding its fields, 
even the future fields, is unconstitutional without Baghdad approval. The federal 
government refers to Article 130 of the Constitution for the legality of its policies 
based on a pre-constitutional legislation, which guarantees legal continuity; pre-
2003 Iraqi laws are valid unless voided or replaced by new legislation. It is clear 
that the Law of the Oil Ministry was enacted for pre-2003 Iraq where 
constitutionally power was concentrated in the central government. The Law 
contradicts the 2005 Constitution that guarantees a federal system and 
distribution of power between different levels of government each independent 
and responsible for making policies within the constitutional boundaries of 
power. However, the issue is much more complicated. These unresolved legal 
issues and disputes are mostly managed through a series of ad hoc informal 
power-sharing arrangements. The ongoing attempts to enact the relevant federal 
legislation have created drafts which according to observers are ‘almost as vague 
as the constitution’, mainly regarding the extent of contradiction and 
disagreement regarding the defined legal framework within which 
administrative and managerial control is shared.759  
On the other hand, as the issue here requires clear interpretation of the 
relevant constitutional principles and provisions, then it would be argued that 
the FSC, as the final interpreter of the Constitution, could in fact resolve the 
controversy surrounding the exact meaning of these provisions. Interestingly, 
despite these ongoing legal disputes, the federal government has not challenged 
the constitutionality of the regional legislation nor has the KRG challenged the 
constitutionality of the laws under the terms of which the federal government 
exercises its powers. Significantly, in a few instances the FSC has been called 
on to decide on the issue.  
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5.2.3.2 The FSC’s Involvement in Oil and Gas related Disputes   
In the very first case, the Governorates’ Oil Exportation (8/2012), the 
Federal Oil Ministry challenged the constitutionality of the decision of the Wasit 
Governorate Council. The Council had decided that it has the right to prevent 
export of oil and gas through existing national transport pipelines within the 
governorate territory. This would occur when the Council finds it necessary or 
it causes damage to the needs of the governorate for oil products or reduces its 
share of oil products. The Federal Ministry claimed that this decision was an 
explicit violation of the constitutional provision that guaranteed ownership of 
oil for all Iraqis (Article 111) and the current oil legislation, which gave the 
Ministry exclusive power over oil and gas. Furthermore, it violated the 
supremacy of the Constitution and federal laws. However, the Ministry did not 
make any reference to the key constitutional provision on the issue: Article 112. 
The FSC did take Article 112 into consideration when deciding the case. 
Following an examination of the constitutional provisions that regulate oil and 
gas, the Court declared the decision of the Council unconstitutional. It argued: 
The constitution requires the enactment of a federal law that regulates 
the cooperation between federal government with governorates and 
regional governments in this matter, and due to the absence of this law 
[yet to be enacted] the implementation of this article [112] is suspended 
until this law is enacted. 760  
The Court referred to the second part of Article 112, considering it to require 
cooperation between the federal government and oil-producing governorates 
and regional government exclusively in terms of strategic policies needed to 
develop oil and gas resources. Therefore, the Council’s ban on oil exports 
contradicted such development. In conclusion, the Court held that according to 
Article 130 of the Constitution the Law of Oil Ministry 1976 is in effect;761  here 
again the Court established legal continuity of the pre-2003 legal system.  
Therefore, the FSC’s approach to the Governorates’ Oil Exportation 
case may reveal several critical legal outcomes. The Court insisted and actually 
confirmed that oil and gas policy is not an exclusively federal matter; rather it 
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requires cooperation between federal and sub-federal governments. However, it 
confirmed the legality of the federal government’s adherence to the pre-
constitutional law, which was enacted for the pre-2003 centralized state. 
Furthermore, the FSC’s judges formalized and legalized the suspension of 
implementing Article 112 and therefore of the coordination required for the 
exercise of oil and gas power between these levels of governments. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that the FSC has allowed the federal government 
to continue its exclusive exercise of oil and gas power as long as there is no 
enacted federal legislation that regulates the issue.762  
It is interesting to note that in its subsequent decisions on cases involving 
KRG, it can be said that the Court entirely ignored the fact that it had decided 
this issue. More importantly, the Federal Oil Ministry did not reflect on or bring 
to the attention of the Court or the KRG that the Court had already decided the 
substance of the issue. In two instances the federal government is said to have 
challenged the constitutionality of the KRG’s policies regarding contracts and 
exportation concerning its oil fields without the approval of the Federal Oil 
Ministry. 
In the KRG Oil Contracts (74/2012) case, the Federal Oil Ministry 
petitioned for an interpretation of Article 112, and whether and to what extent 
it is constitutional and legal for KRG and governorate councils to sign oil 
contracts with international companies without the approval of the federal 
government. The petitioner argued that some councils and the KRG have signed 
contracts of this type ignoring the Ministry’s powers in this regard. The 
petitioner also maintained that the application of Article 112(1) of the 
Constitution required that new implementing federal legislation should regulate 
the cooperation between these levels of governments. In the absence of this law, 
this article was suspended and the existing Law of Oil Ministry gave the Federal 
Government exclusive authority in this regard. The FSC dismissed the case 
here, arguing that the issue in question was a legal dispute between these 
aforementioned parties; therefore, it required the parties to initiate a lawsuit to 
resolve this dispute, which could not be resolved through an abstract 
interpretation of the contested constitutional provision.763 Thus, the Court chose 
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not to interpret Article 112 to clarify and define the powers of both federal 
government and sub-federal governments in regard to oil and gas. However, it 
did confirm that there is a legal dispute between two governments and urged 
both parties to submit a separate lawsuit.  
With this dispute unresolved and the KRG having taken the decision to 
export oil,764 an immediate reaction by the Federal Oil Ministry was to seek a 
ruling from the FSC against KRG- Natural Resources Ministry that would 
prevent it from exporting oil (from fields within its regional territory) 
independently from Bagdad. As a result, the Court in the KRG Oil Export 
(59/2014) case, argued that, 
the decision on the Federal Oil Ministry appeal would give a sense of a 
prior opinion in the course of a proceedings and a judgment that will be 
issued, and this contradicts the applicable judicial context which 
requires that a ruling be made through a lawsuit.765  
It again insisted and called upon the parties to the dispute to seek resolution 
through a lawsuit rather than requesting an abstract constitutional interpretation. 
It is not explicit whether there has been such a lawsuit before the FSC. A 
statement was issued by KRG’s Natural Resources Ministry following the 
aforementioned decision by the FSC, which illustrates KRG’s view on oil and 
gas-related policies and its arguments in any future lawsuit concerning KRG’s 
oil policy. The statement maintained that the ‘Federal Oil Ministry’s claims 
                                                          
764 The KRG started to sign contracts with international companies, which were immediately 
rejected by the federal government. On-going meetings and political efforts between both 
parties failed to reach agreement resulting in federal government considering all these contracts 
illegal and threatening to take action against these companies. The federal government took 
legal action against the Turkish government for allowing KRG oil exports via its territory. In 
late 2013 following its first exportation of oil via a separate pipeline; Federal Oil Ministry asked 
the FSC to issue a decision stopping KRG from exporting oil. Meanwhile, the federal 
government has been following KRG’s exports and sought a foreign judgment, as it filed a case 
against KRG with a US district court accusing the KRG of smuggling oil in particular regarding 
the shipman that carried the KRG crude oil and that was in territories of the State of Texas in 
the United States. The court, however, decided that the issue is not a violation of US law, even 
though it might violate Iraqi law. Two interesting and contradictory reactions to the decision 
have been reported; whilst the KRG celebrated the decision, the Federal Oil Ministry appealed 
this decision. The federal ministry declared that it is not bound by this decision, and that it is 
critical for both parties to rely on the Iraqi court and seek a solution from the FSC without 
political interference. Laurel Brubaker Calkins, ‘Iraq Allowed to Sue Kurds over Texas Oil 
Tanker in U.S’ < http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-09/iraq-allowed-to-sue-
kurds-over-texas-oil-tanker-in-u-s-1->; Danilovich, Iraq Federalism and the Kurds 114-131. 
See also  http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cunpub%5C15/15-40062.0.pdf.  
765 IRQFSC 59/2012 [24/6/2014]. 
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were based on its own interpretation of constitutional provisions to claim that 
the oil and gas affairs fall within federal government’s exclusive 
competence.’766 It further argues that the Federal Oil Ministry is relying on the 
pre-2003 legal system, which ignores the fact that ‘current constitutional 
provisions do not incorporate any oil and gas matters within the exclusive 
powers of the federal government’. The KRG claimed the FSC ruling in this 
case was another key acknowledgement of KRG’s constitutional rights. The 
KRG maintained that the FSC’s decision in this case unanimously rejected the 
Federal Ministry’s appeal and is binding on all authorities including the Federal 
Ministry itself.767  
Furthermore, the indications are that only the implementing federal 
legislation, based on the relevant constitutional principles, could provide 
certainty and solutions to these disputes. Assuming that the Constitution 
differentiates between present and future fields, then the cooperation covers all 
oil- and gas-related activities in respect to the present fields. In regard to the 
future fields, it is possible that the federal government also shares powers with 
sub-federal government concerning strategic policies. In other words, the 
management aspect appears to lie within the residual powers, which belong to 
the sub-federal governments. Thus, the federal governments’ oil policies would 
not only be challenged by the KRG, but also by the governorates which have 
almost the same powers as the KRG, except that constitutionally they are unable 
to amend the application of federal legislation in areas of shared competence. 
Crucially, the 2013 amendment to the Governorates Law 2008, explicitly gives 
precedence to provincial laws in areas of shared competence.768 Therefore, one 
can argue that only a constitutional amendment that provides an explicit and 
clear understanding of the nature of ‘shared’ powers over oil and gas would 
eliminate the controversies over Article 112. 
Overall, the case law of the FSC and the role of the Court regarding 
federalism-related constitutional questions might be open to different 
                                                          
766 The Kurdistan Regional Government, ‘The Supreme Federal Court Rules Against Iraqi 
Minister of Oil's Request to Prevent KRG Oil Exports’ (Press Release by the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, 27 June 2014) <http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/press-releases/385-the-supreme-
federal-court-rules-against-iraqi-minister-of-oil-s-request-to-prevent-krg-oil-exports> accessed 
02 November 2014. 
767 ibid. 
768 Second Amendment Law 2013 to Governorates Law 2008, art 7(4). 
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interpretations. One reading of the previously discussed case law could be that 
it is generally agreed that the passage of a federal legislation, the Governorates 
Law 2008, which is said to be crucial in detailing and defining 
intergovernmental authorities, responsibilities and relationships with the federal 
authorities, resulted in an increasing demand on judicial resolution of 
federalism-related disputes and controversies. Before that, for almost five years, 
the Court had ruled on only a handful of cases of this kind. This piece of 
legislation appears to have adopted a narrow reading of the constitutional 
powers of the governorates which many would claim has limited their powers, 
favoring an expansion of federal power in matters that under the Constitution 
are not reserved for the latter. Therefore, it was generally anticipated that the 
governorates would challenge the constitutionality of the law. However, over 
time it has become clearer that in most of the cases concerning the Governorates 
Law 2008, the main questions demanding clarification and input were from the 
federal authorities, suggesting that governortes council had implicitly accepted 
the legal limitations that the Law is said to impose on their powers.769 For 
example, instead of focusing on matters within the FSC’s jurisdiction, a large 
number of cases demanded the Court’s interpretation of the Governorates Law 
2008, which as the Court itself argued on several occasions lies outside its 
jurisdiction.  
It could be argued that governorate councils, as the highest legislative 
and supervisory authority within the administrative boundaries of the 
governorate, have largely failed, for various reasons, to exercise their 
constitutional competences. Interestingly, although many would argue that 
several of the controversial provisions of the Governorates Law 2008 
contradicted the Constitution, none of the challenges brought before the Court 
addressed the constitutionality of this Law. It is generally maintained that the 
councils remain weak and their lack of fiscal and administrative decentralization 
can also be attributed to the fact that, despite generation of local revenues being 
guaranteed, in practice almost all their budget comes from Baghdad. For other 
                                                          
769 e.g., Karbala Governorate Council demanded that it should get support in reviewing and 
advising on its local legislation from the Shura Council, which is a federal body with primary 
responsibility for providing technical legal advice in the legislative process. The Shura Council 
stated that provinces are not considered to be ‘bodies not linked to a ministry’ as per Article 6 
of State Shura Council Law which enables it to provide legislative advice to such bodies. 
IRQFSC 73/2009 [11/8/2009], See Hamoudi, Negotiating in Civil Conflict 170-173. 
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administrative issues they largely operate under the authority and direction of 
federal government ministers. Others claim that the reason why governorates 
were not seen to be actively challenging potentially arbitrary exercises of 
powers by the federal authorities might be because these newly empowered 
local actors had little experience of decision making. This was largely the legacy 
of decades of centralisation and meant they lacked awareness of their 
constitutional powers.770  
In general the FSC is seen to have taken a self-restrained approach to 
addressing and resolving constitutional questions concerning federalism. 
Except for a handful of cases in which the FSC ruled against the federal 
authorities, it can be said that its decisions have served to legitimize the federal 
authorities’ interpretations of federalism, interpretations that many would claim 
to be inconsistent with the relevant constitutional provisions. Thus, many 
observers argue that the Court’s decisions serve to protect or recognise the role 
of the federal Parliament in defining and modifying constitutional principles and 
the balance of the division of powers and relations between the federal 
government and the governorates. It is possible that in doing so, the Court 
frequently dismissed cases involving this piece of legislation on procedural 
grounds, avoided decision-making on substantive issues; and upheld the federal 
authorities’ broad interpretation of the exclusively federal competencies.   
Many factors might have contributed to that. The very notion of 
federalism and its structure as it was established in the 2005 Constitution was 
supposed to prevent the concentration of power in any one institution or level 
of government and this is new and extremely controversial. Many of its 
structural aspects were left to implementing legislation and many more of those 
which were detailed in the Constitution are ambiguous. Therefore, 
implementing the relevant constitutional principles and provisions would 
certainly result in bitter constitutional disputes and would heighten political 
tensions. Furthermore, the FSC judges might not be ready to jeopardize the 
institutional autonomy of their Court by triggering or supporting developments 
upon which politicians and the public are yet to agree. Instead, it has arguably 
supported the role of the federal legislature to determine the extent of the 
                                                          
770 Cravens, Brinkerhoff, ‘Provincial Governance in Iraq’ 18. 
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independence and powers of the governorates. The Court opted to uphold laws 
and policies which might be considered to do a disservice to federalism since 
they are often supportive of the centralisation of powers in federal authorities 
which is arguably inconsistent with what the Constitution establishes. The Court 
supported these policies and still often tends to avoid challenging their 
constitutionality. 
 These factors might serve to explain the FSC’s response when in 2013 
the federal Parliament amended the Governorates Law and expanded the powers 
of the governorates. The 2013 amendments came after a series of national 
protests and wider demands from within communities, including those that had 
once strongly opposed federalism, which involved taking practical steps to 
establish their federal regions. They also demanded broader powers that would 
enable them to gain control over local policies and resources. These 
amendments were crucial in providing for the supremacy of governorate 
policies over federal ones in areas of shared competence.771 It empowered 
governorate councils to oversee the activities of all officials including senior 
officials and their appointment, without federal authority interference.772 
Following the amendments, governorates enjoy more powers in managing and 
monitoring their revenues including taxation and oil production. The law 
guarantees their right to tax oil companies for causing environmental damage. 
The oil-producing governorates receive a specific share of revenue from this 
natural resource produced from fields within their territories.773 
On the other hand, constitutional cases that involved KRG, the only 
existing federal region, were considerably fewer than those involving 
governorates, despite the fact that disputes and power-struggles between KRG 
and the federal authorities have been more complicated and contested. This is 
in part because the Constitution treats governorates and federal regions almost 
equally, regions can exercise some substantial powers that governorates cannot. 
The most relevant of these is the right of the regional authorities to determine 
conflicts between federal and regional law in matters outside exclusive federal 
competences, and to amend the application of federal law within the region. 
                                                          
771 Second Amendment Law 2013 to Governorates Law 2008, art 7(4). 
772 ibid, art 7(9). 
773 ibid arts 44,45. 
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With respect to the governorates, the judiciary, and in particular the FSC, 
decides and resolves such conflicts.  
Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that the constitutional disputes 
involving KRG can be resolved through the FSC’s interpretation of the relevant 
ambiguous constitutional provisions, since these appear to be central to ongoing 
profound disagreements over power-sharing in Iraq. In this regard, most of the 
constitutional texts were said to have been deliberately left ambiguous as it had 
been almost impossible for drafters to agree on a clear view about how powers 
should be shared and distributed among federal regions and even different 
ethno-sectarian communities. Thus, the Court was clearly avoiding having to 
address the implementation of federalism in matters that have created ongoing 
political and constitutional crises between the two governments. Thus, on the 
handful of occasions that the FSC has addressed questions of this kind, its 
conclusions were seen to be considerably different from those in very similar 
cases involving the governorates, for instance the oil and gas-related cases. 
The key points that can be concluded from analysing the case law of the 
FSC regarding federalism-related questions is that the Court often upheld the 
legal continuity of existing legislation and most decisions here seem to have 
served to legitimise the federal authorities’ exercise of powers and were based 
on somewhat pragmatic arguments. The assumption that the Court is often seen 
to avoid addressing the substance of the laws and government policies that are 
significantly contested might suggest that judges are aware of the broader 
disputed nature of federalism in post-2003 Iraq. Thus, avoiding to rule on 
matters that would further draw the Court into political disputes might increase 
government counter-reactions and interference in constitutional adjudication.  
However, the federal legislature often bypassed the key constitutional 
provisions that guarantee broad and significant powers for governorates, 
especially in regulating the powers of the governorate councils, that would 
certainly bring into question the role of the legislator and the Court. Thus, under 
the rule of law both making and applying legal rules must conform to certain 
generally agreed principles including legality and also the independence of the 
judiciary. Thus, the legislature must conform to the general rules of the 
Constitution and the principles of the rule of law. As the final arbiter of the 
constitutional disputes, when the Court is asked to decide upon and review the 
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constitutionality of legislation, it is also expected that it will uphold the 
Constitution and be itself subject to the rule of law. Thus, it can be concluded 
that constant approval of the government’s (arbitrary) exercise of power has 
risen serious concerns that the Court has provided the government with 
legitimacy for continuing to do so. It might also increase concerns about the 
independence and legitimacy of the Court itself.  
 5.3 The FSC’s Approach to Elections and Government Formation 
Election times are crucial moments but the run-up to elections and their 
aftermath are even more critical. Thus, election-related constitutional and legal 
principles and rules might become central to the power struggle, constitutional 
contestations and legal disputes among political parties, groups and individuals 
involved in the process. Furthermore, this type of dispute can present a 
substantial challenge and a test for the peaceful alteration of power and the 
independence of the judiciary since as part of constitutional review, the Court 
decides on constitutional challenges to the election laws. 
 The FSC is also empowered to rule on a variety of election-related 
issues and its rulings have had broader impact on the democratic transition. This 
includes ratification of the final results of the general election,774 and ruling on 
the Parliament’s decisions regarding the ‘authenticity’ of its members or MPs 
and their replacement.775 Thus, the election-related cases may provide essential 
insights into how political actors demanded and responded to the growing 
involvement of the judiciary in the election-related controversies. The case law 
can also serve to provide insights into the adherence to the law and the principles 
of the rule of law by political actors and the government by enforcing election 
law and submitting to the Court’s jurisdiction for the arbitration of disputes.  
The following discussion analyses the key decisions of the FSC 
regarding constitutional challenges to election laws, replacement of MPs and 
government formation.  
                                                          
774 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 93 (7). 
775 ibid, art 52 states that: First: The Council of Representatives shall decide, by a two-thirds 
majority, the authenticity of membership of its member within thirty days from the date of filing 
an objection. Second: The decision of the Council of Representatives may be appealed before 
the Federal Supreme Court within thirty days from the date of its issuance. 
215 
 
 5.3.1 Challenging the Election Laws  
Since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, four general elections for 
Parliament and governorate councils have been held between 2005 to 2016, each 
of which were critical moments in themselves for the transition to democracy in 
the country. The January 2005 election, based on a single constituency, was said 
to have aimed to transfer power to an elected Iraqi government and establish a 
constitutional committee in charge of drafting a ‘permanent’ constitution for the 
country. The December 2005 election was seen as critical for broader political 
participation, especially for Sunnis, who largely boycotted the January election, 
meaning their representation was minimal.776 The December 2005 election was 
based on a multiple constituency system, with Iraq being divided into 18 
electoral constituencies based on its governorates and this principle has been 
adopted ever since. Both of these elections were based on a closed list. Equally 
important was the March 2010 election for the Iraqi Parliament as it proved to 
be a turning point in the post-2003 democratic transition and is thus of major 
importance in this discussion. This was the first set of elections held under the 
terms of the 2005 Constitution, testing the constitutional and legal principles of 
democratic elections. Furthermore, the 2010 and the 2014 parliamentary 
elections were of crucial importance for the country and the new era of the post-
US withdrawal from Iraq.  
Responding to the changes between each election, elections laws were 
amended to different extents which, by implication, resulted in some of the 
contested constitutional questions. Interestingly, even some of the minor 
changes to the elections laws were said to have important implications for 
political stability and development.777 The constitutional and legal principles 
and the rules that regulate the electoral process and procedures have been central 
to a series of constitutional litigation. The first national election under the 2005 
Constitution was held in accordance with the Electoral Law for Council of 
                                                          
776 See Ben Smith, ‘The parliamentary election in Iraq, March 2010’ (House of Common, 
International, Affairs and Defence Section, Library 11 May 2010) 2. 
777 Meghan L O’Sullivan, Razzaq al-Saiedi, ‘Choosing an Electoral System: Iraq’s Three 
Electoral Experiments, THEIR Results, and Their Political Implications’ (Harvard Kennedy 
School, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs 29 April 2014) 9. 
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Representatives of 2005 (Parliament Electoral Law) under which some 
controversial constitutional questions and disputes arose.778  
5.3.1.1 The Criteria for Allocating Parliamentary Seats 
The first substantial challenge to the Parliament Electoral Law 2005 
involved the distribution of parliamentary seats. The Vice President, Tariq al-
Hashmi, challenged the constitutionality of a provision of this Law that 
allocated each governorate a number of seats proportional to the number of 
registered voters in the governorate.779 The petitioner argued that the contested 
law provision explicitly contradicted the Constitution that guarantees ‘one seat 
per every 100,000 Iraqi persons representing the entire Iraqi people’.780 In the 
Parliamentary Seats’ Distribution (15/2006) case, the Court found the contested 
law provision unconstitutional and called on the legislature to amend the 
contested Law in order to guarantee one seat per 100,000 Iraqi Citizens.781  
The Court was further involved in this issue. In 2009, in preparation for 
the 2010 parliamentary elections, the legislature amended the Parliament 
Electoral Law 2005. First, it provided for the open list formula of proportional 
representation, in which voters can vote for the list (usually one party or more) 
or an individual within the list. Second, it provided for allocation of surplus 
seats: those remaining seats in each governorate or nationwide after the initial 
allocation to the strongest winning list or parties which had already won at least 
one seat from the outset. Third, and the most controversial of all, it provides that 
the Parliament ‘consists of [a] number of seats at a ratio of one seat for every 
hundred thousand people based on the latest statistics submitted by the Ministry 
of Trade.’ In addition to that, eight of the total of sixteen compensatory seats 
were reserved for minorities; the rest were allocated to electoral lists that do not 
                                                          
778 Electoral Law for the Council of Representatives (16) 2005 (Parliament Electoral Law 2005), 
art 15. It is important to notice that the first election on December 2005, for the Transitional 
National Assembly was based on the CPA/ Order No 96: The Electoral Law (15 June 2004) 
which considered Iraq as ‘a single electoral constituency’, established electoral system of 
proportional representation. 
779 Parliament Electoral Law 2005, art 15. 
780 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 49 (1). 
781 IRQFSC 15/2006 [26 /8/2006]. 
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win any seat in any electoral consistency but have a total number of votes that 
exceed the national threshold.782 
These amendments raised concerns and serious questions. The first 
major legal issue to raise from the Electoral Law was that the Ministry of Trade 
statistics exclude Iraqis who were living outside the country and therefore 
contradicts the constitutional principle of 100,000 for each person; most 
importantly it counted Iraqis in exile in the compensatory seats. Furthermore, 
despite increasing the number of parliamentary seats to 325, the number of 
compensatory seats decreased to 16, half of these being reserved for religious 
minorities. As the controversy continued, in a letter to the Parliament, Vice 
President Hashmi objected to the amendments, and argued that this unjustly 
excluded the estimated four million Iraqis, who, because of the war were forced 
to live outside the country. Hashmi called on the Parliament to reconsider this 
matter and amend the contested provision.783 The letter was of significant 
importance given the fact that as a member of the Presidency Council, Hashmi 
could easily veto the legislation. Instead of responding to Hashmi’s request, the 
legislature submitted a formal request to the FSC seeking the constitutionality 
of the reasons cited by Hashmi for vetoing the legislation. In the Hashmi’s Veto 
of the Election Law Amendment (72/2009) case, the Court underlined the 
constitutional principles of one seat per 100,000 Iraqi persons; the 
representation of all components of the Iraqi people; the necessity of a direct 
secret general ballot; and female representation of not less than one quarter of 
the members of the Parliament. It also reemphasized the central role of the 
Electoral Commission in the election process. Interestingly, the Court held that 
the Constitution ‘did not differentiate between the Iraqi living inside Iraq or 
outside it.’ More importantly, it said that the veto was within the time limit 
allowed, as the Parliament had argued that the veto or threat to veto the 
legislation came after the time limit passed. 784   
                                                          
782 Electoral Law for the Council of Representatives (26) 2009 [Parliament Electoral Law (2009] 
- Amendment to Electoral Law (16) 2005, art 1, [emphasis added] which repealed Article 15 of 
the 2005 Election Law. The Ministry of Trade issues all Iraqis, including those in Kurdish 
governorates inside the country, with a card for receiving food rations, an initiative introduced 
by the UN Oil for Food programme. However, this excludes those Iraqis living outside the 
country. 
783 Iraq MP Vetoes New Election Law, (BBC News, 18 November 2009). 
 < http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8365801.stm> accessed 2 June 2014. 
784 IRQFSC 72/2009 [19/11/2009].  
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This veto and FSC’s very general interpretation created extensive 
debates. Eventually, the legislature added new amendments: Iraqis in exile are 
able to vote for candidates in their own governorates and are treated the same 
as those inside the country. Moreover, registered voters are based on the 
statistics of the Ministry of Trade for 2005, with 2.8 percent added to allow for 
the growth rate in each governorate’s population per year.785 However, the 
legislature did not respond to another critical request from Hashmi: the need to 
increase compensatory seats.  
5.3.1.2 The FSC Calls for Developing the Electoral System 
The second type of constitutional cases involved the electoral system 
and, interestingly, these raised controversies concerning some of the core 
aspects of the election law and had direct and crucial implications on the result 
of the general election; however, the challenges came after the general result of 
the election had been approved by the FSC. Thus, it was assumed that any 
decision or annulment of the elections laws would be significant in terms of the 
political process and stability of the country. One of the controversies was about 
the allocation of surplus or vacant seats. The Electoral Law 2009, (the 
amendment to the Electoral Law 2005), provided that the surplus seats are 
allocated to ‘winning lists which acquired a number of seats based on the 
proportion of the votes they acquired.786 Before this amendment and for the 
previous elections in 2005, the surplus seats were allocated based on ‘the largest 
remainder method’ among all competing parties regardless the number of votes 
they had gained.787 Thus, the result would be that only parties that had won seats 
could have vacant seats. This could eliminate those parties that had won votes 
just under the governorates threshold but securing at least one seat based on 
national threshold, this was said to favor strongest parties.788  
Therefore, two MPs challenged the constitutionality of Article 3 of this 
amendment that established this contested method, arguing that it would 
disregard a significant number of votes and lead to the exclusion of many small 
                                                          
785 Parliament Electoral Law 2009, art 1. 
786 ibid, art 3(4). 
787 Parliament Electoral Law 2005, art 16 (3). 
788 O’Sullivan, al-Saiedi, ‘Choosing an Electoral System: Iraq’s Three Electoral Experiments, 
Their Results, and Their Political Implications’ 15. 
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parties. In the Surplus Seats (12/2010) case, the Court found the contested 
amendment unconstitutional. Interestingly, the Court argued that the decision 
would not affect the distribution of the parliamentary seats for the 2010 election, 
in other words, it had no retroactive effect.789 Thus, it cited fundamental 
constitutional principles to declare the contested Electoral Law amendment 
unconstitutional, stating that the amendment contradicted constitutional 
provisions that guarantee ‘the right to vote’790 and ’the right to expression’.791 
The Court also argued that under this legislation, allocating surplus seats to ‘the 
strongest winning lists’ means that the voters’ votes transferred to individuals 
they had not personally voted for. It can be said that the Court considered the 
implications for annulling the election law and consequently the election result 
and perhaps the need for a new election, when it declared that the decision and 
unconstitutionality of the amendment would not have retroactive effect and 
would not affect the 2010 election.  
It is generally accepted practice that the preparation for a new national 
election is the crucial moment during which controversial questions and 
disputes regarding the constitutionality of the election law would arise. 
Therefore, it was not surprising that this FSC ruling was central to the legal 
debates and preparations for the April 2014 parliamentary elections. In 
November 2013 the Parliament passed new amendments to the Electoral Law 
2005, which addressed the allocation of surplus seats. Although none of the 
contested parties challenged the constitutionality of the new amendment, the 
possibility that they would have challenged meant there was significant 
potential that the law could be annulled. This was expected because these 
amendments to the election law were proposed by the Parliament and not the 
executive.792 There was serious concern about the possibility that if this was 
challenged, the Court would nullify it based on judicial precedent already 
established since the Proposal and Draft Law (43/2010) case. This issue was of 
real concern given that at that time the Second Proposal and Draft Law 
                                                          
789IRQFSC 12/2010 [14/6/2010].  
790 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 20: ‘Iraqi citizens, men and women, shall have the right to 
participate in public affairs and to enjoy political rights including the right to vote, elect, and 
run for office.’  
791 ibid, art 38(1): ‘The State shall guarantee in a way that does not violate public order and 
morality: A. Freedom of expression using all means.’  
792 Electoral Law for the Council of Representatives (45) 2013 [Parliament Electoral Law 2013].  
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(21/2015) ruling had not been issued, under the terms of which the law might 
be considered to have been passed within the direct and original legislative 
powers of the Parliament and would therefore be immune from annulment on 
the basis that they lacked the approval of the government.  
5.3.1.3 Cases Involving Minority Quotas and Power-Sharing Deals  
In addition to proportional representation, the post-2003 power-sharing 
arrangements introduced a minority quota system, intended to guarantee 
political representation for religious minorities. The arrangement proved to be 
an equally controversial election-related issue. The Court has received a series 
of questions concerning the reserved parliamentary seats for religious 
minorities. According to the quota, the reserved parliamentary seats are 
distributed as follows: five seats for the Christian constituency in the 
governorates of Baghdad, Nineveh, Kirkuk, Dohuk, and Erbil (‘within one 
electoral district’); one for Yezidi’s and one for the Shabak people in Nineveh 
Governorate; and one for the Sabean Mandean population in the Baghdad 
Governorate.793 The Elections Law 2009 clearly differentiates between quotas 
given to religious minorities. For example, the Sabeans minority group has one 
seat for Baghdad, despite the fact that their population is spread across the 
country like the Christian constituency. At least this was argued by a 
representative of this group who challenged constitutionality of such legal 
differentiation. The petitioner argued that the difference in treating minorities 
contradicted the constitutional principle which states that ‘all Iraqis are equal 
before the law’,794 and prevented the Sabean population in other parts of the 
country from exercising their political rights and participating in elections. 
Thus, this in itself violated another constitutional principle guaranteeing that all 
Iraqis can exercise their political rights including the right to vote, elect, and 
stand as candidates themselves. In Mandean Sabeans (7/2010) case, the Court 
found unconstitutional the contested provision of the Electoral Law that 
introduces this differentiation, therefore, again underlining the non-retroactive 
effect of the decision on the 2010 election result.795  
                                                          
793 Parliament Electoral Law 2009, art 1. 
794 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 14. 
795 IRQFSC 7/2010 [3/3/2010]. 
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A similar pattern was manifested in Yezidis Quota (11/2010) case, which 
challenged the constitutionality of the above allocation of minorities’ seats.  The 
Court upheld the constitutional principles concerning the equality of all 
Iraqis,796 and ‘equal opportunities’.797 The FSC therefore found the contested 
provision unconstitutional, arguing that the quota must represent the genuine 
Yezidi population.798 Implicitly, it increased their representation in the 
Parliament. Thus, the FSC’s ruling obligated the legislature to ensure that in the 
2014 general elections the number of parliamentary seats reserved for Yezidis 
is proportionate to their population. Despite this, the 2013 amendments to 
Electoral Law were passed without any increase in the number of seats reserved 
for Yezidis. As a result, the head of the Yezidis Independent List challenged the 
constitutionality of the Electoral Law, this time, on the grounds that it was a 
proposal law and was not approved by the government. The petitioner referred 
to the previous Yezidis Quota (11/2010) ruling and requested the Court to 
declare the contested Electoral Law provisions unconstitutional and to oblige 
the legislature to implement its previous ruling regarding the Yezidis quota. The 
Court adhered to its previous decision, that the legislature must ensure the 
number of Yezidi seats represents the size of their population. However, it rather 
carefully avoided annulling the contested law, arguing that the issue had been 
decided previously and the representation of the Yezidi should reflect on the 
size of their population as stipulated in Article 49 of the Constitution. This 
requires and depends on the prospective new national census, because this case 
was brought prior to such census which was yet to be conducted, the Court 
dismissed the case on these grounds.799 In other words, the FSC made the 
implementation of its ruling in this regard conditional on the future national 
population census.   
The last of the FSC’s rulings regarding Electoral Law which merits 
consideration here relates to the power-sharing arrangements concerning the 
                                                          
796 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 14 states: ‘Iraqis are equal before the law without 
discrimination based on gender, race, […]’. 
797 ibid, art 16. 
798 IRQFSC 11/2010 [14/6/2010]. The UNAMI, the especial representative of the UN security 
general in Iraq cited and welcomed this decision, among few others, in its report in 2010. See 
Reidar Visser, ‘The UN Security Council, UNAMI and the Yezidi Paradigm in Iraq’ (Iraq and 
Gulf Analysis, 4 August 2010) < http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com > accessed 12 May 2014. 
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distribution of governmental posts in the disputed city of Kirkuk.800 Since this 
case can be considered the first of its kind to challenge a power-sharing 
arrangement that is said to have infringed general constitutional principles and, 
more importantly, human rights, it is crucial to understand how the FSC handled 
and balanced power-sharing arrangements following profound disagreements 
and conflict among major political parties with ethno-sectarian divisions, and 
the necessity for upholding the Constitution itself. In Kirkuk’s Power-Sharing 
(45/2009) case, the Court struck down a proposal presented before the 
Parliament that introduced criteria to ‘subdivide the electoral constituency of 
Kirkuk into three ethnic districts (Arab, Turkmen, and Kurds)’. The Court found 
the contested proposal unconstitutional on the grounds that Article 7 of the 
Constitution guarantees one seat per 100,000 Iraqi persons on a geographical 
basis, and prohibits any kind of discrimination including that based on 
ethnicity.801  
In 2013, a similar question was brought before the Court, in Second 
Kirkuk’s Power-Sharing (24/2013) case, challenging the constitutionality of 
Article 23 of the Electoral Law for Governorates, which detailed a mechanism 
of division of powers and distribution of governmental posts in the city. It also 
provided for a committee within the Parliament to be established representing 
the ‘main three components’ of the city who would take decisions by agreement. 
Importantly, it makes the election for the Kirkuk council conditional on 
implementing this arrangement. Thus,  
                                                          
800 Certain territories in Iraq are considered ‘disputed territories’ between the federal 
government and the Kurdish authority. The foremost conflict concerns the city and governorate 
of Kirkuk which is an ethnically mixed oil reach city in northern Iraq, with majority of Kurds, 
and Arabs and Turkomen. Throughout twentieth century, consecutive Iraqi governments 
changed the demography of the city increasing Kirkuk’s Arab population and forcing locals to 
leave the city. In post-2003 invasion, Kurds called to reverse the Arabization of the city, which 
is a constitutionally recognised call, however, these efforts have been challenged by national 
and regional governments.  Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 140: ‘The executive authority shall 
undertake the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of all 
subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law. The responsibility placed 
upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the 
Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in 
accordance with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (normalization and 
census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine 
the will of their citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007’. See Liam 
Anderson, Gareth Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethno politics of Conflict and Compromise 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2009). 
801 IRQFSC 45/2009 [20/7/2009].  
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The election of Kirkuk governorate and its affiliated Districts and Sub-
Districts shall be held after implementing the process of dividing the 
administrative and security powers and public posts including the 
position of the chairman of the provisional (governorate) Council, 
governor and deputy governor, among the components of Kirkuk 
governorate in equal percentages among the main components.802 
The petitioner, a member of the Kirkuk Governorate Council, argued that this 
had established ethnic discrimination by introducing quotas and power-sharing 
in the local government, and creating a special parliamentary committee to set 
up special electoral measures for the city in this regard. He referred to the 
Court’s previous (above) ruling on Kirkuk elections regarding the ethnic 
division of Kirkuk. The FSC here, declared Article 23 of the contested law 
unconstitutional on similar grounds. It insisted that ‘the Kirkuk arrangements’ 
prevented equal opportunities for all Iraqis, including state employees, as the 
law excluded those who were not from the main components of the population 
of the city of Kirkuk. It concluded that restrictions and measures of this kind 
contradicted the constitutional principles including Article 14 of the 
Constitution which guarantees that ‘Iraqis are equal before the law’. 
Furthermore, in the absence of a general census for Kirkuk, it is impossible to 
determine the size of each of these communities.803 
The Court’s ruling in such contested questions as the power-sharing 
arrangements for the disputed city of Kirkuk is crucial in upholding the 
Constitution. This is partly because this arrangement is actually the result of the 
core of the Iraq post-2003 constitutional and political system that recognises and 
provides for some form of power- sharing based on the diversity of religious 
and ethnicity in Iraqi society. It is also interesting to know that the members of 
the current FSC, and potentially the new Court, were appointed taking into 
consideration the multi-ethnic and religious nature of the society and the post-
2003 power-sharing arrangements.  
Moving from the key cases involving the election laws, the second 
important issue is the eligibility of electoral candidates, MPs, and most 
importantly the replacement of MPs. The case law of the FSC illustrates that the 
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cases concerning replacement of MPs have drawn the judiciary deeper into the 
political domain, especially the electoral process, and contributed to the greater 
judicialisation of constitutionally contested questions. 
 5.3.2 The FSC’s Inconsistent Approach in Deciding the Replacement Cases  
As part of the preparation for elections, the Electoral Commission 
decides on the authenticity of the electoral candidates. It may de-list electoral 
candidates who lack the required constitutional conditions or are currently 
subject to the terms of the De-Baathification Law for their association with the 
pre-2003 Baath party. Some of these decisions may eventually be appealed 
before the Court. Moreover, following the elections, there may be objections to 
eligibility of MPs. The Parliament must decide on this issue by a two-thirds 
majority, and the Parliament’s decision may be appealed before the FSC.804 On 
the other hand, a parliamentary seat might fall vacant for different reasons 
including resignation, dismissal, or death.805 It is also possible that an MP’s 
promotion to a ministerial post will mean that his/her seat will be allocated to 
another electoral candidate. The Constitution remains silent on addressing this 
latter possibility. The MPs’ Replacement Law 2006 provides for legal and 
formal procedures regulating the replacement issue.  
It is important to notice that the MPs’ Replacement Law states that the 
candidates for this replacement must be from the same governorate and same 
electoral list, coalition, entity or bloc.806 However, both the Constitution and the 
Law are silent on addressing two relevant issues in this regard. The first is the 
instance of ministers returning to their parliamentary seats, once these have been 
allocated to other MPs. Although this may be seen as uncommon, it has been of 
great concern, especially following the downsizing of the ministerial cabinet in 
July 2011.807 Secondly, the Law is also silent on replacement cases involving 
candidates who are from the same governorate and the same electoral list.  
                                                          
804 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 52. 
805 ibid, art 49. 
806 MPs’ Replacement Law.            
807 Reidar Visser, ‘Replacement Chaos in the Iraqi Parliament (II)’ (Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 15 
August 2011) <http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com> accessed 2 June 2013> accessed 14 July 
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The MPs’ Replacement Law 2006 has therefore produced an increasing 
amount of constitutional litigation. The FSC has a rather inconsistent approach 
to replacement cases. At first, the Court denied any jurisdiction over such cases. 
In January 2011,when the Parliament requested an interpretation of a specific 
provision of the MPs’ Replacement Law, the Court ruled that it lacked the 
jurisdiction to interpret ordinary legislation.808 This initial approach has been 
criticized for several reasons. First, whilst this denial of any interpretive 
jurisdiction over legislation is consistent with some previous rulings, it is 
however inconsistent with a number of cases in which the FSC did interpret 
legislation. 
 In some instances, the FSC’s rulings were based mainly on the Court’s 
interpretation of the law in question. For example, it had declared an article of 
the Retirement Law 2006,809 constitutional, and on this occasion, its reasoning 
involved an interpretation of the contested provisions of Retirement Law in 
order to explain the rationale for this, followed by its interpretation of the 
constitutional provision under which the law was challenged.810 Secondly, one 
might  also argue that the replacement disputes are directly related to the 
criterion of one seat per 100,000 persons guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Therefore, deciding and replacing vacated parliamentary seats without 
considering the balance between governorates is an explicit violation of this 
constitutional principle. Third, as Visser rightly argues, the Court has 
jurisdiction to decide on disputes that involve the application of federal law, and 
the legislation that applies to replacement disputes was passed by the federal 
Parliament. 811 
Following the June 2011 downsizing of the ministerial cabinet, 
replacement disputes again appeared frequently before the FSC. A number of 
ministers, including those who had won parliamentary seats in the 2010 election 
and had given up their seats as a result of promotion to ministerial posts 
attempted to retake their vacant seats after losing their ministerial posts. 
Although there is no legal basis to support such claims, the State Shura Council 
                                                          
808 IRQFSC 13/2011 [18/1/2011]. 
809 Retirement Law 2006.   
810 IRQFSC 8/2007 [16/7/2007]. 
811 Reidar Visser, ‘The Federal Supreme Court Refuses to Intervene in the Parliament 
Replacement Issue’ (Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 18 January 2011) 
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(Shura Council), the highest administrative court, introduced a general principle 
in this regard, arguing that since ‘there is no law that prevents the dismissed 
ministers from returning to vacant seats,’812 a dismissed minister could retake 
his parliamentary seat provided the seat remained unoccupied.813 With regard to 
already allocated seats, one possible way for dismissed ministers to retake their 
parliamentary seats was to challenge the constitutionality and validity of the 
original replacement decision made by the Parliament. It should be mentioned 
that the Court had dismissed nearly all those challenges to the initial 
replacements on jurisdictional grounds. In these new challenges to the initial 
replacement, which involved ministers, the FSC considered and reviewed the 
substance of the initial replacement and, by deciding the initial replacement was 
unconstitutional, it arguably eased the way for dismissed ministers to retake 
their seats.  
One of the key decisions issued in this regard was in al-Batikh (73/2011) 
case.  Batikh was a winning candidate from the White Iraqiya electoral list,814 a 
post-election list announced in the Parliament, and was initially part of the 
Iraqiya list which participated in the 2010 election. He was then promoted to a 
ministerial post and his parliamentary seat was given to al-Gharbawi of the al-
Iraqiya list [not the White Iraqiya list], both candidates being from Wasit 
Governorate. Batikh lost his post following the 2011 downsizing of the 
ministerial cabinet. Therefore, in order to retake his parliamentary seat, he 
challenged the constitutionality of the Parliament’s initial decision regarding the 
allocation of his winning seat, implicitly demanding to return to this. The Court 
ruled against the Parliament, founding the initial replacement decision to be 
unconstitutional on the grounds that the replacement was between candidates 
from different lists.815 The decision gave the petitioner a strong possibility of 
retaking his seat. According to the Court, the post-election list announced in the 
                                                          
812Reidar Visser, ‘Nujayfi, Maliki, and the Parliamentary Seats of the Iraqiyya 
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Parliament was a new and different list, and this was of key importance in the 
Batikh case since the replacement was between different lists.  
The case law of the FSC indicates substantial inconsistency and most 
importantly seems to overlook one of the most crucial criteria: the number of 
personal votes acquired by each candidate. Taking into consideration the 
number of personal votes acquired by each candidate is a vital criterion, 
particularly in cases involving candidates from the same governorate and 
electoral list which was crucial to MPs’ Replacement (133/2014) case. The 
FSC’s reasoning combines two relevant pieces of legislation here: the MPs’ 
Replacement Law 2006 and the Electoral Law 45/2013. The Court maintained 
that the Replacement Law was enacted in a period when elections were held 
under a closed list and thus determines only two criteria for replacement cases: 
candidates must be from the same governorate and the same electoral list. The 
petitioner, the Court argued, acquired a higher number of votes than the other 
parties to the dispute and continued that,  
since the Replacement Law does not include any provisions regarding 
the personal votes, the Electoral Law 45/2013, which was enacted under 
the open list formula, complies better with the essence of the 
Constitution and Article 38 which obligates state to ensure freedom of 
expression using all means that conform with the freedom of voters to 
elect their parliamentary representatives to the Parliament and those 
who replace them in case of a vacant seat to those with largest number 
of votes. Thus, the Electoral law 45/2013 states that ‘seats shall be 
divided by re-arranging the candidates order based on the number of 
votes acquired by each candidate. The first winner shall be the 
candidate who gets the highest number of votes. The same applies to 
other candidates[ …] .816 
The Court then ruled that the candidate’s number of votes should decide their 
eligibility to replace a vacant parliamentary seat. It can be said that the above 
decision is one of the handful of rulings in which the FSC was not limited by 
the extent of the questions addressed explicitly in the petition. It might also 
illustrate that the Court was willing to fill in legal gaps for which there is no 
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explicit constitutional and legal provision.  This case is said to have marked an 
important development in the FSC’s jurisprudence, as Visser argues: 
This interpretation by the court seems quite radical for a country with a 
strict civil-law tradition, since words such as ‘replacement’ and 
‘membership’ do not even occur in the electoral law, and since the 
replacement law which outlines criteria for governorate and kutla 
[electoral list] (but not personal vote) is still in force. In this way, the 
ruling seems to be of a rather innovative variety.817 
This example suggests that the Court has the competence to reach abstract and 
general constitutional principles if it willing to do so. This shift was further 
evidenced in the Time Limit for MPs’ Replacement (51/2015) case, which 
challenged Parliament’s decision to refuse challenges to the authenticity of a 
number of its members on the grounds that these were not made within 30 days 
after the MP had sworn the constitutional oath. The Court determined another 
important aspect of the MPs’ replacement Law by declaring a decision of the 
Parliament that sets a time limit for challenging the eligibility of its members 
unconstitutional.818  
Another post-election dispute that was high on the political agenda 
concerned the formation of the new government. 
5.3.3 FSC Involvement in the Government Formation Crisis  
Under the provisions of the 2005 Constitution, the formation of the 
government following general elections and, in particular, the nomination of the 
Prime Minister, has the potential to become a controversial and complex issue 
and even to lead to some form of constitutional crisis. The Constitution is both 
detailed and relatively clear on this matter, providing that: 
The President of the Republic shall charge the nominee of the largest 
Council of Representatives [Parliament] bloc with the formation of the 
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Council of Ministers [cabinet] within fifteen days from the date of the 
election of the President of the Republic.819 
In other words, within 15 days of his election, the new president, who is elected 
by the Parliament, must charge the candidate of ‘the largest parliamentary bloc’ 
with forming a new government within 30 days. Then, the Parliament must 
approve individual ministers and the government manifesto by an absolute 
majority. The largest parliamentary bloc was understood to refer to the electoral 
list that gained the largest numbers of parliamentary seats after the FSC has 
approved the final results of the general elections and before the first session of 
the Parliament. Accordingly, in the 2010 election, the largest bloc was the 
Iraqiya list, whose nominee was the former Prime Minister al-Allawi, with 91 
seats out of 325 parliamentary seats, followed by the State of Law list of the 
then Prime Minister Maliki with 89 seats. It was expected therefore that the 
Iraqiya list would form the government. However, on 10 June 2010, 
immediately before the first session of the Parliament on 14 June 2014, the State 
of Law list [with 89 seats] and the National Coalition [with 70 seats] jointly 
formed the National Coalition bloc, and then announced in the first session of 
the Parliament, that it had become the largest bloc in the Parliament at that time.  
With this new development, the Iraqiya as the largest pre-electoral list 
and the newly announced National Coalition as the largest post-electoral 
coalition tested the constitutional principle to breaking point and the formation 
of the government became an ongoing constitutional crisis. One of the relevant 
legal questions was whether the largest bloc, from whom a candidate is charged 
to form the government, is a pre-electoral or a post-electoral bloc formed in 
Parliament. Prior to this announcement, in March 2010 Malaki had petitioned 
for an interpretation of ‘the largest parliamentary bloc’. In its ruling on the 
Largest Parliamentary Bloc (25/2010), the Court scrutinized the relevant 
constitutional provisions, which describe the process of government 
formation,820 and considered Article 76 as a whole, not only the section 
concerning the largest bloc. As a result, the FSC concluded that the 
implementation of Article 76 came into effect after the acting President, the 
oldest member of the Parliament, invites the Parliament to convene its new 
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session.821 In this session, the Parliament elects its speaker, the two deputies, 
and the new President of the state.822 Then the elected President charges the 
nominee of the largest parliamentary bloc to form new government.823 The FSC 
established that:  
the largest parliamentary bloc is: either the bloc which is formed after 
the election from an electoral list which participated in the election with 
a specific name and number, and then gained the largest number of 
seats, or it is a bloc which consists of two or more electoral lists which 
participated in the election under different names and numbers and then 
formed one bloc in the Parliament; the president empowers the 
candidate from the parliamentary bloc which either won most seats or 
which has most seats in the first session of the Parliament, whichever 
one of these has the larger number of seats.824 
This interpretation clearly indicates that the largest parliamentary bloc should 
be either the largest pre- or post-election parliamentary bloc. In its reasoning the 
Court referred to a textual argument provided in Article 76, namely that a post-
election parliamentary bloc cannot exist until the Parliament is convened by the 
President and its elected members have taken the constitutional oath.825 From 
this perspective the interpretation can be said to be reasonable as the most 
fundamental basis of any parliamentary democracy is the relation between the 
executive and the legislative branches of the government, and the accountability 
of the government before the Parliament. Therefore, the Parliament has the right 
to approve or reject the candidate for prime minister.826 In practice, ‘this means 
that unless one party wins an outright majority, election results generally leave 
open a number of different coalition possibilities that will command  the support 
of a majority of Parliament.’827 In other words, it is argued that the Court’s 
                                                          
821 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 54. 
822 ibid, art 55. 
823 ibid, art 70. 
824 IRQFSC 25/2010 [25/3/2010]. [emphasis added] This is translated by Haider Al Hamoudi, 
‘The Iraqi High Court’s Rise to Legitimacy (Jurist Forum 23 April 2010) 
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interpretation ‘reinforces the principle that the executive’s right to govern is 
derived from parliamentary approval rather than the percentage of votes it 
obtains in the national election’.828 
However, one can argue that the critical point from the Court 
interpretation is the timing of the announcement of the post-electoral bloc 
[coalition], which must be in the first session of the Parliament; it disregards 
any coalition or announcement before or after the first session of the Parliament 
and this has provoked profound debates among politicians and scholars. Some 
might argue that: 
[I]t is not clear why, after the general principle of post-election bloc 
formation has already been admitted, there should be any reason to 
consider the first meeting of parliament as particularly important from 
the constitutional point of view. After all, parliament can be expected 
to have several meetings before the PM is nominated even if the 
constitutional timelines are strictly adhered to, and it would for example 
be far more logical to establish a cut-off point following the election of 
the president, when a 15-day window for finding the PM nominee 
begins.829 
It is possible that the Court was conscious of the fact that without having a time 
limit for forming and announcing a post-election coalition, the new coalitions 
and ongoing negations on forming the government might have prolonged the 
constitutional crisis and had severe implications for political stability and 
security which were already fragile. Some observers even argued that the Court 
ruled in a manner to favor ‘the nominee from the parliamentary bloc or list 
which has more parliamentary seats than any in its first session, in this case it 
was the Prime Minister’s, Maliki, bloc’.830  
The formation of the new government in the post-2010 general elections 
proved to be particularly complicated. As disagreements amongst the winning 
electoral lists and political leaders continued and opinions became more 
entrenched, the FSC was further drawn into the constitutional crisis. The acting 
speaker of the Parliament declared the first session of the Parliament to be open. 
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The decision however was challenged by a group of civil society organisations, 
which argued that this was unconstitutional and caused delay in the political 
processes, directly harming and affecting public interests and the Iraqi people.831 
In other words, the decision to consider or accept that the first parliamentary 
session was indefinitely open clearly violated the constitutional time limits in 
this regard.832  
In its ruling, an Open Session of the Parliament (55/2010), the Court 
emphasized the constitutional provisions that establish and guarantee the 
parliamentary system and the principle of the separation of powers. It 
reemphasized the constitutional tasks of the Parliament in its first session; 
electing its speaker and its two deputies, then within thirty days to elect the 
President who then charges the nominee of the largest parliamentary bloc with 
forming the government.833 Accordingly, the FSC held that failure of the 
Parliament to accomplish these constitutional tasks ‘within the constitutional 
time limits’ and the indefinite postponement of the first session contradicted and 
violated Parliament’s mandate. Therefore, the Court found the open session of 
the Parliament unconstitutional, and ordered the Speaker of the Parliament, in 
his official competence, to invite the Parliament to resume this session and to 
accomplish its constitutional tasks. Furthermore, it underlined the fundamental 
role of parliament in a parliamentary system and considered its failure as, 
[A]deficiency in the pillars of the republican parliamentary system 
[which moved] governance away from the democratic path chosen by 
the people when they voted on the Constitution and when they 
expressed their choice through ballot boxes to elect their representatives 
in the legislative.834  
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The Parliament resumed its session and complied with the Court decision but it 
took a long time for political leaders to agree on forming the new government - 
almost eight months.  
The FSC held that an open session of the Parliament was 
unconstitutional, and made the first session of Parliament the decisive moment 
for the announcement of the post-election bloc that would determine who would 
have the initiative to form the new government. Since it was such a long opening 
session, it was far from clear which day was to be considered the date of the first 
parliamentary session. The Constitution is clear that the first session must be 
held within fifteen days from the date of the FSC’s approval of the results of the 
general election.835 The Parliament was convened on 14 July 2010, and 
remained open until 11 November 2010. Determining the date proved to be 
decisive, for example, in defining the largest parliamentary bloc, the start and 
the end dates of the legislative term, and the beginning of the caretaker 
government.836 Therefore, when it was asked on 8 December 2010 to determine 
the date of the first session of the Parliament the Court held that the first date on 
which the Parliament met, that is 14 June 2010, was to be considered its first 
session.837  
An extensive debate has since continued regarding the role of the FSC 
in the Largest Parliamentary Bloc (25/2010) ruling, and the implications of this 
decision for the democratic transition in the country. Many would in general 
agree that the FSC had ‘used the law to defuse a potentially violent debate.’838 
However, political leaders have reacted differently. At that time, Alawi, the 
head of the al-Iraqiya list that won the largest seats of the Parliament explicitly 
dismissed the ruling and even denied the Court’s interpretative powers. He 
                                                          
 835 Constitution of Iraq (2005), art 54, 55. 
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argued that the law of the Court and the TAL, according to which the FSC was 
established, do not authorise the Court explicitly with the jurisdiction to 
interpret the Constitution. He went even further, challenging the existence of 
the FSC on the grounds that the true court of interpretive jurisdiction, which is 
still to be established under the terms of the 2005 Constitution, did not yet 
exist.839  
It should be noted that the formation of the government takes place 
within a constitutional framework established in Article 76. The question of who 
has the first opportunity to form a government became subject to differing views 
in the 2010 government formation. The controversy resulted in a lack of clarity 
as to the form of an alternative government and led to a significant power 
‘vacuum’ and uncertainty in political process. It is not uncommon for such a 
controversy to arise when no single political party or bloc of allied parties has 
an absolute majority of seats in the parliament (a hung parliament) and therefore 
no party has the first opportunity to continue in office and form a government. 
This difficult situation occurred in the 2010 General Election for the House of 
Commons in the United Kingdom; the general constitutional convention is that 
the incumbent prime minister has the first opportunity to form the 
government.840  
Therefore, there might be two relevant points of view about who should 
have the first opportunity to form a government in a ‘hung parliament’. It could 
be argued that the incumbent prime minister should have the first opportunity 
to form the government, as it seems to be the practice in the United Kingdom. 
Another view might be that the party or bloc that has gained the largest number 
of votes and seats, but not an absolute majority, should have the first opportunity 
to form a coalition government with other parties. 841   
The FSC interpretation of the largest parliamentary bloc did not solve 
the controversy and it opened up the possibility of the first of the scenarios 
mentioned above. This implied that the party of the incumbent Prime Minister, 
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Maliki, had the opportunity to do this despite the fact that it has just appeared to 
have lost power. Therefore, many commentators argued that the party or 
electoral bloc that had the greatest number of votes and seats should have been 
given the first opportunity to form the government; if it could not command the 
confidence of the Parliament, then the other option should be taken.  
This latter view then became a hotly contested point in the formation of 
the 2014 government. This time, the leader of the party within the coalition of 
allied parties that won the most votes and seats claimed to have the right to be 
the nominee for the prime minister. Thus, despite the previous interpretation in 
2010, it was still unclear which list was to be charged with forming the 
government. In this instance, the legal issue related to the fact that the National 
Coalition had the largest number of parliamentary seats. This consisted of a 
number of electoral lists including that of former Prime Minister Maliki’s State 
of Law list. The Coalition, which was a post-electoral bloc announced in a press 
conference before the first session of the Parliament and not in the first session, 
insisted that they were the largest parliamentary bloc. As the largest 
parliamentary bloc the Coalition claimed it should have the initiative to form 
the government, as no other coalition was formed or announced in the first 
session of the Parliament. The disagreement arose from the fact that the then 
Prime Minister Maliki was the nominee of the State of Law list but not of the 
National Coalition itself. Therefore, the State of Law list insisted that it had the 
right to form the government, since it had 92 seats, a larger number of seats than 
any other list in or outside the National Coalition bloc.  
As the pressure increased the President of the state petitioned for a ruling 
that would determine the largest parliamentary bloc. In the second Largest 
Parliamentary Bloc (45/2014) case, the FSC adhered to and indeed attached its 
previous interpretation in Largest Parliamentary Bloc (25/2010) ruling, arguing 
that this interpretation was valid and binding for all authorities including the 
federal judiciary namely the FSC itself.842 The Court did not name the largest 
bloc, and the disagreements over which was the largest parliamentary bloc 
according to the Court’s interpretation continued. In a significant development, 
the President charged Haider al-Abadi from the National Coalition and the State 
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of Law list with forming the government. This decision was issued in an 
unstable political and security context and under international pressure, 
especially from the US, as Iraq was facing a major attack from the so-called 
Islamic State group, and some major cities had already fallen under the group’s 
control.843 Maliki, who claimed to be eligible to form the government, rejected 
the President’s choice of nominee and regarded the act as unconstitutional, 
claiming he would file a lawsuit before the FSC against the President.844 The 
subsequent developments indicate growing pressure from the international 
community and most politcial and religious actors in the country on Maliki to 
step down. The pressure accelerated, ever since major Iraqi cities had fallen to 
ISIS, and there was growing support for the move by the President to charge 
Abadi from the same political party as of Maliki (Dawa Party) to form the new 
government. For example, a statement by State Department Deputy 
Spokesperson Marie Harf made clear that, ‘The United States fully supports 
President Fuad Masum in his role as guarantor of the Iraqi Constitution [...] . 
We reject any effort to achieve outcomes through coercion or manipulation of 
the constitutional or judicial process.’845 Thus, Abadi formed a new and broad 
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national coalition government; Maliki, however, did not go further with the 
complaint and since then he has been a vice president of the Republic of Iraq. 
One can conclude that in general the FSC has played a vocal role in 
election-related constitutional controversies and even the political crises that 
often deepen during the preparation for the new election, when the political 
debates and disagreements challenge constitutional and legal principles and 
rules. Thus, reforming or amending the existing election legislation was also a 
crucial test of the extent to which politicians and the government itself were 
willing to enforce and uphold the FSC’s decisions and its growing involvement 
and relevance for the elections. The possibility that the FSC was seen as being 
increasingly relevant to the elections had implications for the legal and political 
system.  
First, as the aforementioned cases have illustrated, the growing demand 
on FSC’s involvement in election-related controversies and disputes has also 
raised significant concerns about the dangers of the judiciary becoming 
embroiled in the political process. Of course, this is partially the result of the 
FSC’s jurisdiction which includes constitutionally reviewing electoral 
legislation, approving the result of the parliamentary elections, resolving 
disputes concerning the eligibility of the electoral candidates, the replacement 
of MPs, and most importantly interpreting constitutional provisions. Thus, it can 
be said that each new election often required that the existing electoral rules 
were amended in line with new political developments and the FSC’s decisions. 
That in itself was a ground for challenging the constitutionality of new legal 
rules. Furthermore, some might argue that politicians have found the FSC to 
represent the last hope when all other possible political choices failed or it could 
be that, for the incumbent government officials, the Court was a reliable source 
that could legitimise their exercise of powers, helping them to hold onto power.  
The implication of the FSC’s involvement in addressing and resolving 
the election-related constitutional questions during the transition to democracy 
was at the very least that it allowed recourse to constitutional and legal means 
for resolving disputes, avoiding other non-legal solutions including violence in 
such a divided, unstable and fragile post-conflict country. Case law was seen as 
an important factor for initiating some relevant electoral reforms that were said 
to conform to the Constitution. Moreover, the implications from the rule of law 
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perspective seem to be of considerable significance. It is generally agreed that 
the inconsistency in deciding like cases such as those concerning the 
replacement of MPs has undermined the role of the Court and led some to 
question its independence from powerful governmental and political actors.  
Overall, it can be said that the Court’s general self-restrained approach 
was of little relevance in this context, since there was evidence that the Court 
did actually decide on the substance of the law and what the law contains, 
especially electoral laws. This seemed to mark a shift from its general approach 
of making decisions relevant to the form and procedure of law making or 
structural aspects of the constitution. Thus, its election–related decisions, 
perhaps as part of its broader involvement in the power struggles, were also seen 
as of relevance to the protection of a specific kind of political rights, in particular 
those of minorities, which again is central to the substantive understanding of 
the rule of law. Importantly, the FSC can be said to have largely upheld the 
principle of legal continuity. The Court was also pragmatic in avoiding 
necessary yet challenging amendments that would have undermined an already 
fragile political system and democratization process. If the annulment of the 
elections laws had taken retroactive effect, it would then have endangered the 
country’s political process and security, which was in crucial need of a 
functioning government given the violence and instability of the political 
process. 
On the other hand, the 2005 Constitution provides that no law enacted 
may contradict ‘the established provisions of Islam’ and it then adds that no law 
enacted may contradict ‘principles of democracy’ or ‘the rights and basic 
freedoms stipulated in this Constitution’.846 The frequency and quantity of the 
cases involving these basic principles and the FSC’s approach to resolving them 
reveal considerable variation. The analysis in the previous sections of this 
chapter provides insights into the extent that principles of democracy and 
constitutional rights have been subject to constitutional litigation. Given that the 
current FSC has not yet incorporated Islamic jurists, it seems important to 
address briefly the role it has played in reviewing the constitutionality of 
legislation involving their conformity to Islamic law.  
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5.4 A Deferential and Self-Restrained Approach to Questions of 
Islamic Law 
The discussion in this thesis illustrates that the post-2003 constitutional 
and political developments suggest a growing role for Islam. This is a significant 
shift from the pre-2003 constitutional developments: Islam is not only 
considered ‘the official religion of the State’ and ‘a foundational source of 
legislation’, but the constitution goes further by providing that no law can be 
enacted that contradicts ‘the established provisions of Islam’.847 Therefore, any 
legislation that is believed to contradict Islamic law can be challenged for its 
constitutionality. There have been extensive debates on the impact of this 
Article and the incorporation of Islamic jurists in the FSC is of particular 
importance in the Iraqi legal system, as argued previously.848 Furthermore, there 
have been number of cases questioning the conformity of legislation with 
Islamic law.  
In principle, the FSC has adopted a self-restrained approach regarding 
cases that question the conformity of legislation with Islamic law, usually 
avoiding ruling on the interpretation of Islamic law and deferring such cases to 
the legislature. In fact, the first and the only example in which the Court 
interpreted Islamic law was Contract Law (60/2010) case. This involved a Law 
of Evidence provision stipulating that contracts over a set amount must be in 
writing.849 A party to a contract who sought to prove this contract using oral 
testimony challenged constitutionality of this legal provision arguing that it 
contradicts Islamic law and ‘settled provisions of Islam’. The Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the contested provision on its own interpretation of the 
requirements of contract in Islamic law and without seeking opinion from 
Islamic jurists outside the Court; instead it cites two Qur’anic verses to prove 
its interpretation.850  
It is important to note that the question at issue in the Contract Law 
(60/2010) case gives the Court the ability to interpret it differently. The Court 
could have ruled the contested provision unconstitutional by citing the opinions 
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of leading Islamic jurists, Sunni and Shi’a, who favour oral contracts. Some may 
argue that the ruling suggests that the Court did challenge the jurists’ 
interpretations, implying ‘that written contracts were at the very least 
Islamically recommended, if not required.’851 In the rather more implicit 
language in Abusive Divorce (10/2015) case, the Court upheld the contested 
Personal Statute Law 188/1959 provision which guarantees a wife’s right to 
compensation if it is established by the judiciary that the husband abused his 
right to issue divorce [Talaq Taa’sofi]. The FSC found that, without developing 
its own interpretation of the Islamic law, the compensation does not contradict 
Islamic law as argued by the petitioner. The Court said that this was a 
compensation for the damage caused to the wife as a result of abusive use of the 
right to issue a divorce; therefore, there was no contradiction with Islamic 
law.852  
However, in other cases the Court dramatically changed its approach to 
Islamic law. For example, the al-Waqf (61/2012) case, in which a petitioner 
challenged the constitutionality of a law that allows the administration of the 
‘Islamic Charitable Foundation [Waqf]’ to take ten percent of the value of the 
Waqf as administrative fee. The petitioner claimed that this legal provision 
violates the relevant Shi’a rules, and therefore, contradicts Article 2 of the 
Constitution, ‘the established provisions of Islam’. The Court found that the 
issue in question [Waqf] required a comprehensive and specialised study of the 
relevant jurisprudence of all Islamic schools in the development of the law of 
the administration of the Waqf. Therefore, there was a need for a single piece of 
unified legislation, which took into account the various opinions and 
understandings of the jurists on this issue. Importantly, the Court upheld the 
contested legislation as constitutional, arguing that it would remain as it is 
unless a new law was to be enacted.853 Furthermore, in Divorce through Agent 
(59/2011) case, 854  the FSC used similar grounds to uphold the Personal Status 
Law provision that prohibits divorce through an agent,855 which the petitioner 
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claimed to be in contradiction with certain Shia Muslim jurisprudence and that 
contradict Constitution which guarantees freedom of ‘commitment to their 
personal status according to their religions’, sects, beliefs, or choices’ for all 
Iraqis.856  
In general, with regards to the Court’s jurisprudence on Islamic law, it 
can be said that in over a decade of the Court’s functioning, for almost half of 
this duration, it was entirely self-restrained and avoided and deferred any issue 
that involved Islamic law. This has changed since 2010, and at times the FSC 
has made decisions about the substance of cases that raise issues concerning the 
conformity of Iraqi legislation with Islamic law. Its case law illustrates that the 
FSC often successfully managed to avoid or defer judgment and rarely had to 
develop a narrow judicial review of Islamic law. In most cases, it achieved this 
by dismissing the case or avoiding the issue on grounds of admissibility and 
restricting adherence to the rules of standing, or adopting a narrow 
understanding of its jurisdiction.857 Indeed, its involvement in the Contract Law 
(60/2010) case and the subsequent shift of approach in following cases suggests 
that the Court tried to be extremely selective. In very rare instances when the 
matter posed less controversial challenges to Islamic jurists, then it develops its 
own interpretation of Islamic law.  
The FSC defers to the legislature on issues of Islamic law and calls for 
the need for new laws regulating matters that require comprehensive, detailed 
and specialised reviews of Islamic law. It can be seen that judges handled these 
issues very carefully; it did not exclude the possibility that the contested 
provisions are repugnant to Islam. On the other hand, at least temporarily, it 
protected the legal rules from judicial review for conformity to Islam.858 
Furthermore, referral to the legislature and avoiding making decisions on the 
substance of Islamic law implies that the Court recognises the complexity of the 
issue ‘which only the legislature could sensibly amend to conform to Islam.’859 
It has become more aware of the political and legal context within which it 
operates, and most importantly, concerns about its legitimacy and position in 
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relation to the powerful religious institution of Najaf.860 It is argued that ‘the 
idea that secular judges would be permitted to develop novel approaches to 
Shari’a, or any aspect of Islam for that matter, in derogation of Najaf would be 
deeply offensive to core Shi’a sensibilities.’861 Another observation is that the 
Court seemingly found it easier to decide on cases that involved legal questions 
and matters, which were originally or mostly based on non-Islamic 
jurisprudence and transferred from such areas as commercial law. It is more 
cautious not to challenge or decide on legislation that was originally or largely 
based on Islamic law including for example the Personal Statute Law and the 
Administration of Islamic Charitable Foundation (Waqf) Law.  
Conclusion  
It was anticipated that the pre-constitutional FSC would be essentially 
involved in the judicialisation of constitutional issues given its rather broad 
constitutional jurisdiction, relative accessibility and the context within which it 
operates. The case law discussed here and the general overview of the Court’s 
handling of constitutional questions and cases illustrate its different approaches 
to constitutional questions depending on the types of related dispute, the degree 
of controversy they entailed, and the parties they involved. The Court has 
operated in an extraordinary transitional democracy, encountering numerous 
challenges; its rulings at times have had crucial, decisive implications for the 
entire constitutional order and on the democratic transition itself. This analysis 
suggests that, like emerging courts elsewhere, the FSC is often cautious, and 
acutely aware of the potential threat of political interference, of pressure from 
powerful religious institutions, of being accused of interference in political 
issues and of the government’s court-curbing actions and disobedience. This is 
evidenced, for example, in its self-restrained approach to cases that involve 
Islamic law.  
It can be said that the case law of the FSC provides significant practical 
insights into the potential experiences of constitutional judiciaries in transitional 
democracies. It suggests that in the aftermath of democratic transition and 
during the adoption of new constitutions there was an increase in the quantity 
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of the contestations of power and jurisdictional conflicts and the Court’s 
involvement in such cases.  In general, the FSC has been self-restrained but 
somewhat inconsistent; it has used procedural grounds, including jurisdiction 
and standing, to defer to the legislature to decide on the substance of the 
contested laws or constitutional matters. A closer reading of the FSC’s case law 
indicates that the majority of the landmark rulings address questions related to 
the structural and institutional aspects of the constitutional order and 
democratization. The Court has defined or redefined the boundaries of powers 
between executive and legislative branches, between the federal and sub-federal 
governments, issuing rulings which have had crucial and broad implications for 
the political and legal system.  
It has contributed to the rule of law in the sense that disputed parties 
sought legal and constitutional solutions, and it has attempted to uphold the 
supremacy of the law. Given the extraordinary context of the transition in which 
the Court acts and upon which it impacts, there was the possibility that disputed 
parties or institutions would adopt other non-peaceful means in handling these 
power conflicts and contestations. It has been noted that the FSC has often 
upheld a very thin, formal version of the rule of law such as checking the 
procedural aspects of law-making, focusing on how the law is made rather than 
what it contains. It has mostly refrained from ruling on the substance of the 
politically charged and contested matters that have deeply divided politicians 
and people. From this perspective, it has protected its institution and legitimacy 
by not entering into contentious disputes that may have served to undermine the 
judiciary. This does not mean, however, that the FSC has not entered some 
divisive political areas. Indeed, its jurisprudence on the legislative-executive 
jurisdictional conflicts at the federal level, or its involvement in the 2010 
government formation crises, suggests otherwise.  
 Occasionally, with specific laws, the Court’s jurisprudence has 
suggested a degree of adherence to the substance of the rule of law. For example, 
by upholding the substantive constitutional principles and provisions on matters 
involving elections laws, it has contributed to the development of this area of 
law, at times triggering or supporting reform and holding the government to 
account for violating the substance and supremacy of the law. On rare occasions, 
the Court has used abstract and general constitutional principles, namely 
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democracy, to solve and even develop detailed and specific aspects of the 
elections laws. Apart from that, however, its effectiveness in holding 
government in check, particularly in the periods between elections, has arguably 
been weak and of significant concern.  
The following chapter will detail the conclusions, of this dissertation, 
and in particular of its case study, and evaluate the broader role of the courts in 
general regarding the rule of law and democratization. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and Synthesis 
 
The judicialisation of politics is seen in countries with different political 
and legal systems. It is in general agreed that in transitional democracies, courts 
are being called upon to resolve even the most basic conflicts in interpretation 
of the newly established constitutional order. This thesis concerned itself with 
the implications of and the interrelation between judicialisation and the rule of 
law in transitional democracies. One may argue that the relatively context-
specific and often temporary challenges and opportunities in transitional states 
could bring the rule of law to the centre of the debate, becoming an essential 
factor in explaining judicialisation and its implications for transitional states.  
Therefore, this research was set to provide an understanding of the 
relationship between the rule of law and the role of the judiciary in a transitional 
democracy when it is viewed through the lenses of the formal and substantive 
approaches. Thus, when the government is not bound by the basic rule of law 
and the law is not sovereign over all, judicialisation, which introduces the more 
substantive elements of the rule of law, would be likely to raise serious 
concerns. For example, it might expose the court to external interference, as 
well as affecting the functioning of a new parliament which is attempting to 
establish its powers and legitimacy.  
Moreover, courts might frequently use formal rule of law reasoning to 
avoid deciding on matters of constitutional substance with broad implications 
for the transition and the country as a whole. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
judicialisation both affects and is affected by the rule of law. This was the main 
argument developed in this thesis which used in-depth analysis of the 
experiences of post-2003 Iraq’s newly established Federal Supreme Court 
(FSC) as a case study concerning the enforcement of the new democratic 
constitutional order.  
The first part of this chapter brings together the main arguments about 
the rule of law, judicialisation, and transitional democracy, and reflects on the 
main findings of this case study, attempting to locate these within a broader 
conceptual perspective. The second part presents a way forward for the FSC and 
makes suggestions regarding further research directions in this area. 
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6.1 Research Findings and Synthesis 
6.1.1 Conceptual Understanding of the Rule of Law and Judicialisation in 
Transitional Democracies  
The theoretical analysis in Chapter Two reveals that the rule of law is a 
contested ideal, the realisation of which is a matter of degree which also varies 
according to the specific conditions in any given country. It can have various 
interpretations and be conceptualised in different ways; however, every country, 
regardless of its political, legal or cultural traditions and values, should 
acknowledge certain principal tenets of the rule of law.862 In more developed 
democracies, the formal notion of the rule of law, which focuses on the manner 
and the form the law takes and the instrumental limitations on the exercise of 
state power, might be taken for granted. For the most part, the rule of law debate 
there has become more focused on the substantive attributes to the rule of law, 
assuming that these formal aspects should enforce substantive values, for 
example, the protection of human rights, or a particular form of political or 
economic and governmental system.863 These conceptual difficulties related to 
the application of the rule of law should not underestimate the importance of the 
basic principles of the rule of law in subjecting the exercise of state power to 
the law, ensuring equality before the law, holding governments accountable for 
arbitrary and overreaching power, and preserving individual rights. Equally, it 
emphasises the importance of arbitration of disputes in an independent and 
impartial manner and according to the law through the courts. 
The conceptual and concrete analyses of transitional democracies reveal 
that the concept of the rule of law, democratisation and judicialisation are 
symbiotically interrelated. These transitional democracies constitutionally 
accept and preserve substantive attributes of the rule of law, as being equal to 
or more important than the formal ones. In practice, the substantive attributes 
are often disregarded and may or may not be the central focus or priority when 
considering this context. On the other hand, introducing even minimalist 
electoral democracies requires that the newly elected and appointed state 
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officials and institution comply with the rule of law and do not merely rule by 
law. This thesis argues that the absence of the rule of law in transitional 
democracies or weak adherence to this would increase the potential for what 
some scholars describe as ‘the unrule of law’ democracies. Accordingly, 
although the transition in such countries might be quite successful in developing 
electoral democracy often regarding the peaceful alteration of power through 
elections, there might be inconsequential development relating to the rule of 
law.864  
Thus, the right question to ask might not be whether the rule of law 
should precede democratic transition, or whether democratic transition should 
precede the rule of law. The concern is whether democratization improves in 
the absence of parallel enhancements regarding the rule of law or whether mere 
adherence to the basic tenets of the rule of law serves to strengthen democratic 
transition. It might be possible that some form of the rule of law will 
successfully apply to those contexts that have not embraced democratization, 
mainly where the transition focuses on economic developments. It is also true 
that, in transitional states that underestimate the relevance of democratization in 
comparison with the rule of law reform, the government is likely to use the rule 
of law, and often formal understandings of this, to legitimise holding onto power 
and to avoid this being contested. Thus, when constitutional culture and 
practices of the democratic accountability of rulers are weak or totally lacking, 
the low level of legal accountability in the sense of horizontal accountability is 
likely to undermine the development of the democratic transition, and infringe 
on the ‘constitutional balance’ of power. 
Thus, reforms targeting the rule of law in transitional democracies 
should not cling to the ideals of the rule of law, but rather develop more practical 
and workable accounts which need to take into consideration the changing 
circumstances of the transition. Given that, the primary concern of the rule of 
law reforms then should become the establishment of those institutions required 
for creating, interpreting, and enforcing laws, and for checking and holding to 
account arbitrary and abusive exercise of power and, most importantly, restoring 
non-violent settlement of disputes.  
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The majority of newly adopted constitutions provide for some form of 
constitutional judiciary: a supreme or constitutional court with expanded 
jurisdiction that serves to hold these different actors legally accountable for 
infringing the newly established constitutional boundaries and rules of 
redistribution of state power.  
It is generally agreed that these courts have grown in authority and 
influence as a result of being involved in the judicialisation of the constitution. 
This thesis maintains that judicialisation may emerge and develop as the result 
of the interaction of multiple factors. These factors arguably supply courts with 
institutional and formal powers, a reasonably independent and accessible 
constitutional judiciary, as well as opportunities, in the form of disputes and 
conflicts, to interpret (unclear) constitutional norms. The judiciary faces 
growing demands from different actors such as individuals, interest groups or 
the government itself, to exercise its jurisdiction for resolving or contributing to 
the resolution of such disputes. Moreover, particular factors might contribute 
significantly to the greater potential for judicialisation of the constitution, during 
the periods leading up to the transitional moments, during the constitution 
writing process and in the immediate years following transition. The rather 
challenging conditions of the transition may result in constitutional texts that 
are often unclear and inconsistent, leaving a number of grey areas. As a result, 
when these are applied they are likely to create considerable conflicts in 
interpretation for which the governmental branches and politicians might turn 
to the judiciary.  
For example, as this case study reveals, the 2005 Iraq Constitution, 
which was written in the course of the transition from an authoritarian regime 
to a democratic one, was the result of time-consuming constitutional negotiation 
and political compromise among various national actors and groups facing 
domestic and international pressure. Although the Constitution was approved in 
a national referendum, it remains a work-in-progress. In the last decade, the 
implementation of the new constitution and transition to democracy have been 
hindered by factors including the legacy of decades of legal and political 
practices under an authoritarian regime, a difficult democratic transition 
characterised by widespread post-transition violence, ethno-sectarian conflict, 
corruption, and political instability. Furthermore, state institutions remain for 
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the most part fragile and failing and, despite the dire need, politicians find it 
difficult to compromise and reach agreements on virtually all policies.865 Thus, 
this was not because the politicians were ignorant of the values and practices of 
separation of powers and the rule of law, and in a broader sense of the 
Constitution itself, but because they often chose intentionally to ignore these 
values and relentlessly pursued a course of weakening the newly established 
governmental institutions. Ignorance might be a crucial factor but even when 
they took these rules seriously, they found it difficult to agree on the exact 
meaning of the rules and where the boundaries of power lie. 
Therefore, the interplay of the above factors may result in significant 
controversies, most of them unresolved, and a tendency among various actors 
participating in the constitutional and political process to exceed the boundaries 
of power. Enforcing these general rules is not only the task of the legislature 
through elaborated and specific legislations. The constitutional judiciary also 
plays a crucial role in determining the contradictions between the detailed text 
of specific statutes and the more abstract general rules of the Constitution, 
thereby determining what constitutes arbitrary or abusive use or overreach of 
power. This can be the most controversial role that the court is expected to play: 
setting out the basis on which it is necessary to check government and hold it to 
account for the exercise of power.   
Furthermore, when the government is not bound by the basic rule of law 
and the law is not sovereign over all, judicialisation, which introduces the more 
substantive elements of the rule of law, would be likely to raise serious 
concerns. For example, it might expose the court to external interference, as 
well as affecting the functioning of a new parliament which is attempting to 
establish its powers and legitimacy. In other words, if difficulties remain in 
accepting and implementing the basic tenets of the rule of law, the primary 
concern of the judiciary should be its institutional independence. Thus, its role 
in checking and holding the government to account might be seen primarily as 
that of upholding the supremacy of the law, how the law works and what form 
it should take rather than what the law itself contains.  
                                                          
865  See Chapter Four (4.1.2). 
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The case study used in this research confirms the argument that demands 
for and use of the rule of law and constitutional judiciaries tend to increase as 
democracy itself is strengthened. For a long time in Iraq, the principle of 
separation of powers was replaced in both theory and practice by the doctrine 
of concentration of powers in one governing body or in a single individual. Party 
politics were minimal or non-existent, and the rule of law and the constitutional 
judiciary were weak, if they can be said to have existed at all. In the aftermath 
of the 2003 regime change, Iraq started its transition towards constitutional 
democracy which constitutionally recognised and provide for a state based on 
the rule of law and democratic principles and values. The position and the role 
of its newly established constitutional judiciary have put its constitutional 
mandate of upholding the principles and values of the rule of law to the ultimate 
test. The FSC is a pre-constitutional court with a mandate to enforce and 
preserve the democratic constitutional order which is still in its infancy. The 
following discussion reflects on some underlying findings regarding the FSC’s 
decade of experience in constitutional adjudication in post-2003 Iraq.    
6.1.2   Principal Findings Regarding the FSC’s Function and Policy 
Two key areas merit consideration regarding the role and functioning of 
the constitutional judiciary under a new constitution in the post-2003 Iraq 
democratic transition: how the FSC approaches constitutional questions and the 
extent to which it has been involved in constitutionally sensitive and 
significantly contested questions. First, the FSC has often taken a deferential 
and self-restrained approach toward the substance of constitutional issues which 
seems to be a fairly common approach amongst emerging courts in transitional 
democracies. This self-restrained approach involves mostly literalist 
interpretations of constitutional and legal rules. A significant number of 
constitutional cases on procedural, admissibility and jurisdictional grounds were 
dismissed so that the other elected branches of the government had to develop 
the substance of the constitutional issues and non-judicial resolution of disputes. 
It was noted that the Court had engaged with the issue of election laws, 
reviewing and considerably checking government policies from both 
substantive and formal perspectives.  
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The Court’s most prominent area of self-restraint concerns the 
implementation of the ‘repugnancy clauses’ of Article 2 of the Constitution: the 
established provisions of Islamic law, principles of democracy, and 
constitutional rights. Indeed, the unique composition of the FSC (which is to 
consist not only of judges but also Islamic jurists and legal scholars) is primarily 
intended to protect and review the constitutionality of legislation, and to confirm 
and balance these three repugnancy clauses.866 During the period covered by 
this research not a single instance occurred which involved a question of 
balancing these three requirements in a given piece of legislation; rather, the 
handful of cases which arose involved scrutinising the legislation for conformity 
with one of them.  
Although the FSC’s deferential approach was relatively successful 
regarding certain issues such as Islamic law, the Court has had different 
approach to other cases of significance in regard to the implementation of the 
structure and function of the newly established constitutional order. Thus, a 
similar deferential approach to these latter constitutional issues could have other 
implications. In other words, one might say that politicians and law makers 
would have ultimately continued for months opposing each other before 
compromising and agreed on more power-sharing deals that possibly in contrast 
with the Constitution, let alone the implication on the country’s political 
stability and security.  
Secondly, the Court has frequently been involved in some of the most 
controversial questions and disputes central to institutional power struggles and 
separation of powers concerning the nature, function and existence of the entire 
constitutional order and wider society. The Court has also often declined to 
become involved, claiming the issue lay outside its jurisdiction. When it has 
become involved, this has led to serious problems of legitimacy as the FSC has 
increasingly addressed and resolved contested constitutional issues. It faces 
consistent demands to continue to exercise influence over Iraqi national policy. 
There is also the risk that further interference in sensitive political areas will 
produce a counter-reaction that may infringe on the Court’s institutional 
autonomy. This generated a long-lasting debate questioning the FSC’s position 
                                                          
866 See Chapter Four (4.2.2.3). 
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and its independence from the executive and its capability of checking 
government excesses. As some comparative literature has noted, the lack of a 
firm constitutional and legislative framework to define the judiciary’s 
composition and protect its independence may jeopardise its role as well as 
posing a threat to its continued existence.867  
In this broader context, much can be said about the experiences of the 
FSC in Iraq, however, four key findings are of greater significance. First, there 
is often uncertainty and inconsistency in decision making. Secondly, there is 
noticeable pragmatism and novelty in deciding cases. Third, there is 
considerable political pressure on the Court and the potential for politicisation 
of the FSC. Fourth, the Court has been seen to support the centralisation of 
power in the federal executive authority.  
1. Uncertainty and Inconsistency in Decision Making 
The FSC’s case law indicates that there is a considerable degree of 
inconsistency in its decision-making, since it has failed to treat similar cases 
alike or to observe jurisdictional and admissibility rules. A good number of 
judgments are inadequately or poorly reasoned, and many others have been 
written in ambiguous language. Such judgments have often resulted in an 
increase in subsequent petitions to the FSC requesting clarification of previous 
ambiguous rulings. The Court’s response has been to decline jurisdiction for 
clarifying its judgments once these have been issued. At times, this not only 
failed to resolve the original ambiguity in the Constitution that the ruling was 
meant to address, but indeed added another binding interpretation that lacked 
clarity and further challenged the implementation of the Constitution.868  
It could be argued that ambiguity of this kind might preserve the 
judiciary from the criticism of openly favouring one party against another, 
allowing the non-judicial resolution of disputes. A final binding judgment which 
lacks clarity can be interpreted by each litigant and any interested individual or 
institution as serving their own interests. This could result in ongoing 
constitutional crises and create the potential for bringing further constitutional 
litigation regarding the same question back to the Court. Moreover, this could 
                                                          
867 Dotan, Lawyering for the Rule of Law 50. 
868 See e.g.  Chapter Five (5.2.1.1 and 5.3.2) 
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affect the seriousness with which individuals and institutions treated the 
constitutional judiciary. Similarly, this could result in the Court contradicting 
itself, and overruling previous decisions or already established judicial 
precedents. This ambiguity might have had a crucial impact as at times it was 
unclear which of the contradictory decisions was to be applied, such as in cases 
concerning Legislative Powers of the Governorate Councils or the Independent 
Commissions.869 Therefore, the legislature added another jurisdiction in the 
latest available draft of the law regarding the new FSC. This will allow the new 
FSC to interpret any previously unclear or ambiguous judgments for which a 
petition is filed with the Court.870  
Inconsistency in the decision making of the FSC is evident in its use of 
admissibility and jurisdictional rules to decide whether or not to respond to 
questions. It was seen to be rather more flexible with regards to requirements in 
cases concerning certain political rights in comparison with its general approach 
to other rights-based cases. It took this approach in election-related cases 
involving or affecting political rights as part of the power struggles between 
different political actors participating in the political process.871  
On the other hand, it can be seen that FSC is bound by the limits of the 
petition submitted before it and the explicitly expressed legal questions. It is 
prohibited (or prohibits itself) from going beyond the original submission. 
Although the Court often adheres to this requirement and is bound by the 
content of the petition, in some of its more controversial rulings the judgments 
do address and indeed introduce crucial and positive rules on matters not 
addressed by the litigants, as in the case of Second Draft and Proposal Law 
(21/2015). When a question was raised regarding the constitutionality of the law 
concerning the replacement of MPs, the Court held that the law was 
constitutional and went into detail regarding the legislative initiative rights of 
the Parliament, and introduced exceptions and general rules relating to this 
right.872 Similarly, the FSC’s jurisdiction to provide a binding interpretation of 
the Constitution independent of any examination of the constitutionality of a 
legislation is listed in the 2005 Constitution but not in the current FSC’s law. 
                                                          
869See e.g. Chapter Five (5.2.1.1 and 5.1.1.1).  
870 See Chapter Four (4.2.1). 
871 Chapter Five (5.3.1). 
872 See Chapter Five (5.1.1.2). 
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Therefore, the Court has developed the pre-conditions for a valid application for 
abstract constitutional interpretation: only certain official institutions can 
initiate a petition of this kind, there must be an ongoing actual dispute calling 
for an interpretation of the Constitution and explicit reference to the respective 
(unclear) constitutional provision. 
 It was noted that the Court’s observation of these conditions has varied 
considerably, even when cases appeared to be similar. At times the petition was 
dismissed and the petitioner was obliged to file a lawsuit, but in other cases an 
interpretation of the Constitution was issued. This was particularly frequent 
when observing the requirements of ‘an ongoing actual dispute.’ The majority 
of cases concerning oil and gas involving the KRG-federal government were 
dismissed on these grounds, whereas the Court was more flexible in observing 
this requirement in cases involving legislative-executive power struggles.873 In 
general, the FSC avoided drawing conclusions on the substance of highly 
divisive and contentious legal and political matters such as cases relating to 
federalism or Islamic law.874 In other instances, it reached influential verdicts 
regarding the contents of some of the most controversial question that had an 
impact on the future of the entire country, its constitutional development and 
polictial stablity such as in the cases of the Largest Parliamentary Blok (2010) 
or in Parliamentary Seats’ Distribution (2006).875 
2.  Pragmatism and Novelty in Deciding Cases 
The FSC, an innovation of the post-2003 Constitution, applies some of 
the new constitutional principles, several of which have been greatly contested. 
The Court acts in the absence of judicial precedents using what might be 
described as a novelty in establishing new, unprecedented rulings. This novelty 
is often combined with pragmatism. On the one hand, it seems to understand the 
context within which it operates and the growing demands it faces to become 
involved in contested constitutional questions and the risks this poses. It may 
prefer to set out different priorities when it interacts with other governmental 
and political actors and its rulings will affect these. Thus, the FSC’s approach 
                                                          
873 See Chapter Five (5.2.3.2) and Chapter Five (5.1.1.2 and 5.1.1.3) respectively. 
874 See e.g. Chapter Five (5.2 and 5.4) respectively.  
875 See Chapter Five (5.3.3 and 5.3.1.1) respectively. 
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of avoiding decision-making or resolving the substance of constitutional 
disputes may preserve this institution from government disobedience, 
challenges or counter-reactions. Arguably, this can be attributed to the Court’s 
self-preservation policy. 
Apart from that, in certain areas the Court has taken into account the 
practical implications of its decisions upholding legal and political continuity 
and stability. For instance, the absence of Islamic jurists in the composition of 
the current FSC has not prevented petitioners from bringing cases that question 
the conformity of legislation with Islamic law. The Court has developed the 
most self-restrained, deferential, and selective approach in response to this 
issue. As in the case of the Contract Law (2010), it very rarely develops its 
interpretation of Islamic law, upholding contested laws as constitutional and 
compatible with Islamic law when the issue is far less controversial or 
contradicted by Islamic jurisprudence.876 This approach is anticipated to 
continue until the new legislation of the FSC incorporates Islamic jurists and 
determines the extent of their decision-making powers within the Court. 
Furthermore, the current FSC judges are not expected to challenge powerful 
religious institutions by developing their own interpretations of Islamic law or 
choosing between somewhat contradictory Islamic jurisprudence and 
interpretations. The Court has not contributed to or facilitated an Islamic legal 
system, as most scholars and observers of constitutional developments in post-
2003 Iraq might have anticipated. Instead, the Court has protected secular 
legislation, albeit temporarily, by preventing more religiously oriented 
legislation unless the Parliament decides otherwise.  
Election-related conflicts also indicate the practical approach of the FSC 
in its explicit acknowledgment of the non-retrospective effects of its remedies 
when annulling election law provisions or addressing the implementation of the 
ethno-religious minorities quota. For example, it took into consideration the 
impact of nullifying the election legislation and criteria on the stability of the 
state as a whole, the need for a functioning government and the dangers posed 
by a power vacuum in the transitional phase of democratization. Thus, its 
judgments were limited in their implications and insisted on the non-retroactive 
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effect of the rulings.877 Moreover, the pragmatism of the Court’s decision-
making might be evident in its reassessments and attempts at overriding or 
limiting the consequences of its previous decisions. It often establishes 
principles in a broad sense and then stands back, and it only starts to limit, 
gradually, the implications of this general rule or principle when it comes under 
severe criticism. In cases involving the formal questioning of ministers and the 
Second Proposal and Draft Law (21/2015), the FSC seems to have shifted from 
imposing direct restrictions on the Parliament that expanded the executive’s 
powers, instead reassessing and minimising the implications of its initial 
conclusion in the infamous ruling on the Proposal and Draft Law (43/2010) 
case by introducing exceptions instead of a general rule.878 
Furthermore, the disputes involving the federal government and the 
KRG illustrate the FSC’s practical outlook when dealing with politically 
sensitive and contentious questions. It often opted not to answer questions 
directly involving federal-KRG powers and the relationship between them, 
despite the fact that they were often clearly related to the application and 
interpretation of legal and constitutional principles and rules, a task which is 
central to the Court’s jurisdiction. It did not explicitly uphold federal authority 
policies, and frequently avoided having to deal with such legal questions, 
tending instead to support legal continuity. It implicitly confirmed the pre-2003 
legislation on issues of the oil and gas sector, even though this contradicts the 
Constitution.879 
The inconsistent approach of the FSC, previously discussed, might be 
seen to serve the Court’s pragmatism. Although in the civil law tradition, this 
might be considered to be a sign of activism on the part of the judiciary, at times, 
it can also be a means of contributing to the development of constitutional 
jurisprudence. There were cases in which the Court extraordinarily reached 
abstract and general constitutional principles, by citing the principle of 
democracy, suggesting that some specific practical matters are more compatible 
with democracy. In doing so, this triggered and supported legal reform of the 
                                                          
877 Whilst the criteria and rules established by the Election Law 2005 by which the parliament 
and the government were elected were consistent with TAL (2004) according to which the 
Election Law was enacted, these clearly contradicted the terms of Constitution of Iraq (2005). 
See e.g. Chapter Five (5.3.1.2). 
878 See Chapter Five (5.1.1.2)   
879 See Chapter Five (5.2.3.2). 
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election laws by consistently striking down legal rules and obliging the 
Parliament to amend the law.880 Similarly, in other cases, despite considerable 
inconsistency in its handling of similar cases and questions, it developed, 
adopted, and added new criteria that reflected reforms in certain aspects of the 
specific legislation concerning the replacement of MPs.881 In the case of MPs’ 
Replacement (133/2014), the FSC even went beyond the original submission 
made explicit reference to another ordinary legislation which was not addressed 
in the petition. Thus, it recognised the personal vote criteria essential to the 
replacement cases on which there was no explicit legal provision.882 
Accordingly, the FSC established broad, abstract constitutional principles to 
develop a rather detailed aspect of the ‘Replacement Law’. 
3. Decision-making under Political Pressure and the Potential 
Politicisation of the Court 
 
The inconsistency, arbitrariness, pragmatism and novelty in the decision 
making of the FSC might strongly correlate to a third and more general 
observation on the newly established counterpart courts operating within similar 
contexts. As an institution, the FSC is arguably vulnerable to external 
interference: it has a broad jurisdiction, in particular, in relation to abstract 
constitutional interpretation. The Court has been involved in particularly 
challenging institutional, structural and political questions, which it has been 
called upon to answer. Its rulings were applied to the specific context of the 
Iraqi transition with significant implications for the entire country and society. 
The FSC is relatively respected as a court of law, and political actors and 
government have often implemented its decisions although they might have 
taken considerable time. However, at times when its decisions departed 
noticeably from the expectations of powerful political actors, its independence 
or even existence came under threat. One example is the Court’s significant 
involvement in the 2010 crisis concerning government formation. Thus, 
following its decision in the Largest Parliamentary Block (25/2010), the 
disputed parties formally challenged FSC’s jurisdiction to provide abstract 
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881 See Chapter Five (5.3.2). 
882 Chapter Five (5.3.2). 
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binding interpretation of the Constitution. It argued that the Constitution gives 
such authority to the new court; the current FSC which is a pre-constitutional 
institution has no such interpretive power.883 Another factor that might explain 
similar responses to the FSC’s judgments is the Court’s position as a pre-
constitutional, transitional, and ‘caretaker’ institution which means it lacks a 
firm and detailed constitutional and legal framework. In fact, its current 
composition infringes the 2005 Constitution. The ongoing debates on the FSC 
Law that are intended to detail the constitutional provisions regarding the power 
and the independence of the new FSC made this piece of legislation the most 
controversial one thus far to be delayed by the Parliament and the most urgently 
needed one.   
Political pressure and at times concern over broader reactions to the 
FSC’s decisions is manifested in the case law discussed here and the events 
surrounding some of its most controversial and decisive rulings. The FSC judges 
were faced with professional and sometimes even physical threats, potential 
pressure from powerful political and religious actors, and the transitional justice 
policies including the de-Baathification laws. Some cases might suggest 
political interference in the judiciary and the complex position of the FSC as an 
emerging institution. The Chief Justice, Madhat, who was also a senior judge 
under the executive-dominated Baath regime before 2003, has played a leading 
role in judicial authority. He is the Chief Justice of the FSC, the head of the 
Higher Judicial Council, and up to 2012 served as the head of the highest 
appellate court: the Federal Court of Cassation. The events preceding his 
temporary removal in 2012 and subsequent political and legal reactions to this 
may well indicate the political pressure on the judiciary. Before that removal, 
many had reservations about the Court’s handling of the controversial cases 
concerning the 2010 electoral candidates or the FSC’s involvement in the post-
2010 election crisis. The Federal Court of Cassation final decisions regarding 
candidate cases came only after the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice, who at 
that time was the head of the Federal Court of Cassation, and some other 
representatives of political parties became involved, indeed as reported 
following a meeting between them. 884  
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Another example that might suggest political pressures on the Court is 
those cases that concern the KRG’s powers. The controversies or legal conflicts 
relating to this are part of an ongoing and much more challenging political crisis 
involving the federal government and the KRG. In practice, resolving the 
ongoing disputes between the two parties on many aspects of the Constitution, 
including the most contentious issue of oil and gas resources, has proved to be 
extremely difficult.885 Therefore, the Court has plainly taken into account this 
broader deep-seated political discontent and the implications of its judgments, 
not only with respect to relations between the federal government and the KRG 
but also among the other actors and institutions in post-2003 Iraq. The KRG-
related cases serve to illustrate the key role which politics can play in shaping 
the conditions of the law. The rhetoric of the rule of law is one thing, but the 
political reality of the constitution is another, and resolving such contested 
issues cannot be based purely on legal texts and their interpretation. Indeed, one 
could argue that the complex interactions between politics, law and 
judicialisation play a substantive role in establishing the rule of law system 
during the transition to democracy.  
4. Centralisation of Powers in the Federal Executive Authority: 
Legitimising the Government’s Exercise of Power 
Despite the inconsistency, pragmatism and novelty of its decision-
making, and the FSC’s awareness of its jurisdictional and institutional 
limitations, one can argue that it has remained largely consistent in maintaining 
one particular agenda and in identifying reasonable ways of strengthening the 
federal executive’s authority.    The division of power in the 2005 Constitution 
is based horizontally on the principle of separation of powers among the three 
federal government branches. Vertically, the power is distributed between the 
federal and sub-federal governments. The principles and structure which govern 
Iraq’s federal system are the most contested and vague areas of the Constitution.  
Constitutionally, both the Parliament and the sub-federal authorities 
have significant powers. The Parliament has the principal responsibility for 
policy making, law-making and holding to account the executive authority. A 
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range of factors may explain the impediments which the Parliament or the sub-
federal authorities face in exercising their powers. Many may consider that the 
FSC’s approach to questions involving the boundaries and the constitutional 
balance of powers represents one such factor. There has been a noticeable trend 
towards the executive branch attempting to consolidate its powers. The conflicts 
involving this balance of powers, in particular between the executive and the 
legislature, have constantly been brought before the Court. FSC case law 
suggests that it has often legitimised the government’s exercise of powers and 
policies changing the constitutional balance of competences. This interference 
seems to have weakened the Parliament, further strengthened the government, 
and affected the development of the federal structure of the state. 
FSC case law illustrates that the Court started its federalism 
jurisprudence with a very passive view which involved developing the federal 
structure of the state. Indeed, during the first five years of its existence, only a 
handful of federalism-related cases were brought before the Court. Following 
the enactment of the Governorates Law 2008, the number of cases increased 
significantly, mainly because this piece of legislation details the competence of 
the governorates outside the Kurdistan Region, their mutual relations and their 
relationship with the federal authorities. It contains principles and rules that 
either introduce limitations on the extent of the devolution of powers established 
in the 2005 Constitution or are vague about its nature. Faced with this lack of 
clarity concerning constitutional balance and an ambiguous hierarchy of 
relations between federal and sub-federal entities, the federal Parliament 
detailed these constitutionally allocated powers in the Governorates Law 2008. 
Many would argue that this has expanded the federal authorities’ powers at the 
expense of the sub-federal powers. Most of the litigation involving this piece of 
legislation initiated by the governorate authorities sought clarification of rules 
which many considered to contradict the Constitution.886 Their petitions mostly 
present constitutional questions inadequately and fail to address the right 
question regarding the constitutionality of the Governorates Law 2008 in itself, 
whether deliberately or due to their inability to do so.  
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However, in a handful of cases the Court struck down federal 
government policies and decisions that would have limited the extent of the sub-
federal authorities.887 The FSC’s decisions might be seen to have upheld and 
served the federal authorities’ policies and decisions that comply with the 
Governorates Law 2008. Thus, many observers would argue that the Court’s 
decisions serve to protect or recognise the role of the federal Parliament in 
defining and modifying constitutional principles and balance regarding the 
division of powers and relations between the federal government and the 
governorates.888 Perhaps, in doing so, the Court would frequently dismiss cases 
involving this piece of legislation on procedural grounds; avoid decision-
making on substantive issues; and uphold the federal authorities’ broad 
interpretation of the exclusive list of federal competencies.  
Any number of factors might explain such approach. First, following a 
series of compromises in the constitutional drafting negotiations, federalism 
was finally integrated into the Constitution as a system of governance but 
remains one of the most contentious issues in post-2003 Iraq. Therefore, 
implementing the relevant constitutional principles and provisions would 
certainly result in bitter constitutional disputes and would heighten political 
tensions. Second, the FSC judges might not be ready to jeopardize the 
institutional autonomy of their Court by triggering or supporting developments 
upon which politicians and the public are yet to agree. Instead, the Court opted 
to uphold laws and policies which might be considered to do a disservice to 
federalism since they are often supportive of the centralisation of powers in 
federal authorities which is arguably inconsistent with what the Constitution 
establishes. These factors might serve to explain the FSC’s response when the 
federal government amended the Governorates Law in 2013 and expanded the 
powers of the governorates. It supported these policies and still often avoids 
challenging their constitutionality and triggering reforms in this regard. The 
2013 amendments came after a series of national protests and wider demands 
from within communities, including those that once had strongly opposed 
federalism, which involved taking practical steps to establish their federal 
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regions. They also demanded broader powers that would enable them to gain 
control over local policies and resources. Interestingly, a closer reading of the 
FSC’s case law suggests that this might not be a question of the Court’s 
weakness and whether or not it is capable of resolving questions related to 
federalism. Indeed, the Court has the means and the interpretive powers to rule 
on more contentious constitutional issues and disputes namely concerning the 
legislative-executive relations and has frequently done so. 
The FSC has had a similar agenda regarding cases involving legislative-
executive power struggles at the federal level of governance. In general, these 
are the most controversial cases brought before the Court and the most frequent. 
The majority of the FSC’s decisions in such cases can be seen as contributing 
to the concentration of powers in the executive branch. It can be argued that the 
pro-executive approach of the FSC was evidence in cases that had severely 
weakened the accountability function of the Parliament and its oversight powers 
on the government. The case law suggests that the Court’s decisions have served 
to weaken and at times more marginalise the Parliament by severely restricting 
its legislative and oversight powers. For example, in the first Proposal and Draft 
Law (43/2010) ruling, the Court subverted the legislative powers of the 
Parliament to the government. The FSC’s interpretation of and the distinction it 
made between two phrases in the constitutional text (proposal and draft 
legislation), denied Parliament any right to direct legislative initiative. During 
the five years since this ruling, the Court annulled virtually all laws that were 
challenged on these procedural grounds, according to which it would invalidate 
proposed legislation from Parliament bypassing the executive’s approval.889  
The most recent Proposal and Draft Law (21/2015) ruling suggests 
something of a shift in the Court’s approach to Parliament’s legislative powers. 
The Court tried to limit the impact of its previous decision which had put an 
absolute ban on its legislative initiative right. However, it is still too soon to 
assess the impact of this, especially given that there have not been any new cases 
on this issue. A series of judgments have restricted the Parliament from 
questioning the Prime Minister and Ministers.890 Moreover, its infamous 
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decision to submit the independent commissions, even those linked with the 
Parliament, to the Council of Ministers was considered eventually overruling 
the Constitution itself.891 
This research was conducted and set to analyse the case law of the FSC: 
an institution formed prior to the adoption of the 2005 Constitution and has been 
exercising jurisdictions that are stipulated in the 2005 Constitution. Crucially, 
over the last decade, the Court has developed an expanded body of case law. 
Thus, it covers some of the most significant constitutional issues and question 
which seem typical to occur under newly established constitutions in the 
immediate of transition to democracy in post-authoritarian regimes. However, 
so far the FSC’s case law has not been thoroughly analysed from a constitutional 
perspective with a crucial aim: to cover comprehensive variety of subjects and 
questions; most important, a study that set to locate these analyses in a broader 
perspective of theoretical debate. Therefore, the following discussion brings 
together judicialisation and the rule of law, which are the two main theoretical 
debates of this thesis, and in line with the main arguments regarding the case 
law of the FSC of Iraq.      
6.1.3 Judicialisation and the Rule of Law 
This thesis assesses original and detailed analyses of the key case law of 
the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq, in the context of universal constitutional 
principles, such as the rule of law, and modern phenomena, such as the trend 
towards the judicialisation of politics, in the specific circumstances of 
transitional democratic states. The following synthesis illustrates the main 
arguments presented in this thesis. First, it deals with the legitimacy problem of 
courts in transitional democarcies. Secondly, it considers whether there is a 
complementary relationship between the rule of law and judicialisation. Thirdly, 
in contrast, it looks at whether in fact there are challenges to the rule of law 
posed by judicialisation. Finally, it reflects on some implications of the rule of 
law in transitional demcracies.  
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1. The Legitimacy of Courts in Transitional Democarcies 
 
Scholars interested in the role of the courts in developed democracies 
often focus on evaluating the expansion of judicial powers and its implications 
for democracy, and whether unelected institutions can overrule the acts of 
elected bodies.892 In addition to this counter-majoritarian argument, these 
studies concern themselves with the challenges posed by constitutional judicial 
review to the principle of separation of powers. At times, under the rubric of 
constitutional review, the courts not only decide on the constitutionality of 
legislation or intrude into policy areas that by and large might be seen to lie 
outside their jurisdiction, but arguably play the role of constitutional drafters or 
a constitutional assembly, setting up new rules or amending existing ones. As a 
result, by implication or design, judicial rulings may modify the constitutional 
balance of power, expanding the powers of one or more institutions whilst 
limiting those of others.893 This raises the question as to whether the courts 
should expand their jurisdiction and intrude into those policy areas which are 
arguably reserved for the other two political branches.  
Given the nature of the constitutional judiciaries, their jurisdiction, the 
questions they deal with and in some cases their membership, they will always 
be involved in some decisions that are affected by or touch upon the realm of 
politics. Actually, some would argue that what differentiates the constitutional 
judiciary from the ordinary courts is that it is not ‘detached from the gravitation 
field of contention for gaining, exercising and preserving political power’,894 
since virtually every decision which it takes may carry implications for both the 
legal and the political system. For example, in legal terms an annulment decision 
overturns an unconstitutional law but at the same time this can be viewed 
politically as a retrospective defeat of the majority in parliament that passed this 
law.895 In general, the impact of judicialisation is often addressed in terms of 
how it infringes on the constitutional balance and separation of powers, as well 
                                                          
892 Klarman, ‘Majoritarian Judicial Review’; Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial 
Review’. 
893 See e.g. Chapter Five (5.1.1.1 and 5.1.1.2). 
894 Böckenförde, E.-W. (1999). Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. Strukturfragen, Organisation, 
Legitimation [Constitutional Review. Structural Issues, Organization, Legitimacy], Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 44(1): 10-11, (as quoted in Hein, ‘Constitutional Conflicts between 
Politics and Law in Transition Societies’17). 
895 Hein, ‘Constitutional Conflicts between Politics and Law in Transition Societies’17. 
265 
 
as the core of democracy, by allowing an unelected institution to invalidate or 
check the policy and actions of elected branches of the government. 
Some might argue that in analysing the behaviour of the courts from a 
democratic perspective one should also take into consideration the 
circumstances and context within which they operate. As discussed previously, 
some scholars have argeud that judicial review might be considered successful 
under certain conditions that might only be fulfiled in a highly developed 
democarcy, including a fully functioning and indepenet judiciary and political 
system. Certainly, this state of affair is an ideal for any transitional or emerging 
democracy. In other words, given that in developed democracies the judiciary 
is a reasonably independent and respected body, concerns over the impact of 
judicialisation on the independence of the judiciary might not be as serious as 
they are in emerging democracies.  
Moreover, judicialisation that is supported or triggered by an 
independent judiciary that enforces the provisions of the constitution might 
effectively be seen to be acting to preserve the essence of the rule of law by 
preventing or limiting the arbitrary exercise of public power. Conversely, in 
transitional democracies where the political system is often seen to have been 
shaped by the inability of state institutions to function sufficiently, the legal 
system is also shaped by uncertainty and the gap between law in theory and in 
practice is growing ever greater. Thus, there are mounting concerns about the 
independence of the judiciary in situations where their intrusion into politically 
sensitive disputes could endanger them.  
Problems regarding legitimacy may seem irrelevant in the period 
immediately following the transition, for various reasons including those 
mentioned above. The legitimacy issue has been discussed from two points of 
view in the relevant literature. One interpretation focuses on the moment of 
transition, arguing that the legitimacy problems of constitutional judicial review 
often seen irrelevant to the constitution making processes that occur during the 
transition from an authoritarian regime to a constitutional democratic rule. Thus, 
debates largely tend to focus on the extent of and mechanisms for limiting 
parliamentary sovereignty or political powers. Almost all legal systems have 
introduced some form of constitutional judicial review of legislation, but there 
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seems an implicit denial of the legitimacy problem, that suggests ‘constitutional 
courts enjoyed their legitimacy largely by default.’896  
One of the explanations might be that there are somewhat exceptional 
circumstances in countries emerging from authoritarianism that create 
differences between them and the established democracies. These would make 
it plausible to introduce rules, institutions, and practices that might be frequently 
criticised in developed democracies, including judicial review. However, these 
exceptions may serve to hold those in power accountable to the law and to the 
constitutional boundaries of powers.897 In other words, under the rubric of 
constitutional review, these courts are intended to help protect the new 
constitutional order, the transition from formal to substantive rule of law and 
from an illiberal to a more liberal system.898 
Another point of view posits that the arguable ‘exceptionalism’ of the 
circumstances of transitional states should not be seen ‘as a means of side-
stepping the objections that we might raise elsewhere to the institutional 
anomalies of strong judicial review.’899 Of course, there are also serious 
concerns about ‘overemphasising’ the role of the constitutional judiciary and 
the implications of a rapid and substantial judicialisation of constitutional 
issues. As politics becomes increasingly judicialised, the judiciary is inevitably 
at risk of exercising more political influence or even interference as well as 
possibly endangering its independence. Thus, judicialisation might create 
conflicts between strengthening the rule of law and enhancing democracy. This 
is said to have some controversial implications; there are constant concerns that 
legislatures are becoming weaker and more marginalised, so the ‘overemphasis’ 
on the judiciary might ‘help discredit the nascent idea of representation through 
periodic elections. 900 In other words, it can be assumed that, even if initially the 
problem of legitimacy of the courts is largely irrelevant, it may gradually 
                                                          
896 Sadurski, ‘Judicial Review in Central and Eastern Europe’ 507. 
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898 Teitel, ‘Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation’ 2031-2032. 
899 Sadurski, ‘Judicial Review in Central and Eastern Europe’ 513. 
900 Stephen Holmes, ‘Conceptions of Democracy in the Draft Constitutions of Post-Communist 
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become relevant at a later stage in emerging democracies once the institutions 
of democracy are functioning. 
2. A Complementary Relationship Between the Rule of Law and 
Judicialisation  
 
The transition from an authoritarian regime to a constitutional 
democracy often underlines a set of new constitutional principles and rules that 
are intended to put an end to authoritarian rule and set the foundations for a new 
democratic constitutional order. Such a constitution can be said to be largely 
transformative and of crucial importance for empowering the government and 
also the governed, and more importantly for restraining the government. This 
transformative nature requires careful constitutional balance, between legal and 
political continuity and change. Thus, striking such a balance is also relevant in 
resolving the potential conflicts concerning legal continuity and legitimacy of 
the pre-transition laws. Constitutional drafters, who often lack mutual trust and 
are faced with the formidable challenges of the transition would, by implication, 
produce incomplete structures for state institution and ambiguous texts, leaving 
many crucial questions of constitutional importance to be dealt with by 
implementing legislation. Furthermore, often there are some unclear 
distinctions between constitutional and ordinary politics, which could increase 
instances whereby ordinary politics and implementing legislations might 
introduce rules and institutions bypassing the constitution itself.  
Thus, one could challenge the conformity of the constitution itself to the 
basic tenets of the rule of law, and ultimately its ability to guide politicians, 
government and judges, and to strengthen the state of the rule of law and 
democracy. Thus, taken all together these might actually delay or/and obstruct 
the making or enforcing of some crucial state policies and laws. It would 
certainly make it more challenging and time-consuming for politicians and other 
actors who need to compromise and reach agreements on highly contentious 
issues related to the transition.  
This assumes that one of the problematic issues with the former 
authoritarian regime was that the constitution was almost irrelevant. In 
transitional democracies, newly elected or appointed government officials, 
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political actors and individuals would want to make, or least wish to pretend to 
make, the constitution relevant. However, it might seem challenging to evaluate 
any state action against a set of uncompleted, unstable and unclear constitutional 
rules. Thus, they may view the constitutional judiciary as a relatively capable 
authority (with binding and final decisions) able to dispense quicker ‘case by 
case’ settlements of such disputes.901 It is therefore not surprising that in the 
initial periods following the transition, questions with potentially significant 
implications for the entire constitutional order and for society are increasingly 
taken to the courts. It is highly probably that in a context that is shaped by the 
inability or unwillingness of politicians to enforce the constitution, courts will 
be called upon to preserve and enforce the newly established democratic 
constitutional order and enhance the rule of law. Implementing such a 
constitutional text within the challenging context of transitional democracies 
will inevitably test the basic principles of the separation of powers, the rule of 
law, and the constitutional judiciary. It can be inferred from the aforementioned 
observation that constitutional judiciaries seem to be gaining increasing 
relevance within such unstable and changing political and legal systems. 
Thus, it makes sense to consider judicialisation and the rule of law as 
having a complementary relationship since the court may have to judicialise 
certain issues to ensure that the basic rule of law is upheld. It is almost inevitable 
then that the court’s role is of crucial importance in defining and redefining the 
constitutional boundaries of powers, relations and competences of the 
governmental branches and federal entities especially in cases concerning inter-
institutional or inter-governmental relations. Thus, the majority of the cases 
brought before and decided by courts in the early years of transitional 
democracy concern structural constitutional issues that are central to the 
separation of powers and the substance of the specific authorities of the newly 
established state institutions. The Iraqi experience might suggest that questions 
or conflicts regarding rights tend to be less frequent and controversial issues. It 
should be noticed that even making decisions about the formal aspects of the 
rule of law can become a contested issue with implications for the entire legal 
and political system. Therefore, when called upon courts have a crucial role to 
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firstly resolve the conflicts by interpreting the respective constitutional norm; 
secondly, it is anticipated that courts would hold the government and its exercise 
of power accountable to the law once the court has determined its meaning as 
applied to the case in question and in future cases.  
Therefore, it is maintained that judicialisation and the expansion of 
judicial powers may enhance the rule of law regarding the role of the judiciary 
in the arbitration of disputes and in clarifying general rules that guide 
government officials and institutions in exercising their powers. It might serve 
to limit ‘the scope of arbitrariness, ensuring that those who exercise public 
powers respect the boundaries of those powers’,902 thus limiting tyranny and 
attempts to concentrate powers in one branch of government. Submission to the 
jurisdiction of the court, particularly when this could be the final reliable 
alternative to the use of violence, would contribute to the creation of a culture 
which seeks peaceful resolution of conflicts through legal means. Literature has 
shown the challenges and dangers involved following elections if the parties to 
the electoral disputes do not submit to the jurisdiction of the court. For example, 
although there were serious concerns about the FSC’s involvement in the 
constitutional crises following the 2010 election, in particular, the case of the 
Largest Parliamentary Bloc (25/2010), the judiciary was certainly successful in 
resolving the disputes and served to prevent recourse to the use of violence.  
Furthermore, the insights from comparative literature and the FSC case 
law suggest that courts often assume that transition means that the whole legal 
system, both pre- and post- transition legal norms, must conform to the new 
constitution based on the rule of law. Transitional democracies often rely on the 
role of the judiciary, and the legislature initially, to harmonise the entire legal 
system of the previous regime with the post-transition one. It is also said that 
courts often make no distinction between legality and legitimacy, frequently 
supporting the principle of legality and continuity of law, even when the 
legitimacy of the law itself is in question.903 This may occur when judicialisation 
involves the formal elements of the rule of law, where questions with significant 
potential implications brought before the court. Here, the court raises the formal 
rule of law reasoning to try to solve the issue instead of engaging in the 
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substance of the controversy.  It is checking that the government observes legal 
certainty, clarity, stability, and formality when implementing general 
constitutional norms to enact particular laws. Legal continuity in transitional 
states might also prevent ‘lawlessness’, especially in those cases when replacing 
an overruled pre-transition legislation would require an implementing 
legislation that often proves to be extremely difficult to enact. Hence, the court’s 
upholding of the formal rule of law might serve the functions of legal continuity 
and certainty. For example, the FSC’s decision to uphold existing pre-
transitional legislation in cases concerning Islamic law, or in those that are oil- 
and gas-related, suggests that it supported legal continuity and protected the 
existing legal relations without considering the legitimacy of the laws involved. 
These and other similarly highly contested constitutional questions have proven 
to be a difficult task for the legislature to regulate in a way that conforms to the 
new constitution, but until the legislature is in a position to do so, the Court 
seems to continue to uphold the principle of legal continuity.   
3. Some Challenges to The Rule of Law Posed by Judicialisation 
The rule of law and judicialisation can also, however, come in conflict 
with each other. Examining judicialisation through the lens of the rule of law 
may raise substantial concerns that it may threaten or cause violations of the 
rule of law. It can be argued that in states in transition the ‘[mis]use’ of the rule 
of law, especially when combined with ignorance or elimination of its 
substantive values, might enable a government to claim it is conforming to the 
rule of law as a mean of minimising the contestation of its excessive powers. 
On the other hand, in the case study explored here, although the judiciary often 
refrained from intervening in the content of government policies, on those 
occasions when it did engage in such controversial constitutional questions, the 
immediate outcomes and long-term implications were of substantial concern. 
Therefore, addressing or resolving the substance of government policies or laws 
might provoke political interference, undermine judicial independence, and 
bring about counter measures that could infringe on its institutional autonomy. 
Thus, the potential for political pressure and even interference in constitutional 
adjudication should be of great concern. Governments in emerging democracies 
trying to legitimise the arbitary exercise of power may even attempt to remove 
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safeguards, including constitutional judicial review, that try to limit this abuse 
of power. This is partially because the independence of the constitutional 
judiciary operating in the early years of transitional democracy is a much more 
complicated and controversial issue.  
Moreover, it can often be seen that political disputes are transferred into 
constitutional questions and decisions on these would have far reaching political 
and legal implications; thus judges intervening significantly in politically 
sensitive issues might provoke an obvious threat to the court’s independence. 
This might encourage particular institutions or powerful actors to use the 
support of the judiciary to legitimise, institutionalise and hold onto power, using 
it specifically to consolidate their powers. Both the comparative literature and 
this case study suggest that in transitional democracies one government body, 
often the executive branch, and particularly the office of the prime minister or 
the presidency, can become overly powerful, and its relations with and uses of 
the judiciary can raise serious concerns. Furthermore, such judicial involvement 
may present a challenge to a weak parliament trying to establish itself and may 
cause further difficulties, particularly if this results in limiting the legislative 
power.  
One view concerning constitutional adjudication in transitional 
democracies is that courts may overstretch themselves, and start making 
political decisions or enforcing these rather than reviewing the constitutionality 
of political decisions. The threat that the response in such cases might have more 
to do with politics than law might serve to undermine confidence in the rule of 
law system and constitutional litigation. Having said that, it could be argued that 
the rhetoric of the rule of law is one thing, whilst the political reality of the 
constitution is another and resolving constitutionally contested issues cannot be 
based purely on legal texts and their interpretation. Thus, constitutions as well 
as constitutional courts are said by definition to be both political and legal, in 
that courts are often considered the final arbitrator of how constitutions are 
enforced with the possibility that only constitutional amendments, often 
requiring specific procedures, and judges themselves, can change judicial 
interpretations and decisions.  
On the other hand, constitutional judiciaries may also respond to 
political pressure or may attempt to further their powers and influence on a 
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political system by developing controversial methods available to any court, 
including inconsistency in deciding similar cases; applying admissibility, 
standing and jurisdictional rules; deciding or declaring jurisdiction on the 
substance of the constitutional questions brought before them, and overruling 
its own precedents or previous decisions. Equally problematically, it could 
employ inadequate reasoning, or ambiguous and confused wording to suggest 
that it is conscious of its institutional limitations and does not want to allow 
itself to be drawn deeper into highly-charged political disputes or to avoid being 
accused of favouring any particular state institution.904    
In the experience of emerging courts in transitional democracies, the 
implications of each of the above methods might prove controversial. An 
inconsistent approach in deciding similar cases and overruling precedents may 
be part of what is expected from the judiciary when applying legal norms in 
rapidly changing conditions; at times, it might serve to develop constitutional 
jurisprudence and novelty in decision-making. For example, despite a 
considerable degree of inconsistency in handling similar cases and questions, 
the FSC’s decisions served to trigger and support reforms in electoral law by 
consistently striking down unconstitutional legal rules. It can be said that in 
cases concerning the replacement of MPs, the Court did not wait for the 
legislators compromises, but developed, adopted, and added new criteria that 
resulted in further reforms regarding this specific aspect of electoral law.905  
These and similar approaches may or may not serve the independence 
of the court, but they question the supremacy of the law and basic tenets of the 
rule of law on the part of the court itself. It remains unclear in such cases whether 
or not the court is itself guided by rule of law principles in defining the meaning 
of the law in the cases before it, in the relevant sense of independence, equality 
before the law and preservation of the formal criteria of the rules including 
stability, clarity and certainty of its decisions which are essential components of 
the rule of law. A constitution might not be successful in creating a stable 
framework for producing a particular form of legal order, or may be insufficient 
to impose ‘limits on unpredictability’.906 Whenever the court is asked to rule on 
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conflicts of interpretations of (unclear) constitutional norms, litigants expect a 
clear and conclusive interpretation of the contested law that will provide the 
necessary guidance.907 An ambiguous judgment only adds to this uncertainty. 
Similarly, ‘inadequate reasoning’ containing significant gaps and contradictions 
might itself become a source of uncertainty and unpredictability as to what the 
court should do in the future, perhaps creating even greater potential for striking 
down laws on unpredictable grounds.908 Therefore, judgments with overly 
vague and open-ended conclusions raise concerns regarding the legal certainty 
component of the rule of law. 
Another view concerning constitutional courts in transitional states 
might be that courts should be thought of as survivors rather than challengers, 
and may prefer to set out different priorities when interacting with and affecting 
other governmental and political actors. In other words, constitutional courts 
that are seen to be interfering too much in the politics might also increase the 
probability that politicians, by implication, might wish to affect the outcomes of 
constitutional adjudication. These may seem to be somewhat controversial 
arguments but this was evident to a certain extent in the Iraq case study.  In this 
case study, FSC’s judges seem to become self-restraint and in response to 
increasing demands on constitutional adjudication, mainly by the government, 
some of the judgments they issued have provoked criticism that the Court 
interferes too much in politics. This has by implication created political and 
government interference in the judiciary, endangering the rule of law. It was 
reported that immediately following the FSC’s interpretation of the largest 
parliamentary bloc, and also considering its general approach in checking 
parlamentary powers, the Court found itself in a very challenging position. As 
a result, the Parliament rushed to have the second reading of the draft of the 
implementing legislation for the new FSC. More crucially, the leader of the 
winning electoral list, whose party was seen to have lost the opportunity to form 
a new government as a result of the FSC’s interpretation in this case, challenged 
the existence and constitutionality of the FSC itself and the interpretative 
jurisdiction that it exercises.  
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4.  Implications of the Rule of Law in Transitional Democracies 
It is generally agreed in the literature that the rule of law is a complex 
and contested concept concerning the supremacy of the law on both governors 
and governed, limiting and preventing the arbitrary exercise of public power. 
Beyond that, scholarship is divided regarding what qualities the law must have 
to limit arbitrary power and how the rule of law should approach that. It can be 
argued that some of the theoretical aspects and questions associated with the 
role of the rule of law and its institutions that have been analysed largely in the 
context of the more established and developed democracies, have not yet 
emerged in transitional settings. Arguably, analyses of the role and implications 
of the increasing rise in judicialisation of constitutional questions in relation to 
the functioning of the rule of law and democracy, especially the problem of the 
legitimacy of courts, might be of relevance here.   
It is also generally agreed that the realisation of the various principles 
and practices associated with the rule of law might vary considerably from a 
reasonably well-developed democracy to that of an emerging transitional 
democracy. It can be said that where the political and legal system are broadly 
functioning, the rule of law often refers to a broader and more substantive 
understanding in which the formal principles and practices have largely been 
established and the focus then would mainly be on recognising the implications 
of the substantive attributes of the rule of law. However, in a transitional or 
emerging democracy with a legacy of authoritarian rule, might the rule of law 
be understood and approached differently? The literature on and the wider 
experiences of transitional states illustrate that the transition from an 
authoritarian to a constitutional democratic system is increasingly understood 
also as ‘a transition’ from the rule by law system to a state based on the rule of 
law. Thus, in such a transitional setting not only is it anticipated that power is 
exercised on the basis of democratic principles and practices, but that it is also 
crucially important that such exercises of public power and broader political 
system need to ‘be implemented lawfully and within the framework of the 
constitution not vice versa’.909 Thus, it is generally observed that a transition 
and the establishment of new constitutional and legal bases coincides with both 
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aiming to empower and more crucially restrain new elected and appointed 
government institutions.  
There may generally be two perspectives to ‘the rule of law in 
transition’: the formalistic one that emphasises legal continuity and certainty, 
the other much more broadly based aspect concerns ‘substantive justice’. Thus, 
most post-transition constitutions include, at least in theory, the substantive 
understanding of the rule of law. But for many reasons including the incomplete 
and uncertain nature of the political and legal systems, combined with a set of 
incompetent state institutions, formal guarantees and the demand for substantive 
attributes are necessarily in conflict. It can be generally observed that the 
societies in post-conflict transition, and to some extent the international actors 
that support and assist the rule of law reforms in those societies, primarily work 
toward establishing and strengthening the basic, often formal, tenets of the rule 
of law before considering more substantive accounts. With a constant demand 
for clarifying the functioning of the newly established structure for the 
distribution of powers, the formal rule of law may also become the central focus 
of constitutional judiciaries in transitional democracies.  
Courts often refrain from deciding on substantive issues and the content 
of government policies and laws, checking instead how these were made. This 
might be because there are still concerns regarding the basic tenets of the rule 
of law, the supremacy of the law and the equality, certainty, stability and clarity 
of the general principles and rules according to which particular laws are 
enacted. It may also be that introducing and institutionalising substantive 
matters, such as rights, for instance, might not serve its purpose of restraining 
the substance of the government policies if these are not going to be respected.  
Of course, one cannot underestimate the importance of such accounts of 
the rule of law. But there is also a risk that reformers, the government, and the 
constitutional judiciary have a tendency to overestimate the use of the formal 
rule of law. Thus, it can be argued that in fragile, transitional democracies, the 
government’s use of the formal rule of law in the absence or ignorance of its 
substantive values might enable it to claim conformity with the rule of law or it 
might be seen as such. It seems controversial to undermine or ignore the 
relevance and importance of the substantive rule of law in transitional states, 
since the persistent focus on the formal rule of law by a government might 
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threaten the rule of law and the democratic transition itself. This is an important 
point given that the executive branch is often powerful and tends to consolidate 
its own power by bypassing the constitutional balance and principle of 
separation of powers. In doing so, the executive may violate or threaten to 
violate the rule of law, and may also frequently have recourse to constitutional 
adjudication to legitimise such exercises, arguing on the basis of conformity to 
the (formal) rule of law in order to hold onto power and avoid this being 
contested. 
One possible explanation is that constitutional courts often have 
substantial powers, enjoy significant (formal) independence and the political 
system within which they operate is often shaped by the inability of state 
institutions to solve internal power-struggles and conflict or some of them may 
take counter measures against the judiciary; under such circumstances the courts 
might be increasingly willing to interfere in political conflicts. Another view 
might be that the constitutions empower courts with substantial jurisdictions and 
fundamental guarantees that protect their independence from the government 
and broader political actors; however, in practice there are serious allegations 
of government or politicians interfering with and even influencing them. This 
would be even more likely in cases where there is widespread corruption and 
constitutional culture is also seen, by and large, to be weak. 
Overall, one could choose to reconsider the current scholarly debates on 
the role of the rule of law since these suggest that constitutional lawyers and 
practitioners seem to have taken the formal rule of law for granted and focused 
on controversial questions of substantive understandings of the rule of law. 
Furthermore, it is increasingly becoming evident that when the rule of law is not 
considered to be integral or to have great relevance in a transition from an 
authoritarian regime toward a constitutional democracy this often poses great 
challenges to the transition itself. It leads to the creation of states of (un)rule of 
law in which some aspects of electoral democracy are seen to develop, but 
emerging powerful actors are often accused of bypassing constitutional balance 
of powers and the rule of law.  
Another concluding view might be that constitutions in transitional 
democracies are largely transformative, and the law and the political system are 
largely unstable and changing. Thus, constitutional adjudication and decisions 
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may often reflect that transformative situation. Furthermore, some would be of 
the opinion that the interaction between politics, law and judicialisation plays a 
substantive role in establishing the rule of law system during the transition to 
democracy. A constitutional judiciary operating in a transitional state often 
faces increasing demands and is increasingly willing to continue to influence 
state policy. On the other hand, there is a risk that the more the court becomes 
involved in addressing and resolving sensitive political areas, the greater the 
potential for counter measures that might infringe upon its institutional 
autonomy. When this tension is combined with severe indictments that a court 
is siding with a powerful state institution or a particular political branch, putting 
in question its relation with the other political branches, a court may lose its 
ability to check government excesses, posing a threat to the rule of law. This 
might require courts to reconsider the nature of their role in emerging 
constitutional democracies and the problem of legitimacy of the courts might 
gradually gain importance in emerging democracies once the institutions of 
democracy are reasonably functioning. 
6.2 A Prospective View on the FSC and Future Studies  
Any thoughts about how the FSC’s functions might transform over the 
long term remain largely hypothetical. What challenges is the Court likely to 
face and how will it operate in the future? How long will it be before a new 
constitutional court is established? Will the Court continue to be largely self-
restrained and selective regarding the cases which it decides to rule on? What 
contribution will it make to transitional democracy?   
6.2.1 A Prospective View on the Future of the FSC 
As an institution and in terms of its functions the FSC is in transition. A 
decade after it came into operation, the institutional structure and identity of the 
constitutional judiciary as established in the 2005 Constitution remain an 
unresolved challenge. Indications suggest that the current pre-constitutional 
court is not going to be replaced by a new court any time soon. The latest 
reading, in May 2015, of the draft new Law of the FSC by the Iraqi Parliament 
has left significant questions unresolved due to deep divisions and 
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disagreements regarding the composition of FSC, and the nature of its powers. 
The issue is more political than legal, and there seems no hope of compromise 
concerning this crucial and controversial piece of legislation at this stage.  
The most controversial issue likely to pose a challenge for the new FSC 
is the inclusion of non-judges within the Court’s membership and their powers. 
If the power of veto is granted to non-judge members of the FSC, namely 
Islamic jurists, this would hinder the Court’s functioning and open it up to 
external interference. Different religious institutions would participate in the 
nomination process and would later be involved in or influence the approach of 
such jurists and their constitutional interpretations. This would also open up a 
largely secular legal system to the dominance of religious rules. There are still 
strong calls from some legislators to secure ‘consensus’ as the basis for 
decision-making within the court which some might see as undermining the 
judicial nature of the FSC, hindering its operation, and politicising the Court. It 
might also endanger the independence and impartiality of the Court given the 
context within which it operates, and knowing that the Court would need to be 
staffed in accordance with the ethno-sectarian division within Iraqi society.  
Furthermore, determining the powers of the Chief Justice, who is the 
head of the highest judicial institutions (namely, the Higher Judicial Council 
and the Federal Supreme Court) would pose another challenge. Critics might 
argue that whilst having one person as the head of these key judicial institutions 
helps to maintain coherence within the higher institutions of the judiciary, it 
may also personalise the federal judiciary as a result of one person monopolizing 
judicial powers, in particular given that many have reservations about his 
relationship with the executive authority.  
The Court lacks the power to review the constitutionality of contested 
laws per se, or in an ex-officio capacity to initiate proceedings against a 
seemingly unconstitutional law, instead being bound by the content and 
questions addressed in the petition. In practical terms, the FSC lacks the 
competence to invalidate a contested law which is clearly unconstitutional even 
when it expresses that indirectly within the judgment. Having the initiative to 
review the constitutionality of an act or legislation in a case brought before the 
FSC, even when it is not explicitly asked to review this, could overcome that 
problem.  
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On the other hand, the current pre-constitutional FSC has been operating 
in the extraordinary context of the transition to democracy. Iraq’s post-2003 
political system remains fragmented and political branches still experience 
challenges in exercising their constitutional powers. These are the result of the 
difficulties associated with the transition and consociational democracy and 
reflect division, instability and the uncertainty of the political system. All of 
these may limit the government’s court-curbing policies and provide greater 
opportunities for contestation and dispute, and, therefore, may facilitate a 
greater degree of judicialisation. Although its performance and involvement in 
constitutional contestations has increased considerably over the period covered 
by this study, the Court is yet to develop a strong accountability function. There 
is potential for it to continue as a self-restrained and deferential court in matters 
that are deeply contested among political parties and groups. It is likely to 
continue taking a similar approach to handling questions of Islamic law. 
As an institution of horizontal accountability, it can be argued that the 
FSC is expected to possess the ability and competence to hold government 
officials and institutional actors to account; however actually doing so might 
endanger the Court’s independence and draw it further into political conflicts. 
There are indications that the Court might further minimise the implications of 
some of its most controversial and widely criticized decisions. For example, the 
FSC has over time limited the implications of its earlier decisions in cases 
involving the legislative powers of the Parliament from almost disregarding any 
legislative right to that of preventing, in certain matters, legislative initiatives 
from Parliament.  
6.2.2 Future Studies  
In light of the literature reviewed during this research and building on 
the conclusions of this study, future research could usefully examine the 
following issues.   
First, studies may investigate the conditions and factors under which 
judicialisation serve the rule of law and democratization. The courts in such 
contexts have been asked to deal with large quantities of diverse issues decisive 
for transition, beyond the usual call placed on their counterparts in more 
established democracies. Research into the expansion of judicial powers could 
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focus more on questions of legitimacy in relation to court independence, 
accepting constitutional judicial review as it is, and acknowledging that it has 
been integral part of emerging democracies. This research does not address the 
point at which judicialisation in transitional contexts becomes a threat to a 
representative democracy, and therefore future research could address 
legitimacy questions concerning whether and how unelected judges are better 
placed than elected legislators in identifying and making decision about 
constitutional issues.   
Second, the present analysis of the experience of emerging 
constitutional adjudication in Iraq found less evidence of a rights-oriented court 
and there is a clear lack of rights-related litigation, despite the fact that legal and 
judicial institutions, intended to protect and challenge human rights violation, 
are well established by the constitution. There is increasingly frequent allegation 
of violations of constitutional rights as a result of past and present legislation 
and state actions; this might provide an opportunity structure for constitutional 
adjudication in the form of disputes. Further studies could look at the potential 
for and obstacles to rights litigation and judicial creation of individual rights and 
empowerment of marginalised minorities. New research could also further 
develop the support structure arguments, by exploring the interaction between 
FSC and existing civil society organisations or broader support structures in 
protecting constitutional rights; their use of litigation and legal means to support 
democratic transition and hold government to account for violating the 
constitution and, for example, in corruption cases.   
Third, individual judges as decision makers and their preferences were 
not the primary concern of this study for reasons explained previously. Future 
studies could look at this aspect of the FSC and its impact on the accountability 
function of the Court. Special focus could be placed on the role of the Chief 
Justice, and the fact that changes of regime, constitutional and legal rules, and 
institutions did not parallel changes in the judges sitting on the court. This could 
include judges’ role regarding legal and political continuity, the impact of 
transitional justice mechanisms with particular focus on how the Court has used 
and been affected by de-Baathification laws. 
 Fourth, this research has provided significant insights into the role of 
the courts in legislative–executive power struggles, and also highlighted various 
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problems that merit further consideration. From a comparative perspective, 
research could focus more specifically on the role courts play in executive-
legislative power struggles from both procedural and substantive perspectives, 
and their impact on the development of the constitutional order at the initial 
stages of democratization. 
Fifth, although this thesis addresses some key issues regarding the FSC’s 
jurisprudence in issues involving Islamic law, this research indicates that there 
is a need for future comparative studies to analyse the role and position of the 
constitutional judiciary in reviewing the conformity of legislation and 
government acts with Islamic law in countries that entrust courts with such a 
task. This could entail addressing the different developments with respect to 
courts with a mixed membership of Islamic jurists and judges, and others 
consisting of judges only. It is still unclear to what extent non-judge members 
of the FSC may affect this issue. Comparative research of this kind therefore is 
important, in particular given the recent trend in majority Islamic countries 
where their transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic systems have 
been accompanied by greater interest in incorporating Islamic law into their 
constitutions. 
To conclude, studying the factors that account for the expansion of 
judicial power and influence, and its potential implications, by bringing together 
both theory and practice regarding judicialisation and the rule of law system in 
transitional democracies (whether focusing on a single case study or taking a 
comparative approach), would make a significant contribution to a greater 
understanding of the interplay of politics and law in general, and the role and 
position of courts in the democratization process in particular.
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